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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the security of Japan's sea lines of communication (SLOC) from 
the pre-war period to 2003. It is the first major study to address Japan's SLOC security 
concerns in a wide-ranging context, comprising economic policy, diplomacy, law 
. enforcement, alliance relations and defence policy. However, the core interest of the 
study is in Japan's approach to military security and the impact that the vulnerability of 
Japan's sea lanes, as perceived by its decision-makers, has had upon strategy and 
defence policy. 
The importance of SLOC to Japan's security since its industrialisation reflects a 
combination of the country ' s arc hi pelagic geography, poor resource allocation and the 
large distances separating it from its primary suppliers of energy, raw materials and 
food. These unchanging fundamentals have ensured that Japanese policy-makers have 
consistently viewed the security of sea lanes as "a matter of life and death". Two 
questions drive the study. The first concerns how Japan's vulnerability to the disruption 
of its sea lanes has defined its perceived security imperatives and choices in defence and 
alliance policy since 1940. The second concerns how Japan's vulnerability to SLOC 
disruption has been used instrumentally, as a rationale to legitimise domestically and 
internationally controversial military activities in the post-1945 period. 
During the Second World War, which Japan in large part entered in order to gain control 
of overseas natural resources, the country's latent vulnerability to naval blockade was 
exposed and military pressure applied to its SLOC helped to accelerate its defeat. In the 
post-war era of constitutional defence constraints, Japanese policy-makers' concerns 
about increased national vulnerability accruing from the vast expansion of Japan's 
overseas trade favoured the use of non-military responses, such as stock-piling and 
diplomacy aimed at securing cooperation from those coastal states astride its major 
seaborne supply routes. At the same time, concerns about the military aspects of SLOC 
security provided an impetus for forming an alliance with the United States in 1951 and 
for the establishment and incremental build-up of the Maritime Self Defense Forces 
(MSDF) since 1954. In the 1980s, 'sea lane defence ' rose to the top of the agenda of 
bilateral defence cooperation with the United States, playing a major role in the 
modernisation of Japan' s maritime defence capabilities and its deepening military 
integration within US strategy in the late Cold War period. While the rationale for sea 
lane defence disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan has faced both a 
more disparate and more plausible set of challenges and potential threats to its SLOC 
from state- and non-state actors in the post-Cold War era. 
This thesis argues that the strategic imperative of SLOC security, for economic, defence 
and foreign policy choices , has essentially remained constant for Japan throughout the 
period of study. This is despite the changes that have occurred to Japan's threat 
perceptions and the pronounced differences between post-1945 and pre-1945 approaches 
and attitudes to 1nilitary security. It is further argued that the official emphasis in post-
war defence policy on the vulnerability of SLOC and the role of the MSDF and alliance 
cooperation in securing maritime transportation can be fully accounted for only by 
understanding its instrumental use as a rationale to justify contentious aspects of military 
security. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the security of Japan's sea lines of communication (SLOC) from 
1940 to 2003. It is the first study to do so in a comprehensive way. The thesis proposes 
and tests the claim that a focus on SLOC can offer particular insights into Japanese 
security imperatives and decisions in this period. It identifies significant imperatives 
defining policy continuity despite points of departure in Japan's overall security stance. 
Backgound. 
Japanese officials and analysts have described the security of Japan's sea lanes as "a 
matter of life and death"1. Indeed, Japan has an obvious strategic interest in maintaining 
the safety of merchant traffic. First, Japan is an island nation and has been reliant on 
shipping to transport most bulk materials and manufactured goods in and out of the 
country since industrialisation in the late 19th century. Second, despite having the 
world's second-largest industrial economy and a population approaching 127 million, it 
possesses limited mineral resources and arable land. Import dependence is marked 
across a range of strategic commodities such as oil (99 per cent), iron ore (99 per cent) 
and copper (96 per cent). Many of its basic energy, raw material and food requirements 
must be met through imports, for which shipping remains the only commercially viable 
mode of transportation. 
A combination of its archipelagic geography, poor resource allocation and the large 
dista'.nces separating it from its primary suppliers of energy, raw materials and food has 
accentuated the importance of shipping to Japan's security, despite its comparatively 
modest trade-to-GDP weighting. Japan depends particularly on sea lanes connecting it 
with the oil terminals in the Gulf, from which it draws nearly all its oil, and other 
shipping routes connecting it with mineral resources from the Indian Ocean basin, 
Australasia, Southeast Asia and North America. While 'self-help' economic policy 
measures such as stockpiling, austerity controls and substitution have the capacity to 
reduce the disruption caused by a halt to seaborne imports, any prolonged interruption of 
Japan's maritime transportation networks would undermine both industrial production 
and the government's ability to provide for the basic welfare of the population. 
Furthermore, in the event that Japan was threatened with military aggression, trans-
1 For example, see Advisory Group on Defense Issues , The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability 
of Japan , Japanese Government Translation, GM:3338- , August 12, 1994, p 22; and Yoshida Manabu, 
'Resources , Maritime Transport and SLOC Security', in Malcolm J Kennedy and Michael J. O ' Connor, 
Safely By Sea, University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 1990, p 36; and Hayashizaki Chiaki : 
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Pacific SLOC would be vital to military reinforcement from the United States, which 
has retained forces in Japan since 1945. 
Conceptual orientation of the study. 
This thesis considers Japan's efforts to minimise its exposure to the threat of seaborne 
supply disruptions within a 'comprehensive security' context, connecting disparate 
policy fields such as trade relations, industrial policy, energy policy and diplomacy. 
However, the core research interest is in military security and the impact that the 
vulnerability of Japan's sea lanes, as perceived by its decision-makers, has had upon 
strategy and defence policy. 
Specifically, the thesis seeks to answer: 
• How has Japan's vulnerability to the disruption of its sea lanes defined its perceived 
security imperatives and choices in defence and alliance policy since 1940, 
particularly in terms of decision-makers' responses to changing strategic 
circumstances? 
• How has Japan's vulnerability to SLOC disruption been used instrumentally, as a 
rationale to legitimise politically or constitutionally problematic military activities in 
the post-war period? 
Two wider concerns inform these questions. The first is the influence which Japan's 
'strategic geography' has had on decision-makers throughout the study period. Strategic 
geography, for the purposes of this thesis, is defined as the influence on a nation's 
defence and foreign policy, as well as its threat perceptions, resulting from its 
geographic location relative to the global distribution of resources and military 
capabilities. 
Japan's security is usually approached in terms of the discontinuity between the pre- and 
post-1945 policy-making environment -- often thought of as a cultural shift -- as 
constitutional defence constraints and the orientation of national priorities towards 
mercantile goals replaced military government and an imperial security paradigm. The 
legacy of the pre-1945 period is normally approached in terms of Japan's ability "to face 
the issue of war responsibility" as the key political issue confronting its post-war 
'Retired Admiral on Post-Cold War MSDF Strategy', Securitarian, November 1996, pp 15-19, in FBIS-
JST-96-053 , November 1, 1996. 
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security policy, leading to its description as a "handicapped" state2. In my view, a 
disjunction between Japan's pre-war and post-war political systems, security institutions 
and structures has obscured the fact that a significant continuity has been maintained, 
throughout the study period (including between its Cold War and post-Cold War 
phases), in the way that 'strategic geography ' has shaped Japan's decision-makers ' 
threat perceptions and strategic policy preferences. 
The second concern pertains to Japan's actual security policy decision-making process. 
The various individual and institutional domestic actors shaping post-war policy include 
the prime minister, cabinet, the Liberal Democratic Party and opposition parties, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the 
uniformed officers of the SDF. In addition to domestic actors, the United States has also 
played a highly influential role in shaping Japan's security affairs since 1945, both at the 
level of formal alliance linkages and through the close ties between the US and Japanese 
armed forces and 'navy-to-navy' relations in particular. The dynamics of this post-war 
decision-making process are identified via a framework presented in Chapter Four, 
which approaches policy at the three levels of Japan's strategic interaction within the 
international system, domestic politics and alliance linkages. It is widely assumed that 
for most of the post-war period the US-Japan Alliance has functioned as a 'prism', 
filtering interaction between the systemic pressures and domestic constraints that define 
the parameters of Japan's security policy. However, I argue in later chapters that 
strategic pressures in the form of uncertainty about the regional security environment, 
especially concerning China and No11h Korea, have led Japanese policy-makers to adopt 
a more independently 'realist' -- that is systemic, balance of power-based -- set of 
perceptions about potential security threats within Japan's regional security environment 
than is commonly accepted. (This point is briefly developed further in the outline of 
Chapters Seven and Eight, below). 
It is surpns1ng no maJor English-language study of Japan's sea lane security has 
appeared in the voluminous body of literature dedicated to Japan' s security and defence 
policy. Two Japanese books on sea lanes were published in the 1980s, when 'sea lane 
defence' rose to the top of the political agenda in US-Japan alliance relations , following 
Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko ' s May 1981 staten1ent that Japan would undertake "to 
defend several hundred miles of surrounding waters and the sea lanes to a distance of 
1,000 nautical miles". Both of these texts concentrated on the issue of Japan' s 
2 Kosaka Masataka, 'Diplomacy and Secmity in the Twenty-first Century', Japan Echo, Winter 1996, p 6. 
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prospective role in defence cooperation with the United States during the 1980s, within a 
general discussion of the strategic aspects of Japan's import dependence3. James Auer' s 
history of Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritinie Forces, 1945-71, and Peter 
Woolley' s Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000, provide a wealth of 
information on the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF), Japan's de facto post-war 
navy, including the emphasis attached to defending sea lanes. Linton Wells' 1975 
doctoral thesis explores Japan's maritime strategic interests on a broader footing, but on 
a more restricted time-scale4. The importance attached to securing a stable supply of 
natural resources within Japan's foreign and economic policies has also been 
highlighted, for example, in Chapman, Drifte and Gow's study of Japan's Quest for 
Comprehensive Security5 . However, no academic study of significant length has been 
undertaken to assess how Japan's sea lane security relates to the broader context of 
defence policy or national strategy over successive periods -- wherein lies the original 
contribution of this thesis6. 
Approach. 
The thesis adopts a historical narrative approach as the method most suited to testing the 
hypothesis that long-term strategic continuity is demonstrable in Japanese security 
policy-makers' perceptions and responses, despite the post-war redefinition of domestic 
political institutions, structural economic change and fluidity in Japan's international 
systemic environment. However, the order of chapters is not merely chronological. In 
particular, Chapters One and Two are broader in scope and establish an empirical and 
theoretical context for the remaining six chapters dedicated to Japan's SLOC security 
which follow. Primary research material used in this thesis is drawn from Japanese and 
English-language documentary sources. I also conducted over 30 interviews in English 
and Japanese with officials and security analysts in Japan, Indonesia and Australia 
between 1999 and 2002. Field work in Japan was carried out with the support of a 
Japanese Ministry of Education research scholarship from October 1997 to March 1999, 
under the supervision of Professor Watanabe Akio, formerly of Aoyama Gakuin 
University and Professor Soeya Yoshihide of Keio University. I undertook a second 
research visit to Tokyo in February/March 2002, to update material to account for new 
3 Murai Shigeru, Shiiren: Umi no Boeisen ('Sea Lanes : Defence Lines of the Sea'), NHK, Tokyo, 1983; and 
Oga, Ryohei . Shiiren no Hiniitsu ('Sea Lane Secrets'), Shobunsha, Tokyo, 1983. 
4 Linton Wells II, The Sea and Japan 's Strategic Interests 1975-1985, John Hopkins University PhD thesis, 
Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1975. 
5 John W. M. Chapman, Reinhard Drifte, and Ian T. M. Gow, Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security: 
Defence, Diplomacy, Dependence. Frances Pinter, London, 1983. 
6 Consideration of the above-mentioned texts and other secondary sources covering Japan's security and 
defence policies is integrated within the arguments developed within each separate chapter rather than in the 
form of a dedicated literature review. 
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developments in Japan's security policy since 19997 . Japanese names in the main body 
of the text are cited surname first, according to the Japanese convention. With the 
exception of personal names, vessel names, book, press and article titles Japanese terms 
cited in the text are italicised but not capitalised, except where cited in bibliographic 
references. While a comprehensive definition of SLOC is contained in Chapter Two, for 
the purposes of this study, 'sea lane security' and 'SLOC security' are used 
interchangeably. All dollar-figures quoted are in US dollars. 
Thesis structure. 
Chapters One and Two set the subsequent six chapters, dealing chronologically with 
Japan's SLOC security from 1940 to 2003, into empirical and theoretical context. 
Chapters Three to Five examine the pre-1945 period (Chapter Three), the 1945-77 
period (Chapter Four) and the late-Cold War period from the late 1970s to 1990 
(Chapter Five). Chapter Six assesses Japan sea lane diplomacy from the early 1970s to 
early 2003. Rapid changes to the global security environment since September 11, 2001 
have hastened a transformation of Japan's own security policy stance under the 
administration of Prime Minister Koizu1ni Junichiro that was already under way. This is 
of an intensity not seen since Nakasone Yasuhiro's premiership in the mid-1980s. The 
effect of such changes under Koizumi is addressed in chapters Seven and Eight, which 
deal with Japan's sea lane security in the post-Cold War era until February 2003. 
In more detail, Chapter One profiles Japan's import dependence -- the underlying reason 
why the security of Japan's SLOC is perceived as a core strategic concern. It analyses 
the features of the global distribution of resources and the structure of Japan's industrial 
economy that have brought about exceptionally high levels of dependence on imported 
fuels, raw materials and food, and a coITesponding requirement to export manufactured 
goods in order to fund imports. As well as profiling the extent of Japan's import 
dependence in key sectors, the chapter analyses the potential that exists for self-help 
measures, such as stockpiling, i·esource substitution and diversification, to reduce 
Japan's economic vulnerability and any temptation to compensate for this through 
increased military preparedness. The chapter suggests that despite such measures and 
long-term trends that point to a lessening of Japan's future import requirements, 
seaborne trade is likely to continue to be perceived within Japan as vital not only for 
maintaining wealth, but to sustaining basic economic activity and human survival. The 
major sea lanes and chokepoints used to convey Japan's overseas trade are also 
7 On that occasion, I interviewed JDA officials, serving and former MSDF officers , Coast Guard officials, 
analysts and representatives from the shipping industry. 
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identified and profiled, together with an analysis of re-routing options and estimates of 
the additional shipping costs they would generate. 
Chapter Two defines the concept of SLOC, by tracing its ong1ns with reference to 
classical theories of sea power developed around the tum of the 20th century and the 
stress these placed on the control of maritime communications. The chapter then 
examines how such concepts were reshaped by changes in military technology as borne 
out by the Atlantic and Pacific anti-shipping offensives of the two world wars. Next, the 
evolution of SLOC security is examined during the Cold War, concerning Western plans 
to defend Atlantic and Pacific SLOC from Soviet interdiction. The chapter then 
explores the widening definition of SLOC security often applied since the end of the 
Cold War, which includes a wide-ranging set of economic, military, law enforcement, 
diplomatic, non-state and environmental concerns. 
Chapter Three reveals how the country's opening up by foreign naval powers in the 
1850s and rapid industrialisation brought a new dependence on maritime transportation. 
It shows that the drive to secure a captive resource base in Asia, in order to lessen the 
leverage of Western powers (particularly that of the United States over its oil supplies) 
helped to determine the grand strategy of Japan's imperial expansion. The objective of 
gaining control of Southeast Asia's natural resources partly as a solution to Western 
energy sanctions ultimately motivated Japan to attack the United States and Great 
Britain in December 1941. However, the associated strategic vulnerability of seaborne 
imports in transit was not adequately appreciated until exposed by the Allied anti-
shipping campaign of 1943-45. The chapter shows that the pre-1945 period is still 
relevant to understanding Japan's contemporary SLOC security because it is the only 
case study of a fully fledged attempt to cut off its seaborne supply routes. As post-war 
assessments by the Japanese government revealed, the wartime blockade was a major --
if still um·ecognised -- factor in Japan's defeat. Furthermore, the trauma of the 'war of 
the maru' (the destruction of Japan's merchant fleet) and the failure of the Imperial 
Navy adequately to defend merchant shipping continues to resonate, in terms of Japan's 
popularly perceived vulnerability to supply disruptions and institutionally within the 
MSDF in terms of the priority accorded to sea lane defence. 
Chapter Four locates Japan's sea lane security from 1945-77 in the context of sweeping 
changes to Japan's strategic and domestic circumstances arising from defeat, occupation, 
the onset of the Cold War and the radical effect these had upon the approach of post-war 
governments to the issues of security and defence. A framework of analysis governing 
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this and subsequent chapters is developed, identifying the major variables of Japan' s 
defence and security policy-making environment at three levels: systemic/strategic, 
alliance links and domestic politics. The chapter shows that despite radical policy 
departures from the pre-war period, Japan's maritime geography and resource 
distribution ensured that continuity was maintained in policy-makers' perceptions of the 
country's potential vulnerability to a disruption of maritime transportation. This concern 
grew as Japan's imported resource needs expanded in line with economic growth and 
increasing reliance on Middle Eastern oil shipped via the narrow and congested Straits 
of Malacca. The chapter argues that notwithstanding constitutional constraints on 
defence capability and responses to political pressures within the US-Japan Alliance, 
Japanese policy-makers' own perceptions of the vulnerability of Japan's sea lanes 
helped to shape their decisions at the level of alliance and defence policy. The chapter 
also considers the influence over Japan's defence policy exercised at a transnational 
level, via navy-to-navy links between the MSDF and the US Navy. 
Chapter Five analyses the decision-making process that propelled sea lane defence to the 
forefront of Japan's defence policy and alliance relations during the 1980s. Building 
from the framework for analysing Japan's post-1945 security outlined in the preceding 
chapter, it argues that Japan's involvement in sea lane defence was, a priori, a reaction 
to pressure from Washington's post-Vietnam determination to shift more of the burden 
of defence to regional allies. However, the chapter also demonstrates that Japan's 
increasing integration as a military partner in US global strategy reflected Japanese 
policy-makers' independent concerns about the build-up of Soviet maritime forces in the 
I 
Soviet Far East and a perceived decline in the relative power of the United States. 
Existing concerns about the vulnerability of Japanese shipping routes, honed by the 
memory of the wartime blockade, the oil crises of the 1970s and attacks on Japanese 
tankers in the Gulf during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War lent weight to the concept of sea 
lane defence as a rationale to persuade politicians, the business elite and a sceptical 
public and political opposition · of the need to develop closer alliance defence 
cooperation and to modernise the SDF' s capabilities. The elastic spatial definition of sea 
lanes also gave supporters of an extra-territorial defence role for the MSDF and Air Self 
Defense Forces (ASDF) the flexibility to expand the geographical boundaries of Japan's 
self-defence zone without directly confronting the proscriptions against overseas 
dispatch and collective self-defence, which have constrained where, how and with whom 
the SDF can operate. 
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Chapter Six explores Japan's diplomatic efforts to maintain navigational access and 
safety in geographically removed sea lanes. It focuses on Southeast Asia as a crucial 
case study, reflecting the fact that nearly half of Japan's imports and exports are shipped 
via chokepoint waterways in the region, including nearly all its oil. The chapter 
examines official and private-level Japanese initiatives since the early 1970s and 
concentrates on efforts to preserve freedom of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and 
Indonesia's arc hi pelagic waters as well as the transportation of Japan's nuclear fuel and 
waste through the region. It argues that Japan's mixed formal and informal approach 
has been largely successful at balancing its interests in upholding navigational safety 
standards and maintaining legally unencumbered access to regional sea lanes on one 
hand, while addressing coastal states' concerns about sovereignty, environmental risk 
and cost-sharing on the other. 
Chapters Seven and Eight evaluate how Japan's sea lane security has evolved since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 abruptly ended the rationale for sea lane defence, 
based on a potential Soviet threat to Japan's SLOC linked to scenarios for superpower 
conflict. Chapter Seven is divided into two sections. The first provides an overview of 
changes that have occuned within Japan's post-Cold War defence and security policies, 
arguing that the end of the Cold War has been accompanied by a rise in 'realist' 
perceptions of Japan's security environment on the part of policy-makers . and analysts, 
reflecting awareness of a more diffuse set of state and non-state-level security concerns 
as well as strategic uncertainty. This shift is then examined in terms of specific threats 
potentially posed to Japan's sea lanes. Section Two introduces the first of two case 
studies in Japan's post-Cold War SLOC security, dealing with the non-state threats 
posed by maritime tenorism-at-sea and piracy, and builds on the general profile of these 
factors given in Chapter Two. The chapter also identifies ways in which such concerns 
have been employed partly as pretexts for the exploration of new security roles for the 
SDF and the Japan Coast Guard, and the pursuit of security cooperation with the United 
States and various states along Asia's coastal periphery. 
Chapter Eight explores potential conventional military threats to Japan's SLOC in the 
post-Cold War era, focussing on China and North Korea. China is seen in Japan as the 
most important state-level variable bearing on Japan's SLOC, reflecting its status as a 
party to sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, its 
geographically dominant position along East Asia's coastal periphery, its growing 
economic and political influence in the region, and its ongoing military and naval 
modernisation programme. This chapter analyses perceptions among security policy-
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makers (in China as well as Japan) in as far as these relate specifically to sea lanes and 
draws conclusions about how these are influencing the strategic dynamic of Sino-
Japanese relations. The chapter reveals that underlying much of the contemporary 
interest in sea lane issues in Japan is an emerging realist view of China. Although still 
disputed within policymaking circles, this foresees two possible threats. First, China 
could disrupt Japan's seaborne imports collaterally as a result of the spill-over effects of 
a maritime conflict in the East or South China Seas. Second, at some point after 2020, 
China may be sufficiently emboldened by the modernisation of its naval, air and missile 
capabilities to obstruct Japan's seaborne imports intentionally for strategic leverage. It is 
also argued that concerns about the security of sea lanes are used to justify aspects of the 
SDF' s force structure development and the adoption of new security legislation designed 
to expand the geographical and operational scope of Japan's security ambit. The more 
limited but also more immediate maritime security threats presented by North Korea are 
also considered in this regard, especially concerning the intrusion of North Korean 
surface vessels into Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone in 1999 and 2001. 
Research findings. 
The findings of the thesis are presented in a Conclusion, following Chapter Eight. 
Briefly, the first major finding is that the strategic imperative of SLOC security has 
remained essentially consistent over time for Japan despite its shifting threat 
perceptions. The second finding is that material strategic calculations alone are 
insufficient to explain policy responses linked with sea lane security in the post-war 
period. Political advantages associated with the instrumental use of SLOC security have 
led decision-makers at various levels to use such concerns to justify contentious aspects 
of defence and alliance policy. The Conclusion ends with a discussion of the likely 
implications of these findings for the future directions of Japan's SLOC security. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Japan's Marititne Trade and Trade Routes: an Empirical Analysis 
Introduction. 
The extent to which sea lines of communication (SLOC) have historically been 
perceived by Japanese policy-makers as core security concerns in large part reflects the 
economic importance to Japan of maintaining inward-bound shipments of fuels, metal 
ores, other raw materials and food, as well as outward-bound exports of manufactured 
goods. This chapter provides an empirical analysis of Japan's economic geography, 
consumption patterns and dependence on imported resources, and major trading 
partners. It shows that overseas trade, although accounting for a relatively small 
proportion of national output, is vital to Japan's survival, as a reflection of its poor 
resource endowment. The assessment put forward establishes that the basic imperative 
of Japan's SLOC security is its vulnerability to supply disruption. The data set out here 
will serve as a basis for comparison, in later chapters, with policy-makers' perceptions 
about where such vulnerabilities are located, geographically and sectorally. 
After a brief geographic overview in Section I, the defining features of Japan's economy 
are outlined in Section II, including its poor natural resource allocation and resultant 
dependence on overseas sources for a wide range of essential industrial and energy 
commodities , as well as food to meet its nutritional needs. Efforts to build oil a:hd 
mineral stockpiles are assessed together with other austerity measures that are 
potentially available to mitigate the impact of a blockade or other systemic disruption to 
Japan' s resource in-flows. Imports are broken down into raw materials, mineral fuels, 
foodstuffs and manufactured goods. These are sourced by region and by country in the 
case of key commodities such as oil. Japan's principal export markets are profiled only 
briefly, reflecting the greater strategic importance of imports. 
In Section III, the infrastructure underpinning Japan ' s trade and the maritime geography 
of its main trade routes is explored. The size and composition of Japan' s merchant fleet 
is analysed, before consideration is given to the prevailing trade routes that link 
Japanese ports to their major resource suppliers and export markets , highlighting three 
basic ' streams ' connecting Japan, first with Europe, the Middle East and Southeast 
Asia; second with Australasia and the South Pacific ; and third, with North and South 
America. Particular attention is paid to those areas where Japanese trade is most 
concentrated and potentially vulnerable to disruption, at 'chokepoint' straits and seas in 
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Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Estimates are compared of the likely costs arising 
from the closure of chokepoints and the availability of alternative diversionary routes. 
I. Geoeraphic overview. 
Japan is an archipelago composed of four major islands, Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku 
and Kyushu and over 3,000 lesser islands (Map 1). 
Map 1: Japan and surrounding straits1 
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Two prominent island chains extend along southwesterly and southerly axes. The 
Ryukyu island chain, including Okinawa, runs parallel to the Nansei Shoto trench, 
towards Taiwan. The Izu-Ogasawara trench extends almost due south of Tokyo as far as 
Io Jima. At nearly 30,000 kilometres (km), Japan's coastline is one third longer than that 
of the United States but no inland point is more than 150 km from the sea. Japan is 
bisected by central mountain ranges that have restricted human settlement to around one 
quarter of national territory. Only 11 per cent of surface land area is used for 
cultivation. 
With nearly 127 million people, Japan still has the seventh largest population in the 
world and a population density, at 335 persons per square km, exceeding that of India. 
The population is predominantly urbanised and concentrated in a coastal 
conglo1neration which runs uninterrupted fro1n the Kanta Plain (including Tokyo) to 
Hiroshima. Over 43 per cent of the population live in Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya2. 
Although the birth rate reached a record low of 1.33 in 2001, demographic trends 
suggest the population will peak at 128 million in 2006, owing largely to the fact that, at 
80 years of age, Japan now has the longest average life-expectancy in the world: the 
ratio of those aged 65 and above is expected to rise from 17 per cent in 2000 to over 
one-third of the population by 2050. However, without large-scale immigration ( which 
is politically and socially problematic), the population is likely to fall below current 
levels in 2013, decreasing sharply thereafter, to around 100 million by 20503. 
II. Econon1ic overview. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Japan's economic miracle was based on a model of value-
added production, whereby manufactured goods produced from imported raw materials 
were exported, generating a surplus that could be re-invested in expanded production 
and access to foreign technology 4. The success of the Japanese 'state capitalist' 
developmental 1nodel has been attributed to a high degree of coordination amongst a 
triumvirate composed of industrialists, bureaucrats and politicians from the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), which held power continuously from 1955 to 1993, resulting 
in policies that ensured capital allocation to targeted industrial sectors, effective export 
promotion and high levels of regulation protecting the domestic market. 
2 Japan Almanac 1999, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1998, p 60. 
3 The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Population Projection for Japan from 
2001 to 2050: With Long-range Population Projections, 2051-2100 at: 
www.ipss.go.jp/Eng1ish/ppfj02/suikei_g_e.html 
4 Nariai Osamu, History of the Modern Japanese Economy, Foreign Press Center, Japan, Tokyo, 1997, pp 
33-35. 
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While the expansion of foreign trade was essential to Japan's rapid post-war 
development, trade makes up a surprisingly small fraction of the economy. The ratio of 
Japan's exports and imports to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 11 per cent and 7 
per cent respectively in 1986, since which time the weighting of trade to GDP has risen 
only slightly5. With the exception of those years immediately after the oil crises of the 
1970s, Japan has maintained a trade surplus since 1965. In 1998, since when trade 
levels have remained broadly unchanged, Japan's total import bill amounted to $319 
billion, compared to export receipts of $440 billion. Since 1960, Japan has made the 
transition from exporting primary industrial goods, such as textiles, iron and steel, to 
much greater reliance on medium technology goods including automobiles, electronic 
goods and chemicals and increasingly towards high-technology goods and services. 
However, Japan's developmental model is now acknowledged to have brought with it 
econormc dysfunction, as relationship-based lender-creditor arrangements and the 
influence of vested interests entrenched within the political system encouraged 
investment in delinquent assets, augmenting high levels of bad debt in the banking 
system and contributing to chronic over-capacity and, in turn, deflation 6. 
After heavy industries such as shipbuilding powered Japan's economic expansion in the 
1960s, the contribution of manufacturing to GDP fell from over one-third to less than 
one-quarter between 1970 and 19957. During the 1980s, spurred by the mounting cost 
of domestic production, 'sunset industries' began relocating overseas, to Southeast Asia 
in particular. This initial 'hollowing out' is being followed by the relocation of a 
further proportion of the industrial base to China, where labour costs are 5 per cent of 
those in Japan and land prices a fraction of the Japanese average. The allure of China's 
low factor costs is such that high-technology firms whose Japan-based plants remain 
competitive are also reported to be relocating there 8. 
These structural shifts combined with stagnant economic growth over the last decade 
have constrained Japan's raw material imports. However, this does not alter the 
continued importance of heavy industry to the domestic economy and its associated 
cormnodity and energy resource import requirements. For example, although crude steel 
5 Reinhard Drifte, Japan's Foreign Policy, Royal Institute of International Affairs/Routledge, London, 
1990, p 65; and Japan: A Country Study, United States Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress/Department of the Asmy, Washington D.C. , 1992, p 270. 
6 Ben Dolven, 'A Blueprint For Recovery', Far Eastern Economic Review, October 31, 2002, pp 44-48. 
7 Facts and Figures of Japan , 1997 Edition, Foreign Press Center, Japan, Tokyo, 1997, pp 40-43. 
8 Goto Yasuhiro, 'Rush into China lacks rational basis ', The Nikkei Weekly, December 2, 2002, p 7. 
14 
production peaked at 120,000 tons in 1973, in the mid-1990s Japan still produced over 
100,000 tons of steel per year; more than it turned out in 1970 and 15 times more than 
in 19409. As Japan is almost totally dependent on overseas sources of supply for iron 
ore, this requires around 120 million tons to be imported annually10. 
The move to high-end services and the production of information-technology goods that 
require fewer resource-inputs than 'old economy' staples such as steel, ship-building 
and cars means that Japan's prosperity is not as directly linked to imports of mineral 
ores as it was during the industrial expansion of the 1960s and 1970s. This trend 
appears likely to continue for the foreseeable future, with little prospect of a return to 
the high growth of the 1980s and the likelihood that manufacturers will seek to relocate 
production offshore in order to remain competitive11 . 
1. Resource dependence. 
Basic dependence on foreign imports of minerals and fossil fuels remains a defining 
feature of Japan's economy at the start of the 21st century. Japan is naturally lacking 
across a range of non-fen-ous ores and metals required in heavy industry, such as iron 
ore, bauxite, manganese, nickel and titanium. Apart from very limited coal, oil and gas 
reserves -- proven oil reserves of 59 million ban-els amount to a little over ten days' 
consumption -- Japan is largely dependent on seaborne imports for mineral fuels, 
minerals and many basic foodstuffs 12. 
9 Japan Iron and Steel Federation figmes cited in Japan Almanac 1999, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1998, p 
152. 
1
° Facts and Figures of Japan, 1997 Edition, Foreign Press Center, Japan, Tokyo, 1997, p 42. 
11 
'GDP sags under deflation, reform fears ', The Nikkei Weekly, November 18, 2002, p 1, 19. 
12 US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Country Profile, at: 
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/japan.html 
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Figure 1: Japan's import dependence for fuels, minerals and foodstuffs 
Crude oil 99.7% Cobalt 100% 
fron ore 99.8% Zinc 92% 
Bauxite 100% Titanium 100% 
Manganese 100% Cotton 100% 
Wool 100% Wheat 93% 
Copper Ore 99.9% Timber 80% 
Nickel 100% Fish/shellfish 44% 
Source: Facts and Figures of Japan, Foreign Press Center, Japan, Tokyo, 1997, pp 40-42. 
Because of its unfavourable resource endowment Japan imports over 80 per cent of its 
primary energy needs, a figure approached only by South Korea among major 
economies within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). In 1997, Japan's total mineral fuel import bill amounted to around $60 billion, 
of which crude oil accounted for $35 billion (roughly equal to the defence budget), 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) $10 billion, petroleum products $7 billion and coal $7 
billion. Following the first oil crisis, which saw oil prices quadruple between 1973 and 
197 5, the government devoted great effort towards improving energy efficiency and 
invested heavily in alternativ~ energy sources, especially nuclear power. The Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI -- now renamed the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry) drew up an energy programme to improve the nation' s energy 
security through a raft of measures directed at domestic demand and international 
supply13. These included: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
conserving energy; 
fully exploiting domestic sources; 
developing alternatives to petroleum; 
developing closer cooperation with producer states; 
diversifying energy sources away from the Middle East; 
siting energy production in the most efficient locations; and 
stockpiling coal and oil (a statutory requirement under the 1975 Petroleum 
Stockpiling Law obliges private oil refiners to stock a minimum 70 days' worth of 
consumption). 
13 Nariai Osarnu, History of the Modem Japanese Economy, Foreign Press Center, Japan, Tokyo, 1997, pp 
45-49 . 
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As a result of government and private initiatives, Japan was transformed into one of the 
most energy-efficient of the major economies, enabling it to absorb a second wave of oil 
price rises six years later with relative ease14. Energy intensity in the industrial sector 
overall improved by 38 per cent between 1973 and 1999. Heavy investment in 
alternatives to petroleum resulted in greater use of coal and LNG, and launched Japan 
into ·the top ranks of nuclear-energy states. As of July 2001, 51 nuclear power plants 
were in operation in Japan, surpassed only by the United States and France. However, 
mounting safety concerns and public opposition since the 1999 criticality accident at 
Tokaimura could prevent further expansion of the nuclear sector15 . Since 2000, energy 
policy has been directed toward the '3Es' of energy security, economic growth and 
environmental protection. A 1994 advisory report drawn up by the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) set a target of cutting growth in energy 
consumption to under 1 per cent up to 2010, and oil's share in energy production from 
56 per cent to 48 per cent16. However, demand for energy in transportation -- where 
scope for alternative fuels to oil is limited -- and the residential sector has nearly 
doubled since 1973, in contrast to trends within the industrial sector17 . 
14 In 1995, Japan's per capita energy consumption was less than that of France or Germany and almost half 
that of the United States. Canada, with less than a quarter of Japan's population consumed two and a half 
times as much petroleum as Japan in 1996; Japan Abnanac 1999, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1998, pp 174-
175 . 
15 
'Energy in Japan', Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
September 2001, p 34; and Japan Almanac 1999, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1998, p 171. 
16 MET! policy document, 'Energy in Japan ' , at www.meti.go .jp/english/aboutmeti/data/a23 l20le.html 
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'Energy in Japan' , Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
September 2001, pp 11-14. 
Figure 2: Breakdown of Japan's primary energy supply, 1960-99 
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Source: METI/ Japan Almanac 1999, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1998, p. 171 18 . 
(Actual percentages are presented in tabular form in Annex 1) 
2. Imports. 
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According to the former Maritime Self Defense Forces Chief of Staff Yoshida Manabu, 
any calculation as to the minimum level of imports required under emergency 
conditions is approximate. However, against the scenario of a naval and air blockade or 
some other calamity befalling the international trading system, Japan's austerity import 
requirements are estimated at around one-third of normal requirements, in order to 
sustain essential economic activity and to support the population 19 . However, Shilling 
(1976) has argued that scope exists for Japan to reduce its import volume by up to 70-80 
per cent without curbing consumption levels, by halting exports and switching 
productive capacity to meet domestic demand. Accordingly, he claimed that shipping 
requirements could be cut from 1,850 arrivals per month to 400. If consumption were 
reduced, this could be lowered to just 280 per month -- or 15 per cent of 1975 levels20 . 
Although this analysis is now over 25 years old, demographic projections of a rapidly 
declining population combined with the likelihood of a declining industrial base suggest 
18 1999 figures from Statistics Bureau and Statistics Center, Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, 
Posts and Telecommunications: www. stat. go .jp/english/ data/handbook/c07 cont.htm 
19 In Michael J. O 'Connor and Malcolm J. Kennedy, Safely By Sea, University Press of Ameiica, Lanham, 
Maryland, 1990, pp 37-38. 
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that Shilling's estimate still bears scrutiny 1n Japan's contemporary econormc and 
security environment. 
Imports can be divided into raw materials, foodstuffs, mineral fuels and manufactures. 
While the ratio of Japan's imports to exports, by value, is roughly 3:4, when measured 
by volume the ratio is reversed to around 7: 1, due to the large quantity of solid and 
liquid bulk commodities, led by crude oil, coal and iron ore. In 1998, seaborne imports 
to Japan amounted to 730 million tons, compared to 101 million tons of exports21 . 
While economists tend to measure trade exclusively in value terms during peacetime, 
the logistics of maintaining in-flows of raw materials in such volumes is a significant 
security factor. 
Figure 3: Breakdown of Japan's imports; percentage value by sector 
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El Manufactures 
80% 
EEil Mineral fuel 
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40% El Raw materials 
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Source: MITI (Japan Almanac 1999, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1998, p 116). 
Total world seaborne trade totalled just over 5 billion tons in 1998, of which crude oil 
made up 31 per cent, coal 9 per cent and iron ore 8 per cent. Together with petroleum 
products and grains, these made up more than half the total of world seaborne trade. 
Japan's share of the total was 16.4 per cent (Figure 4). This represents a slight decrease 
from 1994, when Japan accounted for 18.5 per cent of global tonnage transported by 
ship; or 21.4 per cent in ton-miles -- the standard unit for measuring the efficiency for 
20 David Shilling, 'A Reassessment of Japan's Naval Defense Needs', Asian Survey, Vol. 16 No. 3 (March 
1976), pp 216-229. 
21 Japan Shipowners' Association figures: www.jsanet.or.jp/index2.htm1. 
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the movement of goods by sea 22. Measured in ton-miles, Japan 's trade accounts for 
slightly higher values for most commodities, except petroleum products. 
Figure 4: Seaborne trade volumes for Japan and the world, 1998 (million tons) 
Commodity global % global Japanese % Japanese Japan's % 
volume trade vol. volume trade vol. of global 
trade vol. 
Oil 1,550 30.6 217 26 14.0 
Coal 465 9.2 131 16 28.3 
Iron ore 420 8.3 121 14.5 28 
Oil products 395 7.8 31 3.5 7.8 
Grains 190 3.7 32 4 16.7 
Others 2,050 40.4 299 36 14.6 
Total 5,070 100 831 100 16.4 
Source: Japan Shipowners' Association. 
There are two important trends in Japan's imports over the last 40 years . First, the 
percentage value of raw materials declined from almost half in 1960 to under 10 per 
cent by 1998. Second, the major increase has been in manufactures, which now account 
for nearly 60 per cent of the import bill. The value share of mineral fuel imported in 
1997, while slightly up on 1960, was sharply down from 1980, when it made up half of 
the import bill as a result of price hikes during the second oil crisis. Among the four 
import sectors, the value of foodstuffs has remained the most stable. 
i) Raw materials. 
By value, the most important of Japan' s raw material imports in 1997 was timber (2.6 
per cent of total import value), followed by iron ore (1 per cent). In 1995, raw materials 
imported in substantial quantities · included: iron ore (120 million tons), timber (89 
million tons), copper and nickel (3 .8 million tons each). After oil and coal, iron ore 
occupies the largest volume of any imported commodity, accounting for around 16 per 
cent of seaborne imports. Non-fenous metals totalled 3.7 per cent. Japan must import 
other important non-fenous metals such as manganese, zinc, chrome, titanium and 
cobalt, but in much smaller quantities , making them easier to stockpile. In 2000, a 
METI stockpiling target of 43 ,183 tons for manganese had already been exceeded and 
22 
'Japan and the U.N. Convention Law of the Sea' , Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, at: 
20 
targets for nickel (19,505 tons), chrome (94,853 tons), tungsten (579 tons), cobalt (251 
tons) and molybdenum (1,771 tons) were respectively 61 per cent, 72.3 per cent, 70.8 
per cent, 57.6 per cent and 73.4 per cent completed (Figure 5). METI aims to achieve 
its non-ferrous metal stockpile objectives by 2005 23 . 
Figure 5: Japan's non-ferrous metal stockpiles in tons (2000) 
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ii) Mineral fuels. 
a) Oil. 
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Relative dependence on crude oil for energy production in Japan peaked at 77 per ce_nt 
in 1973, declining to 52 per cent in 199924. Despite efficiency gains, demand for oil 
maintained pace with economic growth in the 1980s, until crude imports overtook 1975 
www.mofa.go .jp/policy/economy/sea/convention.html. 
23 Interview with and Mining and Mineral Agency materials supplied by Imura Akiko, Deputy Director, 
International Divisjon, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry for Economy, Trade and 
Industry, Tokyo, February 28 , 2002. 
24 
'Energy in Japan ', Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
September 2001, p 17; and Facts and Figures of Japan , 1997 Edition, Foreign Press Center, Japan, Tokyo, 
1997, p 5 8; despite the reduction in oil dependence, Japan ' s reliance on oil for energy production is only 
comparable with Italy among other 07 members. 
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levels again in 199025 . However, economic stagnation and the shift to alternative fuels 
has caused demand to fall since the late 1990s (Figure 6). Monthly imports in early 
2002 were down by around 13 per cent year-on-year26 . As of June 2002, Japan's crude 
oil stockpiles totalled 91 million kilolitres, respectively divided between those held by 
the state-owned Japan National Oil Corporation (48 million) and private oil firms (43 
million)27 . This represents around 150 days of domestic consumption28 . 
Figure 6: Japan's oil imports29 and consumption (million tons) 
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Source: BP Amoco Statistical Review of World Energy3° 
b) LNG and coal. 
Japan imports over 25 per cent of all coal traded globally and is easily the world's 
largest importer of steam coal, which is used in power generation and cement 
production. Large quantities of coking coal are also imported. In 1999, coal made up 
17.4 per cent of primary energy, compared to 41.0 per cent in 196031 . Reliance on 
imports sharply escalated over the same period, from around 14 per cent to around 97 
25 Japan Almanac 1999, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1998, p 171. 
26 
'Crude oil imports decline 13.4%', The Japan Times, March 1, 2002, p 9. 
27 The stockpile figures do not include bunker and aviation fuel stockpiled either by the Japan Defense 
Agency or the US military in Japan. (Interview with Arima Jun, Director for International Energy Strategy, 
Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry, Tokyo, February 28 , 2002). 
28 
'Energy in Japan ', Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
September 2001, pp 17-18 . 
29 Crude oil and oil products; oil products typically make up between 10 and 20 per cent of the total . In 
1999, Japan imported 215 million tons of crude and 49 million tons of oil products. (Agency of Natural 
Resources and Energy figures cited in 'Imports of Oil ' 1985-1994', Facts and Figures of Japan, 1997 
Edition, Foreign Press Center, Japan, Tokyo, 1997, p 59). 
30 BP Amoco Statistical Review of World Energy: 'Oil Consumption 1989-1999' , 'Trade Movements 
1989-1999' www.bp.com/worldenergy/oil/index.htm. 
3 1 
'Energy in Japan ' , Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
September 2001, p 22. 
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per cent in 1997. Imports grew from 8,595 tons in 1960 to 149 million tons in 2000. 
LNG has emerged as a major fuel, particularly in power generation, although its share in 
primary energy production is still less than that of coal, at 11 per cent in 1996. It is 
projected to rise to 12-13 per cent by 2010, although this is somewhat below METI 
forecasts from the early 1980s32 . Total LNG imports in 2000 amounted to 54 million 
tons33 . 
iii) Foodstuffs. 
The relatively stable proportion of foodstuffs among Japan's overall imports since 1960 
has masked a steady decline in the self-sufficiency rate for staple food groups. By the 
late 1980s, Japan was importing half of its calorific intake, as rising affluence whetted 
Japanese appetites for non-traditional foods, such as red meat, wheat and com. The 
major exception is rice, in which Japan is self-sufficient, partly for domestic political as 
well as food security reasons, through a combination of the concentrated use of 
pesticides and fertilisers, and tariff protection34. For other cereals and soya beans, 
import dependency is over 90 per cent (Figure 7). Overall, Japan's cereal self-
sufficiency rate is just 30 per cent, which compares to surpluses in the United States, 
United Kingdom, France and Germany. Measured in terms of the calorie-supply, 
Japan's food self-sufficiency dwindled from 79 per cent in 1960 to 42 per cent in 
199635 . 
32 Chapman, Drifte and Gow, Japan 's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence, Diplomacy, 
Dependence, Frances Pinter, London, 1983 , p 198 . 
33 
'Energy in Japan ', Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
September 2001, p 28. 
34 Japan Almanac 1999, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1998, p 139; and Chapman, Drifte and Gow, Japan 's 
Quest for Comprehensive Security: Def ence, Diplomacy, Dependence, Frances Pinter, London, 1983, p 206. 
35 Japan Abnanac 1999, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1998, p 135-136. Food self-sufficiency is calculated in 
different ways, according to calorie-supply, self-sufficiency in staple foods etc. For international 
compaiisons the calorie supply is most commonly used. 
Figure 7: Food imports and self-sufficiency rates (1,000 tons), 1995 
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Japanese diets, while more meat-rich than they used to be, still rely heavily on marine 
products for protein intake, accounting for 40 per cent of the average daily supply of 
protein in 1996. Japan is the largest importer of marine products in the world. In 1995, it 
imported almost one-third of the global marine catch, accounting for 5 per cent of its 
total imports by value. Japan's own fishery production has been gradually declining 
since 1989, when China overtook it as the leading global producer. Japan is currently 
fourth-placed in the world. 
iv) Manufactured products. 
The sharp increase in Japan's import of foreign manufactures in recent years is due to 
the expansion of machinery and equipment as well as consumer goods, which have 
gained more liberal access to the Japanese market in recent years. Major imported 
manufactured items include computers and semi-conductors, textiles and chemicals. In 
addition, many firms are now 're-importing' products manufactured in China and 
Sou~heast Asia for final assembly in Japan36 . 
36 
'China replacing U.S. as top exporter to Japan ', The Nikkei Weekly, December 16, 2002, p 1. 
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v) Import partners. 
In 1997, Japan sourced 3 7 per cent of its imports from Asia, 25 per cent from North 
America, 15 per cent from the European Union (EU) and 11 per cent from the Middle 
East, representing a shift favouring trade flows from Asia and to a lesser extent, Europe. 
While North America has managed to maintain its share, other regions have declined in 
overall importance (Figure 8). 
Figure 8: Japan's import partners by region37 (percentage market share) 
1960 1970 1980 1997 
Asia 21.1 17.6 25.8 37 
W. Asia 9.4 12 31.3 -
N. America 39.1 34.4 20.7 25.3 
EU/E. Europe - - - 14.7 
M. East - - - 11.3 
Oceania 9 9.6 6 5.3 
Latin America 6.9 7.3 4.1 3.4 
Ex-USSR - - - 1.5 
Africa 3.6 5.8 3.2 1.4 
W. Europe 8.8 10.2 7.4 -
Comecon 2.1 3.1 1.5 -
Source: METIi Japan Almanac 1999, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1998, p 116. 
On a country basis, the United States remains Japan's most important trading partner. In 
1995, Japan imported $75 billion worth of US goods, followed by China ($36 billion), 
South Korea ($17 billion), Australia ($15 billion), Taiwan and Germany ($14 billion 
each). However, China has grown increasingly important as a source of low-cost 
imports, with bilateral trade in 2002 expected to be in the region of $90 billion, driven 
by the out-sourcing of production from Japan. On present trends, Chinese imports to 
Japan appear set to surpass those from the United States in 2003 38 . 
This general pattern yields an incomplete picture, as dependence on particular suppliers 
in key commodity sectors remains strong. In the wake of the oil crises, Japan made 
efforts to diversify its sources of supply in minerals as well as energy, opening up new 
resource bases in the Indian Ocean and Latin America. India and Brazil became major 
new suppliers , reducing Japan's dependence on Australia39 . Agreements to supply Japan 
with a wide variety of primary commodities were concluded with countries in East 
Africa and South Asia, raising the profile of the Indian Ocean as a resource base. It is 
37 Pre-1995 figures, for Southeast Asia and 'Communist Asia' have been combined to enable comparison 
with METI's post-1995 'Asia' category. 'West Asia' was also redesignated Middle East in 1995. 
38 
'China replacing U.S. as top exporter to Japan', The Nikkei Weekly, December 16, 2002, p 1, 23. 
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generally recognised, both within Japan and internationally, that commodity supplies 
are more likely to be disrupted at source than in transit40 . The record of attempts by the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to maintain the price of oil at 
the historically high rates of the late 1970s demonstrates that supplier countries' market 
leverage is limited; price, as in all markets, being a function of demand as well as 
supply. However, the restriction of supply at source, whether for commercial and/or 
political reasons, would involve fewer political costs than any military effort to interrupt 
the supply of commodities in transit. To protect itself from supply disruption at source, 
Japan's efforts to diversify its resource supply base have been relatively successful, with 
the crucial exception of oil. 
Japan's success in lessening dependence on the Middle East for petroleum since the oil 
crises have been reversed since the late 1980s, although intra-regionally the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) now supplies more oil to Japan than Saudi Arabia. In 1970, 85 
per cent of Japan's crude was sourced from the Middle East, falling to 68 per cent in 
1987. However, by December 1998, Japan was importing 82 per cent of its oil from the 
Gulf region41 . In 2000 overall, this rose to 87 per cent, peaking at 91.7 per cent in 
December 2001 42. In 1997, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) supplied 28 per cent of 
Japan's crude oil, Saudi Arabia 25.3 per cent and Iran 9.6 per cent43 . In 2000, the top 
five suppliers were UAE (25.6 per cent), Saudi Arabia (21.6 per cent), Iran (11.5 per 
cent) and Qatar (9 .6 per cent). Indonesia ( 4.8 per cent) and China (2.2 per cent) retained 
their long-held positions as Japan's largest non-Middle Eastern oil suppliers. The 
prospect of access to Russian oil as a means of reducing Japan's dependence on the 
Middle East was revived during Prin1e Minister Junichir6 Koizu1ni's visit to Russia in 
January 2003, with a proposed pipeline that would transport Siberian oil 4,000 km to a 
Sea of Japan terminal at Nakhodka44 . Japan has also made efforts to invest in 
exploration in the Caspian to lessen its dependence on Arabian oil. Mitsui acquired a 
15 per cent stake in Azerbaijan's Kur Dashi oil field in 2001, reported to contain 
reserves of 0.5-1.0 billion barrels. However, new exploration will be offset within the 
39 Friedman and Lebard, The Coining War with Japan, St Martin 's Press, New York, 1991 , p 182. 
40 Michael MccGwire, Australia as a Regional Seapower: an External View, SDSC Working Paper No. I 1, 
Australian National University, Canbena, 1979, p 16. 
41 
'MITI: Iraq conflict won ' t affect Japan fuel p1ices ', Asahi Evening News, December 18, 1998, p I. 
42 
'Energy in Japan ', Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
September 2001, p 19. 
43 Facts and Figures of Japan , 1997 Edition, Foreign Press Center, Japan, Tokyo, 1997, p 59; while China 
is a net importer of oil, it exports light oil from its Daqing field for use in Japanese power plants. 
44 
'Editorial: Challenges in Moscow', Asahi Online, January 11 , 2003: at 
www.asahi.com/english/op-ed/K20030l 1100246.html 
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next decade as Malaysia and Indonesia become net importers and imports of Chinese 
light oil dry up. 
Japan's major LNG suppliers are located in Southeast Asia and Australia. Indonesia (37 
per cent), Malaysia (20 per cent) and Australia (15 per cent) were the largest providers 
in 199745 . In 2000, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia together accounted for nearly 67 
per cent of Japan's LNG imports, although in that year a new contract was signed with 
Oman towards maintaining a diversified supply portfolio46 . Japan imports half its coal 
from Australia (steam and coking coal in roughly equal proportions) and the remainder 
from North America, China and Indonesia. In 1995, of 120 million tons of iron ore 
imported in total, 59 million tons were from Australia, 28 million tons from Brazil and 
18 million from India 47. With regard to non-fenous metals, Japan has built up a diverse 
network of suppliers to minimise its dependence on single-suppliers as far as possible. 
For example, Japan imports no more than one-fifth of its bauxite/aluminium and nickel 
from any one country. Among suppliers who dominate non-fenous metal imports, Chile 
provides 44 per cent of Japan's copper, Russia supplies 62 per cent of palladium, while 
China meets 68 per cent of Japan's zinc needs. The United States is Japan's most 
important supplier of foodstuffs accounting for almost one-third of the $51 billion Japan 
spent on imported food in 1995, including most of its soya beans48 . 
3. Exports. 
In a security context, commercial exports are of lesser strategic importance during 
armed conflicts than imports, assuming that imports can be financed for the duration. 
Manufactured goods account for almost all Japan's exports (96 per cent in 1997). Three 
regions account for the bulk of Japan's markets (Figure 9). In 1997, Asia accounted for 
42 per cent of Japan's export market; North America 29 per cent and the EU 16 per 
cent49 . Although Sino-Japanese trade has expanded to over $80 billion in recent years, 
the United States remains Japan's largest bilateral export partner, absorbing $121 
billion-worth of Japanese products in 1995; more than South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and China combined50 . The United States is Japan's biggest customer for 
45 Japan Abnanac 1999, Asahi Sh.imbunsha, Tokyo, 1998, p 121. 
46 
'Energy in Japan ', Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
September 2001, p 28 . 
47 Joonsoo Jon, 'Critical Non-energy Import Dependencies in North-east Asia ' , in Bateman and Bates (eds), 
Shipping and Regional Security, CanbeITa Papers on Strategy and Defence, No . 129, Australian National 
University Press, Canbe1Ta, 1998, p 83. 
48 Facts and Figures of Japan, 1997 Edition, Foreign Press Center, Japan, Tokyo, 1997, p 41. 
49 Japan Almanac 1999, Asalu Sh.imbunsha, Tokyo, 1998, p 116. 
5
° Facts and Figures of Japan , 1997 Edition, Foreign Press Center, Japan, Tokyo, 1997, p 48 . 
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passenger cars, integrated circuits, computers, automotive parts, machine tools and 
cameras. 
Figure 9: Japan's export markets by region (percentage of overall export value) 
1960 1970 1980 1997 
Asia 32.2 28.5 28.1 42 
W. Asia 3.5 2.8 10.1 -
N. America 29.7 33.7 26 29.3 
EU/E. Europe - - - 16.5 
Latin America 7.5 6.1 6.9 5 
Middle East - - - 2.9 
Oceania 4.9 4.2 3.4 2.4 
Africa 8.7 7.4 6.2 1.3 
Ex-USSR - - - 0.6 
W. Europe 11.7 15 16.5 -
Comecon 1.6 2.3 2.8 -
Source: METVJapan Almanac 1999, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1998, p 116. 
III. Maritime transportation and Japan. 
Shipping performs the function of a 'conveyor belt' for Japan's economy, drawing in 
energy, raw materials and food from around the world and distributing manufactured 
products to overseas markets. While one quarter of Japan's trade by value is now 
carried by air, maritime transport accounted for 99.74 per cent of Japan's total trade 
volume of over 800 million tons in 1996. Japan's major ports are clustered around its 
central Pacific coast and the Inland Sea (seto naikai). Compared with South Korea or 
the Russian Far East, this gives Japan better protection against any attempt to block 
access to the Sea of Japan, which shares some of the characteristics of a chokepoint, 
being ringed by several narrow straits. Presently, the five largest ports in terms of cargo 
handled are, in descending order, Chiba, Kobe, Nagoya, Yokohama and Mizushima. 
Coastal shipping has played a . traditionally important role in Japan's domestic 
transportation network. During the sakoku period of 'national seclusion' (1639-1854), 
when international trade and travel were strictly limited and controlled by the 
Shogunate, the economic importance of shipping was still such that a law restricting 
ship construction to under 1,000 koku ( 49 gross tons) was revised to allow larger ships 
to ply trade along Japan's coasts. While this dependence on shipping for domestic 
commerce has been diminished by the expansion of road and rail infrastructure, coastal 
shipping still accounts for nearly 42 per cent of the volume of goods transported 
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domestically51 . After 1945, Japan's emergence as a global mercantile power was 
dependent on the development of a large, Japanese-owned merchant fleet. Prime 
Minister Ikeda Hayato's goal of doubling national income during the 1960s was 
accompanied by an unprecedented expansion of the merchant fleet in order to boost 
trade. During 1963-67, oil tanker tonnage expanded at an average of 22 per cent per 
year, and non-tanker tonnage by 12 per cent. As a result of this construction boom, 
Japan was able to meet increased import demand for oil, which increased at an average 
annual rate of 18 per cent; imported dry cargo, which grew by 19 per cent; and dry 
cargo exports which expanded by 12.5 per cent52. 
1. Merchant fleet. 
In 2001, according to the United Nations, Japan's merchant fleet totaled 14.6 million 
gross registered tons (GRT)53. After contracting from a peak of 40 million GRT in 1984, 
gross tonnage has stabilised since the mid-1990s in the range of 13-14 million GRT54. 
The total fleet is divided into oil tankers (3.3 million GRT), bulk carriers (3.1 million), 
general cargo ships (2 million), container ships (0.6 million) and other types (5.6 
million)55. 
As of 1999, Japan operated around 214 petroleum tankers, divided between smaller 
specialised tankers and Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) -- supertankers that range 
from 160,000 to over 300,000 deadweight tons (DWT) 56 . The recent trend has been 
towards building smaller double-hulled VLCCs of around 230,000 DWT, purpose built 
to comply with under-keel clearance draft restrictions that apply to vessels transitting 
the Straits of Malacca. Some Japanese shipping companies are negotiating for a further 
allowance of 0.5 metres57 . Breaking down the remainder of the ocean-going fleet by 
vessel type, in 1999, there were 146 bulk carriers, 49 general purpose cargo ships, 13 
chemical tankers, 16 combination bulk caniers, four combination ore/oil caniers , 25 
51 Japan Shipowners' Association figures: www.jsanet.or.jp/english/ed3-4.html. 
52 
'K' -line company history: www.kline.co.jp/profile/e_milestones3.htm. 
53 Gross tonnage is a measurement of space used for cargo and passenger vessels arrived at by dividing the 
volume of a ship in cubic feet by one hundred; only vessels above 1,000 GRT are included in the total 
given. 
54 Japan: A Country Study, United States Federal Research Division, Library of Congress/Department of the 
Army, Washington D.C. , 1992, p 240. 
55 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport, 2002, United 
Nations, New York and Geneva, 2002, p 127. 
56 Tanker capacity is measured in deadweight tons, which refers to the weight of cargo and fuel carried, 
measured in metric tons . 
57 Interview with Captain Osuka Yoshihiro, Asst. General Manager, Marine Safety and Environmental 
Team, 'K' -Line, Tokyo, February 28, 2002. 
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container ships, 45 LNG caniers, 22 refrigerated cargo ships, 48 roll-on/roll-off ferries, 
nine passenger ships and 60 vehicle caniers. 
Among the recommendations of the Report on Comprehensive National Security, 
commissioned by Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi in April 1979, were that the 
Japanese government should "Examine alternative marine routes in case a situation 
occurs in which existing routes, such as the Malacca and Lombok straits, are blocked to 
traffic (and) secure a constant volume of marine transport capacity"58. However, Japan 
has since followed the international trend towards increased use of open registry ( 'flags 
of convenience') provided by Panama, Liberia and the Bahamas, as a means of reducing 
costs. According to the Japanese Shipowners' Association, more than 90 per cent of 
Japan's ocean-going merchant fleet were foreign-registered ships on charter in 1998. 
This phenomenon was aggravated by the sharp appreciation of the yen after 1985, 
which saw Japanese shipping giants such as Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) and Mitsui 
O.S.K. Lines accumulate debts of up to $1 billion on their trans-pacific cargo routes. As 
well as resorting to foreign registry as a means to cut overheads, Japanese shipping 
firms have made massive cuts in the number of their Japanese employees. In 1994, the 
merchant fleet canied 70 per cent of the country's imports and 43 per cent of exports. 
When foreign charters were excluded from this total, just 23 per cent of imports and 3.8 
per cent of exports were carried in Japanese hulls59 . Only 20 years previously, 
Japanese-flagged vessels canied 44 per cent of imports and 27 per cent of exports60 . 
Assuming that a sufficient quantity of Japanese-flagged, chartered or foreign-registered 
vessels continued to service Japan's import needs in the event of a major security crisis, 
substantial scope would appear to exist for shipping to divert around most localised 
obstructions at chokepoints located in Middle-Eastern or Southeast Asian waters, albeit 
generating higher transportation costs. While higher costs would provide an obvious 
incentive, in terms of profitability, for shipping companies to add capacity to routes 
servicing Japan, their willingness ( or that of seamen's unions) to sail in the face of 
increased risk or the withdrawal of insurance cover is highly problematic, as is explored 
in Chapters Two and Five. Moreover, the absence in post-war Japan of any Naval 
Control of Shipping legislation, owing to political sensitivities over the influence of the 
58 Report on Comprehensive Nationa l Security (Translation), Comprehensive National Security Study 
Group, July 2, 1980, p 58. 
59 Ministry of Transport and Facts and Figures of Japan, 1997 Edition, Foreign Press Center, Japan, Tokyo, 
1997, p 66. 
60 Linton Wells II, 'The Sea and Japan's Strategic Interests 1975-1985 ', John Hopkins University PhD 
thesis , Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1975, p 325. 
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military, denies the Japanese government any legal instrument to compel even Japanese-
flagged merchant ships to sail. 
2. Shipping routes. 
Japan's most important regular shipping routes fall into three broad streams. First, and 
economically most important, is the southwest stream (composed of several interlinking 
sea lanes) connecting Japan with Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Second, 
a southern stream connects Japan with Australasia and the South Pacific. Third, the 
trans-pacific 'Great Circle' route connects Japan with the Americas61 . 
Although peacetime patterns of trade and import dependence are not synonymous with 
wartime needs, assuming that scope exists both to switch to alternative sources of 
supply and alternative shipping routes, for an economy as dependent upon imported 
energy resources and raw materials as Japan's, they are still likely to have a major 
influence on its strategic needs in the event of a sustained maritime conflict. Oil 
remains the most strategic commodity of all for Japan, and attempts at diversifying its 
supply base and its impressive stockpiles notwithstanding, shipping routes from Japan 
to the Gulf would assume particular importance in any medium- to long-term security 
crisis for Japan, although several alternative routes exist within this southwestern 
'stream', as is explored below. Maintaining supplies of mineral fuels and metallic ores 
from Australia and South-east Asia would also be important. The disruption of food 
imports would have a less acute security impact, reflecting the much greater substitution 
options available. However, it is significant that the "disruption of sea lanes" was 
mentioned among "conceivable threats to Japan's food security" in the 1979 Report on 
Comprehensive National Security62 . 
Of Japan's three maritime transportation streams, the trans-pacific Great Circle and 
central Pacific routes traverse mostly open ocean or coastal areas that are sparsely 
populated and which -- since the end of the Cold War -- have been largely free of 
geopolitical tensions. However, the two other major streams are geographically 
encumbered by several chokepoints, in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, where 
shipping is concentrated into narrow waterways, close to areas where political 
instability and regional conflict are prevalent. 
61 The Great Circle Route highlights the distortions of the Mercator Projection in depicting relative 
distances beyond the Equator. 
62 Report on Comprehensive National Security (Translation) , Comprehensive National Security Study 
Group, July 2, 1980, p 11. 
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Those used for transporting significant proportions of Japanese commerce include the 
straits of Malacca, Lombok and Makassar and, to a lesser extent, Sunda -- all of which 
fall wholly or partly within Indonesian archipelagic waters. Although 1,800 nautical 
miles (nm) from north to south, the South China Sea itself can be considered as a 
chokepoint, reflecting the partial constriction of its southern, eastern and northern 
egress points. The Sea of Japan and the Taiwan Strait -- though the latter is not a 
significant route for Japan 's trade except with Taiwan and Chinese mainland points 
opposite -- can also be considered chokepoints. In the Middle East, the Suez Canal is an 
artificial chokepoint, but the most important is the Strait of Hormuz. 
2.1 Southeast Asian chokepoints. 
In 1993, Japan imported 385 million tons worth $102 billion through Southeast Asia's 
major SLOC, representing 42 per cent of total import value, or 4 per cent of GDP. It 
also exported 33.6 million tons worth over $153 billion, representing 42.5 per cent of 
total exports, or 6 per cent of GDP. Only Australia rivals Japan's level of dependence 
qn Southeast Asian SLOC. Comparable figures for Australia, on much lower volumes, 
were 39.5 per cent of export value and 53 per cent of import value63 . China, for 
example, relied on Southeast Asian chokepoints for 22 per cent of its export value and 
just 10 per cent of its import value -- although the impressive expansion of China's trade 
since 1993 has also increased the importance of Southeast Asia's SLOC to China. 
Figure 10: Japan's imports through Southeast Asian chokepoints (1993) 
SLOC per cent import value ($ billion) million tons 
value 
Malacca 29 71.5 240 
Sunda 0.5 1 9 
Lon1bok 2.5 5.5 69.5 
South China Sea 40 96 305 
Combined total 42 101.5 385 
Source: John Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, 
National Defense University Press/Center for Naval Analyses , Washington, 1996, Appendix A, p 67. 
63 John Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, National 
Defense University Press/Center for Naval Analyses, Washington D.C., 1996, pp 23-26. 
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Figure 11: Japan's exports through Southeast Asian chokepoints (1993)64 
SLOC % export value value ($ billion) million tons 
Malacca 27.5 99.5 12 
Sunda 0.1 0.5 0.1 
Lombok 2.5 9 3 
South China Sea 41.5 150 32 
Combined total 42.5 153.5 33.5 
i) Straits of Malacca. 
The Straits of Malacca ( composed of the Malacca Strait, the Phillip Channel and the 
Singapore Strait) are the most important waterways for Japanese trade outside of 
Japan's territorial waters, leading to the straits' description as "the most crucial to the 
economic life of Japan"65 . The straits connect the Indian Ocean (via the Andaman Sea) 
to the Pacific (via the South China Sea). From their northernmost and widest extremity, 
between Thailand and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, to their exit into the South 
China Sea east of Singapore, the straits extend for over 500 miles, with widths varying 
from 200 to just three miles. 
At its narrowest point, the commanding width of the navigable channel is only 500 
metres, with a commanding depth of 23 metres66 . In certain shipping lanes within the 
straits, draft is as little as 16 metres67 . (For a map of the straits and the Traffic 
Separation Scheme in operation there, see Map 10, Chapter Six). Despite these canal-
like parameters (Suez is 21 metres deep and 300 metres across) the Straits of Malacca 
are the busiest waterways in the region and second only to the Dover Strait in the world. 
Traffic through the straits is also forecast to grow by 5 per cent annually through to 
201068 . Estimates of the straits' overall usage vary between 30,000 and 100,000 ships 
per year, depending on the date of the estimate and whether cross-straits traffic is 
included. The likely figure for inter-regional traffic through the straits is around 50,000 
64 Source: John Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, 
National Defense University Press/Center for Naval Analyses , Washington, 1996, Appendix A, p 67. 
65 Ouchi Kazuomi. 'Making the Straits Safer: A User ' s View of Alternative Routes ' , paper given at the 
International Conference on the Strait of Malacca: Meeting the Challenges of the 21 st Century, Malaysian 
Institute of Maritime Affairs , June 14 and 15, 1994, p 1. 
66 Henry J. Kenny, An Analysis of Possible Threats to Shipping in Key Southeast Asian Sea Lanes , Center 
for Naval Analyses Occasional Paper, Alexandria, Virginia, February 1996, p 2; and H Djalal, Indonesia 
and the Law of the Sea , Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 1995, p 355. 
67 
'Energy Security and Sealane Disruption', Australian Energy News , Issue 24, June 2002 ; at 
www.industry.gov. au/resources/netetenergy / aen/ aen24/ 6emgy .html 
68 United Nations estimate, quoted by Singaporean Defence Minister David Lim, 'Singapore hosts 16-nation 
naval exercises', Reuters News Service, June 12, 2001. 
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transits per year, yielding a daily average of around 137 ships. The value of trade 
passing in both directions is estimated at $500 billion69 . In 1993, a daily average of 
around 30 tankers passed through the straits in both directions, with crude oil estimated 
to account for 58 per cent of cargo tonnage in the straits 70 . According to more recent 
data, in 2000, a total of 17,579 tankers of all sizes carried petroleum products through 
the straits, yielding a daily average of 48 transits. 
According to the US Department of Energy, the volume of petroleum estimated to pass 
though the Straits of Malacca daily is 10.3 million barrels, a total surpassed only by the 
Straits of Hormuz 71 . VLCCs from the Gulf typically carry around 2 million barrels, 
implying that as few as six fully-laden VLCCs could technically carry all of the oil 
normally passing through the straits, although the large number of terminals to be 
serviced in Northeast Asia requires tankers in greater numbers 72. In addition, over 3,000 
LNG carriers passed through the straits in 2000. As a result of an Under-keel Clearance 
scheme introduced in the straits since 1981, laden VLCCs exceeding 230,000 DWT 
have since been diverted through the Lombok Strait. About 72 per cent of laden tankers 
passing from the Gulf to Northeast Asian destinations are thought to use the straits. 
Larger VLCCs and Ultra-Large Crude Carriers (ULCCs) have to divert through the 
Lombok Strait73. 
Japan remains the largest user. In 1993, with combined west and eastbound trade worth 
$170 billion, Japanese cargoes accounted for 37 per cent of all inter-regional tonnage 
passing through the straits in either direction 74. Around $100 billion of this, or 27.5 per 
cent of Japan's total exports, travelled through the Straits of Malacca in 1993, 
amounting to 12.2 million tons (Figure 10). Japan owned 28 per cent of tonnage 
transitting the straits in that year -- four times as much as any other user, although a 
diminishing proportion of such vessels are Japanese-flagged75 . While China's rapidly 
69 
' India begins patrolling Malacca Straits ', The Hindu Online, April 20, 2002: 
www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/20/ stories/2002042002901100 .htm 
70 John Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritinie Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, National 
Defense University Press/Center for Naval Analyses, Washington D.C. , 1996, pp 56-58. 
71 
'Energy Security and Sealane Disruption ', Australian Energy News, Issue 24, June 2002; at 
www.industry.gov. au/resources/netetenergy / aen/ aen24/6emgy .html 
72 
'World Oil Transit Chokepoints', Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, 
November 2002, p 2, 5 at: www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/choke.html 
73 The draft of the Straits of Malacca is deep enough to accommodate even the largest, 500,000 DWT 
ULCCs making the outward-bound journey to the Middle East with ballast (Chia Lin Sien, in Hamzah (ed.). 
The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding and Navigational Safety , Maritime 
Institute of Malaysia/Pelanduk Publications, Kuala Lumpur, 1997, p 104. 
74 John Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, National 
Defense University Press/Center for Naval Analyses, Washington D.C., 1996, p 10. 
75 Ibid. Appendix A, p 68 . 
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rising oil imports are likely to erode Japan's position as the number one tanker user over 
time, Japan has until recent times accounted for up to 70 per cent of all the oil shipped 
through the strait, followed by South Korea, China and Taiwan. Japan, in tum, relies on 
the straits for a similar proportion of its oil, with most of the remainder being routed via 
the Lombok Strait76. In spite of the high volume of oil bound for Japan via the straits, 
surprisingly few VLCC transits are required: of 2,148 tankers monitored through the 
strait from the Middle East during 1995, 969 were bound for Japan, while a 1994 
estimate puts the number of fully-laden large tankers bound for Japan slightly lower at 
around 700 per year -- or just two per day77 . Such a figure is basically consistent with 
Japan's daily consumption of 5 .44 million barrels of oil in 2001, although the import of 
specialist fuels requires a larger number of smaller, specialist tankers to meet Japan's 
daily needs. 
ii) Sunda Strait. 
After the Straits of Malacca, the Sunda Strait, separating Java and Sumatra, is the 
second-most direct route for shipping passing from the northern Indian Ocean to the 
South China Sea, involving an additional 630 nm -- or about two days' steaming. Sunda 
is about 50 nm long and passage to the South China Sea is gained through the Gaspar or 
Karimata Straits. For cargoes bound from the Cape of Good Hope and other southern 
Indian Ocean destinations, the Sunda Strait is the most direct route for traffic to and 
from Northeast Asia, although trade volumes are miniscule compared with the Straits of 
Malacca. In 1993, Japan received 9 million tons of imports through the Strait, mostly 
coal, coke and iron ore from Africa. About one-quarter of two-way tonnage through the 
Strait was bound to or from Japan in 1993. Although the strait is relatively wide at about 
twelve miles across, draft is limited to 18 metres in places and strong currents hamper 
navigation to a greater degree than in the Straits of Malacca. Ships exiting the strait 
must also negotiate hazardous offshore oil installations in the Java Sea78 . As a result, 
most ships displacing in excess of 100,000 DWT use either Malacca or Lombok. If used 
as an alternative to the Straits of Malacca, Sunda would add around 8.5 per cent to the 
76 Ouchi Kazuomi, 'Making the Straits Safer: A User's View of Alternative Routes ', paper given at the 
International Conference on the Strait of Malacca: Meeting the Challenges of the 21 st Century, Malaysian 
Institute of Maritime Affairs, June 14 and 15, 1994; and Akaha Tsuneo, Japan in Global Ocean Politics, 
University of Hawaii Press and Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, Honolulu , 1985, p 19. 
77 Ouchi Kazuomi, 'Making the Straits Safer: A User's View of Alternative Routes ', paper given at the 
International Conference on the Strait of Malacca: Meeting the Challenges of the 21 st Century, Malaysian 
Institute of Maritime Affairs, June 14 and 15, 1994, p 4. 
78 John McBeth, 'Troubled Waters ', Far Eastern Economic Review, December 29, 1994 and January 5, 
1995, p 19; and H Djalal, Indonesia and the Law of the Sea , Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
Jakarta, 1995, p 357. 
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cost of a one-way voyage79 . (Until 1992, when the United States closed its bases in the 
Philippines, Sunda also connected US bases there with Diego Garcia, in the Indian 
Ocean80). 
iii) Lombok-Makassar. 
The Lombok strait separates Bali and Lombok and connects with the Makassar Strait to 
the north. Lombok-Macassar is the second most important strait in Southeast Asia for 
Japan's trade, with half of the total tonnage observed in the strait in 1993 bound to or 
from Japanese ports 81. Combined passage through the two straits is 660 nm. Both straits 
offer a minimum width of 11 miles and unlimited draft. For this reason, Lombok-
Makassar is the favoured deep-water alternative to the Straits of Malacca 82. According 
to Chia (in Hamzah ed., 1997), the volume of oil shipped to Japan from the Middle East 
is evenly split between Lombok and Straits of Malacca (the larger size of vessels 
meaning fewer are required). However, Noer and Gregory estimate that only 5.5 
million tons of crude was shipped through the Strait in 1993 (in eight VLCC transits and 
29 smaller tankers/3 . Iron ore and coke shipments from Australia account for most of 
the cargo moved through the Strait. 
To cover the extra 1,014 nm between Malacca and Lombok requ1res three days 
steaming and adds 13.5 per cent to shipping costs. The Lombok route offers potential 
economies of scale because its deeper draft enables passage of ULCCs above 300,000 
DWT. However, such gargantuan designs appear no longer to be favoured by tanker 
operators; given that the prevailing draft at most off-loading terminals would not 
accommodate them84. Despite the efforts of the Indonesian authorities to attract tanker 
traffic (and associated revenues) by installing mooring buoys and refuelling facilities off 
Ampenan, the main port in Lombok, the shift away from ULCC designs may reduce 
79 Russ Swinnerton, 'A Description of Regional Shipping Routes : Navigational and Operational 
Considerations', Maritime Studies, No. 87, March/April 1996, pp 10-22. 
80 D.P. Djalal, The Geopolitics of Indonesia's Maritime Territorial Policy, Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, Jakarta, 1996, p 130. 
81 John Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Econoniic Concerns in Southeast Asia, National 
Defense University Press/Center for Naval Analyses, Washington D.C., 1996, p 12. 
82 Chia Lin Sien in Harnzah (ed.). The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding 
and Navigational Safety, Maritime Institute of Malaysia/Pelanduk Publications, Kuala Lumpur, 1997, p 
107. 
83 John Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, National 
Defense University Press/Center for Naval Analyses, Washington D.C., 1996, p 61. 
84 According to Swinnerton significant fuel, operating and crewing cost savings are generated when a 
550,000 ton tanker passing through Lombok is compared with the 2.75 journeys it would require for a 
200,000 tanker to move an equivalent cargo though the Malacca Strait -- notwithstanding the limited 
number of VLCCs and extra capital and terminal costs involved ('A Description of Regional Shipping 
Routes: Navigational and Operational Considerations ', Maritime Studies, No. 87, March/April, 1996, pp 
17-19). 
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further the number of tankers transitting the Strait85 . However, Lombok remains the 
principal route for bulk caniers sailing from western Australia to Japan. 
In the event of the Straits of Malacca being closed, most Japanese tankers would have to 
pass through the Lombok Strait. According to one Japanese estimate, this would require 
an extra 15 tankers and add approximately $88 million to the annual import bill. Based 
on an oil import bill of $35 billion in 1997, this would amount to roughly 0.3 per cent of 
the total86 . Another source puts the per-ship cost for the entire detour through Lombok 
at $200,000-300,00087 . Among Japan's shipping firms, 'K' -line has studied re-routing 
options in case of a closure of the Straits of Malacca and maintains adequate bunker 
reserves to make the two-day diversion via the Sunda strait, in the case of shallow-draft' 
vessels, or otherwise via the Lombok Strait. In a worst-case scenario, the company has 
looked at a southerly route through the archipelago via Maluku, but has not considered 
the far longer di version south about Australia 88 . 
iv) South China Sea. 
In 1993, commercial transits through the South China Sea totalled 36,000 according to 
Noer and Gregory's estimate 89. Although not as enclosed as the Meditenanean, to 
which it has been compared, it shares some chokepoint characteristics (see Map 2). 
According to Kawamura (1998), owing to the shallowness of the sea sunounding the 
Spratly Islands, the South China Sea for practical purposes is a "sea lane where ships 
move primarily along the continental shelf'90 . Southern access is through the Malacca, 
Sunda or Lombok Straits. Eastern access is via the Sulu Sea. Northern access is via the 
Luzon Strait/Bashi channel and the Taiwan Strait. Shipping normally passes west of the 
Spratlys. The composition of shipping and cargoes bound to and from Japan via the 
South China Sea is basically the same as the Straits of Malacca and Sunda. During 
85 Chia Lin Sien in Hamzah (ed.). The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding 
and Navigational Safety, Maritime Institute of Malaysia/Pelanduk Publications , 1997, pp 116-119. 
86 Akimoto Kazumine, Re-routing Options and Consequences: "Safeguarding Seaborne Trade in Straits and 
Archipelagic Regimes", Conference paper given at the 13th International Conference on Sea Lines of 
Communications, Canbe1Ta, April 2001. 
87 John McBeth, 'Troubled Waters', Far Eastern Econoniic Review, December 29, 1994 and January 5, 
1995, p 19. 
88 Interview with Captain Yoshih.iro Osuka, Asst. General Manager, Marine Safety and Environmental 
Team, 'K' -Line (Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha), Tokyo, February 28 , 2002. 
89 John Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, National 
Defense University Press/Center for Naval Analyses, Washington D.C., 1996, p 56. 
9° Kawamura Sumihiko, 'Shipping and Seaborne Trade -- Regional Security Interests', The Kawamura 
Papers, The Kawamura Institute, Chiba, Japan, November 1998, p 108. 
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typhoon season, shipping using Lombok-Makassar enters the South China Sea via the 
Sulu Sea/Basilan Strait, south of Mindanao. 
Map 2: The South China Sea and island groups 
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The cost to Japan of a 12-month closure of the South China Sea, diverting oil tankers via 
the Lombok Strait and east of the Philippines, has been estimated at $200 million. A 
Japanese estimate puts the cost as basically the same to that imposed by a closure of the 
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Malacca Strait -- requiring 15 additional tankers to be added to the route and an extra 
$88 million in shipping costs. This is roughly corroborated by the reported findings of a 
joint study conducted by the Japan Defense Agency and the Indonesian authorities in 
the late 1980s that put the number of extra tankers required to divert around the South 
China Sea, via Lombok and east of the Philippines, at 1891 . 
Map 3: Oil shipment routes and volumes through Maritime Southeast Asia 
Source: John H. Noer with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, 
National Defense University Press/Center for Na val Analyses, Washington, I 996, p. 18. 
v) Ombai-Wetar. 
Also within Indonesian waters, the· Ombai passage, between Timor and the Alor islands, 
is wide and deep and for this reason is believed to be the favoured route for American 
submarines passing between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The interconnecting 
W etar passage runs between the Arafura Sea and Flores Sea. Ombai-W etar could be a 
significant diversionary route for Japanese commercial traffic if other passages were 
blocked, providing equidistant passage for Australian exports from the north and west to 
91 Interview with Admiral Sunardi, Republic of Indonesia Navy, J ak:arta, March 2000. 
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Japan and it is deep enough to take VLCCs92. Further east, the Torres Strait poses 
navigational hazards for vessels over 50,000 tons93 . For Japan's iron ore shipments 
forced to divert from northwestern Australia around Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, 
transportation costs would increase by 15-20 per cent94. 
In a worst-case scenario whereby the Indonesia archipelago was closed to international 
shipping, shipping from the Middle East and Europe to Japan could divert around 
Australia, although this would double the mileage compared with the Straits of Malacca 
route. Japanese estimates from the 1980s claim that shipping distances would be 
increased by up to 78 per cent if tankers were forced to sail around Australia95 . Noer 
and Gregory estimate that $1.5 billion would be added to Japan's annual oil import bill, 
compared with Akimoto's calculation of $1.2 billion96 . 
2.2 Middle Eastern chokepoints. 
The voyage between Japan and Gulf oil terminals typically takes 20 days each way97 . 
The distance from Yokohama to Aden, via the Straits of Malacca, is 6,535 nm (see Map 
4). The Strait of Hormuz sits at the mouth of the Gulf, where Japanese tankers were 
repeatedly attacked during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. A total of 13 million barrels 
per day is estimated to flow through the strait. Japan has a considerable stake in 
freedom of navigation tlu·ough the Strait of Hormuz, and accounts for around 20 per 
cent of all tanker tonnage. The strait is strategically important owing to the non-
availability of alternative tanker routes to access Gulf oil terminals (although there are 
alternative pipeline routes). Shipping passes through 2-mile wide lanes in either 
direction. 
92 B.R. Victor, 'Denial of Passage Rights in the Indonesian Archipelago -- Australian Implications' , Journal 
of the Australian Naval Institute, February 1994, p 45. 
93 David Shilling, 'A Reassessment of Japan's Naval Defense Needs', Asian Survey, Vol. 16 No. 3 (March 
1976), p 226. 
94 Hector J. Donohue, 'Protection of Sea Lines of Communications - Potential for Regional Co-operation in 
the Western Pacific ' Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, May 1990, pp 57-64. 
95 Akaha Tsuneo , 'Japan's Response to Threats of Shipping Disruptions in Southeast Asia and the Middle 
East ' , Pacific Affairs, Vol. 59, No . 2, Summer 1986, p 266. 
96 Akimoto Kazumine, "Re-routing Options and Consequences : Safeguarding Seaborne Trade in Straits and 
Archipelagic Regimes", Conference paper given at the 13th International Conference on Sea Lines of 
Communications , CanbeITa, April 2001. 
Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1975, p 190. 
Map 4: Indian Ocean and Middle-East chokepoints 
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However, the Strait of Hormuz is wide enough, despite overlapping 1naritime territorial 
claims by riparian states, for the extension of territorial seas to 12 nm under the United 
Nations Law of the Sea Convention not to have changed its international status. 
Moreover, its importance to global oil supplies makes it an area of international security 
concern. Closure of the Suez Canal, which is economically significant to Japan only for 
the container trade, would require diversion via the Cape of Good Hope, adding an 
additional ten days' steaming, or 23 per cent to the cost of exports shipped from 
Yokohama to Rotterdam. In February 2003, Japanese firms including Nissan, Sony and 
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Murata Manufacturing were reported to be considering diverting shipments to Europe 
normally routed through Suez via the Cape route, in response to an increased risk of a 
tenorist attack on the canal, in the context of US military action threatened against 
98 Iraq . 
Conclusion. 
This chapter has surveyed Japan's maritime geography and econormc structure and 
concluded that stockpiling, substitution, diversification and other economic contingency 
measures have not altered the defining characteristics of Japan's international political 
economy. These are its poor natural resource allocation, resulting import dependence 
and a large population relative to domestic food production. 
Since industrialisation, Japan's poor resource endowment has determined its 
international political economy, as the need to access overseas industrial and energy 
commodities, and food, has defined the central imperative of its foreign policy and 
security concerns. Globalisation and the transnationalisation of production under the 
control of multinationals have made maritime trade important to all advanced industrial 
econormes. While Japan's economic geography bears comparison with that of Taiwan 
and South Korea, it is important to note that Japan's dependence on imported 
commodities is on a far larger scale and the risks attached to supply disruption thus 
cany a very high premium for Japanese policy-makers. 
Stockpiling measures put in place in the 1970s serve to give the country a combined 
public-private cushion equivalent to five months' oil consumption in the civilian sector 
under normal conditions; a period that could probably be extended if austerity controls 
were enacted immediately. However, the comparatively lean energy consumption 
profile of industry since the oil crisis also means that there is limited latitude to 
iinplement austerity measures without affecting production, while the growth of 
automotive transport makes it more difficult to reduce dependence on petroleum. If 
Japan were to switch to an austerity footing, import requirements for fuels, raw 
materials and non-substitutable food items could be cut to around one-third or 
approximately 240 million tons, based on the 720 million tons of goods imported in 
1996. As Shilling suggests, essential import requirements could be cut further if the 
98 
'Japanese companies mull alternate distribution routes to avoid Middle East fracas', The Nikkei Weekly, 
February 10, 2003, at: www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/AC/TNW/Search/Nni20030210FR7IRAQI.htm. Itocho 
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insurance premiums in the Middle East. 
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government decided to forego export earnings. However, the economic costs of doing 
so could be sustained only a temporary basis without incuning a balance of payments 
crisis ( as of November 2002, Japan's foreign exchange reserves were equivalent to 
estimated import cover of 8.5 months). 
The structure of Japan's international seaborne trade has created a particular economic 
dependence on the southwestern SLOC connecting Japan with Southeast Asia, the 
Middle East and Europe, and especially the Straits of Malacca -- Japan's energy 
'lifeline'. Australia's role as an energy, minerals and food supplier to Japan also makes 
the southern SLOC strategically important, while the trans-pacific SLOC to North and 
South America hold great economic as well as militarily significance for Japan. Against 
the risk of a localised obstruction occuning in chokepoints along these SLOC, 
considerable scope exists for alternative routing, the security implications of which are 
taken up in Chapters Two and Six. 
Having established the geographic and economic fundamentals of Japan's vulnerability 
to SLOC disruption, I move next, in Chapter Two, to consider the definition of SLOC 
security and threats to shipping in a generalised, strategic context. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Sea Lines in Strategy 
Introduction. 
This chapter explores the historical background to, and definition of, sea lines of 
communication (SLOC), as a strategic concept. Its examines how SLOC security has 
evolved over the last century by drawing upon 'classical' theories of sea power, the 
evidence of the two world wars, the Cold War and the post-Cold War period. Japan is 
included to the extent that its experience is corroborative of, or runs contrary to, 
common patterns identified. However, the purpose of the chapter is to identify a 
'universal' definition of SLOC security which can be applied in subsequent chapters to 
the particular perceptions and policy choices that have shaped Japan's SLOC concerns 
since 1940. 
The security of 'sea lines of communication', a military term that has crossed over into 
international relations, is still widely assumed to be among the leading national security 
concerns of maritime corrnnercial and naval powers, such as the United States and 
Japan. This is despite the fact that the last major conventional conflict at sea occurred 
more than 20 years ago, in the Falkland Islands -- the only occasion since 1945 that a 
submarine has sunk another vessel in anger. In the light of how common references to 
the security of SLOC -- or sea lanes -- have become, there has been little accompanying 
effort to define these terms conceptually or geographically. 
This chapter tracks the ong1ns of 'sea lines of communications', with reference to 
classical theories of sea power and how these strategic premises have been re-evaluated 
over two world wars, the Cold War and the decade since, which has heralded the rise of 
non-state threats to shipping from terrorism and piracy, and seen the definition of 
maritime security develop fro1n a 'narrow' military base to encompass a broader policy 
agenda. The analytical focus spans economic geography, diplomacy, military science 
and law enforcement -- fields that must be set in general context before being subject to 
more detailed scrutiny in Japan's case in subsequent chapters. The historical lens used 
in this chapter is deliberately extended. This reflects the assumption, notwithstanding 
the rise of security risks posed to shipping by terrorism and piracy, that military threats 
(whatever their likelihood) retain the most significant potential to disrupt sea 
communications on a systemic scale. As long as navies, such as Japan's, continue to 
focus on the importance of SLOC security as a core rationale, it is necessary to take 
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account of the empirical record of three major strategic offensives against merchant 
shipping during the two world wars, which continue to cast a long shadow over doctrine 
and institutional memory. Japan' s pre-1945 SLOC security is the subject of the 
following chapter, but reference to Japan's historical experience is included here to the 
extent that it highlights 'universal' themes. The relevance of theories of sea power 
formulated in the era of 'navalism' and high imperialism may appear of questionable 
relevance to the contemporary parameters of maritime security, given the magnitude of 
technical and political change in the intervening century. However, the works of Mahan 
and Corbett, as well as later writers such as Castex and Brodie, are helpful in distilling 
first principles. 
I. Principles of sea communications. 
The importance of controlling communications 1s a central tenet of many classical 
theories of sea power. In The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783, the work 
that from its publication in 1890 established Alfred Thayer . Mahan' s reputation as the 
doyen of sea power advocates, Mahan wrote that "certain well-worn paths" exist within 
the "wide common" of the sea within which ships are concentrated and vulnerable to 
obstruction1. Great Britain's foremost famous naval strategist, Sir Julian Corbett, was a 
contemporary and a critic of Mahan, whose Some Principles of Maritinie Strategy was 
published in 1911. Corbett in particular asserted that "all problems of Naval Strategy 
can be reduced to tenns of 'passage and co1nmunication'" -- a nautical term dating from 
the late 18th century2. 
'Sea power' can be broken down into 'command of the sea', denoting a somewhat 
idealised state in which the freedom of movement on, above or under the sea is 
unchallenged and the now more widely used relative term, 'sea control ' , the corollary of 
which is ' sea denial'. Although Corbett's theory of maritime strategy was mainly 
concerned with the positive uses of command of the sea, he appreciated equally that the 
sea has a negative strategic value in terms of its denial to an enemy, which for 
continental powers seeking mainly to deter or delay intervention by maritime powers 
1nay of itself be a sufficient objective3. 
1 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1 783, First Ame1ican Century 
Series Edition , Hill and Wang, New York, 1957, p 9. 
2Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Ma ritime Strategy, Naval Institute Press Classics of Sea Power Series, 
Annapolis, 1988, pp 315-323 . 
3 Ibid. p 94. 
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SLOC originates from an analogy drawn with overland lines of supply -- including the 
fixed infrastructure of roads and railways -- used by armies to connect frontline forces 
with bases and production centres in the rear, in turn requiring control, or at least the 
benign neutrality of surrounding tenitory. Owing to the very different properties of 
water, the definition of lines of communication at sea is more relative. Corbett regarded 
naval strategy conceptually as a battle over sea communications for the objective of 
gaining control and ultimately command of the sea. However, he also realised that an 
analogy drawn between conquest of tenitory and dominance over sea space has the 
potential to mislead because "the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or 
l . ,,4 ownersup . Definitional problems sunounding SLOC that risk confusing military 
principles of land power with those of sea power are compounded by the use of such 
terms as 'chokepoints', 'sea lanes', 'strategic waterways', 'trade routes', 'focal areas' , 
'maritime approaches' and similar terms that risk conflating principles of naval strategy 
with principles of market economics governing trade. 
The most basic, passive, strategic quality of sea space is as a barrier to the movement of 
peoples and armies. The defensive advantages that separation by water offers against 
invasion, although latterly eroded with the advent of air power, long-range missiles · or 
indeed 'asy1nmetric' tenorist attacks, still pertains to the contemporary strategic 
environment. Since 1945, the logistical and operational difficulties involved in 
mounting large-scale amphibious warfare have meant that only a select number of states 
have the capabilities required to do so. As a reflection of the rising costs of military 
action, among those who possess such capability, very few have done so against 
opposition; the US landings at Inchon during the 1950-53 Korean War; the Anglo-
French landings at Suez in 1956 and the UK reoccupation of the Falkland Islands in 
1982 being ainong a handful of post-war examples. 
While teclu1ology continues to erode the barriers posed by distance, and non-state actors 
are increasingly the focus of tlu·eat perceptions, physical geography still exerts a cardinal 
influence on the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare. Australia's post-
Vietnam defence doctrine has been defined with reference to the 'sea-air ' gap separating 
it from the Indonesian archipelago 5. Japan's defence white paper contains the premise 
that "as Japan is made up of an arch-shaped archipelago, a foreign country has to invade 
4 Ibid. p 95 . 
5 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canben-a, 1986. 
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it via sea and air"6. Further back in history, the Tsushima Strait, although separating 
Japan from the Korean peninsula by only 40 miles, formed a baITier that thwarted 
successive attempts by the Mongols to invade, even though Japan itself lacked a navy 7. 
The Tokugawa Shogunate's policy of maintaining national seclusion for over two 
hundred years would not have been possible had Japan not been an island nation. The 
strategic advantages for Japan of being an island nation "sealed relatively well from 
external threats" continue to be stressed in a contemporary context, as by Sato Seizaburo 
(1996) who argues that the country's experiment with post-war pacifism is paiily made 
possible by geography8. Buzan (1995) observes in a Japanese context that "isolationism 
can sometimes be a workable security policy in a way that it almost never can be for 
continental states"9. 
In an active sense, the relative efficiency of waterborne transportation compared with 
overland means has afforded decisive strategic advantages -- both in terms of projecting 
power and conducting trade -- to those states possessing the necessary technology, 
resources and political foresight to construct ocean-going fleets. Militarily, as Norman 
Friedman has observed, sea communications have given maritime states advantages 
comparable to interior lines of communication on land 10. Commercially, the advantages 
of waterborne transportation are such that it costs as much to ship one tonne of coal from 
Australia to Great Britain as it does to transport the same amount 150 miles within Great 
Britain via rail 11 . 
Such paradoxical strategic qualities of the sea, as part-buffer and part-enabler are borne 
out in Great Britain's historical experience. The na1Tow Channel separating the English 
south coast from Continental Europe proved sufficient for Great Britain to escape 
domination by successive continental hegemons -- Philippine Spain, Napoleonic France 
and Nazi Germany -- each unable to project their superior land strength over water. 
Conversely, Great Britain's access to the sea and possession of a large naval and 
merchant fleet paved the way for the establishment -- if more by accident than design --
6 Defense of Japan 1997, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, 1997, p 105. 
7 Luck was also on Japan ' s side: although bad weather frustrated the Mongols ' two invasion attempts in the 
late 13th century, Japan was able to launch a brief but highly destructive invasion of Korea across the strait 
via Pusan, under Hideyoshi, from 1592-98. (Hermann Kinder and Werner Hilgemann, The Penguin Atlas of 
World History, Volume One, Penguin , 1978, p 227). 
8 Sato Seizaburo, 'Clarifying the Right of Collective Self-Defense', Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 3 No. 2, 
Fall/Winter 1996, pp 98-99. 
9 Barry Buzan, 'Japan's Defence Problematique ' , The Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No . l , 1995, p 26. 
10 Norman Friedman, The U.S. Maritinie Strategy , Jane's , London, 1988, p 62. 
11 Eric Grove, 'The Secmity of Shipping: the Global Perspective' in Bateman and Bates (eds), Shipping and 
Regional Security, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 129, SDSC, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1998, p 2. 
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of a global trading network and overseas territorial acquisitions. While mercantilism 
enabled Britain strategically to 'out-flank' European continental powers , its naval 
superiority also enabled it to capture the overseas trade of weaker mercantile powers 
such as Portugal and Holland. In the countervailing case of Japan, the Tokugawa 
Shogunate ' s two centuries of reliance on the sea as a physical barrier to foreign 
encroachment was conve1ied overnight into a strategic liability with the aiTival of 
Commodore Perry's 'black ships' in Uraga Bay in 1853. Because Japan's military 
technology had remained in stasis during its self-imposed isolation, rapid exposure to 
superior Western military technology left the Shogunate little choice but to accede to 
trade treaties on unfavourable terms, paving the way for its downfall. 
Sea power, when used to project power on land can confer decisive force multiplier 
effects upon an attacking force tln·ough manoeuvre and surprise. At one extreme, the 
Normandy landings in 1944 -- which remain the largest-scale example of maritime 
power projection to date -- succeeded because opposing forces were dispersed thinly 
along Europe's coastal periphery, affording the Allies the initiative to choose the time 
and place at which to mass their forces. However, the possession of maritime forces can 
equally give rise to a temptation to strategic 'over-stretch'. From Athens' campaign 
against Syracuse during the Peloponnesian Wars to the Anglo-French campaigns in the 
Crimea (1854-56), and the Dardenelles (1915-16), the difficulties of operating at the end 
of an extended seaborne supply chain with poor intelligence has given rise to many 
militai·y failures, while the D-Day landings themselves were made possible only through 
meticulous pla1ming and preparation and the bitter lessons of raids such as that of 
Dieppe. In naval strategy too, 'concentration', has long been stressed as a cardinal 
principle, on the basis that the military effectiveness of naval forces generally declines 
the further that these are deployed from their home bases (nuclear submarines being one 
. d . )P maJor mo ern exception -. 
Mahan and Corbett rose to influence before the First World War, in a strategic context 
dominated by a few , mainly European naval powers. Although sea mines , submarines, 
aircraft and torpedoes had all been invented, the surface dimension was predominant. 
The major naval conflict of the era, the 1904-05 Russo-I apanese War, culminating in the 
epic gun-duel at Tsushima, appeared to confirm the primacy of the battle ship, 
reinforcing what Corbett termed the 'battle faith' of the Royal Navy, as well its 
12 Michael MccGwire, 'The Geopolitical Importance of Strategic Waterways in the Asian-Pacific Regional', 
Orbis , Vol. 19, No. 3, Fall 1975, pp 1059-60. 
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Japanese, European and US counterparts 13 . This focus on the decisive battle-fleet 
encounter he thought distracted naval planners from the true purpose of naval strategy 
which is to gain control over maritime communications, rather than to annihilate enemy 
fleets per se 14. However, the operational debut of new weapons such as torpedoes and 
sea mines, which had cost Admiral Togo Heihachiro' s fleet two battleships during the 
blockade of the Russian Far East squadron at P~rt Arthur, forewarned that the 
battleship's supremacy was threatened and that the days of the close blockade were 
numbered. By 1914, the close blockade was no longer viable against the increased 
lethality of inshore defences. Instead, the Royal Navy opted for a distant blockade to 
contain the German fleet during the First World War, though at the expense of ceding it 
limited freedom of movement within the N 011h Sea. 
Mahan advanced the view that "The necessity of a navy ... springs ... from the existence 
of a peaceful shipping and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has 
aggressive tendencies"15 . However, his belief in -- and prescriptions for -- achieving sea 
power were guided more by a deterministic and dogmatic view of naval power as an end 
in itself rather than being instrumentally linked to trade protection. Mahan held that a 
set of criteria (geographical location; physical conformity, including natural resources 
and climate; extent of tenitory; population; national character and political system) 
together constituted 'natural conditions' determining the development of sea power 
among states. However, Mahan also differentiated functionally between 'lines of 
communication' to support foreign military ventures such as Napoleon's offensive in 
Egypt and 'lines of travel', or trade routes16 . 
Corbett saw overland and maritime lines of communication sharing tlu·ee common 
military purposes, as: 
1) lines of supply; 
2) lines of lateral communication; and 
3) lines of retreat. 
13 Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantages of Navies in War, The Free Press, 
New York, 1992, pp 17-18. 
14 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Naval Institute Press Classics of Sea Power 
Series, Annapolis, 1988, p 95. 
15 Alfred Thayer Mal1~, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783, First American Century 
Series Edition, Hill and Wang, New York, 1957, p 23. 
16 Ibid. p 9. 
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He fu1iher subdivided maritime communications into those required by the belligerents' 
fleets for supply of fuel, stores and ammunition; communications between an army 
overseas and its home base; trade routes (which service the resource needs of the 
belligerents' home bases); and 'lateral' communications between their overseas bases17 . 
Corbett's claim that command of the sea "means nothing but the control of maritime 
communications, whether for commercial or military purposes"18 , was echoed during the 
inter-war period by the French Admiral, Raoul Castex, who wrote that "The mission of 
maritime forces is simply to dominate lines of communications, and the achievement of 
that situation is normally described as having sea mastery"19. Eric Grove suggests that 
Corbett's attachment to the abstract appeal of 'lines of communication' may have led 
him astray intellectually from the premise that it is ships, rather than belts of sea, that 
have intrinsic strategic value20 . However, it is notable that the concept of patrolled sea 
routes, in conjunction with the blockade of enemy ports, had been advocated by a British 
Admiralty committee as early as 1885, after concluding that convoying had become an 
". . bl " 21 1mpractica e concept . 
Commerce warfare received only peripheral attention from Mahan, who thought that it 
"could not be by itself alone decisive"22. Similarly, Corbett's recognition that the 
security of bulk imports and food had become a "a matter of life and death" for Great 
Britain did not sway him from his conviction that the guerre de course (literally, 'the 
war of the chase') was marginal within naval strategy. The objective of dominating the 
enemy's communications would be achieved by seeking out the enemy's fleet "nine 
times out of ten". 
However, Corbett also asserted that if maritime communications are shut down and 
command of the sea established, then the analogy with tenitorial conquest is close, since 
economic pressure on one's enemy begins immediately, unlike on land where it only 
l7 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Naval Institute Press Classics of Sea Power 
Series, Annapolis, 1988, pp 315-323. 
ts Ibid. xx.ix, p 94. 
19 Raoul Castex, Strategic Theories: Selections translated by Eugenia C. Kiesling, Naval Institute Press 
Classics of Seapower Series , Annapolis, 1994, p 36. Castex, though a lesser influence on naval theory is 
included within the scope of this study because he wrote during the inter-war period and from a national 
perspective more attuned to 'sea denial' strategies, unlike both Mahan and Corbett, whose focus lay more in 
the pursuit of 'sea command'. 
20 Preface by E1ic J. Grove in Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritinie Strategy, Naval Institute Press 
Classics of Sea Power Series, Annapolis, 1988, xxxv. 
21 Desmond Wettem, 'Ships, not lines, must be defended ', Pacific Defence Reporter, 1989 Annual 
Reference Edition, p 93. 
22 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783 first published 1890, First 
American Century Series Edition, Hill and Wang, New York, 1957, pp 27-28, 481n. 
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follows a military result23 . Corbett's apparent failure to grasp the strategic potential of 
the guerre de course may be attributed partly to the then-untested potential of the 
submarine as a weapon of economic blockade. Since Corbett held that "No power will 
incur the odium of sinking a prize with all hands" barely six years before the German 
Navy adopted unrestricted U-boat warfare against Allied merchant ships , it was also the 
product of a highly conditioned mode of thinking from the perspective of an established 
naval power, in which the non-lethal seizure of ships was still regarded as "more akin to 
a process of law . . . than to a military operation"24. 
Corbett saw focal areas and terminals, where concentration is unavoidable, as merchant 
ships' greatest point of vulnerability, but thought these could be adequately defended by 
a flotilla guard25 . He also rejected the notion that trade routes in the open ocean were 
"undefended", believing that Great Britain's merchant fleet was large enough, when 
measured against the threat of attack from surface raiders, to ensure that sufficient 
imports would reach the home islands without the need to organise convoys that might 
otherwise dilute limited naval resources26. 
II. The world wars. 
The Central Powers' North Atlantic submarine campaign during the First World War 
demonstrated that even in the face of a successful Allied blockade of Germany's battle 
fleet, a 'counter-blockade' could be mounted using submarines. The first Battle of the 
Atlantic revealed new vulnerabilities for maritime powers in an · attrition-based conflict 
decided ultimately by industrial capacity and economic stamina. By breaking down the 
conceptual distinction between 'military' and 'commercial' shipping, the conflict eroded 
taboos against targeting merchant shipping and using "all means of effective maritime 
pressure", leading ultimately to 'um·estricted' U-boat warfare, from February 191727 . 
The first Battle of the Atlantic demonstrated that a potentially decisive sea denial 
capability, in the submarine arm, could operate independently of forces challenging for 
sea control. In April 1917, a total of 852,000 tons of Allied shipping, including one-
quarter of all merchant ships leaving UK po11s , was lost, taking the country ' s domestic 
food stocks to within six weeks of exhaustion. The potency of the submarine is 
23 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Naval Institu te Press Classics of Sea Power 
Series, Annapolis, 1988 , pp 100-101. 
24 Ibid. p 269 . 
25 Ibid. pp 261-65 . 
26 Ibid. pp 270-75 . 
27 Raoul Cas tex, Strategic Theories: Selections translated by Eugenia C. Kiesling, Naval Institute Press 
Classics of Seapower Series, Annapolis , 1994, p 39. 
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appreciated from the small numbers of U-boats committed (a total of 199 were lost 
during the war), the relatively unsophisticated tactics used (single U-boats operating 
independently) and the partial blockade, by mine fields, of the main ingress points from 
Germany's North Sea U-boat pens to the Atlantic. After raids against Germany's 
submarine bases and despite persisting with the "proven futility" of area anti-submarine 
patrols, merchant losses were not properly curtailed until the convoy system was fully 
operational in August 1917, after being adopted belatedly in May2
8
. 
Based on his expenence during the First World War, Castex (who commanded 
antisubmarine patrols in the Mediterranean, where Japanese Imperial Navy vessels were 
also operating on the Allied side) believed that acquiring a limited capacity for sea 
denial might be adequate, at least for a continental power, to preserve territorial gains 
against intervention by maritime powers. He recognised that in the age of total war, 
economic factors themselves had become 'military', but believed that a distinction could 
still be drawn between; first, 'peacetime' maritime communications as the foundation of 
econormc wealth; and second, communications during war. The latter could be 
separated functionally into: i) those required to sustain a war economy; ii) those 
allowing forces to be moved; and iii) those fulfilling the function of internal 
communications under certain geographic conditions29 . 
Castex stressed the importance of national geography, population and the distribution of 
resources -- energy, raw materials and food -- in deciding the different extent to which a 
disruption of seaborne trade would affect states. By the 1920s, when most major navies 
had converted or were converting from coal to oil as their primary bunker fuel it was 
already clear that oil was in a category of its own among strategic commodities. Given 
the expectation that in future conflicts victory would flow ultimately from economic 
strength, "accessory conce1ns" such as navy-transport bureau relations, stockpiling and 
austerity measures to limit import demand were also recognised by Castex as linked 
within an overall national effort. 
Although Castex maintained that the guerre de course could not be independently 
decisive, he saw the potential of the sub1narine and aeroplane to erode the dominance of 
surface fleets, and was thus a keen proponent of the submarine
30
. Regarding measures to 
protect shipping against submarines, he considered convoy to be superior to arming, 
28 Liddell Hart, 'History of the First World War ' , Redwood Burn, Trowbridge & Escher, 1977, pp 400-03 . 
29 Raoul Castex, Strategic Theories: Selections translated by Eugenia C. Kiesling, Naval Institute Press 
Classics of Seapower Series, Annapolis , 1994, p 30. 
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diverting or independently routing merchant ships, stressing that convoy rmn1rmses 
losses, returns the initiative to the defence by maximising the potential for counter-attack 
and maintains the focus correctly on defending "the objects themselves rather than the 
space"31. Based on his experience as a practitioner in anti-submarine warfare, he 
rejected the concept of patrolled areas as misconceived 32. 
During both world wars, the Battle of the Atlantic was a contest between 1naritime 'sea 
control' and continental 'sea denial' powers. On both occasions, a maritime coalition 
with Great Britain and the United States at its core sought to assert sea control in order 
to maintain trans-atlantic communications to sustain Great Britain's war eff 01i and to 
project US military power into Europe (and in the Second World War, North Africa), 
against a German-led alliance that sought to sever sea communications binding the 
maritime coalition together. Germany's surface fleet, while venturing out in the early 
phases of both wars, was unable successfully to challenge the UK and US navies for sea 
control in the Atlantic, leading to its confinement as a 'fleet in being' in the North Sea 
during the First World War and to its piecemeal destruction in the Second. However, by 
means of a strategic offensive against merchant shipping led by submarines and aided by 
mines and shore-based aircraft, Germany nonetheless significantly disrupted the 
maritime supply chain between the United States and Great Britain and between the 
latter and the Soviet Union. 
In the Second World War, the U-boat threat was eventually stemmed, though at a cost in 
resources far in excess of those committed by Germany to its submarine campaign, 
estimated by one source at a ratio of at least 15: 133. The approximately 900 submarines 
of the Kriegsniarine at Admiral Karl von Doenitz' s disposal (781 of which were lost) 
sank 14.57 million tons of Allied and neutral shipping, or 60 per cent of the totai34. In 
addition to the direct losses, this forced the Allies to divert substantial naval assets to the 
defence of shipping -- withholding their use for offensive applications -- and delayed the 
flow of men and materiel across the Atlantic, thus pushing back the date of the 
Normandy invasion from 1943. 
Bernard Brodie (1943) noted that, contrary to the evidence of naval conflicts up to the 
Russo-Japanese war, the German anti-shipping campaigns in the Atlantic in the First and 
30 Ibid. pp 360-63, 372-377. 
31 Ibid. pp 367-70. 
32 Ibid. p 368. 
33 Michael Poirier, 'Sea Control and Regional Warfare ', U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , July 1993 , p 64. 
34 John Winton, Convoy: The Defence of Sea Trade 1890-1990, Michael Joseph, 1983 , p 319. 
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Second World Wars suggested that "the decision on the seas might go not to the 
belligerent with a stronger navy, but to the one least vulnerable to interrupted 
communications"35 . Brodie concluded that disputed sea control had beco1ne the norm in 
naval warfare, as the submarine acted as an equaliser for lesser naval powers, unable to 
vie for command of the sea on the surface36 . Brodie regarded the maintenance of trans-
atlantic communications as a sine qua non of victory in the Second World War, echoing 
Winston Churchill's "only real fear" of losing the Battle of the Atlantic. In total war, 
Brodie recognised -- as had Castex earlier -- that the outcome depended as much on the 
industrial capacity of the United States and Great Britain to produce sufficient shipping 
to compensate for losses as it did on naval strategy37 . 
In the Pacific theatre during the Second World War, the Japanese Imperial Navy sought 
to establish sea control in the Western Pacific by forcing a decisive encounter with the 
US main battle fleet. The rapidity of its military successes in 1941-42 disguised the 
country's vulnerability to a merchant blockade until US submarines and aircraft were in 
a position to exploit it, in 1943-44. (Japan's pre-1945 SLOC security is fully discussed 
in Chapter Three). 
Brodie identified three types of defensive cover for shipping; 'general cover', evasive 
routing and direct protection38 . First, general cover refers to the indirect protection 
conferred through command of the sea, secured by a superior naval force disposed in 
such a way as either to destroy or neutralise a hostile fleet-in-being. Second, against the 
tlu·eat of sub-surface or air attack, the most basic form of protection for merchant 
shipping is evasive routing except near to terminals where concentration is 
unavoidable39 . Brodie noted that during the early phases of both world wars, merchant 
raiders enjoyed their greatest success by preying upon lone ships whose inexperienced 
or uninformed captains adhered to predictable peacetime routes. Third, of strategies 
aimed at direct protection, convoy presented merchant ships with greater overall security 
compared to single sailings. 
35 Bernard Brodie, A Laynian's Guide to Naval Strategy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
1943 , p 84. 
36 Ibid. p 59. 
37 Ibid. p 85. 
38 Ibid. pp 82-103. 
39 There are four categories of evasive routing: unescorted convoy, random independent routing, stream 
routing and wave routing. (Hector J. Donohue 'Protection of Sea Lines of Communications -- Potential for 
Regional Co-operation in the Western Pacific ', Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, May 1990, pp 57-
64 ). 
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Since the end of the Napoleonic wars, convoy has periodically been discarded as "dull 
and unspectacular work" only to be resunected belatedly in extreniis, usually to positive 
effect40 . During the First World War, convoy was initially resisted as logistically 
difficult to organise and tactically flawed by presenting a concentrated target limited to 
the speed of the slowest vessels in the group. However, after being introduced in May 
1917 the convoy system had within five months reduced the rate of Allied shipping lost 
to one-qua11er that of April -- and to just 1 per cent of shipping under convoy41 . The 
United States had been an enthusiastic supporter of convoys in the First World War. By 
the time it entered the Second World War, valuable information on convoying routes 
and procedure had passed out of the Navy's institutional memory. Only disastrous 
losses suffered by Allied shipping operating off the US eastern seaboard in the first half 
of 1942 challenged the prevailing US view that "The Navy does not like convoys. It is a 
purely defensive form of warfare ... in so far as enemy submarine warfare forces us to 
use the convoy system, we unwittingly play into his hands"42. 
Once established, convoys were demonstrated during both world wars to offer the most 
effective protection, proving only marginally easier to detect than single ships, as well as 
offering the 1nost effective means of counterattack. Convoy was, according to the 
authoritative post-Second World War account 43 , a means "not only of protecting 
shipping but of locating and destroying U-boats" 44 . Given the shortage of naval vessels 
available for escort duty, the concentration of merchant shipping in convoy presented the 
most efficient means to allocate limited resources for their protection. Of the 2,240 
merchant ships lost in the Atlantic and Arctic, 63 per cent were either sailing singly or 
were separated from their convoys45 . 
Many of the lessons from the Second World War were specific to the differing 
geography and distribution of capabilities in the Atlantic and Pacific theatres. However, 
a number of general principles regarding SLOC security from both world wars can be 
advanced. In both conflicts a maritime coalition, based on an Anglo-US trans-atlantic 
40 James A. Boutilier, 'Air Defence of Merchant Ships ', Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Vol. 15, 
No. 3, August 1989, p 41. 
41 Liddell Hart, 'History of the First World War', Redwood Bum, Trowb1idge & Escher, 1977, p 402. 
42 Quoted in Eric J. Grove (ed). The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939-1945; A Revised Edition 
of the (1957) Naval Staff History Volumes IA (Text and Appendices) and lB (Plans and Tables), The Navy 
Records Society/ Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot, 1997, p 13, 32. 
43 D.W. Waters' confidential 1957 staff history The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939-1945, 
edited by Eric Grove, was released by the Navy Records Society in 1997. 
44 Eric J. Grove (ed). The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939-1945; A Revised Edition of the 
(1957) Naval Staff History Volumes IA (Text and Appendices) and lB (Plans and Tables), The Navy 
Records Society/ Ashgate Publishing Limited, Alders hot, 1997, p 49. 
45 Desmond Wettem, "Ships, not lines, must be defended", Pacific Defence Reporter, 1989 Annual 
Reference Edition, p 93. 
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axis, was victorious against a predominantly continental alliance. This observation 
excludes the fact that the Soviet Union/Russia was present as a continental ally on the 
Allied side to absorb most of Germany's military energy, while Japan was a key 
maritime power that was nonetheless defeated in the Second World War. However, the 
US-UK experience in the Atlantic in the world wars demonstrated that sea 
communications were surprisingly robust in the face of sustained military pressure, once 
measures for the defence of shipping (and convoy in particular) were organised. Trans-
atlantic SLOC also yielded strategic advantages as well as vulnerabilities, allowing 
maritime (and air) power to be projected throughout Western Europe and North Africa 
and enabling strategic economies comparable to those which Germany enjoyed 
internally within occupied Europe. The Japanese experience showed, equally, that if 
inadequately defended, SLOC could lay open import-dependent belligerents to a 
blockade of merchant shipping that would eventually sap their industrial capacity to 
suppo1i modern warfare. The Allies' distant blockade of the European Central Powers 
in 1914-18 showed that, over time, blockade could be effective in downgrading the 
fighting power of even relatively autarkic continental powers. 
In both world wars, attempts to institute patrolled lanes proved to be unambiguous and 
costly failures. In spite of the poor record of such efforts when attempted in 1916-17 off 
the south-west coast of Ireland, the 'Ship Lane Patrol' when mounted by the US Navy in 
early 1942 off the US Atlantic seaboard proved singularly unable either to locate enemy 
submarines or to protect merchant shipping. The introduction of convoy in the Atlantic 
thus corrected the "fallacious doctrine" that sea routes or sea lines of communications 
possessed concrete reality or strategic value independently of the ships themselves 46. 
Germany's submarine offensive in 1940-43, although ultimately unsuccessful, 
demonstrated the strategic potential of the submarine-led counter-blockade. Germany's 
anti-shipping campaign and that of the United States in the Pacific achieved results out 
of all propo1iion to the resources invested. Indeed, a German victory in the Battle of the 
Atlantic might well have been secured had more resources been committed to von 
Doenitz' s submarine programme at an earlier stage, denying Great Britain and its allies 
the time to re-learn half-forgotten strategies such as convoy and bring their cumulative 
industrial superiority to bear. 
46 Eric J. Grove (ed). The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939-1945; A Revised Edition of the 
(1957) Naval Staff History Volumes IA (Text and Appendices) and lB (Plans and Tables), The Navy 
Records Society/ Ashgate Publishing Limited, Alders hot, 1997, p 49. 
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During the Second World War in the Pacific, Japan benefited initially from substantial 
sea control yielded during the US and European retreat from Southeast Asia, as well as 
an island screen against the Pacific 'proper', extending south through Okinawa, 
Formosa/Taiwan, to the Philippine and Indonesian and Micronesian archipelagos, 
allowing it to maintain resource in-flows from East Asia and the South Pacific with only 
limited impedance until the second half of 1943. However, once the United States had 
overcome technical, doctrinal and logistical obstacles to employing its submarines 
effectively, its anti-shipping campaign from late 1943 onwards (latterly assisted by 
earner and land-based aviation), proved that targeting maritime econorruc 
communications could be independently decisive. Despite possessing submarines and 
torpedoes technically superior to those of the United States, the Imperial Navy itself 
failed to exploit the potential for attacking extended US SLOC sustaining MacArthur's 
and Ninlitz' s amphibious pincer movements, respectively pushing north from Australia 
and west from Hawaii -- such was the strength of its 'battle faith'. 
III. The Cold War. 
At the end of the Second World War, at the very moment that US Navy appeared set to 
e1nerge as the dominant naval power of the future, the introduction of nuclear weapons 
rendered questionable future scenarios for sustained, high-intensity conflict between 
1naritime powers. The advent of the nuclear age threatened to make obsolete the 
traditional power-projection role of the US Navy. The US Navy responded to this partly 
technical, partly bureaucratic challenge ( on the pai1 of the Air Force) by arguing for and 
gaining control over the submarine component of the nuclear 'strategic triad' 47 . It also 
lobbied successfully to retain a conventional strike capability based around carrier battle 
groups, which have since formed the core of its post-war force structure. Until the mid-
to late 1960s, US naval superiority over the Soviet Union was not questioned. 
Conventional military conflict between the superpowers, although planned for on the 
scenario of a Warsaw Pact move on western Europe and other regional flashpoints, took 
on proxy forms in 'wars of national liberation', in which the United States was rarely 
challenged at sea. As a result, logistic lines of communication across the Pacific used to 
sustain US interventions on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam were largely 
unimpeded. 
While the importance of shipping protection in western naval planning diminished after 
1945, the lessons learned and institutionally retained from the Second World War 
47 James A. Boutilier, 'Air Defence of Merchant Ships ', Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Vol. 15, 
No. 3, August 1989, p 42. 
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continued to feed into western naval planning during the Cold War. This was evident 
from the Radford-Collins Naval Control of Shipping Agreement of 1951 , which arose 
from discussions among senior naval officers from the United States, Great Britain, 
Australia and New Zealand who set out to divide the Pacific into geographical zones of 
responsibility for the protection of merchant shipping including such activities as 
convoying, safe routing and the exchange of weather information, anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW), search and rescue, and surveillance (the latter being subject to a further 
agreement in 1978)48. Organisations for the Naval Control of Shipping (NCS), spanning 
such activities as authorising sailings, route selection, the organisation of convoys , 
tactical di versions and movement reporting continued to be maintained beyond the Cold 
War by the United States and allies such as Australia and Singapore, manned largely by 
naval reservists49. 
Until the mid-1960s , the Soviet Union restricted its maritime ambitions to developing a 
'brown water' navy for coastal operations and to constructing its own fleet of strategic 
missile submarines. From the late 1960s, Western planners perceived a rising potential 
Soviet threat to US sea control in both the North Atlantic and No1ih Pacific, particularly 
from Soviet attack submarines "primarily aimed at interdicting our sea lines of 
communication" used to re-supply US forward-deployed forces and those of its allies50 . 
In response to the build-up of the Soviet Navy and the emergence of new sub-surface 
and air threats to the blue-water operations of US aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), initial variants of a 'maritime strategy' stressed 
the direct defence of US military SLOC51 . 
At the end of the 1970s, a far more ambitious version of the maritime strategy was 
developed, closely associated with Admirals John F. Lehman and James D. Watkins 
(appointed Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations , respectively, under the 
Reagan administration) who believed that by using the superiority of the US Navy in 
mobile strike power to target Soviet SSBNs and other high-value targets , the Soviet 
Navy would be forced to divert its su1iace, air and submarine assets into a defensive 
posture within 'bastion' seas, thereby alleviating pressure upon trans-atlantic and trans-
Pacific SLOC. A reactive posture of defending directly against Soviet strengths at sea 
48 Graham Pries tnall, ANZUS and the Radford-Collins Agreement: Australia's naval mission, Journal of 
the Australian Naval Institute , January/March 1997, pp 49-52. 
49 Hector J. Donohue, 'Pro tection of Sea Lines of Communications -- Potential for Regional Co-operation in 
the Western Pacific', Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, May 1990, pp 57-64. 
50 Testimony of Adm. Metzel to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, for Department of Defence 
Auth01izations for FY 1980, 96th Congress, US Government Printing Office, p 2934. 
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and 'swinging' naval forces from one theatre to another was thus replaced by the far 
more radical concept of 'horizontal escalation', based on utilising forward-deployed US 
forces to target vulnerable sectors of Soviet military infrastructure. Beginning in 1981, a 
review of naval defence policy and burden-sharing conducted by the Reagan 
administration gave political backing to the acquisition of a '600-ship fleet'. An 
unprecedented peacetime defence build-up ensued, funded by a 7 6 per cent increase in 
military expenditure between 1976 and 1986, the year that the Maritime Strategy was 
officially announced by Admiral Watkins and adopted by the Reagan administration52. 
In North-east Asia, the Maritime Strategy and 'horizontal escalation' meant that US 
forces would be able to open a new front in the Soviet Far East, in the event that Soviet 
forces threatened in areas of relative strength such as Western Europe or the Middle 
East. As geography was key to US calculations of relative strength vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union, Japan's role assumed critical importance "as a springboard from which the 
United States can launch attacks against the Soviet homeland (and) ... a shield behind 
which the US Navy can fight Pacific battles"53 . Such scenarios necessarily proceeded 
from the problematic assumption that a high-intensity conflict that was global in scope 
could be contained below the threshold of a strategic nuclear exchange. Desmond Ball 
(1991) argues that the escalatory pressures inherent in the Maritime Strategy could have 
brought a nuclear response at an early stage of any superpower clash in the Northwest 
Pacific54. (The importance of the Maritime Strategy and horizontal escalation to Japan's 
involvement in sea lane defence is explored in Chapter Five). 
With the Maritime Strategy increasingly geared towards an offensive force posture, 
doubts were expressed about the continued relevance of Second World War-type 
convoys, especially in the Pacific, given the likely according of priority to trans-atlantic 
SLOC in any superpower conflict55. In the late 1980s, Vice Admiral J. Blouin outlined 
four concepts towards securing key Pacific SLOC, involving convoy, independent 
sailings, defended lanes and offensive operations56 . In this context, the concept of 
patrolled SLOC was revived as an "expansion of the convoy concept": 
51 Robert Komer, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense?, University Press of America/ Abt Books, 
Lanham, 1984, pp 61-63. 
52 Joseph P. Keddell , The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures, M.E. 
Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1994, p 131. 
53 Admiral James D Watkins, 'The Maritime Strategy ', The US Naval Institute, US Department of Defense, 
February 1986, p 482. 
54 Desmond Ball, 'Escalation and the Use of Nuclear Weapons', Chapter 6, 'Provocative Plans: A Critique 
of US Strategy for Ma.ii time Conflict in the North Pacific ', CanbeITa Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 
79, Australian National University Press , Canberra, 1991 , pp 81-93. 
55 For example, W.L. Owen, 'Is the Convoy System Old Hat?', Paci.fie Defence Reporter, September 1985. 
56 
'Convoy or Defended Lanes ', Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, August 1989, p 56. 
A protected or defended lane would involve sanitizing a geographical area against 
the submarine threat, followed by the installation of a barrier or protected perimeter 
to provide for penetration warning .... Protective forces would be positioned along 
a transit route. Each unit of the protective force would be assigned an area of 
responsibility, the size of which depended upon the speed and sensors of the 
protective platform, perceived threat, environmental conditions and weapons 
involved57 . 
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The credibility of patrolled lanes as conceived in the late Cold War was predicated upon 
the advances made since 1945 in ASW, drawing upon the combined resources of air-
and sea-based patrol units and a global, remote surveillance infrastructure, based on a 
network of SOSUS (sound surveillance sonar system) sea-bed acoustic a1Tays, land-
based high-frequency radio detection nets and dedicated naval reconnaissance satellites 
providing comprehensive optical, infra-red and signals-intelligence coverage of the 
oceans
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. Despite such technical advances, the attachment of Pacific and NATO 
planners to defending sea lines of communication was criticised in some qua11ers as 
duplicating past mistakes made in respect of t.q.e abstract concept of patrolled SLOC59 . 
Starting in 1979, with a proposal to establish a private study group to examine SLOC 
security in the Asia-Pacific region, a series of bi-annual international conferences 
dedicated to SLOC security were inaugurated in 1982. Co-organised by the United 
States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, China, Taiwan and a number of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, SLOC conferences were attended by 
politicians, defence officials, serving military officers and representatives from shipping 
firms and other maritime industries. By the end of the Cold War, the conference agenda 
had evolved into three main objectives, namely: 
1) to a1Tive at a 1nutual understanding of SLOC defence; 
2) to agree upon the methods of SLOC defence and its necessity; and 
3) to implement practicable cooperation for SLOC defence and burden sharing60 . 
57 Ibid. pp 57-58. 
58 See Desmond Ball and Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the 
UKUSA Countries, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985. 
59 Desmond Wettern, "Ships, not lines , must be defended", Pacific Defence Reporter, 1989 Annual 
Reference Edition, p 90. 
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IV. Post-Cold War SLOC security. 
Since the end of the Cold War, a 'narrow' military-focused paradigm of SLOC security 
based on great power conflict and the defence of freedom of navigation on the high seas 
has given way to a more comprehensive agenda, incorporating political-legal and non-
military issues, such as expanding maritime sovereignty claims under the UN Law of the 
Sea Convention (UNCLOS), environmental problems and general issues of shipping 
safety. The definition of maritime threats has also been expanded to include non-state 
actors involved in terrorism and piracy. Corresponding with these shifts, the roles of 
navies have also undergone change increasing the number and importance of 
constabulary tasks and 'operations-other-than-war', such as sanctions enforcement, anti-
piracy patrols, counter-terrorism, peace-keeping support, fisheries protection as well as 
'benign' functions including disaster relief, search-and-rescue and naval diplomacy --
with a larger number of exercise partners than was the case during the Cold War. While 
deterrence has continued to be seen "as the bottom line of naval policy", the reduced risk 
of high-level conflict at sea has also fed into an expectation that fewer ships are required 
to perform a broader range of functions than was the case when Western navies planned 
for global superpower conflict61 . 
Concerns that were present but sidelined during the Cold War have since risen higher on 
the agenda of policy-makers. Efforts by coastal states to extend state controls beyond 
the tlu·ee-mile limit of territorial waters formerly adhered to by most Western maritime 
states prompted the first of three conferences on the UN Law of the Sea Convention, 
which was held in 1958. However, UNCLOS did not enter into force until after the 
Cold War had concluded, in November 1994. Concern about threats to shipping from 
non-state actors long pre-dates the end of the Cold War. In 1985, the hijacking of the 
Achille Lauro cruise ship, although an isolated incident, brought modern terrorism to 
sea, while piracy began to attract attention as a resurgent phenomenon in Southeast Asia 
from the early 1980s62. Despite the US declaration of a global 'war on terrorism' since 
September 11, 2001, a scenario that supports sustained, high-level naval combat that is 
global in scope is difficult to envisage and counter-terrorism will continue principally to 
be a war of intelligence and law enforcement, in which conventional military power is a 
suppo1ii ve but subordinate element. 
61 Ken Booth, 'The New World Order' and the Future of Naval Power' , Journal of the A ustralian Naval 
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In terms of capabilities, the run-down of the former Soviet fleet has left a much-
diminished Russian navy and China's emerging blue-water capability as the only 
remotely credible local challengers to US naval superiority, which continues to reap the 
benefits of multiplier technologies in command, control, communications and 
intelligence, and computerised battle management that are now at least one generation 
ahead of competitors' 63 . The end of the Cold War and the run-down of much of the 
fonner Soviet Navy restored US command of the sea in the open ocean to levels 
unmatched since 1945. Confirmation of this was seen in the doctrinal shift adopted by 
the US Navy to littoral operations, 'Forward from the Sea'. For the most part, the force 
structure built up by western navies for open-ocean ASW operations during the Cold 
War could be adapted to littoral roles with relative ease. One major exception concerns 
the limited ability both of the United States to operate its large, exclusively nuclear-
powered attack submarines (SSN) -- designed to hunt Soviet submarines in the open 
ocean -- in shallow seas. Similarly, the bias built into US acoustic monitoring for 
detecting Soviet SSBN s and SSN s in open, deep-water areas led Eric Grove to predict, 
in 1993, that in the post-Cold War era ultra-quiet conventionally-powered attack 
submarines (SSK) "may become an important equaliser, the means by which smaller and 
poorer countries can defend themselves from richer and more powerful assailants"64, an 
assertion which the submarine procurement patterns of East Asian navies, including 
those of China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea as well as established SSK 
65 f operators such as Japan, appear subsequently to have borne out . The potential or 
commercial and/or military SLOC to be severely disrupted in the event of regional 
conflict in the Asia-Pacific, whether collaterally or as the result of a modern-day 
blockade or guerre de course is still widely assumed to be possible, in the expectation 
that "Strong regional powers will acquire submarine forces and develop doctrine to 
employ them against sea lines of communication"66 . 
The US military remains reliant on sea communications to project power reactively and 
to sustain its network of overseas bases. In major post-Cold War US strategic planning 
documents , while no threat to US sea control is foreseen in the Atlantic, the security of 
SLOC in the Middle East and Western Pacific has been retained among stated core US 
security interests. The East Asia Strategic Review released in 1995 highlighted the 
63 Paul Dibb, Force Modernisation in Asia: Towards 2000 and Beyond, SDSC Working Paper No. 306, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canben-a, 1997. 
64 E1ic Grove, 'Navies in Future Conflicts ', in Anthony Bergin and Hugh Smith (eds) , 'Naval Power in the 
Pacific: Toward the Year 2000', Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London, 1993, pp 169-170. 
65 David Lague, 'We All Live for Another Submarine, Far Eastern Econoniic Review, August 15, 2002, pp 
12-14. 
66 Michael Poirier, 'Sea Control and Regional Warfare', U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , July 1993, p 65 . 
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security of sea lanes and a particular need to maintain the "ability to move forces 
through the sea lines to support contingencies in the Middle East", reflecting East Asian 
economies' growing dependence on oil from the Gulf. However, indicative of a shift in 
US post-Cold War perceptions, the security value of Southeast Asian chokepoint 
waterways such as the Malacca Strait has been evaluated as much in terms of their 
economic importance to regional and global trade as their significance as transit routes 
for military deployments between the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. According to 
an unclassified 1993 National Defense University/Center for Naval Analyses study 
commissioned by the US Navy's Deputy Chief of Naval Operations: 
For many years, the prime concern was military, not economic, as the United States 
required secure maritime transport via SLOCs in case of war. Now the emphasis 
has shifted to the economic component of our national security, a policy reaffirmed 
when the United States announced (in March and May, 1995), that it would not 
accept disruption of trade in the South China Sea 67. 
However, reflecting the uncertainty which prevailed as to the trend of future US security 
priorities -- at least until September 11, 2001 -- the same study notes that as the "Cold 
War 1nind-set recedes, the naval mission of protecting shipping could emerge as an 
explicit national priority"68 . The end of the Cold War provided impetus for the 
emergence of a truly global trading system within the framework of the World Trade 
Organisation and the 1990s saw an unprecedented expansion of global trade, much of it 
emanating from the developing economies of the Asia-Pacific, which had already 
doubled their share of world trade, from 10 per cent to 20 per cent in 1970-1990. 
Viewed from realist perspectives in international relations, the boost to global trade 
facilitated by the end of the Cold War has the potential to add to security tensions by 
increasing competition over finite energy resources and to amplify the vulnerability of 
key chokepoints to military pressure or tenorist attack. With overall Asian energy 
demand forecast to rise by around 71 per cent between 1999 and 2020 the risk of a 
strategic dynamic developing as part of increasing inter-state competition for access to 
hydrocarbons is seen by certain cormnentators as potentially focussing conflict on the 
energy import routes themselves69 . In April 2002, reflecting increasing anxiety within 
Asia about oil supply intenuptions in transit, a sea lane disruption simulation exercise 
67 John Noer with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritinie Economic Concerns in South-east Asia, National 
Defense University Press/Center for Naval Analyses, 1996, Washington D.C. , p 1. 
68 Ibid. p 6. 
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was launched by Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre ( a part of Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation), involving wide-ranging participants drawn from over 20 Asian states70 . 
From countervailing neo-liberalist positions the growth of maritime trade is viewed as a 
force militating against inter-state maritime conflict by increasing the number of 
stakeholders in the security of the hard and soft infrastructure underpinning international 
trade and raising the economic costs of conflict7 1. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the internationalisation of the maritime transport industry 
has also increased, to the point where a ship's registry, owner, insurer, crew and cargo 
are typically contracted among several nationalities. This process, which has occurred 
as a result of increased liberalisation and commercial pressures to drive down ship 
operators' costs, itself carries strategic consequences. Commentators view dwindling 
national fleets as undermining more than one country's security given doubts about the 
dependability of international shipping firms during crises and the inability of 
governments legally to compel them to sail72 . Other analysts see the internationalisation 
of the shipping industry as complicating the option of blockade for potential aggressors 
by raising political costs to unacceptable levels. Daniel Coulter contends that defence 
planners have been slow to adjust from Mahanian security paradigms in response to a 
revolution in maritime transportation, in which ships, ports and other transportation 
nodes are increasingly networked73 . 
The strategic quality of a given waterway is a relative calculation of geopolitical and 
military factors, and all waterways are potentially strategic 74 . However, Coulter assumes 
that in the absence of credible threats to shipping in the open ocean, SLOC are 
synonymous with chokepoints, as the only places where ship traffic can systemically be 
hindered. Although the time-sensitive requirement of military planners to deploy forces 
in the quickest time possible via the most direct route is essentially unchanged since 
Mahan' s day, the economics of navigational access through chokepoints operates under 
70 
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market-based rules which give the system considerable flexibility to cope with most 
localised obstructions. Whereas for reactive military deployments, timeliness is the 
most important criterion of success, the unit of efficiency for commercial cargoes is ton-
nliles. 
Such obstructions can be diverted around without incuning prohibitive add-on costs as 
long as alternative routes are available and spare shipping capacity exists. As a result of 
over-investment by heavily subsidised ship-builders in Europe and Asia, large surpluses 
were built up during the 1990s across the global dry bulk and tanker fleets. Of the 252 
million dead weight tons (DWT) of dry bulk-canier capacity in service globally in 1995, 
there was a surplus of nearly 18 million DWT. While the surplus for bulk caniers has 
since declined to around 3 million DWT in 2001, for tankers the surplus rate remained 
above 6 per cent, or 18 million DWT in 2001, out of a global tanker fleet of 280 million 
tons. This suggests that ample slack exists within the system to cope with most 
foreseeable contingencies 75 . A similar situation cunently exists in relation to container 
shipping, with around 3,500 container ships estimated to be in service globally, for a 
combined capacity of around 6 million 20-foot-equivalent units (TEUs), almost three 
times the level of 1990 ( causing trans-Pacific container freight rates to fall by one-third 
since 1999)76. Given that shipping costs form a small (and diminishing) proportion of 
the overall import bill, the economic consequences of diverting to longer routes would 
be manageable for large economies, while the additional profit generated from extra 
ton/mile requirements would create a strong incentive for shipping firms to add capacity 
to service alternative routes 77 . As evidence of this, Coulter points to the closure of the 
Suez Canal, from 1967-75, as having only a marginal effect on global trade, despite the 
long diversion around the Cape of Good Hope. Only in the case of the Straits of 
Hormuz is the potential for the closure of a major chokepoint acknowledged by Coulter 
to have strategic potential, given its monopoly over access to oil terminals in the Gulf. 
However, the continued passage of tankers through the straits during the 1980-88 Iran-
Iraq war, in spite of ships being targeted by both sides and raised insurance premiums, is 
seen as evidence of the resilience of modern maritime transportation networks and the 
tanker's surprisingly robust ability 'to get through' . Indeed, while individual tankers are 
74 Michael MccGwire, 'The Geopolitical Importance of Strategic Waterways in the Asian-Pacific Regional' , 
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vulnerable, there are weaker links in the oil supply chain: pipelines are fixed, exposed 
and non-substitutable, while the infrastructure of oil production, refining and storage 
presents more lucrative targets to potential adversaries. The loss of a single tanker 
would not necessarily halt supplies. 
Coulter blames the residual influence of Mahan for the persistent confusion between 
military principles and market principles governing contemporary maritime 
transportation. As a result, he concludes that chokepoint SLOC are not essential to the 
free flow of seaborne commerce reflecting the fact that the "choice of route is a function 
of market conditions". Similarly, according to MccGwire' s 197 5 assessment, "despite 
the volume of traffic passing through Malacca and the other straits of the Indonesian 
archipelago, these waterways are not essential for interoceanic trade"78 . 
However, Coulter has also argued that a new Achilles Heel has been created within the 
global trading system, limiting its ability to withstand shocks. This, he argues, is 
declining as the up-scaling trend in container shipping funnels world trade via a small 
number of hub ports concentrated in East Asia79 . Combined with the relocation of 
industrial production to China and other low factor-cost destinations and the widespread 
adoption of just-in-time production techniques, this renders the maritime transportation 
system vulnerable to the disruption of operations at those few ports capable of handling 
vessels with a capacity of 5,000 TEU or above, for which no substitute port-handling 
capacity exists. The top five hub ports in the world are all located in East Asia, led by 
Hong Kong and Singapore (handling 18 million and 15.5 million TEU respectively in 
2001), South Korea's Pusan (8 million), Taiwan's Kaohsiung (7.5 million) and Shanghai 
(6.3 million/0. Larger classes of container ship are in prospect with 8,000-TEU vessels 
and above considered teclmically and commercially viable. 
The capacity of maritime trade, especially the flow of goods between East Asia and the 
United States, to survive the shocks of the 1995 Kobe ea11hquake, the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks and the US West Coast ports stoppage in October 2002 suggests 
that the syste1n is perhaps more robust than feared. However, Asia ' s ability to withstand 
disruption will only truly be tested in the event of a hub-port stoppage, a regional 
military crisis or a terrorist strike targeted at its po11s infrastructure. 
78 Ibid. pp 1072-73 . 
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The greatest point of vulnerability in the maritime transportation system may in fact be 
the 'soft' infrastructure of marine insurance: it is uncertain to what extent shipping firms 
would be able or willing to operate if confronted by a sharp spike in premiums, or the 
extension of 'exclusion zones ' withdrawing insurance cover in the Middle East or 
Southeast Asia should terrorist or war risk be judged unacceptably high81 . Since the 
October 12, 2002 Bali bombing, war-risk status has applied to Indonesian ports, but not, 
as of February 2003, to passage through the archipelago. 
1. Sources of potential threat. 
Some factors which have the potential to disrupt maritime transpo11ation, such as 
maritime accidents, disasters at sea, or industrial disputes, while important to the flow of 
shipping are clearly not military SLOC security concerns. Potential challenges and 
threats to SLOC security which conceivably would merit the attention of post-Cold War 
defence planners fall into three categories: 
i) maritime sovereignty claims that restrict navigational access to specific waters; 
ii) terrorism-at-sea and piracy; and 
iii) regional conflicts, which have the potential to disrupt proximate sea transportation 
routes, either as a result of the collateral effects of wars that spill out onto the maritime 
plain, or through deliberate obstruction by a sea denial power. 
i) Maritime sovereignty claims. 
At the end of the Second World War, the vast majority of the world's seas and oceans 
were regarded as 'high seas' areas in which all states enjoyed freedom of navigation 
rights , based on principles first outlined in the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius ' Mare Liberuni 
in 1609. Currently, two-fifths of the world's seas and oceans are subject to some form 
of jurisdictional claim. The dramatic post-1945 shift in the legal status of seas and 
oceans arose out of a basic division between the desire of coastal states (mainly in the 
de-colonising world) to assert their sovereignty and enclose surrounding waters , against 
the concerns of Western maritime states to preserve freedom of navigation rights for 
80 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport, 2002, United 
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naval and commercial shipping and to maximise their access to marine resources in the 
water column and seabed. 
Moreover, the end of the Cold War was also taken as a cue by some coastal states to 
steer the onus of maritime security away from great power military interests in power 
projection to the responsibility of littoral states for the management of coastal waters and 
straits. Malaysia's former maritime ambassador B.A. Hamzah, for example, described it 
as an opportunity for littoral states in the Straits of Malacca to escape their perceived 
historical role as "gate-keepers" to the great powers82. 
UNCLOS was born in 1958 out of a need to mediate a compromise in international law 
between the interests of coastal and maritime states. The political difficulties and 
technical complexity involved in reaching an agreement acceptable to all participants led 
to a second and third convention in 1968 and 1982 (UNCLOS II and III respectively), 
and it was only in 1994 that the Convention finally entered into force. UNCLOS 
incorporated several new concepts into international law, many of which had already 
been codified within national statutes. These included an extension of territorial seas 
from 3 to 12 nautical miles, archipelagic status (ultimately granted to 14 nations, 
including Indonesia, the Philippines and the Solomon Islands) and 200-nautical mile 
exclusive economic zones (EEZ). Several categories of passage were negotiated to add 
to the prevailing regime of high-seas passage (see Appendix 2). It is estimated that 
UNCLOS brought 116 straits within the joint or sole jurisdiction of coastal states83 . 
Many newly independent coastal states harboured sensitivities over the prevailing 
regime of high-seas passage, which was resented as a legal cover for former colonial 
powers to preserve military access. Many de-colonising states , particularly archipelagic 
nations , such as Indonesia, were acutely sensitive to the risk of foreign intervention and 
infiltration. This was matched by a strong desire on the paii of post-independence elites 
to assert sovereignty over geographically and ethnically fractured polities. Moreover, 
many coastal states lacked the capacity necessary to monitor their own coastlines. 
Tensions between the maritime and coastal states over legal attempts to enclose ai·eas of 
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sea were especially acute 1n maritime Southeast Asia, where Indonesia sits at a 
"geopolitical crossroads "84. 
UNCLOS has been viewed positively as reinforcing an order-based, institutionalised 
approach to establishing a common legal framework that both recognises the sovereignty 
claims of coastal states while upholding principles of freedom of navigation through 
international straits and offshore areas85 . In the Asia-Pacific, no state has opposed the 
principles of freedom of navigation or innocent passage, while North Korea alone has 
not adopted the Convention86 . Nor has any state in the region yet introduced tolls for the 
use of straits. Despite lingering sensitivities over the terms of passage for naval vessels 
under UNCLOS, particularly in respect to the terms of archipelagic sea lanes passage, 
both maritime and coastal states were able to reach agreement on freedom of navigation, 
probably reflecting shared interests in maintaining access to maritime commerce 87. 
Relative to the scale of daily flows of global and regional maritime traffic, restrictions 
introduced to date have had limited effect on the navigational freedoms of commercial 
vessels and aircraft, with the exceptions confined mainly to the transportation of nuclear 
cargoes and very large oil tankers. However, UNCLOS has failed to assuage the 
concerns of those who regard it as creating a framework for 'creeping jurisdiction' that 
could lead to new restrictions on passage or tolls being levied on heavily used 
waterways88 . Most freedom of navigation concerns have concerned naval vessels and 
overflight rights. In July 1994, in the lead-up to UNCLOS' passage into international 
law, the US Department of Defense conducted a study to calculate the extra time and 
fuel required for a ca1Tier battle group deploying from Japan to Bahrain to detour around 
Australia, based on a scenario of being denied access to the Indonesian Archipelago and 
the Straits of Malacca 89 . 
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1994 at: prosea.org/articles-news/unesco/UNLOS_Dept_of_Defense_Position_Summary_94.html 
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ii) Terrorism-at-sea and piracy. 
Among potential maritime security threats posed by non-state actors, terrorism-at-sea 
and piracy have received most attention since the end of the Cold War. This section 
deals first with terrorism-at-sea, before profiling modern piracy. Maritime terrorism is 
composed of the dual threats of attacks on ships and the threat of ships themselves being 
used to.deliver concealed weapons of mass destruction (in containers or hidden within a 
ship's superstructure). Both have the potential to cause systemic economic dislocation, 
with the effect of a major attack on a US port or a transhipment hub such as Singapore 
being felt globally. The US Container Security Initiative adopted after the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington requires designated port 
authorities to report to US customs the contents of containers destined for US ports 24 
hours before a ship's departure. The US Antiterrorism Act 2002 (HR3983) also allows 
for entry into American ports to be refused for suspect vessels and for security 
assessments to be conducted in foreign ports. The governments of Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Malaysia are among those to have allowed US customs inspectors to be 
stationed at their ports90 . 
The risk of terrorist attacks at sea was demonstrated by the suicide 'ramming' attack 
against the USS Cole outside Aden harbour in Yemen, in October 2000, which killed 17 
US sailors. Following the foiling of a suspected al-Qaida linked plot to bomb US naval 
vessels and personnel in Singapore in October 2001, a switch to 'soft targets' was 
suggested by the October 6, 2002 ramming of the French oil tanker Liniburg, off Yemen, 
which in its execution closely resembled the attack on the Cole91 . After the attack on the 
Limburg, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) recommended that designated lanes 
used by tankers be declared 'no-go' areas for unauthorised craft, enforced by 
intensifying naval and police patrols92. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks, the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) also announced plans in May 2002 to draw up a convention on countering 
terrorism-at-sea and to initiate new guidelines for ships and port infrastructure93. These 
were carried forward into the International Code for the Security of Ships and Port 
Facilities (including the mandatory fitting of all new vessels above 300 gross registered 
tons with satellite tracking and the designation of on-board security officers) and 
90 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritinie Transport, 2002, United 
Nations, New York and Geneva, 2002, pp 75-76. 
91 Traces of TNT and parts of a inflatable speed-boat were found within the Limburg' s hull. 
92 
'Make tanker lanes into no-go areas for other shipping says IMB', October 14, 2002, ICC/IMB 
Commercial Crime Services website: www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2002/stmies/limburg.asp 
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amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
including the embossing of registration numbers on ships' hulls. Both initiatives were 
adopted by the Ilv1O in December 2002 and will come into effect from July 1, 2004. 
The Ilv1B warned in its 2001 piracy report that terrorists might target shipping and the 
head of the Ilv1O warned that extra vigilance would be required94. The Bali bombing 
underlined Indonesia's susceptibility to Islamic terrorism and a heightened risk that 
inter-regional shipping passing through chokepoints such as the Malacca, Sunda and 
Lombok straits could be targeted in subsequent strikes. While as of early 2003 there had 
been no repeat of the attack on the Limburg in Southeast Asian waters, among 
hypothetical post-September 11 scenarios to have been mooted is a terrorist attack on a 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier or similar vessel while transiting the Malacca Straits, 
an act which it is claimed "would devastate Southeast Asia's economies and 
environment and severely disrupt trade as the straits could be closed to shipping for 
years"95 . The newly formed US-based Maritime Intelligence Group has also claimed 
that members of Southeast Asian terrorist groups have been trained in suicide ramming 
techniques by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in Sri Lanka. In addition 
they are also said to be developing other techniques for targeting shipping in Southeast 
Asia, including the use of sea mines and submersibles96 . 
More 'conventional' acts of terrorism-at-sea have also been carried out as part of the 
spill-over of separatist conflicts, the most organised being those carried out against 
government forces by the 'Sea Tigers', the LTTE's maritime wing, until a February 
2002 cease-fire. In addition to past suicide attacks, LTTE actions at sea extended to 
robbery against international shipping in the busy sea lanes south of the island for 
revenue-generating purposes, while the guerrilla group has operated its own fleet of 
ships to smuggle in arms and supplies to the J affna Peninsula. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
(GAM) separatist guerrillas, in Indonesia's Aceh province, have engaged in hostage-
taking as a means to fund their operations, although a peace settlement in December 
2002 has greatly reduced levels of violence. GAM is thought to be responsible for the 
hijack of a ship carrying coal in the Malacca Straits on August 25, 2001 , the crew of 
93 
'Maritime states seek accord on terrorism at sea, Financial Tinies, May 29 , 2002, p 10. 
94 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2001 , ICC 
International Maritime Bureau, Barking, January 2002, p 22. 
95 John J Brandon, 'Protect Asia' s Shipping ', Pacific Forum CSIS , PacNet 21A, May 24, 2002. 
96 Jason Szep, 'Islamic militants trained for sea attacks ', Reuters News Services, 21 January 2003 . 
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which was subsequently held to ransom97 . The Abu Sayyaf group 1n the southern 
Philippines has engaged in similar activities98 . 
In 1983, the issue of maritime piracy was raised at the IMO' s general meeting, leading 
to the adoption of Resolution A545 which called for governments to adopt "measures to 
prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships"99 . The IMO subsequently 
requested that member states inform the Organisation of the details concerning any act 
of piracy or armed robbery against ships under their flag, including the reaction of 
coastal state authorities. The IMO also instructed its Maritime Safety Committee to 
draw up regular reports to record piracy incidents. 
Modern maritime piracy (different definitions of which are explored below) occurs in 
coastal regions throughout much of the developing world, in South America, West and 
East Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia. In 1998, over 200 incidents 
were reported to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) worldwide, including at least 
67 fatalities, 138 vessel boardings, eleven shooting incidents and 15 hijackings100. The 
problem has been most intractable in Southeast Asia. 
Before 1989, piracy in the Malacca Straits was rare, at around about seven cases a year, 
but in that year the incidence of reported attacks increased to 28. In 1998, the IMB 
concluded that the incidence of piracy had reached "alarming" rates around Indonesia, 
the Straits of Malacca, Bangladesh, India and the Red Sea. The number of piracy 
incidents reported worldwide peaked at 469 in 2000, 119 of which occurred off 
Indonesia. Although the global incidence of piracy fell to 335 repo1ied incidents in 2001, 
it rose again in 2002, to total of 370 incidents, while the number of hijacks also 
increased from 16 to 25. Indonesian waters were reconfirmed as the world's most 
dangerous, host to 103 incidents 101 . 
97 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2001, ICC 
International Maritinie Bureau, Barking , January 2002. p 17, 20. 
98 
'Pirates seize Malaysian boats near Philippines', Reuters News Service, June 15, 2001. 
99 Tanaka Norihide and Takase Hitoshi, in Hamzah and Ogawa (eds.), Combating Piracy, The Okazaki 
Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 2001, pp 166-67. 
100 
'Japanese Insurer Offers Piracy Cover ' ICC/IMB Commercial Crime Services website, July 25, 1999: 
www .iccwbo.org/ ccs/news_archi ves/1999/j apenese_insurer_offers_piracy _cover. asp; 
and Jayant Abhyankar 'An Overview of Piracy Problems: A Global Update', Society of International Law, 
Singapore (SILS) Piracy Seminar', October 22, 1999, Orchard Hotel, Singapore: 
www.sils.org/seminar/1999-piracy-02.htm 
101 
'High sea ten-orism alert in piracy report ', ICC/IMB Commercial Crime Services website, January 29, 
2002: www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archi ves/2003/stories/piracy%20 _report_2002. asp; and 'Seafarers 
Warned on Indonesia Pirates , Somali Armed Gangs ', Dow Jones Newswires, October 23 , 2002. 
Map 5: Piracy incidents reported to the International Maritime Bureau in 2002 
Source: International Chamber of Commerce: 
www.iccwbo.org/ccs/imb _piracy/piracy_ maps2002.asp 
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The IMO defines piracy according to article 101 of the 1982 UNLOS declaration as, 
"any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation' directed at private 
ships or aircraft on ( or above) the high sea". Such incidents that take place within the 
territorial waters of a state are classified as "armed robbery at sea". The definition of 
piracy has been contested in terms of which illegal activities should be admitted, ranging 
from terrorism-at-sea to petty theft committed while vessels are in port. Also debated 
has been whether to extend the definition to include criminal activities committed within 
territorial and archipelagic waters, in addition to high seas areas and air space. 
However, reflecting its institutional focus on preventing maritime crime, the IMB uses a 
more inclusive definition, incorporating any "act of boarding or attempting to board any 
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ship with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability 
to use force in the fu1iherance of that act"102. 
While this looser definition avoids the distortion of the IMO' s more legalistic approach, 
the IMB' s definition has been criticised by shipping associations as exaggerating the 
scale of the piracy problem103 . By the same token, many incidents are believed to be 
under-reported by shipping companies that tend to weigh the slim probability of 
recovering stolen property and apprehending pirates unfavourably against the risk of 
raised insurance premiums and the prohibitive cost of cha1ier delays incurred while port-
side investigations can be conducted 104 . 
Crimes against shipping grouped under the 'piracy' umbrella differ widely in both 
motivation and method. The IMB has identified a typology of modern piracy105 . First, 
the practice of illegally boarding vessels under way, at night and from the rear, for the 
purpose of theft has been the most commonly witnessed form of piracy in Southeast 
Asia, formerly concentrated around the Philip Channel between Singapore and 
Indonesia. The average value of property and cash stolen during boardings has been put 
at between $5,000-$15,000, although this does not include the cost of damage, or the 
indirect and often much higher costs of delays and increased insurance106. Such attacks, 
generally characterised by low levels of violence, are concentrated in territorial waters 
rather than high seas. The declining size of ships' crews is a factor contributing to the 
increased vulnerability of merchant ships to hit-and-run attacks, making it harder to 
maintain deck watches over large vessels 107 . 
Second, robberies directed at easily removable property or valuables aboard ships at 
anchor are repo1ied to be a common feature of piracy as practised in South American 
and West African waters . Until recently, these were seen as characterised by higher 
levels of violence than the under-way boardings in Southeast Asia. However, since its 
102 Jayant Abhyank:ar, in Hamzah and Ogawa (eds) , Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala 
Lumpur, 2001 , p 11. 
103 See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, 'Crossing the Line?: Maritime Violence, Piracy, Definitions and 
International Law' , in Hamzah and Ogawa (eds), Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 
2001 , p 66. . 
104 Even when apprehended, pirates may not face ciiminal proceedings. In the celebrated case of the Petro 
Ranger, a tanker intercepted by Indonesian pirates in the South China Sea and taken to the Chmese island of 
Hainan, Chinese authorities repatriated the crews ' abductors to Indonesia without trial . 
105 Jayant Abhyank:ar, Piracy and Ship Robbery : A Growing Menace ', in Hamzal1 and Ogawa (eds). 
Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 2001 , pp 10-59. 
106 Stanley Weeks , "Law and Order at Sea: Pacific Cooperation in Dealing with Piracy, Drugs and Illegal 
Migration" , in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds), Calming the Waters: Initiatives f or Asia Pacific 
Cooperation, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 114, Australian National University Press , 
Canberra, 1996, pp 43-56. 
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1997-98 economic crisis, a wave of impromptu robberies on ships near Indonesia falls 
into this category. 
Third, a category of 'military-style' piracy incorporates the illicit involvement of 
uniformed personnel in attacks on shipping for material gain and also overlaps 
tenorism-at-sea in cases where shipping is targeted by separatist guenillas for the 
purpose of smuggling or fund-raising through exto1iion, theft and kidnapping. It has 
also been asse1ied that attacks on shipping with cove1i military involvement have been 
sanctioned for political as well as commercial reasons. In the East China Sea, the 
intimidation of shipping took on quasi-military overtones during a series of incidents in 
1991-93 when firearms were used against merchant ships and fishing vessels, frequently 
without any attempt at boarding. As is seen in Chapter Eight, Japanese analysts believe 
that the harassment of Japanese and other shipping was tacitly sanctioned by Chinese 
officials for the purpose of reinforcing sovereignty claims. 
Fourth, ship seizures have occuned whereby pirates take control of a vessel under way, 
beyond the range of coastal law enforcement, until appropriated cargo can be offloaded 
to another vessel alongside or at a friendly port. Such seizures imply a high level of 
organisation and potential violence, in the worst cases resulting in the killing or 
abandonment of the original crew at sea 108 . Several instances of this type of piracy have 
occurred in the East and Southeast Asia, including the Petro Ranger, the Tenyu and the 
Alondra Rainbow. The theft of vessels for use as 'phantom ships' in transnational cargo 
fraud is another growing trend: examples include the M. V. Antoinette and the M. V. Isla 
in the Philippines. 
Piracy 'hotspots' identified at vanous times 111 the Asia-Pacific region over the last 
decade include the Yellow Sea, the waters north of Taiwan, the Hong Kong-Luzon-
Hainan 'triangle' (which includes the northern po1iion of the South China Sea), the 
Surigao Strait south of Mindanao, and the Straits of Malacca and Sunda. Piracy is an 
inherently mobile problem, thus complicating law-enforcement efforts. In 1991-93, 
after anti-piracy patrols were introduced by Malaysia and Singapore in the Malacca 
Strait the reported incidence of piracy fell from 32 to 5 incidents, while incidents in the 
adjacent South China Sea climbed from 6 to 31 between 1992 and 1993, suggesting that 
107 Crew sizes of 30 or less on board large container ships and tankers are the norm. 
108 Jayant Abhyankar, Piracy and Ship Robbery: A Growing Menace', in Hamzah and Ogawa (eds) . 
Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 2001 , pp 10-59. 
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local success may merely have had a displacement effect1°9. Nonetheless, the IMB' s 
Deputy Director has expressed the view that the scale of crimes at sea is small in relation 
to the incidence of onshore crime and that pirates ' operations are most effectively 
disrupted by targeting their shore bases. While the total cost of maritime crime in 2000 
has been estimated as high as $US25 billion110, compared with the prospect of 
intentional military obstruction of SLOC or tenorism-at-sea intended to cause mass 
destruction or economic damage, modern piracy cannot be considered as a systemic 
threat to the security of international shipping lanes, much less to global trade. While not 
precluding the necessity for, and ability of, international law enforcement cooperation 
and joint coast guard patrols to counter the spreading phenomenon of maritime piracy, 
the number of incidents involving vessels under way remains a small propo11ion of the 
total. As a 'fact of life', some measure of lawlessness at sea might be thought of as an 
extension of various categories of organised and opportunistic crimes that are committed 
on land in developing countries, which create add-on costs for business but do not 
generally deter business operations themselves. 
iii) Regional conflicts. 
Of the regional conflicts that have occuned since the end of the Cold War, for example 
in the Balkans, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, most have been civil wars 
involving little or no maritime element, except for the operations of the 'Sea Tigers' in 
Sri Lanka and GAM in Aceh. Although the 1991 Gulf War was a mainly air-land 
conflict, damage done to two US vessels from mines as well as the prospect of 
submarines being used to interdict Coalition SLOC in the Gulf caused concern for US 
nrilitary planners 111 . Despite this generally positive post-Cold War record, several flash-
points with potentially serious maritime dimensions are located astride major shipping 
routes in the Asia-Pacific. 
Among the most frequently cited is the South China Sea, where it is claimed that "even 
low-level, local conflicts could disrupt the SLOCs"112. The Spratly and Paracel islands, 
reported to lie atop major oil and gas deposits, are subject to co1npeting tenitorial claims 
among several ASEAN members and wholly claimed by Vietnam, China and Taiwan 
109 Stanley Weeks, "Law and Order at Sea: Pacific Cooperation in Dealing with Piracy, Drugs and Illegal 
Migration", in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds), Calming the Waters: Initiatives for Asia Pacific 
Cooperation, Canbe1Ta Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 114, Australian National University Press, 
Canberra, 1996, p 46. 
110 The estimate is by James Warren of the School of Asian Studies at Murdoch University ; 'Asia piracy 
costs $25 billion a year, says expert ', Reuters ews Service, December 10, 2002. 
111 Michael Poirier, 'Sea Control and Regional Warfare ', U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1993 , p 64. 
112 Patrick M. Cronin and Yamaguchi Noboru, 'Japan ' s Future Regional Security Role ', Strategic Review, 
summer 1992, pp 20-21. 
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( although the latter's claim is in practice limited to occupation of the largest island in the 
Paracels)1 13. On May 10, 1995 US Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned China, 
following the placing of Chinese territorial markers on Mischief Reef, which lies well 
within the Philippines' 200 nautical mile (EEZ), that Washington would view "with 
serious concern any restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that was not 
consistent with international law"114. According to a 1998 report by Congressman Dana 
Rorabacher115 , China's naval activity around the Spratlys "threatens trade and military 
sea-lanes vital to the United States and our allies". Under normal conditions, a large 
volume of inter-regional merchant shipping (in the order of 36,000 ship transits per year) 
normally passes through the South China Sea116 . Overlapping ten·itorial disputes have 
not triggered a clash between regular naval forces since 1988 and only minor 
confrontations since. However, the South China Sea is still regarded as potentially 
volatile, in the context of 'resource nationalism', legal clai1ns reinforced by the rigidities 
of domestic politics and armed forces modernisation programmes being unde1iaken by 
many claimants. The relatively undeveloped and reactive nature of the existing 
confidence building and crisis-resolution machinery in the region is also seen as 
hampering the effectiveness of regional diplomacy, despite ASEAN' s efforts to persuade 
China to accept a Code of Conduct already brokered among its member states who are 
also disputants in the South China Sea. 
Any large-scale resumption of fighting on the Korean Peninsula would almost certainly 
take the form of a predo1ninantly air-land battle, with any naval element most likely 
limited to the enforcement of a sanctions blockade or clashes in the Yellow Sea, of the 
type that which involved the sinking of a South Korean frigate in June 2002 and a 
similar incident in 1999. However, there would also be a substantial risk of mines being 
used by the No1ih, as in the 1950-53 Korean War. Most seriously, in the case of an 
armed conflict between China and Taiwan, unless liinited to an exchange of missiles 
across the Taiwan Strait, the potential for a substantial maritime component ranges from 
the seizure of Taiwanese-held islands off the mainland, through various gradations of 
blockade, to the possibility of a full-blown invasion of the island. China' s planning for a 
cross-straits conflict and the impact of this and potential maritime conflicts in the South 
China Sea on the SLOC security interests of the United States and Japan is explored in 
Chapters Seven and Eight. However, suffice it to say that compared with the North 
113 See for example Henry J Kenny, An Analysis of Possible Threats to Shipping in Key South-east Asian 
Sea Lanes, Center for Naval Analyses Occasional Paper, Alexand1ia, February 1996. 
114 Barbara Opall, 'U. S. Warns Claimants in South China Sea', Defense News, May 15-21, 1995, p 3. 
115 Quoted from 'US Congressman Raps Washington ' , Asahi Evening News, December 28, 1998, p 3. 
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Atlantic, where the perception of acutely threatened Western SLOC during the Cold War 
has since given way to a wholly benign naval security environment, in the Western 
Pacific, the view remains widely held that "it is simply too early to conclude that war 
has lost all its appeal"117 . 
Conclusion. 
This chapter traced the conceptual origin of SLOC in theories of sea power and observed 
how its definition as a nanowly conceived concept within naval strategy was remoulded 
and expanded by the currents of technological and geopolitical change in the twentieth 
century. I showed how the importance of controlling maritime communications for 
conducting trade and projecting power was stressed particularly by Sir Julian Corbett, 
who viewed it as the key to maritime strategy. However, the mono-dimensional 
definition of sea power on which Mahan and Corbett's assumptions were predicated was 
transformed by the development of the aircraft, the sea mine and -- above all -- the 
submarine, which during two world wars gave sea denial powers the revolutionary 
capability to mount a counter-blockade without having to directly challenge supenor 
naval powers for sea control. 
The total nature of these conflicts blurred the combatant/non-combatant distinction 
between navies, used to project power, and merchant fleets, whose role in transporting 
n1ateriel and natural resources essential to sustaining industrial production became 
equally 'strategic'. Submarine-led offensives against shipping in the Atlantic and 
Pacific exposed the vulnerability of import-dependent maritime powers, raising the 
importance of 'commerce raiding' from an ancillary aspect of the war at sea to a 
potentially decisive factor. Conceptually, the advent of total war thus broke down the 
distinction between 'economic' and 'military' sea lines of communication. 
The experience of the war at sea up to 1945, somewhat ambiguously underlined not only 
the vulnerability of maritime powers against the unique strategic potential of the 
submarine, but pointed also to the robustness of maritime transportation networks when 
properly defended. Convoy, though initially resisted by the Allies in the Second World 
War as it had been in the First, was critical to overcoming the German submarine threat 
in the Atlantic on both occasions. Conversely, all attempts during both conflicts to 
implement SLOC defence as an ASW operational concept were failures. Japan's 
116 John Noer with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritinie Economic Concerns in South-east Asia, National 
Defense University Press/Center for Naval Analyses, 1996, Washington D.C. , p 56. 
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negligence in protecting its shipping in the Pacific (the subject of Chapter Three) 
accelerated the virtual destruction of its merchant fleet and played a major role in 
hastening its defeat in 1945. 
Despite doubts about whether a high-intensity naval conflict could realistically be 
sustained between nuclear powers given the dangers of nuclear escalation and the one-
sided naval nature of most regional conflicts after 1945, the defence of SLOC remained 
integral to the planning of the United States and its maritime allies during the Cold War, 
especially in response to the growth of Soviet naval power fro1n the mid-1960s onwards. 
However, concepts for SLOC defence underwent a transition in US naval strategy, as 
'reactive' plans for the direct defence of high-value cargo were eclipsed by the Maritime 
Strategy's bold emphasis on 'offence as the best defence'. 
The threat of a superpower 'blue water' conflict disappeared with the end of the Cold 
War. However, the Asia-Pacific region in particular is host to a number of um·esolved 
territorial disputes which, particularly in the context of China's accelerating military 
modernisation programme, have the potential to lead to a high-intensity maritime 
conflict, across the Taiwan Strait and/or in the South China Sea. There is a widespread 
consensus that chokepoints remain the most vulnerable segments of SLOC and concerns 
that conflicts in East Asia could interrupt international shipping flows reflect the 
proximity of regional 'flash-points' to chokepoint straits where merchant shipping is 
normally concentrated. Such chokpeoints normally encountered in transit could 
probably be bypassed, as seen in Chapter One, at less economic cost than is often widely 
assumed. However, the scope for diversion narrows as ships approach their terminals 
and the concentration of the container trade in particular around a small number of hub 
ports augments this aspect of SLOC vulnerability above others. 
The end of the Cold War has witnessed an expanding definition of SLOC security -- as 
reflected in the broader maritime agenda of the ongoing Asia-Pacific SLOC conferences. 
This has brought to the fore new threats and challenges potentially impinging upon 
freedom of navigation for international shipping from piracy and terrorism-at-sea, as 
well as non-military issues of environmental security and shipping safety. A new 
1naritime terrorist objective of mass destruction and economic dislocation has eclipsed 
piracy's more limited concern with financial gain as the most important non-state threat 
to shipping and seaborne trade. 
117 Aaron Friedberg, 'Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia', International Security, 
Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993-94, pp 18-32. 
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While the world wars broke down the division between 'military' and 'economic' 
SLOC, such a distinction is still conceptually useful, especially as contemporary SLOC 
threats are likely to arise below the threshold of total war. Moreover, as Coulter 
suggests, the strategic requirements applying to the use of SLOC to project military 
power reactively differ significantly from the use of SLOC to conduct maritime trade. 
While the onus on speed for reactive naval deployments inherently limits flexibility in 
the choice of route, commercial shipping retains a much higher degree of flexibility to 
divert around localised obstructions in transit. 
In the remainder of this thesis, these definitions and concepts are related to the specific 
circumstances of Japan's SLOC security, from 1940-2003. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Japan's pre-1945 SLOC Security 
Introduction. 
This chapter, which starts with Japan's opening up to the outside world and ends with its 
defeat in the Second World War, explores historical precedents for Japan's post-war Sea 
Lines of Communication (SLOC) security concerns. The underlying contention is that while 
post-war strategic circumstances have changed, the geographical and economic context is 
still relevant. The catastrophe suffered by Japan's merchant marine between 1943-1945 also 
has continuing psychological resonance in modern Japan and upon popular ·and elite 
perceptions of vulnerability. Lastly, while the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) are 
structured and oriented very differently to the Imperial Navy, elements of continuity 
between the two institutions are revealed in the history of the pre-1945 era, with a bearing 
on the priority placed upon post-war SLOC security by senior MSDF officers, many of 
whom formerly served in the Imperial Navy. The chapter is divided into four sections; 1) 
Maritime economic interests, outlining Japan's foreign trade, merchant marine and 
economic dependency on sea-borne commerce; 2) Maritime strategic interests, dealing with 
relevant aspects of the development of the Imperial Navy, 1868-1945; 3) The War of the 
Maru; an account of the Allied anti-shipping campaign in the Pacific War; and 4) The 
inadequate protection of merchant shipping, which details Japan's defence of 1naritime 
transportation and reasons for its shortcomings. 
In the century between Co1nmodore Perry's act of gunboat diplomacy in Uraga Bay in 1853, 
which began Japan's opening up to the world, and 1953, its first full year of independence 
after the Allied Occupation, few nations have compressed more into their history. At the 
initial point of departure Japan was still in a state of self-imposed quarantine in place since 
the 17th century. Trade was minimal, delegated to Dutch merchants operating through 
Nagasaki, and the possession of large sailing craft was prohibited by an ordinance dating 
back to 1635. At the midpoint, 1903, Japan had prevailed in its first modern test of arms 
against China; was an ally of Great Britain, the pre-eminent sea power of the day; and was 
poised to inflict a historic victory over Russia, the world's third-largest naval power and 
Japan's immediate expansionist rival in Northeast Asia. Japan's metamorphosis from 
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international recluse to great power in just 50 years also marked the high-point in its pre-
1945 maritime history . In 1945, the Imperial Navy was already fading into memory, the 
broken hulks of its battle fleet strewn from Midway Island to the Philippine Sea and its 
surviving units were disestablished in October of that year. By 1953, the nation's post-war 
leaders were in the process of establishing a new navy, this time under American auspices. 
One of the major consequences of two centuries of closure to the outside world was Japan's 
failure to develop strong maritime traditions, in spite of its geography. Lacking meaningful 
overseas trading links or sailing ships bigger than inshore fishing and cargo vessels, Japan 
had to import and 1nodel the skills of a seafaring nation when compelled to end its 
international isolation. In overcoming the emotional and technological inertia of two 
centuries of insularity the generation that lived through the Meiji Era (1868-1912) 
demonstrated a remarkable capacity to absorb and adapt alien systems of thought and 
r 
action. Japan's transformation from quasi-feudal to pro to-modern in 30 years is perhaps 
unrivalled. Rushing to put in place a modem system of government across fields as 
disparate as finance, defence and education, the Meiji statesmen were attempting not only 
to catch up with western organisational concepts and technology from a low base, but did so 
at a time when Western civil and military science was itself advancing at revolutionary 
pace. 
The scale of Japan's post-war economic dependence on sea transportation was outlined in 
Chapter One. Japan's prewar maritime interests can be divided into the economic, arising 
from industrialisation, and the strategic, as power began to be projected beyond the shores 
of the new unitary state. Militarily, from 1894-1945, the Imperial Army was continuously 
engaged on the Northeast Asian mainland and it fell to the Imperial Navy to provide 
transportation and sea control as prerequisites to the army's continental presence. 
Economically, sea transportation was indispensable to developing Japan's industrial base. 
For the civilian economy, exports were the only means to generate the foreign exchange 
needed to finance imported technology and raw materials (including metallic ores , rubber, 
high-grade coal and later, oil). Mechanisation spread this dependence to the military until 
modern warfare was no longer possible without a strong industrial base and a secure fuel 
supply. However, in none of the wars fought prior to 1941 was Japan's vulnerability to 
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commerce warfare sufficiently exposed to prepare it for the disaster suffered by the 
merchant marine in the Pacific War and the part this played in the country's defeat. 
I. Maritime econo111ic interests: Foreign trade and the n1erchant marine before 1945. 
Once launched on the path to industrialisation, the Meiji founders' immediate concern was 
to import the skills and equipment necessary to lay the economic foundations of a modern 
state. Although this initial need ameliorated with the success of import substitution policies, 
industrialisation and population growth made it necessary to import increasing quantities of 
raw materials and food . With this general 'problem' in mind, Japan's pre-1945 foreign trade 
and industry can be divided into two periods; 1859-1914 and 1914-1945. 
i) 1859-1914. 
The first phase, from the full opening of Japan's ports in 1859 to around 1880, was mainly 
concerned with setting up Japanese commerce to compete with western firms trading in 
Japan. Government investment was also directed into infrastructure and key industries such 
as shipbuilding and munitions. Most of Japan's trade stayed in foreign hands during the first 
half of Emperor Meiji's reign . Primary and semi-manufactured goods, such as tea and silk, 
were exported for foreign exchange to pay for the purchase of foreign plant and know-how. 
The trend towards increased Japanese ownership was pioneered by the family-run zaibatsu 
conglomerates; Mitsui, established in 1876; Mitsubishi; Sumitomo and Yasuda 1. Under 
Meiji, the bottom-up mercantile culture slowly built up under the Tokugawa Shogunate met 
with the top-down, planned capitalism of Meiji bureaucrats , forging the links between 
commerce and political administration which have since characterised the Japanese 
developmental model. In the second phase, from 1880 to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, 
textiles, as Japan ' s first major commercial manufacturing sector, began to move out of 
people ' s homes into small factories. Latecomers on the international scene, Japanese 
manufacturers found themselves at a disadvantage in competition for overseas markets with 
western firms able to produce superior-quality products while enjoying the protection of 
empires and spheres of influence. Once China was commercially opened to Japan as a 
participant in the treaty port system in 1895, this suited investment in textiles and light 
manufacturing, but heavy industry required greater protection. By the turn of the century, 
the Meiji government ' s efforts to build up indigenous commerce and industry had 
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successfully reduced the need for foreign machinery, chiefly from Great Britain, although 
Japan ' s reliance for certain kinds of manufactured goods continued up to the First World 
War2. Exports, still dominated by silk, also began to include a rising proportion of 
manufactured goods3. In the third phase, which lasted up to the First World War, heavy 
industry began to emerge properly in Japan 4. Textiles still accounted for half of exports, 
chiefly to the United States, Korea and China (which doubled as a supplier of raw cotton 
and consumer of the finished product). Investment in urban power electrification also 
surged during this time5. 
However, during the Meiji period, "scarcely any change took place without indirect, if not 
direct, connections with wars or preparations for war"6. Commerce and conquest became 
intertwined in several ways. First and foremost , to the Meiji oligarchy the creation of 
national prosperity was considered as one half of the national security equation. Military 
strength and wealth were equated as sources of national power and prestige, encapsulated in 
the slogan fukoku kyohei ( ' rich country: strong army') . Industrialisation was actively 
promoted as part of the Meiji oligarchs ' drive to acquire modem armaments. Armaments 
production received a major boost after the Triple Intervention of 1895, when Russia, in 
concert with France and Germany, compelled Japan to rescind the Liao tung Peninsula, 
newly wrested from China. Determined to avoid a recunence, Meiji officials added six 
regular di visions to the army and began constructing a new battle fleet with the aim of 
making Japan as self-sufficient in military production as possible. Spending on the Navy 
leapt four-fold , to over 50 million yen , between 1895 and 1898 7. Second, financing an arms 
build-up on this scale, much of it purchased overseas, was only possible with a healthy 
commercial sector to provide a taxation base. Third , obtaining captive markets by force in 
China and Korea shielded Japan 's fledgling industries from western competition and 
allowed them to prosper. Fourth , tenitories brought under Japanese control promised to 
provide a steady stream of raw materials , and labour, needed for industrialisation. Among 
1 Sydney Giffard, Japan Among the Powers, 1890-1990, Yale Uruversi ty Press, New Haven and London, 1994, 
p 42. 
2 Nakamura Takafusa, Lectures on Modern Japanese Econoniic History 1926-1994, LTCB International Library 
Foundation, 1994, p 17. 
3 W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modem Japan, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo, 1990, pp 111-14. 
4 These three phases have been adapted from W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford , 1987, p 37. 
5 Nazli Choucri, Robe11 C. North, Yamakage Susumu . The Challenge of Japan Before World War II and After: 
A Study of National Grovvth and Expansion, Routledge, London, 1992, p 30. 
6 Ibid. p 40. 
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these raw materials only coal was relatively plentiful in Japan, and this was of low-grade 
quality requiring the importation of higher grades for coking8. As more of Northeast Asia 
came under the Japanese yoke, Korea, Manchuria and China became important sources of 
coal, iron ore and pig-iron to the home economy. Manchuria began receiving Japanese 
investment in 1906 and, as the army-run colony of Manchukuo from 1932, would 
eventually provide 20 per cent of Japan's pig-iron and 8 per cent of its steel9. Lastly, an 
indirect consequence of industrialisation was the doubling of Japan 's population to 50 
million during the Meiji era. Self-sufficiency in food production dropped to 80 per cent and 
to compensate, Taiwan, ceded by China in 1895, and Korea, annexed in 1910, became 
important suppliers of rice 10. 
ii) 1914-194 5. 
The First World War provided a timely fillip, bringing the Japanese economy out of 
recession in 1915. Japan was able to break into trading concessions formerly monopolised 
by the European powers, while catering to the huge transportation and shipbuilding needs of 
the Allies. Though the war was not of great military significance for Japan , the expansion of 
its trading and shipping interests and the new significance -which oil gained during the 
conflict nudged Japan over a strategic threshold. The functioning of the economy and its 
military arms would in future be hostage to the security of seaborne transportation and 
overseas resources. 
Since the 1900s, exports had expanded from an annual average of 85 million yen between 
1890-94, to 1,800 million yen between 1920-2411 . Yet because imports outstripped exports 
in most years except for the wartime boom of 1915-1918, Japan actually carried a balance 
of payments deficit into the 1930s 12. The end of the war also left Japan with an overcapacity 
in shipbuilding and other industries. Recession returned in 1920 and was followed by the 
devastating earthquake in Tokyo and Yokohama of 1923 which required massive 
reconstruction. These negatives aside, Japan's economy had by the 1920s attained a mature, 
7 Beasley, The Rise of Modem, Japan , Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo, 1990, p 148. 
8 Choucri et al. , The Challenge of Japan Befo re World War II and After: A Study of National Growth and 
Expansion, Routledge, London, 1992, p 29. 
9 Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo , 1990, p 198. 
1° Choucri et al., The Challenge of Japan Befo re World War II and After: A Study of National Growth and 
Expansion , Routledge, London, 1992, p 28. 
11 Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan , Charles E . Tuttle Company, Tokyo, 1990, pp 112-13. 
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generally balanced structure in which the zaibatsu held a dominant position. By mid-
decade, annual foreign trade was approaching 5 billion yen, or around one-tenth of national 
wealth 13 . Despite the onset of global depression, by 1930 heavy industry a_nd chemicals had 
overtaken textiles as the most produ~tive sector of the economy, accounting for nearly one-
third of output1 4 . 
After Japan experienced a severe recession known as the Showa Slump, from the title of 
E1nperor Hirohito's reign (1926-1989), the devaluation of the yen in 1932 provided 
incentive to import cheaper raw materials from East Asia. Exports to the region, where 
there were relatively few barriers to Japanese products, flourished at the same time. During 
1934-36, China, Korea and Taiwan between them absorbed 60 per cent of Japan's exports 
and accounted for half its imports 15 . Encouraged by generous government subsidies directed 
toward rearmament, heavy industry pulled Japan out of recession until it accounted for 
almost 60 per cent of output by 194016 . The transition to a wartime economy followed 
Japan's withdrawal from the Washington and London naval treaties in 1936, and the 
outbreak of general hostilities in China in July 1937. Increasingly militaristic governments 
funnelled state resources into war preparations, raising military spending from 9 per cent of 
GNP between 1933-37 to 38 per cent of GNP in 1938-4i17. 
As political ties with the United States soured over Japan's China policy, the reliability of 
Japan's primary supplier of oil and a host of other mineral resources presented the military 
and civilian leadership with an acute dilemma. In none of the territories under Japan's 
control was there an adequate supply of rubber, or many non-ferrous metals or oil --
commodities all critical to a sustained war effort. Japan therefore had to purchase most of 
these strategic resources on the open market. The combined total of bulk commodity 
12 Choucri et al., The Challenge of Japan Before World War II and After: A Study of National Growth and 
Expansion, Routledge, London, 1992, p 37-38. 
13 Sato Ichiro, The Naval Policy of Japan, Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual 1927, Wi11iam Cowes and 
Sons, London pp 71-80. 
14 Nakamura Takafusa, Lectures on Modern Japanese Economic History 1926-1994, LTCB International Library 
Foundation, 1994, p 6, p 16-17. 
15 Beasley, The Rise of Modem Japan , Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo, 1990, p 188. 
16 Sydney Giffard , Japan Aniong the Powers, 1890-1990, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1994, 
p 115-16. 
17 Beasley, The Rise of Modem Japan, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo, 1990, p 189. 
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imports in 1941 amounted to about 20 million tons 18 . As access to US resources became 
politically uncertain, military and business circles began contemplating Southeast Asia as 
an alternative source of strategic materials. Until the war in Europe changed the balance of 
power, Japan was reluctant to risk confrontation with the United States and Great Britain by 
pressuring for a greater commercial allocation of Southeast Asian resources. In October 
1939, with the European colonial powers preoccupied with the struggle against Hitler, the 
Cabinet Planning Board concluded that Japan should "bring within our economic sphere 
areas on the East Asian mainland and in the southern region" 19 . The ideal of economic 
autarky for Japan found expression in the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. 
Overseen by a special 1ninistry created in November 1942, the Greater East Asian Co-
prosperity Sphere was partly political in nature, responding to a long-running Japanese 
foreign policy ambition to exclude European colonialism from Asia. The economic 
motivation was to incorporate Japan's military conquests into a yen-denominated bloc 
capable of furnishing its material needs in wartime and beyond. 
iii) Merchant fleet. 
The creation of a merchant fleet, as a necessary adjunct for an aspiring trading nation, was 
assigned high priority in Meiji development strategy. Modern cargo vessels were essential 
for coastal as well as foreign trade. Japan constructed its first steamer in 1866, but imported 
about 90 per cent of its merchant ships up to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. 
Shortcomings in Japanese designs exposed in the war motivated the Meiji government to 
invest and intervene heavily in shipbuilding to improve its naval and merchant fleets, the 
latter doubling in size to 1.5 million tons within a decade. Shipbuilding was further 
invigorated by the Russo-Japanese War, and while still on a modest scale compared to other 
industrial powers , by 1913, half of Japan ' s trade was being ca1Tied in Japanese bottoms20 . 
Owing to the stimulus to shipbuilding provided by the First World War, Japan possessed 
the world's third largest 1nerchant navy by 1917 and was unable to keep pace with new 
18 The importance of other bulk commodities to Japan's war economy is frequently overshadowed by Japan 's 
dependence on oil. Iron ore requirements, for instance, expanded fro m less than 500,000 tons in 1940 to 
1,718 ,000 tons in 1943 18 , almost all of which had to be brought in by sea. 
19 Ibid . p 201. 
20 Sydney Giffard, Japan Among the Powers, J 890-1990, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1994, 
p 42. 
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orders its shipyards were receiving21 . A post-war glut in shipping worldwide hit Japanese 
shipbuilders hard, but the industry eventually recovered in the 1930s with the aid of 
renewed subsidies and the introduction of a scrap-and-build scheme by the government 
designed to encourage the modernisation of the fleet22 . In 1935, the merchant fleet consisted 
of 924 cargo ships, 319 semi-cargo ships, 73 passenger ships and 39 tankers23 . By 1941, 
Japan's merchant marine was eclipsed only by Great Britain and the United States 24. Yet 
this belied Japan 's continuing dependence on foreign bottoms to carry 40 per cent of its 
trade, most of which were certain to withdraw their services in wartime25 . Furthermore, the 
projected shortfall was sure to be worsened by requisitioning on the part of the Imperial 
armed forces. 
Requisitioning in fact began in the 1930s, dividing the merchant fleet under separate Army, 
Navy and civilian direction. The General Staffs of both services oversaw shipping under 
their control, while the Shipping Control Board was created within the Ministry of 
Communications to 1nanage civilian vessels. No central coordinating authority existed. The 
Navy increased its demands for merchantmen until 1,740,200 tons, approaching one third of 
the total, had been commandeered by the time of Pearl Harbor26 . Some of this included 
'shadow' warships classed as ocean liners to circumvent the limitations treaties27 , but 
requisitioning of civilian ships and crews on such a scale would nevertheless leave the 
merchant marine genuinely under-equipped to meet the nation's economic transportation 
needs in wartime. Anny requisitioning was even more draconian, bringing over 2 million 
tons of merchant shipping under its control by Pearl Harbor. Though some was returned to 
civilian control, the extended campaigns in the Solomons and Burma retarded the process 
21 Mark P. Parillo. The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993, pp 
50-52. 
22 Nakamura Takafusa, Lectures on Modern Japanese Econoniic History 1926-1994, LTCB International Library 
Foundation, 1994, p 71. 
23 James E. Auer. The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71, Praeger, New York 1973, p 
14. 
24 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997, pp 395-98. 
25 D.W. Waters, 'Japan - Defeat though Blockade - 1941-45', The Naval Review, Vol. 76, No. 3, July 1988, pp 
246-47. 
26 Mark P. Parillo. The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993, p 
75. 
27 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997, p 319,361. 
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and the army remained so short of transports during the war that even the 'super-battleship'' 
Yamato . was used as a troop f erry28 . 
Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Cabinet Planning Board determined that 3 million 
tons of merchant shipping would be required to keep Japan's economy afloat. Added to this, 
the army's transportation needs were estimated to be 2.3 million tons during the first six 
months of operations, declining to 1.1 million tons per year thereafter. The Navy's shipping 
requirements were predicted to remain steady at 1.8 million tons annually29 . By the outbreak 
of war the combined merchant fleet had reached 6.4 million tons, and with further 
construction, the prospect of captured vessels and a flotilla of wooden craft to draw upon, 
these demands appeared within its reach on paper at least. Provided that merchant shipping 
losses could be kept to under 1 million tons per year and ample resources for steel 
production secured, the director of the Planning Board judged that new construction would 
enable Japan to maintain the flow of materials to Japan at 1941 levels30 . Other government 
studies warned that if civilian shipping was reduced to 1.5 million tons, steel production 
would decline by one-fifth and more than half the output of the secondary sector, composed 
of bulk commodities such as coal, salt, fertiliser, soy, bricks and cotton, would be lost. The 
3 million-ton figure calculated by the Cabinet Planning Board as necessary for economic 
survival, was in fact over-assessed, described in one view as "a positive assessment 
intended to bring war about"31 . Prewar estimates in general demonstrated insufficient 
understanding of the stresses that wartime conditions would impose on the sea 
transportation system. Compounding the dangers and logistical difficulties faced during the 
Pacific War, Japan's civilian and military transportation were approached as discrete 
problems. Partly, this was for bureaucratic reasons, but except for a relatively few cases, the 
front lines were too far removed from natural resources to combine economic and military 
supply missions efficiently. Military supply ships generally returned to Japan carrying 
28 Mark P. Parillo . The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993, p 
15, 239; Table A.5. Control of Japanese Merchant Marine Tonnage during World War II. 
The Imperial Army also designed, built and operated its own fleet of transpo1t submarines throughout the war to 
resupply outlying ganisons. 
29 Mark P. Parillo. The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II , Naval Institute Press , Annapolis, 1993, pp 
34-38. 
30 Nakamura Takafusa, Lectures on Modern Japanese Economic History 1926-1994, LTCB International Library 
Foundation, 1994, p 109-10. 
31 Ibid. p 110. 
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ballast, leaving civilian ships to bear the unsupported burden of supplying the home 
32 
economy . 
II. Maritime strategic interests: The ln1perial Navy, 1868-1945. 
Before turning to the war against Japanese shipping in the Pacific and the responses of the 
Imperial Navy and Japanese government, it is worth focussing on the institution of the Navy 
and relevant aspects of its 77-year history in three phases; Phase I: birth to maturity, 1868-
1905; Phase II: uncertainty, austerity and expansionism, 1906-36; Phase III: oil -- life-blood 
for the Navy, 1937-45. This is not a battle history, but intended to highlight the most 
important influences on the traditions, outlook, threat perceptions and doctrine of the 
Imperial Navy, including such particular factors as the Navy's role in politics and its 
dependence on imported oil. 
Phase I: Birth to maturity, 1868-1905. 
The Imperial Navy formally came into existence with the Meiji Restoration in 1868, from a 
composite force of foreign vessels assembled by the Satsuma clan since the 1850s33 . The 
enduring schism between Army and Navy under Meiji owed something to the legacy of clan 
rivalry between the Satsuma and Choshu households who fought a civil war early in the 
Meiji era. While Satsuma exerted a lasting influence over the Imperial Navy, Choshu 
34 
maintained a close association with the new national army . Early development was 
concerned with building up the fleet and overcoming the shortage of indigenous knowledge 
by importing modern naval technology, tactics and strategy from the West. This meant 
reliance on imported vessels, mostly from Great Britain, which as the world's leading naval 
power established a paternal relationship with the world's newest35 . The Imperial Navy was 
ideally placed as an institution to fulfil the Meiji ethos, acting as a conduit for foreign 
learning and technology, strengthening Japan 's defences and enhancing national prestige. 
32 D.W. Waters, 'Japan - Defeat through Blockade - 1941-45', The Naval Review, Vol. 76, No. 3, July 1988, p 
247. 
33 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941 , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997, p 5. 
34 When Satsuma's coastal artillery at Kagoshima dueled with a British naval squadron in August 1863, Togo 
Heihachiro , the victor at Tsushima in May 1905, was present as a gunner. (Edwin P. Hoyt, Three Military 
Leaders: Togo, Yamamoto, Ymnashita, Kodansha International, Tokyo, 1993, pp 21-24). 
35 Ian Nish (ed), Anglo-Japanese Naval Relations: Papers by Kiyoshi Ikeda, Ian Gow, John Chapman, Chit-
chung Ong, Inten~ational Studies 1985/3, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 1985. 
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Proof of the latter came with the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, 
Japan's symbolic accession to the great power club. The alliance, too, was largely naval in 
character, the product of Great Britain's desire to preserve a favourable balance with 
Russia. However, the British government was careful to negotiate its terms so that military 
assistance only applied in cases of attack by more than one country. Though not party to 
Japan's pre-1914 wars, Great Britain supplied it with naval vessels used to win naval 
victories over China and Russia, delivering its last battleship, Kongo, to the Yokusuka 
shipyards in November 191336 . The horizons of Japan's early naval leaders were necessarily 
confined and their energies consumed by the challenges of building up a modern navy. This 
in fact aided the development of a coherent naval strategy limited to exercising local sea 
control. Only once the Imperial Navy escaped the territorial and technical limitations of its 
inaugural phase, in 1905, did it set out on the path to strategic over-extension. 
Early Imperial Navy officers tended to imbibe the tenets of western naval thinking 
uncritically, accepting the 'navalist' orthodoxy of Alfred Thayer Mahan that national 
greatness lay in domination of the seas, and that the means resided in potent battle fleets. 
Though Mahan wrote for an Anglo-American audience, his works fed through into a 
preference for offensive naval doctrine in J apan37• In later years, after Japan emerged as the 
naval hegemon in the Western Pacific, Mahan' s views helped to shape a deterministic 
strand of thinking in both Japan and the United States that a naval clash to decide mastery 
of the Pacific was inevitable. In 1894, Japan entered into its first modern war against China 
with a mixed fleet of 28 warships totalling 57,000 tons and a force of 24 torpedo. boats , 
incorporating Japanese-designed quick-firing guns and torpedoes. On the strength of 
prestige accruing from its victory over the Chinese Fleet at the Yalu River, and its role in 
facilitating landing operations in Liaotung and Korea, the Navy successfully boosted its 
status and budgetary share to a level comparable with the army. With memories of the 1895 
Triple Intervention still fresh , Yamamoto Gombei , then chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of 
the Navy Ministry , pushed for the construction of a battle fleet to be built up over ten years 
comprising six battleships, six armoured cruisers and 23 destroyers amounting to 234,000 
36 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie . Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941 , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997, pp 163-64. 
37 Although the United States Naval Academy closed its doors to Japanese students in the 1890s, this did not 
prevent Mahan from exerting a powerful influence on young officers such as Akiyama Saneyuki (see below), 
who made an unsuccessful bid to lure Mahan to teach strategy in Japan. (Ibid. p 71) . 
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tons. When complete, the 'six-six' fleet was a quantitative and qualitative leap that elevated 
Japan into the top flight of naval powers. Yamamoto's rationale for the core of the new fleet 
- six battleships - was based on his (1896) estimate of the largest opposing naval force that 
Japan was likely to face, which he surmised to be a '4+2' squadron assembled by one major 
and a lesser naval power in coalition38 . As long as the Russians were equally determined to 
reinforce their Pacific Squadron, based in Port Arthur and Vladivostok, the Imperial Navy 
would lack control of the Japan and Yellow seas, an essential requirement if it was to 
challenge Russian expansion in Manchuria and Korea. 
By 1903, Japan was openly gearing for war with Russia and hurried additions to the fleet 
took the Imperial Navy into hostilities the following February with a total of six battleships, 
eight armoured and 16 other cruisers, 20 destroyers and 58 torpedo boats. As in 1894-95, 
the scope of Imperial Navy operations against Russia was local, involving pre-emptive, 
small-unit attacks on the enemy's fleet ports, the support of landing operations and a major 
fleet encounter. Although conducted offensively, the strategic role of the Imperial Navy --
to support army operations on land -- was defensive, a point realised at the time by Sir 
Julian Corbett39 . At Tsushima, in May 1905, Admiral Togo Heihachiro scored the most 
famous annihilating victory in modern naval history against the Csar' s Baltic Fleet 
(renamed the Second Pacific Squadron) at the end of its seven-month voyage from Europe. 
The totality of Togo's victory, presaging Russia's defeat on land, heralded a major shift in 
the balance of power in East Asia, confirmed the Imperial Navy's strategic, tactical and 
technological prowess and dealt a shock to those unprepared for the first defeat of a 
European power by a non-European race. In its wake, Japanese naval theorists such as 
Akiyaina Saneyuki and Sato Tetsutaro found the confidence to ponder a naval strategy 
tailored to meet Japan's requirements, but which would extend the horizons of the Imperial 
Navy beyond local defence. 
The Imperial Navy's success at Tsushima blinded its leadership to less glamorous aspects of 
the war that could have yielded important lessons including the failure to develop any 
38 This resembled capability-led planning on the model of Great Britain's two-power standard, which had 
dictated the Royal Navy's force structure since 1889. (Ibid . pp 57-60). 
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strategy for commerce protection. Having requisitioned 681,000 tons or most of the 
merchant fleet, to fulfill Army and Navy transportation needs, Japan had to rely on foreign 
and especially British-flagged shipping for 90 per cent of its trade for the duration of the 
Russo-Japanese war 4°. In the conflict's early stages, a detachment of Russian cruisers from 
the Vladivostok squadron successfully broke out of the Sea of Japan through the Tsugaru 
Strait into the Pacific and began raiding merchantmen plying Japan's eastern coasts. More 
damaging than the physical destruction caused by these raids was the resulting increase in 
insurance rates, the suspension of selected shipping services from Great Britain and the 
effect on public morale until the squadron was finally disabled in August 1904. This first 
experience of commerce-raiding, though much to the Navy's emba1Tassment, did not 
prompt a serious re-evaluation about the defence of merchant shipping 41 . The overriding 
naval concern in the wars against China and Russia was the protection of military sea lines 
of communication. 
Phase II: Uncertainty, austerity and expansionism, 1906-1936. 
With the Russian naval threat neutralised and Japan's position in Korea firmly established, 
the nation's immediate security aims had been met and the direction of defence policy was 
no longer so obviously determined. In April 1907, the Imperial Defence Policy (teikoku 
kokubo hoshin) was inaugurated as an attempt to codify national threat perceptions and 
force requirements in this new period of strategic uncertainty. In addition to 25 standing 
army di visions, the '8: 8' plan called for a fleet composed of eight battleships and eight 
cruisers. Great Britain was still Japan's ally, but the other foreign powers featured in the 
Policy were Russia, Gennany and France, the agents of Japan's humiliation in 1895, as well 
as the United States. The addition of the United States came at the insistence of the Imperial 
Navy42. With Russia discounted as a naval challenger after Tsushima, the Imperial Navy 
. cast a wary eye eastwards to the United States as its long-term rival, concerned at the how 
the opening of the Panama canal and the projected fortification of bases in Guam and the 
39 Julian S. Corbett, Sonie Principles of Maritime Strategy, Naval Institute Press , Annapolis , 1988, p 309n. 
Corbett was commissioned to write a confidential history of the Russo-Japanese War for the War Staff at the 
Admiralty. 
40 Nomura Minoru, Kaisenshi ni Manabu ('Learning from the History of War at Sea'), Bungei Shun ju, Tokyo, 
1994, p 75. 
41 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997, pp 107-09. 
42 In 1901 , Japan possessed a larger fleet than that of the United States, but by 1907 the Unjted States had a 
superiority of eleven battleshjps. (Ibid. pp 146-49). 
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Philippines would affect the naval balance in the Pacific43 . Japan's suspicions were matched 
in Washington, and political relations were further aggravated by two recurrent sources of 
tension over the 'Open Door' to China and Japanese migration to North America. These 
tensions were contained, but the British, for their part, felt sufficiently apprehensive to 
renegotiate the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1911, to exclude the United States from its 
44 terms . 
As the founder of a Japanese naval doctrine distinct from western tutelage, Akiyama 
Saneyuki culled from Japan ' s conflicts with China and Russia a number of precepts and 
beliefs which according to Mark Peattie did much to shape the pre-war course of the 
Imperial Navy45 . At the Naval War College in Tsukiji, Akiyama helped instill a respect for 
planning, training and logistics and developed an operational concept designed to inflict 
attrition on an enemy fleet by the launching of forward attacks prior to committing the 
Combined Fleet 46. Central to its success would be Japan's ability to acquire 'big ships and 
big guns' (taikan kyohoshugi) capable of overcoming the quantity of any opposing battle 
line with the quality of its own47. Akiyama developed his theories after the Russo-Japanese 
war, when Togo's tactical initiative at Tsushima had paved the way for a strategic victory 
over a numerically superior foe. Having delivered success in Japan's limited wars against 
China and Russia, the strategy of seeking a decisive fleet encounter was adapted by 
Akiyama to meet the hypothetical threat of an American battle fleet advancing across the 
Pacific. Akiyama' s other legacy was the emphasis he placed on non-material factors in 
achieving victory. Belief in the triumph of spiritual over material elements in war, if not 
unique to Japan, was culturally deep-rooted and has been ascribed to the martial legacy of 
the samurai class48. In the years following Tsushima the Imperial Navy faced no immediate 
threat to its control over surrounding waters, and had little need to call upon spiritual or 
moral reinforcement to compensate for material weakness. The contradictions between 
43 Hector Bywater, writing in 1927, cites from the account of Franklin Roosevelt, as the fo1mer Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, about "ten nervous days in the summer of 1908, (when) the United States hovered on the 
edge of an ultimatum from Japan" over American plans to modernise its defences in the Philippines (Navies and 
Nations: A Review of Naval Developnients since the Great War, Constable and Company, London, 1927, p 152). 
44 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941 , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997, p 142, 186. 
45 Mark R . Peattie, 'Akiyan1a Saneyuki and the Emergence of Modern Japanese Naval Doctrine', Proceedings, 
January 1977, pp 61-69. 
46 
' Combined Fleet ' (rengo kantai) was the name given to Imperial avy's major battle force. 
47 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941 , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997, p 129. 
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rationalist and emotional strains of thinking in the Imperial Navy only surfaced in the 
1930s, as it prepared to take on the United States. Akiyama' s confidence in the ability of 
Japan's moral qualities to prevail over the industrial and military potential of the United 
States only grew as war approached. Reinforced in Japanese society at large by the 
strengthened role of state Shintoism, this faith took on a canonical appeal at all levels of the 
Navy. 
Sato Tetsutaro, whose works on seapower appeared slightly earlier at the turn of the 
century, argued Japan ' s need of an oceanic defence posture extending well beyond the 
requirements for local defence49. In Sato's notion of c01mnand of the seas (seikaiken) , 
though vaguely defined, lay the seeds of the Imperial Navy ' s commitment to offence as the 
best means of defence50 . His legacy has been more concretely identified in the practice of 
setting a ratio of capital ships to maintain against a potential enemy51 . After naval threat 
perceptions centered on the United States, for planning purposes at least, the powerful 
Operations Division of the General Staff determined that the Imperial Navy needed to 
maintain 70 per cent of the US Navy's first-line strength in heavy cruisers52. More broadly, 
Sato's influence on the Navy is associated with territorial expansionis1n enshrined in the 
concept of a 'south advance ' (nanshin). Since its creation, the Imperial Navy had enjoyed 
independent access to the emperor, its constitutional status equal with that of the army, 
although its political influence was never as strong. The intense rivalry and suspicion which 
grew up between both institutions was one of the most destructive and unresolved features 
of the governmental system set up under Meiji53 . Once the Army established a pennanent 
foothold in Korea and Manchuria the Navy risked losing status, not to mention its budgetary 
48 See Mark P . Parillo . The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993, 
p 26. 
49 Most famously in Teikoku !co!cubo shi ron ("On Imperial Defence History"). 
50 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941 , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997 , pp 135-4 1. 
51 Capital ships refers to battleships, heavy cruisers and, later, aircraft carriers. 
52 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941 , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis , 1997, p 235. 
53 Hostility between the Navy and Army was of a different order to the inter-service rivalry experienced in all 
large militaries. In the 1930s for example, the Navy fo1tified the Ministry in Kasumigaseki against the possibility 
of Army assault while Admiral Yan1amoto Isoroku , the future chief of the Combined Fleet was flanked by Navy 
bodyguards to deter assassination by the Army unit assigned to protect him. The jealously-guarded autonomy of 
both services bred not only confusion and duplication of effo1t but prevented a centralised command structure. 
Incredibly, the Navy concealed preparations for the Pearl Harbor attack from General Tojo un til November 1941 
and later masked the full extent of its losses at Midway from the premier (Mark P . Parillo. The Japanese 
Merchant Marine in World War II , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993 , p 19-24; and Edwin P . Hoyt, The 
Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since WWII, Donald I. Fine, ew York, 1985, p 101). 
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allocation, without a rival strategy of its own. Despite the Navy's generally moderate 
reputation, its more impulsive officers were inspired by Sato' s dreain of carving out an area 
of influence to the south. The obvious problem in the 1900s was that this meant certain 
collision with the western colonial powers, which between them already controlled most of 
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Logically, the path of least resistance for Japan's 
imperial ambitions lay in China's vast north-eastern hinterland, with the Army as its chief 
agent. The concept of a ' south advance' to trump the army's 'north advance' (hokushin) 
received a more concrete imperative once East Indies oil became a coveted commodity, but 
made little practical sense until the First World War created an opening for Japan in the 
Pacific. 
After joining the Allies in late August 1914, Japan moved against German possessions 
north of the Equator in China and the Pacific. With Germany virtually powerless to resist, 
by 1915 Japan had seized the Kaiser's possessions in Shantung, expanded its commercial 
concessions across north-eastern China and incorporated Germany's island territories from 
Palau to the Marsh alls. However, Japan 's virtually bloodless extension into the Pacific did 
not fundamentally shift the centre of gravity of expansionism away from the Imperial Army 
in Northeast Asia, where by 1917, 50,000 troops were deployed in Shantung and 
Manchuria, substantial forces in Korea and a further 75,000 about to be sent to Siberia54 . 
Japan's gains in the Pacific were recognised as League Mandates at Versailles in 1919 and 
supposed to remain unfortified under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, ratified in 
1923. Though of limited economic worth, Japan's Pacific mandates held a considerable 
strategic value by excluding a foreign naval presence and acting as outposts to monitor US 
Pacific Fleet manoeuvres in peacetime. In war, they could be quickly adapted as submarine 
and sea-plane bases to block communications between the United States and its western 
Pacific possessions (the Philippines and Guam) and as logistic stepping stones for any 
advance on Southeast Asia. 
The Imperial Navy had a secondary, but potentially instructive, involvement in convoy and 
antisubmarine operations during the First World War. The Australian Imperial 
Expeditionary Force destined for Gallipoli was provided with a Japanese escort across the 
54 The Imperial Army dragged out its intervention into the rear of the Russian Civil War until 1925 when the last 
Japanese troops were withdrawn from no11hem Sakhalin, the southern half of which had been ceded to Japan in 
the Treaty of Portsmouth, in 1905. 
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Indian Ocean in 1915. Then in 1917, at Britain ' s request, the Imperial Navy sent a destroyer 
squadron to the Mediterranean to assist in convoying allied shipping against submarines of 
the Central Powers55 . Although its arrival had a favourable impact upon allied losses , as in 
the Russo-Japanese war, experience did not translate into lessons learned. Instead, in the 
eyes of Japan's naval staffers it was the inconclusive gun duel at Jutland which reconfirmed 
the primacy of the decisive fleet encounter. Overshadowed by Jutland, the German U-boat 
offensive against Allied shipping in the Atlantic, which had demonstrated the strategic 
potential of the submarine and the effectiveness of convoys, received little attention in 
Japan after the war, although the same might be said of . the Royal Navy -- and with less 
excuse
56
. However, Japan's experience in the First World War differed from that of its 
Allies in that it was not a party to any of the major land offensives and untouched by the 
value shifts wrought among other belligerents. Japan, in fact, had a 'good' war, enhancing 
its econo1nic and strategic position at the relative expense of the European powers, but it 
was left curiously out of place in 1919, in a war-weary world receptive to Wilsonian 
idealism and arms limitation. Having mastered the rules of the imperial game as late-
co1ners, Japan's military elite saw little reason to dim their enthusiasm for expansion. 
The 1920s brought econormc austerity to Japan and a period which saw Japanese 
democratic institutions temporarily flourish; factors which kept the military in check. 
Smaller, recession-pinched budgets forced hard choices on the Navy, sharpened by the 
spiralling costs of constructing battleships with ever-bigger guns and thicker armour. This 
did not prevent the Navy from pushing for the construction of an '8:8:8 ' fleet (to be 
composed of twin battleship squadrons and a force of eight heavy cruisers). When plans for 
the fleet were trimmed to an 8:6 configuration, fiscal reality was as much the culprit as 
Japan ' s new treaty obligations. The drafters of the Washington Naval Limitations Treaty, 
negotiated over 1921-23, conceived it as a stabilising alternative to military alliances and 
arms races. With fewer resources than Great Britain or the United States, the Treaty offered 
Japan an escape from a cycle of competition it could not hope to win, at the psychological 
price of being fixed into a position of inferiority. Over strong objections from the Navy, the 
Foreign Ministry (gaimusho) settled for a capital ship ratio of 5:5:3 and a mutual agreement 
55 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imp erial Japanese 
Navy, 1887- 1941 , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis , 1997, p 169. 
56 Eric Grove (ed). The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939-1945; A Revised Edition of the (1957) 
Naval Staff History Volumes lA (Text and Appendices) and lB (Plans and Tables), The Navy Records 
Society/ Ashgate Publishing Limited , Aldershot , 1997, pp 3-4. 
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to refrain from fortifying Pacific bases . This represented a loss on the 10: 10:7 ratio upon 
which the Imperial Navy had predicated the success of its war plan against the United 
States. Elements in the Navy objecting to what they construed as a slight to national pride 
organised themselves into a Fleet Faction to oppose the Treaty57. While the Fleet Faction 
was unable to prevent Japan's accession to the Washington Treaty in 1923 it won a partial 
victory when the Imperial Defence Policy was revised, in deference to the Navy, 
designating the United States as Japan 's number one enemy ahead of the Soviet Union and 
China. In a portent of Japan ' s international isolation, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was 
allowed to expire in the same year. 
Belief in the dominance of surface battle-fleets held firm in Japan, as it did within the US 
Navy and Royal Navy, even as improvements in submarines and naval aviation chipped 
away at the 'capital' status of the battleship, still defined by the throwing distance of its 
guns . Failing to see a strategic threat to merchant shipping in these new technologies 
naturally inhibited the ability of Japan's naval planners to develop their own doctrine for 
commerce protection or commerce warfare. Japanese submarines, of which several classes 
were developed in the 1920s and 1930s had the range, endurance and armament to equip 
them for both roles. The J-class submarines were capable of sustained operations off the US 
west coast, and were armed with torpedoes superior in range, speed and payload to their 
American counterparts throughout the Pacific war. A British strategist wondered at the time 
whether a larger submarine force would make Japan ' s coastal waters and the Yellow Sea 
impregnable against raiding squadrons58 . Yet the Imperial Navy's inability to develop a 
submarine doctrine independent of the surface fleet was not simply a failure of imagination. 
Underlying the Navy's preoccupation with offensive doctrine was the strategic rationale 
that Japan could only hope to prevail in a short war with the United States , forcing a 
negotiated settlement before US industry could bring its greater mobilisation capacity to 
bear. Unable to rebuild its fleet quickly enough the larger power would be obliged to seek 
57 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941 , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis , 1997, p 200. 
58 G.A. Ballard cited in Bywater, Navies and Nations: A Review of Naval Developnients since the Great War, 
Constable and Company, London, 1927, p 204-05. 
An exceptional prewar exercise, conducted in October 1940, involved Japanese submarines patrolling Tsushima 
Strait, the Bungo Channel (between Shikoku and Kyushu) and the approach to Tokyo Bay, against hypothetical 
submarine attacks on Japanese commerce. Despite the success of the simulated attacks, the high command was 
too pe11urbed by the apparent susceptibility of their submarines to radio direction-finding to develop this further 
as an operational concept (David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the 
Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 , aval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997 , p 430). 
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terms, as it had in 1905. To those responsible for drawing up the Navy 's war plans in the 
1920s, a strategy of economic blockade against an enemy with ten times Japan's industrial 
capacity, copious natural resources, and whose eastern seaboard lay beyond Japan 's reach 
must have seemed illogical. Had Japanese planners developed the doctrine and tactics for 
interdicting US logistic sea lines of communication across the Pacific their prospects might 
well have been more rewarding. While unlikely to have stopped US amphibious operations 
during the Pacific, Japan ' s capacity to complicate Allied efforts would probably have 
justified the investment. During the Battle of the Atlantic, reports of the success enjoyed by 
German U-boats against Allied shipping until 1942 did nothing to jolt the Japanese naval 
command into rethinking submarine operations, despite all attempts at persuasion by the 
German naval attache (and U-boat commander) in Tokyo, Paul Wenneker59 . As a result, 
Japan's naval submarine doctrine and design remained welded to the Combined Fleet 
throughout the Pacific War and the long supply chains used to sustain the US ' island-
hopping' campaign went largely unharried60 . 
What did occupy the close attention of Japan's naval staff in the 1920s and 1930s were the 
anticipated communication routes of the US surface battle fleet across the Pacific. After the 
American Asiatic squadron in the Philippines and Guam had been neutralised, it was 
assumed that the US Navy would undertake a massed sally westward to retake Guam and 
the Philippines. Japanese naval strategy was originally based on luring the American fleet to 
a line between the Bonin and Mariana Islands where the superior gunnery of the Combined 
Fleet could inflict a Tsushima-type blow despite its numerical inferiority. It was expected 
that the bulk of the US Pacific Fleet would advance along one of four lines of approach to 
the western Pacific. The first of these, the north circular route, was the shortest but 
discounted owing to its rough weather conditions. The second, South Pacific route was 
considered overly long. This left the direct route from Hawaii and a south-central path 
through the Gilbert and Marshall island chains, both of which necessitated the capture of 
territory that could be converted into forward bases. After the Washington Naval Treaty 
pegged Japan 's naval shipbuilding with the United States and Great Britain at 5 :5 :3 the war 
59 Robe11 Goralski and Russell W. Freeburg, Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant 
Victory or Defeat, William Monow and Company, Inc., New York, 1987, pp 186-1 89, p 199. 
60 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis , 1997, pp 217-1 9. 
In the course of the war, only two campaigns were launched by Japanese submarines against Allied shipping, in 
the Indian Ocean in July 1942, and against shipping between Australia and the United States in spring 1943 
(Eric Grove, ed. , The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939-194S , p 156). 
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plan was broadened to include attacks on the advancing US fleet forward of the Bonin-
Mariana line, by submarines and aircraft operating out of the Pacific Mandates. Provided 
that a roughly equalised American fleet would obligingly steam into the path of the 
Combined Fleet it was believed that the Imperial Navy could overcome its quantitative 
disadvantage and prevail in a short conflict61 . 
The Navy's battle strategy was not without its own critics . In the 1930s, aII power 
advocates sensitive to the impact of evolving technologies and tactics, including the 
wartime commander of the Combined Fleet, Yamamoto Isoroku, questioned the tethering of 
Imperial Navy doctrine to the decisive fleet encounter on the grounds that aircraft were 
eroding the traditional primacy of battleships in naval warfare62. In place of battleships, the 
advent of fully-fledged aircraft carriers from the late 1920s promised to introduce a 
quantum leap in offensive reach . Others doubted the ability of the Imperial Navy to 
concentrate sufficient force or to manoeuvre tactically in the open expanses of the Pacific, 
unlike in the confines of the Tsushima Strait, or Yellow Sea. Continuing to rely on a 
reactive strategy of drawing the enemy fleet into the superior gun range of the Japanese 
battle line was , they argued, no longer credible63 . Nevertheless, the maxim of 'big ships and 
big guns' continued to dictate procurement into the 1930s, reaching its zenith with the 
laying down of the leviathan super-battleships, Yamato and Musashi, displacing over 
60,000 tons each 64. Only once Japan withdrew from the treaty regime in 1936 and began to 
quadruple military spending did Japan's carrier force come into its own. However, the 
effect was merely to supplant one offensive orthodoxy with another, obscuring the Navy's 
weakness in escort vessels65 . Had the naval limitations regime not been extended to cover 
destroyers, sub-chasers and lesser vessels in the 1930 London Naval Treaty it is likely they 
would have continued to be marginalised by budgetary pressures. 
From the mid-1930s, developments in the domestic and international political environment 
brought war closer. The gradual accession of army hardliners to power in Japan after 1930 
61 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941, Naval Institute Press, Annapohs, 1997, pp 201-205 . 
62 Edwin P . Hoyt, The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since WWII, Donald I. Fine, ew York, 
1985, p 106. 
63 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941 , aval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997, p 475-76. 
64 Displacement tonnage is used for the total weight of a ship and its contents, primarily for warships. 
65 Mark P. Parillo. The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993, p 
16. 
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intensified after 193666 . By the mid-1930s, the Fleet Faction had bested moderate elements 
for control of the Navy and started cooperating with the army to subvert civilian control, 
culminating in the military-run cabinet of Tojo Hideki , a serving army general, in 194067 . 
The Imperial Defence Policy was revised for the third and final time in 1936. The revised 
document identified the United States and Soviet Union as equal threats, as a compromise 
between Imperial Army and Navy threat perceptions, while China and Great Britain (for the 
first time) were added as subordinate enemies. The uncertainty and austerity of the 1920s 
and early 1930s had given way to the clear expectation of war, for which preparations 
began in earnest. The existence of four major potential adversaries spoke on one level of 
confusion between the Imperial Army and Navy over Japan's strategic direction 68 . More 
fundamentally, it revealed the slide in Japan 's international relations since the Manchurian 
Incident in 1931. Responsibility for the deterioration of Japan's diplomatic' position up to 
this point lay largely with the K wantung Army's expansionist policies in China. However, 
from the late 1930s, the Imperial Navy's ambition and its thirst for oil caused it to lead the 
charge into Southeast Asia. 
Phase III: Oil -- life-blood for the Navy, 1937-45. 
After the idea of a Mahanian clash with the United States took root in the Imperial Navy in 
the 1920s, Japan 's dependence upon the United States for 80 per cent of its oil , even more 
in the case of high-octane aviation fuel , loomed large in the minds of naval policy-makers, 
seeding the idea for the seizure of the oil-rich East Indies. Japanese ship designers had early 
on realised the advantages , in range and speed, to be gained from oil's high calorific value 
as a bunker fuel , and were replacing coal-fired warships prior to the First World War69 . The 
flip-side of this increased military performance for Japan was that of all the powers it was 
the most vulnerable to a cut-off of overseas supplies. A single battleship of the Combined 
Fleet burned over 1,000 tons of oil to maintain its top speed over 24 hours 70 . In 1940, the 
66 In Febrnary, an abortive army revolt in Tokyo paved the way for a purge of moderate politicians and later in 
the year the ar111y bypassed the gaimusho to conclude the anti -Comintern Pact with Italy and Germany, prepar·ing 
the ground for the Axis pact. 
67 Edwin P . Hoyt, The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism, Since WWII, Donald I. Fine, New York, 
1985 , p 92, 93 . 
68 The Navy ' s Operational Pl an for 1939 postulated simultaneous operations against four enemies including the 
Soviet Union (David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial 
Japanese Navy, 1887-1 941 , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis , 1997, p 466). 
69 
'Bunker' is fuel used for boiler-filing in ships. Bunker oil and heavy oil are the same thing. Japanese 
experiments with oil-fired boilers date back to the 1880s. 
7° Figure for the Mutsu from Mar·k P. Par·illo . The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II, Naval Institute 
Press, Annapolis , 1993, p 41-42 . 
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Navy accounted for one quarter of the national consumption of 100,000 banels per day71 . 
Domestic production had by that time barely reached 10,000 banels per day, including 
synthetics72 . Among independent exporters, the Soviet-controlled half of Sakhalin offered 
proximity and huge potential but was politically undependable 73 . Great Britain, for its part, 
consumed most of the oil produced in Persia, Burma and northern Borneo. By far the most 
promising commercial prospect were the oil fields of the Netherlands East Indies which 
could potentially yield up to 10 million tons per year, enough in theory to meet Japan's 
combined military and civilian fuel demands at full production. The colonial government 
was reluctant, however, to increase Japan's allocation beyond 20,000 barrels per day, or 
one-fifth of its import requirements 74 . The cheapest and most abundant source left open was 
the United States. 
The Navy fell back on two strategies to lessen its vulnerability; synthetic production and 
stockpiling. Japan's synthetics programme yielded much more disappointing results than in 
Germany and despite the hopes placed in Manchurian oil shales as a captive source of 
petroleum, failed to deliver oil in strategic quantities. Oil stockpiling dated back to 1909 
and accelerated in the late 1920s when the conversion of the fleet to oil-fired boilers was 
completed 75 . The Imperial Navy's potential oil weakness was apparent at the time, leading 
Hector Bywater to predict, in 1927, that Japan would retain mostly coal-fired warships 76. In 
1931, the Navy had 3 million tons of oil in its stores which, according to its earlier 
estimates, would meet wartime needs for one year based on the projected fuel consumption 
of the assembled fleet sailing at 24 knots77 . General stockpiling was made compulsory 
under the Oil Industry Law, passed in 1934, bringing all petroleum imports under 
71 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997, p 408-409; and Robert Goralsb and Russell W. 
Freeburg, Oil & War: Ho w the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat, Wi11iam Monow and 
Company, Inc., New York, 1987, p 93-94. 
72 Goralsk_j and Freeburg, Ibid . Appendix 14, Sources of Petroleum in Japan Proper, 1938-1945, p 348. 
73 Ibid. p 100. 
On a purely speculative note had Japan's attempts in the 1920s to purchase Sakhalin outright from the Soviet 
Union proved successful, history might have been different. 
74 Ibid. p 95. 
75 Mark P. Parillo. The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993 , p 
40. 
76 Navies and Nations: A Review of Naval Developments since the Great War, Constable_ and Company, London, 
1927, p 200,211. Unfortunately, Bywater also predicted that Pearl Harbor was "secure from all save spasmodic 
or casual attack" and that "a Japanese expedition against Hawaii is never likely to take place". 
77 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997, p 406. 
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government control78 . By 1936, the Navy's stockpile of oil products had advanced to 3.5 
million tons. However, so had the Navy General Staff's estimates of their fuel requirements 
-- to 3.5 million tons in bunker per year, plus 440,000 tons of aviation fuel79 . After 1937, a 
combination of the Navy's involvement in China operations, intensified training, and the 
expansion of the fleet siphoned off an unforeseen volume of oil, retarding the stockpiling 
effort. 
Impending war with the United States threatened disaster for the Navy unless alternative oil 
supplies could be secured in short order. The colonial powers, which had stood in the way 
of the Navy's 'south advance' ever since Sato Tetsutaro's day, experienced a sudden 
weakening of their position in Southeast Asia with the outbreak of war in Europe. A narrow 
window opened, framed by military opportunity in Southeast Asia on one side and the 
prospect of an American oil embargo and runaway arms buildup on the other. It was 
assumed that any move on the East Indies would necessitate control of the Philippines and 
Malaya, meaning war with the United States and Great Britain. A further diplomatic 
squeeze on the beleaguered Dutch East Indies administration in the face of Dutch colonial 
intransigence, even after Holland was occupied, resulted in an agreement to supply Japan 
with 72,000 barrels daily for six months, in November 1940. This still fell well short of 
Japanese expectations. Facing a mounting tide of suspicion in the United States, Japan 
embarked on an all-out purchasing campaign to procure as much crude as possible on the 
open market and especially to increase its stocks of American high-octane aviation fuel 8° . In 
early 1941, the Army High Command commissioned a report from the Economic 
Mobilisation Bureau of the War Ministry outlining two scenarios. Japan could either opt 
immediately for war with Great Britain and the United States, expect shipping losses 
leading to oil shortages and industrial disruption after two years, or face an economic 
blockade that would eventually compel it to accede to American demands on China or face 
78 Nakamura Takafusa, Lectures on Modern Japanese Economic Histo ry 1926-1994 , LTCB International Library 
Foundation, 1994, p 72. 
79 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imp erial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997, p 408, and Mark P. Parillo . The Japanese Merchant 
Marine in World War II , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993, p 43 . 
80 Ibid . p 407 . 
According to Nakamura, the reason Japan did not declare war on China in 1937 was in order to maintain 
commercial access to the US market out of concern over the terms of the Neutrality Act, which baned US 
expo11s to any belligerent nation (Op. Cit. p 106). 
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ruin. The study concluded that war gave Japan better options, but warned its forecast of two 
years of self-sufficiency in oil might be shortened if vital sea lanes were blocked81 . 
On July 2, an Imperial Conference was convened to put the royal imprimatur on the Navy's 
planned 'south advance', describing it as necessary for "the security and preservation of the 
nation". The setting up of forward bases in southern Indochina, relinquished by French 
Vichy authorities under threat of Japanese attack, triggered the freezing of Japanese assets 
in the United States and a total oil embargo on August 182. The hawkish chief of the Navy 
General Staff, Admiral Nagano Osami, was appraised of the risks of war with the United 
States but nonetheless put his view before the emperor that it was better to fight than accept 
defeat through economic strangulation, thus "risking war rather than shame"83 . With its 
stockpiles being depleted at the rate of 2,900 barrels per hour, the Navy staff committed 
itself to seeking war at the earliest opportunity84. In the early autumn of 1941, Admiral 
Yamamoto' s pioneering advances in carrier operations, developed over the summer, 
injected a new and tantalising option for the Imperial High Command, the possibility of a 
pre-emptive attack on the US Pacific Fleet which had relocated from its west coast bases to 
Pearl Harbor in 194085 . Insecurity about its fuel supply built up over 15 years had become 
the leading casus belli for the Imperial Navy, pushing it into the enormous gamble of 
attacking the United States and invading Southeast Asia simultaneously86 . 
The Navy entered the Pacific War with 3.6 million tons of bunker fuel, 490,000 tons of 
aviation fuel and 1.4 million tons of crude, accounting for a total of around 5.5 million tons 
of oil products out of a nationally stockpiled total of nearly 8 million tons 87 . The Cabinet 
81 Robert Goralski and Russell W. Freeburg, Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant 
Victory or Defeat, William MoJTOW and Company, Inc., New York, 1987, pp 95-100. 
82 John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, Bantam Books, New York, 1970, 
pp 94-96; Japan had moved into northern Indochina in September 1940, but the United States had stopped short 
of including oil in its trade sanctions for fear of precipitating war. 
83 Mark P. Parillo . The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993, p 
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Planning Board estimated that it would be able to recoup 850,000 kilolitres from Southeast 
Asia in 1942, 2.6 million in 1943 and 5.3 million in the third. Thus it was projected that the 
draw-down of Japan's stockpiles over two years would be offset by imports from the 
'southern regions' 88 . Until the 1930s, the Navy's plans for war with the United States had 
not extended far beyond the waters north of Tai wan and the Northeast Asian littoral. Yet in 
1942, the scope of its operations rippled out to encompass Hawaii to the east, the Aleutians 
to the north, the Indian Ocean to the west and the Coral Sea to the south. Following the 
Navy's inability to deliver a knock-out blow to the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor or 
Midway, its fuel calculations went hopelessly awry. In fact the Imperial Navy fought three 
major sea battles, Midway, the Philippine Sea/Marianas and Leyte Gulf, as well as several 
lesser engagements instead of the single decisive encounter anticipated. These three main 
battles alone consumed over 1 million tons of oil. Unsurprisingly, the Navy's petroleum 
consumption during the war turned out to be double its prewar estimates89 . To put this in 
perspective, one calculation puts the Navy's petroleum use at 60 per cent of national 
consumption during the Pacific W ar90 . 
Given the determining role of oil in Japan's naval strategy, the question of tanker capacity 
received belated attention. The Navy operated its own tankers, but began to subsidise 
civilian construction heavily in the 1930s. In 1934, Japan owned some of the largest tankers 
then in existence, but the fleet only totalled 39 ships and 120,000 tons. Tonnage tripled to 
364,000 in 1940, and because the new additions to the fleet were also faster, efficiency 
improved fourfold91 . Nevertheless, the essential modesty of Japan's prewar tanker fleet is 
easily appreciated when compared with opposing countries. In 1940, Great Britain boasted 
450 tankers of 3,235,000 tons , and the US tanker fleet totalled 2,824,000 tons 92 . A special 
subsidy for tanker construction in Japan was introduced in 1941 enlarging the fleet to 94 
88 Nakamura Tak:afusa, Lectures on Modern Japanese Economic History 1926-1994, LTCB International Library 
Foundation, 1994, p 110. 
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ships representing 575,000 tons 93. This was still inadequate to jointly meet civilian and 
military demand, and Japan stayed dependent on American, British and Dutch tankers right 
up to Pearl Harbor. A crash wartime construction effort expanded the tanker fleet to a peak 
of 834,000 tons at the end of 1943. 
On May 8, 1942, Japan's suffered an early setback to its hopes for oil production in 
Southeast Asia when a patrolling US submarine sank the Taiyo Maru, carrying a party of 
Japanese oil experts en route to organise production in the captured East Indies oil fields 94. 
However, for the first full year of the conflict, the criticality of the oil situation remained 
latent. In its initial conquests the Imperial Army captured 4 million barrels left by the 
retreating Allies who were also unable to complete the demolition of Southeast Asian wells. 
In spite of the loss of the Taiyo Maru, Japan was thus able to recover 70 per cent of the East 
Indies prewar production rate of 180,000 barrels per day within the first year95 . Moreover, 
Allied attacks on Japanese tankers were very slow in developing, sending a mere 4,000 tons 
to the bottom in the whole of 194296 . As 1943 approached, Tojo and the War Cabinet felt 
confident that Japan had solved its energy crisis. Of the 136,000 barrels produced daily in 
Southeast Asia in 1943, 96,000 were locally consumed, much of this by fleet units at 
Singapore, and the excess sent to Japan 97 . But in shipping the squeeze was already being 
felt. Three out of every four tankers Japan owned were shuttling oil from Southeast Asia to 
Japan. Although an absolute increase in oil imports was achieved, from a daily average of 
29,000 barrels in 1942 to 40,000 barrels in 1943, the proportion being exported to Japan 
declined, from 40 per cent in 1942 to 29 per cent in 1943 suggesting that inadequate 
transportation capacity, not production, was the limiting factor98. 
93 Mark P. Parillo. The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993, p 
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May 8, 1942 coincidentally marked the end of the Battle of the Coral Sea, the first setback 
suffered by the Imperial Navy in the war and an indication that the swift victory its leaders 
were depending on would be elusive. The first steps to organise protection for the merchant 
fleet were only taken that spring, while the vita( energies of the Imperial Navy were 
channelled into preparations for the decisive showdown expected at Midway, in June. 
When the US submarine offensive against Japan_ese shipping finally geared up in 1943 it 
would become known as the 'war of the Maru' after the generic designation for Japanese 
merchant vessels. In the following sections the Allied campaign against shipping is outlined 
before analysing Japan's maritime protection efforts in closer detail. 
III. The War of the Maru. 
A variety of military means were at the disposal of Unites States and Allied forces in the 
campaign to destroy Japanese shipping; submarines, surface vessels, mines, coastal 
artillery, land-based and carrier aviation. It is testimony to the offensive power of the 
submarine that, as in the Atlantic, it also emerged as the dominant weapon against shipping 
in the Pacific, sinking 55 per cent of the 8 million tons destroyed by US forces 99 . In the 
latter stages of the war, carrier aircraft and mine-laying B-29 bombers levied an increasing 
toll on Japanese shipping, however it was without question the fleet submarine that broke 
the back of the merchant marine, and with it Japan's war economy. 
Despite its ultimate success the submarine campaign against Japanese shipping began 
hesitantly, beset by technical and doctrinal handicaps. After the fall of the Philippines, the 
US submarine force was dispersed among three bases; Pearl Harbor, Freemantle and 
Brisbane which took time to organise in the chaos that followed the Japanese attack. The 
US Navy had also to contend with its own Mahanian stalwarts reluctant to abandon 
outmoded doctrine. As a consequence, commerce warfare against Japan was approached 
cautiously. For the US submarine force, the pursuit of the Imperial Navy's capital ships was 
considered the most important of a plethora of missions, limiting their effectiveness against 
99 The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World 
War II By All Causes, Navy Department, Washington D.C. , February 1947, vii, Table II (Japanese Naval and 
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the more lightly protected merchant targets 1°0. Many submarine commanders were replaced 
for lacking aggressiveness in their patrols and the main weapon in the US sub-surf ace 
inventory, the magnetic torpedo, was plagued by malfunctions 101 . The total Japanese 
tonnage sunk in 1942, 725,000 tons , amounted to no more than the combined German tally 
of Allied shipping in the Atlantic for February and March and fell within the margin of 
acceptable losses outlined by the Cabinet Planning Board before the war. The flow of 
strategic materials to the homeland, at around 20 million tons, remained constant on 1941 
levels. Japan's merchant fleet saw off the first year of the submarine campaign with a 
minimal net loss of tonnage while managing to increase the size of its tanker fleet by 
111,000 tons to 686,000 tons 102. 
US fleet submarines, operating unmolested out of Australia and Hawaii with the benefit of 
greater numbers, better tactics and focus built up in the first year of the war, sent 388,000 
tons of tankers to the bottom in 1943. Slow to spot the Achilles Heel in Japan's war-
fighting capability, the US Navy, once aware of it, prosecuted the war against Japanese 
merchantmen ruthlessly, targeting tankers in particular. 'Wolf-pack' tactics, on the German 
model, were introduced to interdict Japan's shipping where it was most concentrated, in the 
Luzon Strait and Empire waters 103. In 1943, over 2 million tons of shipping was destroyed 
and Japan suffered a 3 million-ton shortfall in bulk commodities on the previous year. 
Home-based refineries operated at less than one-third capacity104. Mounting merchant losses 
exposed the shortcomings of Japan's limited shipbuilding infrastructure which proved 
inadequate to meet both naval and cargo vessel construction needs. Concentrating ship-
building resources on tankers at the expense of ordinary merchant ships miraculously 
preserved aggregate tanker tonnage for most of 1944 at around 800,000 tons in the face of 
appalling losses 105 . However, this did nothing to improve security for those tankers actually 
inbound fro1n Southeast Asia. In a more telling statistic, from a peak of 740,000 tons of oil 
10° Clay Blair describes a total of ten other operational roles for whi ch US submarines were used (Silent Victory: 
The U.S. Subniarine War Against Japan, J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia and New York, 1975, pp 357-
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imported to Japan in the second quarter of 1943, the flow fell off in the third quarter of 
1944 to just 178,000 tons 106 . In the final 15 months of the war, just 9 per cent of oil 
shipments from Southeast Asia made it through to Japan 1°7. 
In 1944, the anti-shipping campaign crippled the Japanese war economy. In that year, US 
submarines alone sank over 600 ships of 2.38 million tons, exceeding their tally for the rest 
of the war108. Japan's merchant fleet which started the year at nearly 5 million tons was 
halved by the end of December109 . The successor organisation to the Cabinet Planning 
Board acknowledged at the end of fiscal 1944, "Damage to shipping, chiefly from enemy 
submarines, has been far greater that (sic) anticipated just prior to the war and has far 
outstripped the volume of vessels built" 110. The report also admitted that military production 
and transportation had been maintained "at the sacrifice of the civilian sector". The flow of 
bulk commodities to Japan slumped to 10 million tons, half that of the total three years 
previously. US offensive efforts were redoubled by contrast. In February 1944, 52,000 tons 
of tankers were among 186,000 tons of Japanese shipping decimated in a 2-day air-raid on 
Truk, the Combined Fleet anchorage in the Caroline Islands 111 . Air attacks and mining 
directed at Japanese refining facilities at source in Southeast Asia also forced the closure of 
the Navy oil refinery at Balikpapan. By this stage, aircraft carriers were numerous enough 
to allow their use against merchant ships, when previously Imperial Navy targets had · 
exclusive priority. Once US forces were re-established in the Philippines in late 1944, the 
shipping routes from Southeast Asia to the homeland became far more hazardous. Attempts 
at fighting tanker convoys through to Japan most often resulted in their wholesale 
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destruction, and after the first quarter of 1945 oil imports ceased altogether112 . For the 
Imperial Army and Navy the loss of the Southeast Asian shipping lanes threatened not just 
supplies to the home base, but the flow of arms and ammunition to their forward units 113 . 
Japanese authorities turned to increasingly desperate measures to supplement their 
dwindling petroleum stocks. A campaign to process pine roots for aviation fuel was 
launched but ultimately yielded only 3,000 barrels of substandard aviation fuel. Bunker fuel 
was supplemented with large quantities of alcohol. Unbeknown to the crews of the B-29s 
who began to assault Japan en niasse in 1945, the refineries and oil storage areas they were 
assigned to hit had mostly run dry. Symbolising the desperate straits of the Imperial Navy at 
the end of the war, the °Yamato was dispatched on a suicidal foray to engage the American 
invasion fleet at Okinawa on April 8, 1945. Fuel was so short by this time that only 4,000 
tons of heavy oil were spared for the mission, barely adequate for the superbattleship to 
execute its attack run 114. When Japan capitulated four months later, 4,000 tons was all the 
bunker oil left in the country. Following the surrender, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey 
concluded: 
"The war against shipping was perhaps the most decisive single factor in the 
collapse of the Japanese econ01ny and logistic support of Japanese military and 
naval power. Submarines accounted for the majority of vessel sinkings and the 
greater part of the reduction in tonnage" 115 . 
US submarines in the Pacific sank 55 per cent (4.8 million tons) of the total Japanese 
shipping destroyed, compared with 60 per cent (14.57 million tons) of the total Allied 
112 Mark P. Parillo. The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993, 
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shipping sunk by their German counterparts in the Atlantic 116 . While the U-boat offensive is 
estimated to have cost Germany 781 submarines and 39,000 men, the destruction meted out 
by the submarines of the United States Pacific Command was achieved at the relatively 
economical cost of 3,500 men and 52 submarines lost to all causes. D.W. Waters claims that 
through the agency of just 5 per cent of the total Allied military power deployed in the 
Pacific, "the defeat of Japan was primarily the result of sea blockade" -- a feat which is 
"one of the least publicised facts of history" 117 . 
IV. The inadequate protection of n1erchant shipping. 
The main reason for the Imperial Navy's abject failure to protect Japan's merchant fleet in 
the Second World War was that its doctrine, structure and philosophy had become almost 
entirely geared towards annihilating the US battle fleet in an intense conflict of limited 
duration. When the failure of this strategy was shown up at Midway, in June 1942, the Navy 
was unable to adjust to a more defensive mode of warfare that prioritised the defence of 
merchant shipping. Portents of Japan's vulnerability to blockade date back as far as the 
Russo-I apanese war and at least a theoretical understanding of the problems involved 
existed within the Imperial Navy prior to 1941. However, efforts to put maritime commerce 
protection into action, were hesitant and piecemeal until hopelessly late in the war. 
The "defence of general merchant shipping routes" was mentioned in the Imperial Defence 
Policy of 1907, but only insofar as this did not interfere with the Navy's primary purpose, 
the destruction of the enemy fleet. Subsequent revisions of the Imperial Defence Policy 
concentrated on the need for a "rapid war and decisive encounter" (sokusen sokketsu) 11 8. 
Neither the surface threat to merchantmen in the Russo-Japanese war, nor Japan's 
participation in anti-submarine warfare in the Mediterranean in 1917-18 made a lasting 
impression on Imperial Navy doctrine. Yet the importance of protecting far-flung sea lines 
of communication was clearly understood in certain quarters. An article in the 1927 edition 
of Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual on ' Japan's Naval Policy' by Commander Sato 
Ichiro, reveals an early appreciation of the new vulnerability to which industrialisation had 
exposed Japan: 
116 John Winton, Convoy: The Def ence of Sea Trade 1890-1990, Michael Joseph , 1983 , p 314, and Robe11 
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"Japan is poor in natural resources and, to supply the factories, we 1nust get raw 
1naterials from abroad. We must get many of our manufactured goods from foreign 
markets, too. To do this our sea-communications must be safe and secure". 
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It is in this context of protecting sea communications that Sato justified the existence of the 
Imperial Navy as "an absolute guarantee of national existence". Up to the Russo-Japanese 
war, the role of the Navy had been simpler, confined to the "destruction of the enemy fleet 
and the safety of the sea-communications for the supply of expeditionary forces" 119 . With 
industrialisation, Sato realised that trade protection had risen to become a core requirement 
equal to defence from invasion. Sato's analysis of Japan's vulnerability to trade disruption 
was remarkably prescient considering the importance he attached not just to trade flows 
across the Sea of Japan , Yellow and East China Seas, but to Japan's more remote sea lanes. 
Sato divided overseas trade protection into three areas of priority for the Japanese Navy. 
Noting that a third of Japan's imports were carried across the East China Sea from the 
Asian mainland, he identified the security of these waters as Japan's first naval duty. 
Guarding the sea lanes in the China Sea, used to draw supplies of oil, rubber and metals 
from Southeast Asia, was its "ahnost as essential" duty. The third mission of the Imperial 
Navy would be to keep open the more distant supply routes to Europe and America. Sato' s 
concern with securing the sea route to Southeast Asia accurately predicted a strategic weak-
point that emerged during the Pacific War: 
" ... an ite1n of the ut1nost i1nportance coming from farther afield is fuel oil. One-half 
of the oil imports of Japan is drawn frmn the Dutch Indies 120 , and the freedom of 
that sea-route will be absolutely necessary for her power of resistance. The control 
of the routes in the China Sea is of great value to Japan, too, for the supply of 
rubber, clothing materials, and metals. The protection of trade in these waters is 
119 Sato Icluro , The Naval Policy of Japan, Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual 1927, William Cowes and 
Sons, London, p 26. 
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therefore a charge against the Japanese Navy almost as essential as its first 
duty" 121. (Italics added). 
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Writing during the international naval limitations regime of the 1920s, Sato advocated the 
construction of auxilliary ships to extend ship protection south of the East China Sea, but 
such pleas fell mostly on deaf ears. In 1929, a communication was passed to the emperor 
written by the Naval Chief of Staff Kato Kanji on the necessity of protecting sea lanes, but 
failed to spell out any concrete recommendations 122 . Contemporary foreign analysts were 
also sensitive to Japan's "essential sea routes, the vital arteries through which her life-blood 
flows" 123 , while a US prewar intelligence assessment concluded that "Japan's lines of water 
and land communication provide indispensable support to her sustained war production and 
her deployment of armed forces and material" 124 . Imperial Army and civilian estimates 
before the war flagged the importance of shipping for maintaining Japanese industry and 
war potential, and linked success to "the Navy's ability to secure maritime traffic". 
However, concerns voiced inside and outside the Navy failed to feed through into either a 
review of naval policy undertaken in 1928 or the revised Impe1ial Defence Policy of 1936, 
which only mentioned shipping protection in the Tsushima Strait125 . Once the decision was 
made to capture the South-East Asian oil fields the Navy was slow to adjust existing plans 
despite the obvious, onerous burdens on sea transportation this would bestow. The 
operational plan for 1941 merely outlined the responsibility of the Navy's first-line units to 
protect sea communications in the waters north of Tai wan "within the limits allowed by 
circumstances", something that few Combined Fleet officers had either the time or 
inclination to consider. When quizzed about the submarine threat to shipping and convoys 
in mid-1941, the Navy chief of staff Admiral Nagano brushed off the concerns of cabinet 
members. Even when personally questioned by Hirohito about Japan's ability to "obtain and 
transport oil without hindrance when faced with attacks by planes and submarines based in 
Australia" the naval chief of staff was unruffled126 . Plans to protect shipping were finally 
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extended south of Taiwan, on November 5, 1941, to include the South China, Java and 
Celebes Seas, through which the main Japanese invasion forces would pass. Beyond that, 
the commitment went no further than to "endeavour as far as possible to defend sea lanes in 
the area of the Pacific Mandates, the Philippines and Sea of Okhotsk" 127 . 
Critical to such sanguine attitudes was the failure of the naval command to grasp the 
strategic potential of the submarine, underestimating both the capability and temperament 
of the United States to use its submarines as a tool of economic warfare against Japan 128. 
The Operations Division of the Naval General Staff regarded enemy submarines and 
destroyers as extensions of the battle fleet, reflecting their own doctrinal preferences . Such 
myopia may also have been influenced by Great Britain's attempt at the Washington 
Conference to ban submarine construction outright. Certain intelligence officers, Niimi in 
the 1920s and later Ooi Atsushi in the 1930s, had studied the German U-boat campaign in 
the First World War and were attuned to the sub-surface threat to merchant shipping, but 
were unable to influence naval policy higher up 129 . 
During the Pacific War, Japanese shipping to and from the southern regions operated along 
two strategic sea lanes. The first, south-west route (nansei koro) was strategically the most 
important, serving as Japan's major line of communication to the East Indies and Malay 
Peninsula, for imports of raw materials as well as to ferry military supplies to occupied 
areas in Southeast Asia. The south-east route (nanto koro) stretched from Japan to the 
Marianas and beyond to Rabaul, in New Britain. Though of lesser economic importance, 
the south-east route was nonetheless vital for delivering troops, weapons and ammunition to 
support operations in the Solomon Islands, Bismarck Archipelago and New Guinea. At the 
beginning of the war, ship protection was delegated to the local Navy district commands in 
Japan until the establishment of the First and Second Maritime Escort Forces on April 10, 
1942. The First Mariti1ne Escort Force was assigned to protect convoys from Japan to 
Singapore, where it retained its headquarters under a Vice-Admiral with a Shipping Control 
Officer (unkoshikikan) attached. The new unit was equipped with a force of ten aging 
destroyers , two torpedo boats and five converted gunboats. The Second Maritime Escort 
127 Nomura Minoru. Kaisen Shi ni Manabu, Bungei Shunju , Tokyo , 1994, p 280. 
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Unit, to protect merchant shipping between Japan and Truk, was smaller, initially consisting 
of four destroyers, two torpedo boats and one gunboat130 . A light cruiser (Yubari) was added 
. S b 131 m eptem er . Prewar estimates had suggested a figure well in excess of 300 large 
escorts as the minimum needed to form a commerce protection force but the reality of 
finding suitable equipment for the new escort units was highly problematic 132. At the 
beginning of the war, Japan had yet to develop a vessel expressly designed for merchant 
defence, while existing destroyers were "considered too valuable for pure escort work" 133 . 
Development of the kaibokan, a class of small coastal defence ships of under 1,000 tons, 
took several years to obtain funding in the 1930s. The first of these entered service in June 
1940 and only four had been commissioned by Pearl Harbor134 . Originally designed to 
protect Japan's northern fishing fleet, the kaibokan were scaled down from their original 
design to divert extra funds into the super-battleship programme. According to Evans and 
Peattie, the super-battleships were a "diversion of the navy's attention and the nation's 
resources from one of the most critical strategic problems that the navy faced: its utter 
dependence on its overseas routes and the need to acquire the ships, to form the 
organisation, to shape the doctrine, and to develop the training that would be the most 
effective in protecting those sea routes" 135 . 
In July 1942, merchant protection was up-graded with the establishment of the First Escort 
Fleet in Taiwan to extend coverage for Japan's merchant shipping in the East China Sea 
with a fleet of around 20 vessels 136 . Of the forces committed, many of the destroyers -- like 
their captains -- were superannuated and the sub-chasers too slow and poorly-armed to 
venture far offshore. Lack of funding had also retarded the development of sonar and 
hydrophone detection technology in the 1930s which would have been invaluable to the 
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anti-submarine effort 137 . Twenty-six improved versions of the kaibokan, in two classes 
(Etorofu and Mikura) each of around 1,000 tons , were eventually laid down between March 
1943 and May 1944, and faster vessels equipped with better ASW weapons were later 
added to the escort forces. But they were continually over-stretched, unable to offer more 
than skeletal coverage of key choke-points 138 . Japanese convoys, moreover, were tiny in 
comparison with Anglo-American efforts in the Atlantic 139 . 
Indifference to shipping protection 1n the Navy's upper echelons, aggravated by 
bureaucratic and inter-service rivalries, manifested itself in poor organisation. Unlike in 
Great Britain, where Atlantic shipping was overseen by a central committee from 1941, 
control over the Japanese merchant marine remained under separate Army, Navy and 
civilian administration until virtually the end of the war. Direction was left to be negotiated 
among the Army and Navy General Staffs and the civilian Shipping Control Board, created 
in April 1942, and the inevitable result was duplication and inefficiency. This fragmented 
approach was mirrored among the relevant branches of the Navy. Commerce protection was 
just one of several duties handled by the Defence Preparations Office of the Naval General 
Staff until October 1942 when a new body was created known as the Twelfth Division of 
the First Bureau. Yet only three staff officers were assigned to it, holding separate 
responsibility for convoys and routing, anti-submarine operations and the armament and 
communications equipment aboard merchantmen. Planners in the Navy Ministry preferred 
to concentrate their energies on the armament and readiness of the Combined Fleet, while in 
the line commands, port officers supposedly charged with shipping safety in the eight 
district and 'guard' units of the Imperial Navy were too habitually overburdened to give 
shipping protection more than cursory attention 140 . Escort operations in 1942 lacked an 
overarching mechanism to co-ordinate and standardise different procedures used for the 
control of shipping, convoying and distribution of cargo 141 . All this notwithstanding, the 
137 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imp erial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941 , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis , 1997, pp 440-41. 
138 A total of tlu·ee sub-chasers, for example, was assigned to screen oil tankers saihng from the navy refinery at 
Balikpapan through the Makassar Straits until May 1943 . 
139 John Winton, Convoy: The Def ence of Sea Trade 1890-1990, Michael Joseph , 1983 , p 313 . 
140 Ibid. pp 310-312; and Mark P. Parillo . The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II , Naval Institute 
Press, Annapolis , 1993, p 67. 
141 Robe11 Goralski and Russell W. Freeburg, Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant 
Victory or Defeat, William Monow and Company, Inc., ew York, 1987, p 194. 
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skill of individual convoy commanders could still frustrate American submarines when 
operating with good intelligence 142. 
Mounting losses in autumn 1943 demonstrated the vulnerability of cargo vessels without 
proper convoy protection. In March, a Second Convoy Escort Fleet was created, ported in 
Saipan, with responsibility for convoys between Yokohama and Truk. But the four 
destroyers and two torpedo boats assigned were unequal to the task. More significantly, in 
November, a Grand Escort Headquarters was set up by the Chief of the General Staff, 
according top priority to commerce protection in all areas under its control from the Kuriles 
to Singapore, although its remit did not extend to the Combined and China Area Fleet 
sectors 143 . As a sign of its importance the new headquarters was put under the command of 
a former Minister of the Navy, Admiral Oikawa Koshiro 144 . However, with few officers 
experienced in convoying operations, the Grand Escort Headquarters continued to pay the 
price of the Navy's earlier indifference and frugality, having at its disposal fewer than 50 
ships of 800 tons and above in addition to the 901 st Air Group. The grandiose strategy 
developed by Admiral Oikawa' s staff hardly matched the resources at their command. _It 
relied on exploiting the partially enclosed nature of Japan's major sea lanes to Southeast 
Asia to shield merchant shipping from Allied submarines and air power by using Borneo, 
the Philippines, Taiwan, the Nansei Shoto and the Ryukyu islands as natural buffers against 
the open reaches of the Pacific. Sea-air gaps between the islands would be closed by a 
network of minefields and radar stations. A similar plan aimed to use the Bonin and Kazan 
Retto (Volcano Islands) to screen Japan's shipping routes to the Marianas. Within these 
gigantic sanctuaries the forces of the Grand Escort Fleet would patrol sea lanes. A few 
minefields were laid towards implementing the scheme but the American juggernaut 
crossing the Pacific began to overrun the intended defensive perimeter in 1944, and the 
resulting calamities suffered by the Combined Fleet soon distracted the attention of the 
Naval General Staff145 . It seems doubtful in any case that had the scheme been made 
142 Clay Blair, Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan , J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphi a 
and New York, 1975, p 387. 
143 Mark P. Parillo. The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993, p 
69-70. 
144 John Winton, Convoy: The Defence of Sea Trade 1890-1990, Michael Joseph, 1983, pp 313-15. 
145 Ibid. p 316. Japanese press repo11s cited by Bywater (Navies and Nations , p 221) suggest that an earlier 
ver~ion of this plan may have existed as far back as 1922, to defend sea communications along an outer line from 
Kamchatka to Taiwan and an inner line between Japan and Korea. It is possible this may have been 
misinforn1ation. 
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operational the Japanese experience with patrolled lanes would have been any more fruitful 
than the US and UK experience in the Atlantic (see Chapter Two). 
In the first two months of 1944, US submarines sank nearly 500,000 tons of shipping 
causing the question of convoy escort to be brought before the emperor. Thereafter, larger 
and better-defended convoys were introduced, drastically improving survival rates 
compared to merchantmen sailing individually146 . However, Japanese reversals in the 
Marianas from mid-1944 panicked the naval high command into placing Admiral Oikawa's 
escort assets at the disposal of the Combined Fleet. Scarce anti-submarine warfare vessels 
ill-suited to surface combat were pressed into service at Leyte Gulf and even ordered to 
pursue American caniers 147 . The convoy system subsequently began to disintegrate and 
escorts were organised on an ad hoc basis . In the war's terminal phase, Japanese naval 
tactics and armament were less and less of a match for the United States and the system of 
three-dimensional warfare it had perfected for waging on, under, above the waves and in the 
electro-magnetic spectrum. The use of radar in prosecuting night attacks removed the 
protective cloak of darkness for Japan's naval and cargo vessels alike148. Advances in 
signals intelligence helped steer US submarines to approximately half of their targets 149 . 
Fighting spirit was powerless to resist the overwhelming combination of superior 
technology and numbers. The last organised convoys to leave Southeast Asia in January 
1945 quickly foundered in the South China Sea. The ultimate sanctuary of the Sea of Japan, 
regarded as a 'Japanese lake' since 1905, was penetrated by US submarines in June. With 
the merchant marine and Imperial Navy reduced to a shadow of their former glory, a 
centralised command authority over shipping was finally established in May, but in the 
circumstances it was virtually an empty gesture 150 . By the end of the war, casualties 
suffered by the Japanese merchant marine exceeded one hundred thousand men of all 
ranks 151 . 
146 Individual sailings were two-and-a-half times more likely to be sunk according to Winton (Op. Cit. p 318). 
147 Mark P. Parillo . The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993 , p 
73. 
148 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imp erial Japanese 
Navy, 1887-1941, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997, p 415. Night-fighting was a skill for which the 
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149 Clay Blair, Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan, J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia 
and New York, 1975, p 18. 
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151 John Winton, Convoy: The Defence of Sea Trade 1890-1990, Michael Joseph, 1983, p 319. 
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In summary, the poor organisation and neglect that characterised the Japanese maritime 
commerce protection effort had several underlying causes. Most important of all was the 
unshakeable belief of the Navy that the centre of gravity of both forces lay with the main 
battle fleet. Had Japan moved to implement a rearguard strategy to protect merchant 
shipping after Midway then the US submarine offensive would have enjoyed something less 
than free rein, and might have been substantially impeded. The Navy's failure to at least 
accord better protection to oil imports was indeed short-sighted, for a shortage of oil 
became the single most important constraint on naval operations after 1943 152. Strategy 
aside, rivalry among the institutions of the Japanese state would have taken its toll on 
efficiency, working against centralised control at all levels of the war effort. A shortage of 
fiscal resources before the war also imposed practical limits on the size of any escort force, 
since most of the naval budget was required to keep up first-line battle fleet strength vis-a.-
vis the United States Navy. As Colin Gray writes, "Strategic flexibility flows not only from 
sound doctrine and an open but educated mind but also from numbers; and inflexibility 
flows from the absence of numbers" 153. Systemic weaknesses aside, Japan's woeful 
shipping protection effort was in the end a product of the Navy's indifference, which 
persisted even when confronted with the evidence of ship losses and the bankruptcy of the 
prewar strategy. Given the disparity in resources Japan could never have hoped to win a 
prolonged conflict against the United States. But the Navy need not have given up the 
merchant fleet as cheaply as it did. 
Conclusion. 
Modernisation from the 1860s onwards locked Japan into dependence on sea transportation , 
underpinning the health of its economy and underwriting its war-making ability. Japan's 
dependence on overseas resources, especially oil, was as important contributing factor 
behind its decision to go to war with Great Britain and the United States in 1941. That this 
same dependence had transformed an undefended merchant marine into a strategic liability 
was not grasped by the naval high command, so intent was it on winning a quick victory 
over the US Pacific Fleet. The Imperial Navy developed its strategy and tactics out of 
limited wars fought at the turn of the century in which its major roles were to protect the 
152 Robe11 Goralski and Russell W. Freeburg, Oil & War: Ho w the Deadly Strugg le for Fuel in WWII Meant 
Victory or Def eat, Willian1 MoITow and Company, Inc., New York, 1987, pp 189-190, 315-16. 
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short communication lines to China and Korea, and to directly challenge opposing navies 
for sea control. Neither the defence of merchant shipping nor the long-term security of the 
industrial base were essential to victory in 1895, 1905 or 1918. When the Navy tried to 
scale up its strategy for local war to the vast expanses of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and 
the total war of 1941-45, it was totally inadequate. Nevertheless, too many resources and 
too much pride had been invested in the Navy 's 'battle faith' to be swiftly redirected into 
strategies for protecting maritime transportation. Once the United States had organised 
itself for a concerted attack on Japanese shipping, led by its submarine forces, the War of 
the M aru exposed the full extent of Japan's vulnerability to blockade. Efforts to protect 
merchant shipping in the form of dedicated escort forces and organised convoys arrived too 
little, too late. In spite of this, what little was done to organise convoys greatly improved the 
survivability of Japanese merchant ships. 
For most Japanese, the blockade ranks together with the atomic and incendiary bombing of 
its cities as the greatest hardships visited on Japan during the Second World War. After the 
war, the former Minister of Munitions, Toyoda Teijiro, stated in his interrogation that "the 
shipping shortage and the scarcity of oil were the two main factors that assumed utmost 
importance in Japan's war efforts" 154. Official testimony before the Diet was more clear-cut, 
acknowledging that "the greatest cause of our defeat was the loss of shipping" 155 . 
Since 1945, Japan has had no overseas territory or bases to defend and control of sea lanes 
on which Japan's econo1nic security depends has been in large part the responsibility of the 
United States Navy. The War of the Maru however continued to cast a long shadow, 
shaping Japan 's post-war perceptions of vulnerability and bearing upon the roles and 
missions of the MSDF and the emphasis placed upon the security of sea lines of 
communications and escort operations. 
153 Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantages of Navies in War, The Free Press, New 
York, 1992, p 21. 
154 Quoted in Mark P . Parillo . The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II , Naval Institute Press, 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Japan's Sea Lane Security in the Era of Defence Constraints, 1945-77 
Introduction. 
This chapter analyses the extent to which the perceived vulnerability of sea lines of 
communication influenced the policies of post-war Japanese governments and other 
security actors in Japan from 1945-77; the era in which Japan recovered its sovereignty 
and established itself as an economic superpower without acquiring a concomitant 
military status. Japan's post-war security is normally seen in terms of the 
discontinuities with the pre-war status quo, as empire and militarism gave way to the 
peaceful expansion of trade within a security framework based on defence linkages with 
the United States and a system of constitutional and other constraints that strictly 
regulated the Self Defense Forces (SDF) from their formation in 1954. In the context of 
these changes, this chapter addresses two basic questions that are carried forward into 
subsequent chapters. First, to what extent did security concerns about Japan's sea lanes 
dispose post-war governments towards forming an alliance with the United States and 
acquiring independent defence capability? Second, given the domestic and international 
controversy surrounding rearmament, to what extent were "sea lane defence" and the 
"safety of maritime transportation" used as rationales to legitimise the creation, 
existence and force structure of the SDF and the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) 
in particular? 
A framework is presented for analysing Japan's post-war defence and security at the 
levels of international systemic interaction, transnational alliance linkages, and domestic 
politics. This is followed by an examination of the 'Yoshida Doctrine', which served as 
the de facto blueprint for Japan's security and diplomacy during the Cold War. In the 
section entitled Naval Renaissance, the complex and clandestine process which led to 
the MSDF' s establishment is profiled and contrasted with greater official resistance 
towards the creation of ground forces. Naval links with the United States and 
institutional continuity maintained from the Imperial Navy are also identified as key 
influences on the MSDF' s structures and thinking. Planning for the protection of 
maritime transportation and the build-up of MSDF capabilities is then charted up to the 
late 1960s. Two competing visions for the MSDF are explored: Sekino Hideo's vision 
of a great power navy dedicated to defending sea lines of communication, versus 
Kaihara Osa1nu' s model for a limited anti-invasion force. In this context, a short-lived 
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official attempt around 1970 to implement Sekino' s 'autonomous' vision is profiled 
against the ascendancy of defence constraints, which were formalised with the adoption 
of the National Defense Programme Outline (taiko) in 1976. Perceptions of a growing 
Soviet threat to Japan's sea lanes as far as 1977 are then evaluated, as a prelude to 
Chapter 5 which deals with the rise of sea lane defence to the forefront of Japan's 
defence and alliance policies in the 1980s. 
I. Analytical fra111ework for Japan's post-war security policy. 
Japan's post-war defence and security policy-making environment is most profitably 
described at three levels of analysis: systemic, transnational and domestic. Two key 
documents set the foundations for post-war security: the November 1946 Constitution 
(kenpo) and the 1951 Security Treaty between Japan and the United States (nichibei 
anzen hosho joyaku, often shortened to ampo), revised in 1960. 
At an international systemic level, from 1945 onwards, Japan's external environment 
was defined initially by disarmament, occupation and the redrawing of its borders to the 
four main islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu. Thereafter, it was recast 
in the global, bipolar schism of the Cold War and the co1Tesponding division of Asia 
into Communist and Western-backed blocs. At the same time, the legacy of Japan's 
military expansion in the Pacific War also continued to define Japan's relations with 
Asian countries in particular. While the dissolution of Japan's empire (formally secured 
with the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty) removed any strategic requirement for Japan 
to maintain nlilitary lines of communication with overseas bases, the expansion of its 
industrial base after 1950 greatly increased its dependence on sea lines of 
communication (SLOC) for imports of raw materials, energy and food (see Chapter 
One), while indirect strategic dependence remained on US military SLOC for the re-
supply and re inf orce1nent of US forces in Japan and Korea. 
At a transnational level, Japan's post-war political and strategic orientation was to a 
large extent a 'default' position determined by the United States' role as the occupying 
power. Reflecting a contradiction between the initial US objective of demilitarising 
Japan and Washington's subsequent drive to co-opt it as a military partner in the Cold 
War, Japan's post-war security linkages with the United States have acted both as a 
constraint and driver of Japanese rearmament. On one hand, the 1951 US-Japan 
Security Treaty gave Japan a de facto defence guarantee (made de Jure in 1960), 
bringing it into the Western camp and obviating, in the perception of its post-war 
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political leaders, any strategic requirement to deal with external security threats 
independently. On the other hand, transnational links pushed "questions of military 
security higher up on the political agenda than would have been possible in light of the 
organisation of the Japanese government and of Japan ' s civil-military relations"1. 
In an external security context dominated by linkages with the United States, Japan's 
post-war domestic defence 'debate' was framed between the outright opposition of left-
wing parties towards reannament and alliance with the United States, and conservative-
nationalist forces on the right which favoured a more independent approach to defence 
and less strategic reliance on the United States. As Katzenstein and Okawara (1993) 
have argued, questions of military security (in contrast to questions of economic 
security) were deeply contested in post-war Japan, centering on the legitimacy of the 
SDF and their potential to be employed in an internal as well as external security role2. 
At the level of society, pre-war popular esteem for the military was replaced by a 
widespread suspicion of military institutions while SDF members were held in low 
social estee1n. After the establishment of the SDF in July 1954, their constitutionality 
was subject to repeated legal challenges (and upheld by the Sapporo District Court in 
1973). Between these poles, post-war governments basically followed the compromise 
course of limited rearmament set by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, who formed five 
administrations between 1946 and 1954. The November 1946 Constitution promulgated 
under Yoshida, though not preventing the establishment of the SDF in 1954, has served 
as the primary legal and moral reference point for successive political and normative 
constraints on the acquisition and use of military p9wer by the Japanese state. Chapter 
II ('Renunciation of War'), Article 9, of the Constitution states: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, 
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency 
of the state will not be recognised3• 
1 Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan 's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy 
Responses in a Changing World, Cornell East Asia Series, Ithaca, N.Y., 1993, p 99. 
2 Ibid, pp 7-8. 
3 J.A.A. Stockwin, Governing Japan , Blackwell , Oxford, 1999 , p 46. 
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Although the 1951 Security Treaty was revised in 1960 and Article 9 of the 1946 
Constitution has been subject to substantial 'reinterpretation', these documents have 
served as the twin foundations of Japan's security policy since 1945 and symbolise the 
major departures from the pre-war status quo. 
II. The Yoshida Doctrine. 
In the late 1940s, Pri1ne Minister Yoshida Shigeru faced the overlapping challenges of 
reconstructing Japan's shattered economy and rebuilding ·Japan's international 
reputation while still under foreign occupation. In this environment, all short-term 
policy imperatives pointed away from rearmament as an issue certain to be domestically 
divisive, internationally contentious and economically burdensome. Yoshida responded 
to this predicament by adopting a pragmatic national posture "unconnected with any 
considerations of ideology" based on the pursuit of trade-led economic growth as the 
foundation of domestic stability and a minimalist political and military footprint 
overseas, based on political and military alignment with the United States4. The 
'Yoshida Doctrine', which set the blueprint for Japan's foreign, defence and economic 
policies during the Cold War was intended more as a temporary expedient until such 
ti1ne as Japan could resume full responsibility for its defence and security rather than a 
blueprint for post-war grand strategy5. 
The Yoshida Doctrine, in essence, recognised the enormous power disparities between 
occupier and occupied, anticipated the emerging Cold War and charted a tactical course 
for Japan designed to minimise its political exposure while maximising its economic 
benefits, via commercial access to the non-Communist bloc. One of the prices of this 
arrangement was denial of co1nmercial access to China after 1949. As late as 1951, 
during the Korean War, Yoshida had still hoped to restore diplomatic and economic 
links with China, which had served as Japan's 'traditional' export market and supply 
base on the Asian Continent6. He also believed that maintaining economic relations with 
the fledgling People's Republic would induce China's Communist leaders to be 
independent of the Soviet Union and would later brand US containment policies based 
4Y oshida quoted in Murata Koji, 'The US-Japan Alliance and the US-Korean Alliance: Their Origins , 
Dilemmas and Structures", Comparative Strategy, Vol. 14, 1995, p 187. 
5 Kenneth Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era, The AEI Press, Washington, 
D.C. , 1996, p 26. 
6 John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954, 
Harvard East Asian Studies Monographs , 1979, pp 401-403 , 413. 
124 
on a monolithic view of Communism as "a total failure"7. However, Yoshida' s 
overriding interest lay in concluding a security treaty with the United States and the 
weakness of his position forced him to defer to US strategy. 
Given increasing Japanese doubts about the capacity of the United Nations to function 
as a global institution for collective security, Yoshida appreciated that a security 
align1nent with the United States brought with it a guarantee of access to an 
international trading system8. Within such a system Japan could secure the in-flows of 
natural resources needed to trade its way to prosperity, based on a highly regulated 
home market and the creation of a world-class export sector. This prompted one of two 
structural shifts in the international political economy of Japan's trade. First, Southeast 
Asia took China's place as a substitute source of raw materials and export demand9. 
Second, new oil finds in the Gulf region led the Middle East to become Japan's primary 
source of oil, replacing its pre-war dependence on North America. Thus, Japan's entry 
into a Western-led trading system led the sea route connecting Japan to the Gulf, via 
Southeast Asia, to assume central importance to its economic well-being. Sea lanes 
linking Japan to Australia also became essential to imports of minerals and food, while 
maritime access across the Pacific served both as an inward conduit for minerals and 
food as well as for exports bqund in the opposite direction. Yoshida felt "that Japan 
should and could live as a maritime nation and that cooperation with (the United States) 
would be the best way to acquire access to the world market and its resources and to 
safeguard her sea routes" 10. By submerging Japan ' s political and strategic interests 
within Pax Americana, Yoshida, at the political cost of diminished sovereignty, paved 
the way for four decades of prosperity and the expansion of GDP between 1950 and 
1990 by a factor of 152. 
The Yoshida ad1ninistration proposed a cooperative security a1rangement with the 
United States as early as 1947, offering basing facilities to US forces in return for the 
conclusion of a peace treaty and a US defence commitment to Japan 11. Anticipating the 
emergence of rival US- and Soviet-led camps in Eas t Asia three years before the Korean 
7 Soeya Yoshihide, in Muttiah Alagappa (ed. ), Asian Security Practice: Mate rial and ldeational Influences, 
Stanford University Press, California, 1998, p 203. 
8 Martin Weinstein , Japan's Postwar Defence Policy, Columbia University Press, New York, 1971 , pp 19-
20. 
9 Richard Stubbs, 'US-Japanese Trade Relations: the ASEAN Dimension', The Pacific Review, Vol. 5, No. 
1, 1992. 
1° Kosaka Masataka, 'Japan's Maj or Interes ts and Policies in Asia and the Pacific', Orb is, Vol. 24, No. 3, 
Fall 1975, pp 793-808. 
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War, Yoshida believed that the presence of US forces in Japan would provide an 
adequate deterrent against direct Soviet aggression 12. Yoshida believed that reciprocity 
in the security arrangements could be offered by conceding to the United States a liberal 
basing agreement that would turn Japan into a strategic, logistical and intelligence-
gathering hub underpinning US military strategy in the Western Pacific. While an 
exclusively non-military contribution to regional stability would avoid aggravating 
regional sensitivities, Japan could contribute to international security as an economic 
force for stability and a developmental model for decolonising nations in Asia and 
beyond. This broad conception of a bilateral security arrangement was reflected in the 
title of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United 
States. References to the treaty as an 'alliance' (domei) remained taboo within Japan 
into the 1980s. 
Although US attitudes towards Japanese rearmament were already softening with the 
onset of the Cold War and the Co1mnunist victory in China, it was the outbreak of the 
Korean War, in June 1950, that brought about a reversal in US policy towards Japan. 
Two weeks into the conflict, on July 8, General MacArthur sanctioned the creation of a 
National Police Reserve Force (NPRF) of 75,000 men, reflecting his concerns about an 
internal security vacuum arising from the deployment of three US divisions from Japan 
to South Korea. During negotiations to conclude a security treaty, held in January 1951, 
Special Ambassador John Foster Dulles pressed Yoshida to transform the NPRF into an 
army of 350,000 capable of dealing with an external attack from the Soviet Union13 . 
Yoshida, on the other hand, regarded the risk of Soviet invasion as minimal and placed 
at least equal weight on internal tlu·eats to national security in the form of economic 
sabotage or insurrection. Together with a vague offer to establish domestically recruited 
armed forces numbering 50,000, Yoshida reiterated the offer of bases to support the UN 
military effort under way in Korea, maintaining that a large-scale military build-up was 
both beyond the nation's means and strategically unnecessary as long as the United 
States maintained a military presence in Japan to ensure deterrence. 
When the Security Treaty was signed on September 8, 1951 -- concurrently with the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty -- the stationing of US forces in Japan was guaranteed 
11 Martin Weinstein in James H. Buck (ed.) The Modern Japanese Military System., Sage publications, 
Beverly Hills , California, 1975, p 42. 
12 Kosaka Masataka, 'Japan's Major Interests and Policies in Asia and the Pacific', Orbis , Vol. 24, No. 3, 
Fall 1975, p 794. 
13 Reinhard Drifte, The Security Factor in Japan 's Foreign Policy, 1945-1952 , Saltire Press, Ripe, 1983 , p 
111. 
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beyond the end of Occupation, ensuring a de facto security guarantee even though there 
was no formal commitment to defend Japan in the Treaty text14. However, the shift ~n 
US policy in favour of Japanese rearmament was apparent in the Preamble to the Treaty, 
which stated that the United States would continue to station forces in and around Japan 
in the expectation that Japan "will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own 
defence against direct and indirect aggression", while avoiding "any armament which 
could be an offensive threat"15 . 
With the conclusion of the Security Treaty the Japanese government thus committed 
itself to a policy of limited rearmament as the price of securing US military protection 
and a reduction in US troops in Japan, who still numbered more than 200,000. However, 
basic differences between the two countries over the size and function that an 
'indigenous' armed force would assume were still unresolved. As far as Yoshida was 
concerned the primary mission of Japan's paramilitary forces was "to preserve a 
satisfactory relationship with the United States"16. However, in September 1952 he 
assented to the formation of self defence forces and agreed to include defence against 
external aggression as one of their basic missions. 
Both govern1nents still had to agree on manpower totals before the SDF could be 
inaugurated and begin drawing on US surplus equipment stocks. The NPRF and 
Maritime Safety Force (which MacArthur had increased by 8,000 men at the same time 
the NPRF was fonned) were first merged under the National Safety Agency, emerging 
as the l l0,000-1nan National Safety Force in October 1952. A Security Advisory Group 
was fonned to draw up manpower targets. Subsequently, at talks held between Foreign 
Minister Ikeda and Secretary of State Robertson the following October, a compromise 
figure of 180,000 was settled upon, clearing the way for military aid to flow via the 
Mutual Security Act, promulgated on March 8, 1954. After the necessary legal 
foundation was put into place through the Defense Agency Establishment Law and Self 
Defense Forces Law, the SDF were formally inaugurated on July 1, numbering 
approximately 146,000 men. 
14 Both Treaties came into effect on April 28 , 1952, when the Occupation formally ended. 
15 Under the 19 51 Security Treaty US Forces retained an internal security function within their remit. When 
the Treaty was revised in 1960 this provision was removed. 
16 Kenneth Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era, The AEI Press, Washington, 
D.C. , 1996, p 29. 
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The constitutionality of the SDF was based on the government's interpretation of 
Article 9. The Renunciation of War clause closely bore the hallmark of US influence in 
its drafting. MacArthur ' s February 1946 draft of Article 9 was worded to reflect the 
immediate post-war aim of denrilitarising Japan in perpetuity, stating: 
War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an 
intrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It 
relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defence and 
protection. 
No Japanese Army, Navy or Air Force will ever be authorised and no rights of 
belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force. 
Scope for interpreting the final version of Article 9 adopted by the Diet to allow the 
establishment of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) was facilitated by insertion of the 
clause, "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph," at the beginning of 
the second paragraph. This crucial re-wording was at the initiative of Foreign Minister 
(later prime minister) Ashida Hitoshi, during Diet deliberations prior to the 
Constitution's promulgation17. Without this addition, "Japan would have been ba1Ted 
from possessing all types of armed forces" 18 . The provision in Article 66 of the 
Constitution that "The Prime Minister and other Ministers of states must be civilians" --
intended to distance the new Constitution from the Meiji Constitution, which had 
guaranteed a political role for the Imperial Army and Navy -- also implied that the 
existence of military forces was legally recognised. 
In the immediate post-Occupation period, Yoshida' s administration and the ruling 
Liberal Party found itself under attack over its approach to defence policy from both the 
Socialist and Communist opposition parties, who were implacably opposed to 
rearmament and alliance with the United States , and from the conservative nationalist 
Progressive party, led by Ashida Hitoshi and Shigemitsu Mamoru, who sought to amend 
the Constitution to facilitate a more independent approach to defence. Reflecting the 
do1nestic controversy generated by rearmament, the institutional capacity of the defence 
establishment continued to lag behind efforts to boost frontline capabilities. The 
National Defense Council (NDC), for example, did not materialise until July 1956, two 
17 I.A .A. Stockwin, Governing Japan, Blackwell , Oxford, 1999, pp 166-68. The original version of Article 
9 was drafted by Colonel Charles Kades, MacArthur's head of the Government Section. 
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years after it was announced. Still felt to be missing, fundamentally, was a legal 
framework tying defence policy into the Constitution. This gap was filled with the 
announcement of the Basic Policy for National Defence on May 20, 195719. With the 
Basic Policy in place, the way was finally open for a more coherent approach to defence 
planning through a series of four-year defence build-up plans, though at a pace gradual 
enough to minimise controversy and the diversion of resources from economic recovery. 
A further attempt was made to amend the Constitution, by the Democratic Party-led 
cabinet of Hatoyama Ichiro, in December 195420 . However, after the merger of 
conservative parties into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) the following year, 
inaugurating the ' 1955 Syste1n' under which LDP governments would rule 
uninterrupted until 1993, an institutional and political course was charted under which 
successive administrations would basically adhere to the Yoshida Doctrine. With the 
exception of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, who briefly contemplated a policy of 
independent rearmament in 1957, LDP premiers throughout the Cold War adhered to 
Yoshida' s policy of incre1nental expansion of the SDF, alongside the introduction of 
formal and informal constraints on defence capability in order to appease left-wing 
opposition. Bans were introduced against the overseas dispatch of the SDF (1954) and 
restrictions on arms exports were codified into three principles in 1967. Three other 
'basic policies' adopted since 1957 have also constrained the SDF' s evolution: 
• An Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy; which sanctions the use of force by the 
SDF only in response to an attack already initiated and limits the level of defence 
capability to the minimum required for self-defence. 
• A policy of "not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other 
countries", which has been taken as a prohibition against acquiring "offensive" 
weapons systems. 
18 Sato Seizaburo, ' Clarifying the Right of Collective Self-Defense', Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 3 No. 2, 
Fall/Winter 1996, p 95 . 
19 The Basic Policy is based on four principles: 
1) To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation, thereby 
cont1ibuting to the realisation of world peace; 
2) To promote the public welfare and enhance the people's love for their country, thereby establishing the 
sound basis essential to Japan's security; 
3) To develop incrementally the effective defence capabilities necessary for self-defence, in accordance with 
the nation 's resources and the prevailing domestic situation; 
4) To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S . Security Arrangements , pending the 
effective capability of the United Nations in the future to deter and repel such aggression. 
(Defense of Japan 2000, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times , Tokyo , p 246). 
20 Michael J. Green, Anning Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics and the Postwar Search for 
Autonomy, Columbia University Press , New York, 1995, p 42 . 
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• The Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which since 1967 have proscribed the 
possession, production, and handling of nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. 
Although the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) itself admits there is no clear definition of 
what constitutes "military power" and the military relevance of a semantic division 
drawn between offensive and defensive weapons systems is questionable, these policies 
have nonetheless constrained weapons acquisitions choices, excluding ballistic missiles, 
bombers, large aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and -- until recently -- in-flight 
refuelling21 . 
Without the presence of US forces in northern Japan or Korea, it is likely that a 
perceived 'threat from the north', based on the Soviet seizure of the four Japanese-held 
islands in the southern Kuriles/Northern Territories in August and September 1945, 
co1nbined with Stalin's support for the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, 
would have led Japan's civilian leadership to reconsider a defence build-up as a matter • 
of national survival. Historically, since the nineteenth century the Korean Peninsula has 
been perceived emotively by Japanese strategists as a "dagger pointed at Japan's heart". 
The continuity of such strategic concerns well into the post-1945 period is apparent in 
the view of relatively moderate commentators such as Kosaka Masataka, that "if the 
Korean peninsula were to fall into the hands of hostile powers there would be a serious 
and i1nmediate tln·eat to Japan, and control of nearby air space and sea lanes"22. 
However, as long as the United States was committed to the forward defence of Japan in 
Korea and deployed 'tripwire' forces in Hokkaido, the main function of the Ground Self 
Defense Force (GSDF) as far as Yoshida was concerned would continue to be the 
political one of raising contributory forces to maintain the diplomatic framework of the 
US-Japan Security Arrangements rather than any strategic role beyond Japan's post-
1945 borders. 
Compared with the dynamics of land-based power in Northeast Asia, Japan's post-1945 
maritime strategic environment was more fully transformed by Japan ' s alliance with the 
United States, in effect inverting the strategic polarity of the Pacific, transforming it 
from Japan's maritime frontline ( as had been the case from 1905-45) to the equivalent 
21 Defense of Japan 1995, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, p 63 . 
22 Kosaka Masataka, 'Japan ' s Major Interests and Policies in Asia and the Pacific ', Orbis , Vol. 24, No. 3, 
Fall 1975, p 798 . 
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of a rear area connecting it commercially with its major export and import markets in 
North America and Southeast Asia, and militarily linking US forward bases in Japan 
and elsewhere in East Asia, with Hawaii and the US West Coast23. Moreover, 
Communist states on Asia's maritime periphery possessed only limited maritime 
capabilities during the 1950s, neither able nor willing to challenge US naval and air 
superiority over water, with the partial exception of the Taiwan Strait. In this benign 
maritime environment, as noted in Chapter Two, the importance of military SLOC to 
US strategy tended to be obscured, given the overwhelming dominance of the US Navy. 
However, an awareness of the naval dimension to the US security guarantee was keenly 
perceived both by Japan's post-war leaders and former Imperial Navy officers, many of 
whom staffed the Maritime Self Defense Force itself or moved into positions of 
importance in politics, or became businessmen "wo1Tied about the security of Japan's 
trade routes"24. Compared with ASDF or GSDF generals, former MSDF officers would 
continue to have a much higher representation within industry into the 1970s25 . 
From this perceptive, the underlying purpose of the Security Treaty was "to secure 
Japan's lines of supply in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and to permit it access to export 
markets, particularly those in the United States"26 . However, Article V of the revised 
1960 US-Japan Security Treaty only obliges the United States to respond to "an armed 
attack against either Party in the territories under · the administrations of J apan"27 . The 
argument that Article V of the Treaty, "does not impose any responsibility on U.S. 
military forces" to respond to "attacks against Japanese merchant shipping on the high 
seas" would later be used by proponents of an expanded Japanese navy and an 
'autonomous' defence posture in the late 1960s28 . 
Japan's dependence on the US Seventh Fleet for security in the sea areas from Japan to 
the Gulf was recognised by Yoshida, who was sympathetic to a linkage between trade 
and the necessity for naval protection. This was reflected in the tacit support provided 
for the creation of post-war maritime forces by his administration, in contrast with the 
23 Oga Ryohei. Shiiren no Himitsu, Shobunsha, Tokyo, 1983, p 172. 
24 James E. Auer, 'Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force: An Appropriate Maritime Strategy? ', Naval War 
College Review, Vol. 24, No. 4, December 1971, p 12. 
25 Peter J Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy 
Responses in a Changing World, Cornell East Asia Series, Ithaca, N.Y. , 1993, p 77. 
26 George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coniing War with Japan, St Martin's Press, New York, 
1991 , p 297. 
27 Treaty text quoted from Defense of Japan 1995, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, p 241 (my 
emphasis). 
28 Sekino Hideo, 'Japan and Her Maritime Defense ' , U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1971, Vol. 97, 
No. 819, p 119. 
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political resistance which met US demands to establish a large Japanese army. This 
difference of approach can be ascribed to several reasons. First, Japan's export-led 
economic growth was, in a physical sense, completely reliant on the expansion of a 
large, Japanese-flagged ocean-going merchant fleet -- set to become the second largest 
in the world, at 30 million tons, by the end of the 1960s -- in order to import the raw 
materials and fuel for industrial expansion which drove growth. The purely defensive 
objective of protecting Japan's commercial shipping interests thus accorded with the 
post-war political priority placed on economic recovery and expansion. Second, 
Yoshida -- who maintained close links to former Imperial Navy officers during the 
Occupation -- recognised that the political costs of maintaining naval forces, operating 
out of the glare of media publicity and away from foreign populations, would be much 
lower than for maintaining any Japanese troops on the ground in Asia29 . Third, while 
the process of gradual naval rearmament was pursued with a degree of official 
encouragement in Tokyo, the inter-personal and institutional bonding between former 
Imperial Navy personnel and US Navy officers was a factor independently driving the 
reconstitution of Japanese maritime security forces at a transnational level. The 
spontaneity of rapprochement between naval veterans from both countries contrasted 
with SCAP' s purge of Imperial Army officers30. 
III. Naval renaissance. 
Although nearly nine years separated the inauguration of the MSDF from the 
disestablishment of the Iinperial Navy, a virtually unbroken institutional lineage was 
maintained. Compared with efforts to establish ground forces, the development of a 
post-war navy, although clandestine, proceeded more smoothly under the "sympathetic 
guidance of the U.S. Navy and the strong traditions of the Imperial Japanese Navy". 
The strength of transnational links was reflected in the fact that the MSDF trained with 
and was equipped by the US Navy long before the Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF) and 
GSDF formed links with their conesponding US armed services. Its acquisitions were 
also guided towards complementing capability gaps in Seventh Fleet units based in 
Japan, 1nainly in mine-counter measures and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). At the 
same tiine, the MSDF was a direct descendant of the Imperial Navy, retaining many of 
its personnel, as well as its customs, traditions and institutional forms. As part of this, 
the MSDF also inherited the ambitions of those whose "beautiful dream" was to restore 
Japan's post-war navy to a fully fledged, stand-alone force whose mission would be to 
29 Reinhard Drifte, The Security Factor in Japan 's Foreign Policy, 1945-1952, Saltire Press, Ripe, 1983, p 
104. 
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defend Japan's sea lines of communication. Although in part due to a mixture of 
nostalgia for past grandeur and the empire-building tendencies common to all large 
bureaucracies, the dream of an 'autonomous' navy also reflected fears that a future 
guerre de course might be directed at Japan's commerce as well as doubts about the 
reliability of the US security commitment extending to Japan's merchant marine. The 
presence of Imperial Navy veterans at all key levels of the fledgling MSDF also ensured 
that the institutional memory of the wartime blockade was passed on 31. 
Although the Imperial Navy was officially abolished in November 1945, its command 
structures were held intact within the Second Bureau of the Demobilisation Ministry 
Department32. In part, this reflected an urgent need on the Allies' part to clear Japanese 
waters of approximately 100,000 sea mines, many of them air-dropped in the final 
months of the war. A sizeable Imperial Navy minesweeping capability had escaped 
destruction in the war and 1ninesweeping operations conducted by its former officers 
and vessels, organised in a 'route clearance unit' (koro keibitai), began shortly after the 
suITender on September 2. 
In August 194 7, the government responded to arguments that Japan required a coast 
guard to protect Japanese fishing vessels from seizure and to . coordinate the 
minesweeping effort. The Maritime Safety Board -- later renamed the Maritime Safety 
Agency (MSA) -- was created with the transfer of 28 former Imperial Navy auxiliary 
sub-chasers from the Demobilisation Ministry. Although under the control of the 
Ministry of Transport, the coast guard was deliberately constituted to serve as the 
nucleus of a future navy33 . 
The difference between official attitudes towards naval and ground rearmament is 
demonstrated by the fact that even as Yoshida negotiated with the Occupation 
authorities over the size of a reconstituted army, in October 1950, 46 minesweepers 
from the koro keibitai, now under MSA command, were hastily assembled and ordered 
to assist in 1nine clearance operations in support of US amphibious operations in 
Wonsan Bay, Korea. During operations, one Japanese vessel sank, eight personnel were 
30 Ibid. p 103. 
31 Interview with Captain Otsuka Umio, MSDF, Agenda Coordinator, Western Pacific Naval Symposium, 
Plans and Program Division, Maritime Staff Office, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo, March 1, 2002. 
32 James E. Auer, The Postwar Reannanient of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71, Praeger, New York, 
1973, pp 49-52. 
33 Ibid. pp 63-64. 
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wounded and one killed34. Subsequently, Admiral Arleigh Burke together with a circle 
of ex-Imperial Navy officers led by Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo (who would later 
embark on a political career in the Diet) jointly developed plans for Japan's maritime 
forces that, in addition to performing peacetime constabulary and coast guard functions, 
would include a role "in the defense of her own country and in defense of the high seas 
surrounding the Japanese archipelago". In April 1951, Burke wrote: 
"I personally believe that the solution to this quandary lies in the formation of a 
small group of United States Naval Officers to study, plan, and direct the initiation 
of a small Japanese Navy. This Japanese Navy need not be called a Navy. It can be 
called a Coast Guard or anything else. . .. I should think it might be desirable to 
augment this group ... with about ten Japanese ex-naval officers. This contingent 
would become the nucleus of the Japanese Navy Department"35 . 
The United States planned initially to create "a small seagoing force" of sonar-equipped 
anti-submarine patrol ships in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union. Admiral 
Nomura and other senior ex-Imperial Navy officers won the backing of Yoshida as well 
as future pri1ne minister, Hatoyama Ichiro, for the necessity of rebuilding a Japanese 
Navy36 . Although the Nomura group received a cold reception from Yoshida and Dulles 
for its plan to reconstitute a navy composed of 337 vessels, totalling 300,000 tons and 
750 aircraft, their lobbying efforts within the US Navy and Japan's civil authorities won 
backing for the creation of the Maritime Guard Force (kaijo keibitai) as an autonomous 
unit within the MSA37 . In April 1952, the Maritime Guard Force was established before 
being succeeded by the Coastal Safety Force in August. Neither unit possessed 
operational capabilities beyond minesweeping, but in organisational terms they were 
naval in all but name and mostly staffed by former Imperial Navy officers and sailors. 
The NPRF and Coastal Safety Force were merged under the National Safety Agency, 
emerging as the 110,000-inan National Safety Force and the Maritime Safety Force in 
August 1952. The National Safety Agency was placed under the direction of the Prime 
Minister' s Office (kantei). 
To equip the de facto navy, agreement was reached with the United States to charter 
surplus US vessels in November 1952, resulting in the transfer of six frigates and three 
34 Taoka Shunji, 'Possible Involvement in Mine Sweeping and Danger of Handling Over Carte Blanche --
Pitfalls of US-Japan Guidelines ', Aera, June 23, 1997, pp 27-28. FBIS -EAS-97-119, June 23, 1997. 
35 James E. Auer, The Postwar Reannanient of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71 , Praeger, New York, 
1973, p 80 .. 
36 Ibid. p 72. 
37 Ibid. p 82. 
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landing ships in January 1953. A further Naval Vessel Loan Agreement was concluded 
in May 1954, paving the way for the loan of 159 ships, worth $80 million, including 
destroyers, support vessels and a single submarine38 . The United States continued to 
supply one-third of MSDF ton11age and aircraft until 1967, when the military aid 
programme to Japan was terminated. 
IV. Protection of marititne transport up to the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan. 
Post-war Japanese proposals for a naval role in protecting shipping, in the form of 
convoys over the high seas, date back to 1952. In August, the seido chosa iinkai 
(Systems Investigative Committee), was established as a supra-ministerial body 
designed to aid in the drafting of government policy. It incorporated a defence sub-
committee responsible for drafting armed forces requirements for Japan, based on its 
analysis of global conditions and the Security Treaty. The newly formed Maritime 
Safety Force contributed its assessment, based on a long-range maritime force estimate 
drawn up by uniformed officials within the Maritime Safety Agency. The sub-
committee recommended that Japan would require naval forces totalling 475,000 tons. 
It was envisaged that this very substantial force would be constructed with the help of 
US military aid over a 13-year period, involving government expenditures of 8 trillion 
yen. The subcommittee concluded that maintaining "supply lanes on the seas" was one 
of the core objectives of national defence. To this end, the acquisition of "maritime 
defence potential" would serve the "primary objective of maritime convoying and anti-
submarine warfare". Specifically, the plan recommended that: 
Convoys along coastal and territorial waters will be conducted in full, while 
one-third convoys on the high-sea are conducted39. 
This proposal was the first official attempt to factor the security dimensions of Japan's 
rising economic dependence on imports into post-war military planning. The seido 
chosa iinkai sub-committee estimated that funding for the plan would require up to 8 
per cent of the government's annual expenditure to complete. The plan met with active 
opposition from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) in the austere conditions of the 
immediate post-Occupation period40 . Such was the stringent supervision of the MoF 
over the JDA' s budgetary claims (including via its personnel seconded to the Agency) 
38 Ibid. pp 94-95 . 
39 Ibid. p 154. 
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that 'civilian control' has been seen as synonymous with MoF control41 . After 1955, 
more modest acquisition targets for the MSDF were proposed, with force estimates 
ranging from 81,000 to 143,000 tons. However, the government was not able to embark 
on any long-range defence plan until the Basic Policy for National Defense was passed 
in May 1957. On June 14, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke's cabinet embarked on the 
first of four four-year defence build-up plans (boei seibi keikaku). 
Intended to span five years but shortened to three, the First Defense Build-up Plan 
(1958-60) was concerned with building up the core capability of the Self Defense 
Forces. The tonnage of the MSDF was set at 124,000 tons. The Second Defense Build-
up Plan ( 1962-66) ventured further, committing Japan to build up defence forces "able 
to cope effectively with an aggression at or lower than (the level of) a local war, using 
conventional weapons". The MSDF fleet was expanded to 140,000 tons to increase its 
ASW capabilities, although its logistical base remained under-developed. The Third 
Defense Build-up Plan outlined as a further objective for the MSDF, "increasing the 
ability to defend coastal areas, straits and surrounding waters". The National Defense 
Council approved the following additions to the MSDF inventory: 56 vessels of all 
types amounting to 48,000 tons; 14 destroyers , including Japan's first surface-to-air 
missile (SAM) and helicopter-equipped models, five submarines as well as 60 fixed-
wing ASW patrol aircr~ft and 33 ASW helicopters42. 
For the first time, under the Third Defense Build-up Plan the "protection of maritime 
transportation" (kaijo kotsu no hogo) was officially added to Japan's defence 
responsibilities43. Specifically, the Third Defense Build-up Plan detailed emergency 
plans to establish two sea 'route zones' (korotai) to the southwest and southeast of 
Japan's major Pacific ports. The southwestern route (nansei korotai) was defined as 150 
nautical miles (nm) wide and 840 nm long, extending from Osaka along the axis of the 
Ryukyu Islands/Nansei Shoto to the Bashi Channel, between Taiwan and the 
Philippines. A second, southeastern route zone (nanto korotai), 240 nm wide, extended 
1,000 nm from Tokyo along the axis of the Ogasawara/Bonin Islands to a point north of 
40 During fiscal years 1955-57, defence expenditure averaged 13.3 per cent of government general account 
outlays. After falling steadily, by fiscal 1977, defence accounted for just under 6 per cent of government 
expenditure. (Defense of Japan, 1977, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, p 166). 
41 Javed S. Maswood, Japanese Defence: the Search for Political Power, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Allen and Unwin , 1990, p 31. 
42 James E. Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritinie Forces, 1945-71 , Praeger, New York, 
1973, p 159. 
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Guam. Both 'route zones' extended approximately to the 20th Parallel. At this time, 
these island chains were still under US administration: the Ogasawara Islands were 
transferred to Japanese sovereignty in 1968; the Bonin Islands/Kazan Retto in 1971; and 
the Ryukyu Islands in 1972. 
In testimony to the Special Committee for Okinawa and the Northern Territories, on 
November 30, 1970, the chief bureaucrat at the JDA, Kubo Takuya, who was to play an 
important role in the development of defence policy during the 1970s, became the first 
official to announce the geographical scope of the MSDF' s sea lane defence concept in 
the Diet, stating that "the Southeast route extends in a corridor about 100 miles wide 
from Tokyo Bay in the direction of Saipan for 1,000 miles. The southwest route goes 
through Osaka and Kyushu to the end of the Ryukyu island chain in a corridor also 
about 100 miles wide whose exact length slips my mind at the moment, but is also 
nearly 1,000 miles"44. 
During the 1960s, MSDF staff officers conducted a war game to determine escort 
requirements for convoy operations between Japan and the Philippines and Guam. It 
was esti1nated that to maintain daily import requirements of 150,000 tons, a convoy of 
60 ships would have to arrive every three days, requiring a total of 54 destroyer escorts. 
However, even assuming the entire surface fleet could be put to convoy duties in 
wartime, the MSDF possessed only 38 destroyers by the end of the Third Defense 
Build-up Plan, in 1971. Auer's contemporary judgement was that "if Japan ' s naval 
forces have been built up to protect its ocean-going merchant shipping, it could be 
considered that its relative progress has been negative"45 . 
Despite the fact that past US, British and Japanese attempts to implement a concept of 
patrolled sea lanes had proved disastrous in wartime compared with convoy (as noted in 
chapters Two and Three), MSDF plans for the protection of shipping embraced such a 
concept in response to the growing gulf between the MSDF' s limited escort resources 
and Japan's rapidly expanding merchant fleet 46 . 
43 Waga Kuni ni okeru Boe iryoku Seibi no Keika, ('Trends in Japan 's defence equipment build-up '), 1982. p 
45 . This report was commissioned internally within the JDA as an account of history of postwar defence 
planning. 
44 Cited in Maeda Tetsuo, The Hidden A nny: the Untold Sto ry of Japan's Military Forces, Edition Q Inc., 
Chicago, 1995, p 231. 
45 James E. Auer, The Postwar Rearma,nent of Japanese Maritime Fo rces, 1945-71, Praeger, ew York, 
1973, p 165. 
46 Sekino Hideo , 'Japan and Her Maritime Defense' , U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1971 , Vol. 97 , 
No. 819, p 115. 
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V. Autonomous defence and MSDF capabilities. 
Between 1969 and 1971, during the Third Defense Build-up Plan, the question of an 
'autonomous' or 'self-reliant' defence posture (jishu boei) received consideration in 
Japan's defence and business circles. According to Nakasone Yasuhiro, who was JDA 
Director General from January 1970 to July 1971, the basic concept called for Japan, 
while maintaining exclusive dependence on the US nuclear umbrella, to "make the Self-
Defense Force the main ele1nent in the country's conventional defence and to 
complement this with the J apan-U.S. mutual security system"47 . Particular emphasis was 
laid upon the need to develop Japan's "maritime power", in the form of a major naval 
build-up, in which ai1n the JDA was backed by seg1nents of the business community. A 
'Malacca Straits defence theory' (maraka boeiron) also appeared around the same 
time 48. 
During the drafting of a fourth plan to be budgeted from fiscal 1972-73, the JDA 
departed from the pattern of incremental build-up established under the first three 
defence build-up prograrmnes to propose a major expansion of Japan's defence 
capabilities. 'Autonomous' defence arose in a strategic context shaped by the draw-
down of US ground troops in Vietnam, from 1969 onwards, which for the first time 
challenged assu1nptions underlying the Yoshida Doctrine by raising questions about the 
reliability of US treaty cormnit1nents in Asia. This assertiveness from the Agency was 
closely associated with Nakasone 's 18-month JDA directorship, an example of the 
i1nportance of individual policy-makers in the formation of Japan's defence policy 
despite the 'faceless', consensual image often ascribed to decision-making in Japan 49. 
Negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty influenced the 
defence debate in several ways. In a direct sense, although US forces were to remain 
there, the transfer of the Ryukyu Islands to Tokyo's control pron1ised to extend the 
SDF' s responsibilities for territorial defence ( concerning mainly the Maritime and Air 
Self Defense Forces), virtually to Taiwan. At a jointly held JDA and Ministry of 
47 Quoted in Ibid . p 111. 
48 Goto Moto, 'Japan in Asia', Japan Quarterly, October-December 1969, Vol. 26 No. 4, pp 390-391. 
49 The importance of individual decision-makers' contribution to Japan ' s post-war defence policy is one of 
the central contentions of Katahara Eich.i's thesis, The Politics of Japanese Defence Policy Making, 1975-
1989 (Griffith University, April 1990). This applies not only to Nakasone in the 1945-77 period, but to the 
troika formed by Kubo Takuya, Sakata Mich.ita and Miki Takeo who -- as is explored later in this chapter --
actively steered a moderate defence policy comse in the mid-l 970s, even though they were assisted in this 
aim by reinforcing domestic and external trends. 
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Foreign Affairs (MOFA) press conference in May 1969, JDA officials outlined three 
implications of the reversion of Okinawa for defence policy: 
l. While Japan's defence posture has previously been based on a gradual consolidation of 
defence power and maintaining the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in view of the internal and 
external situations, the growth of national power and the improvement of (Japan's) 
international status, defence efforts will be more positively pushed forward in the future, and 
defence power, capable of coping effectively and flexibly with the state of direct or indirect 
aggression, will be perfected. 
2. Japan would assume pnmary responsibility for the defence of Okinawa after reversion. 
Regarding the maritime defence of Okinawa, Japan should acquire the necessary defence 
power for the patrolling of the sea areas around Okinawa, maintaining and controlling ports, 
and the securing of the Nansei sea lane around Okinawa, in the same way as in the sea 
areas around the homeland50 . 
3. For our country which is surrounded on all four sides by the sea, and which bases its 
existence on trade, the securing of the safety of maritime transport is an indispensable factor 
for the survival of our country. Further efforts will be made for the strengthening of our 
maritime defence power and for the improvement of defence of the straits and maritime 
escort". 
Despite such declarations, no details were forthcoming about projected costs or 
equipment that the JDA intended to procure under the proposed Fourth Defense Build-
up Plan until Nakasone joined the JDA. A detailed draft of the 'New Plan' or 'Nakasone 
Plan', so-named to advertise a departure from the gradualist pace of previous build-up 
plans, was released in April 1970. The plan was among several controversial moves 
associated with Nakasone' s term as JDA Director General, including a proposal to 
revise the Basic Policy for National Defense to formalise a supplementary role for the 
alliance in Japan's defence policy51. The draft of the Nakasone Plan stipulated that the 
SDF should be able to deal independently with "limited, direct aggression" by securing 
air and sea control around Japanese territory. Reflecting the importance of maritime 
defence, the plan called for a doubling of the MSDF fleet from 142,000 tons to 320,000 
tons within a decade. Plans to protect maritime transportation within the nansei and 
nanto korotai were linked to the planned acquisition of two 8,000-ton helicopter 
50 Asahi Shimbun , May 18, 1969, Daily Summary of the Japanese Press, US Embassy, Tokyo, May 1969 
(emphasis added). 
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carriers, each of which would be capable of carrying six helicopters to conduct ASW 
patrols to the Bashi channel (between Taiwan and the Philippines) and north of Guam52. 
The 'Nakasone Plan ' was provisionally budgeted at between 5.7 and 6.5 trillion yen, or 
roughly double the expenditure of the Third Defence Build-up Plan 53 . 
Support for autonomous defence was forthcoming from the Federation of Economic 
Organisations (keidanren) which was briefed by the JDA on its plans for defending 
Japan's commercial shipping lanes. At its general meeting in 1969, the keidanren 
passed a resolution backing autonomous defence and a doubling of the ratio of defence 
spending to Gross National Product (GNP), from around 1 per cent to 2 per cent54. The 
support expressed by business for autonomous defence in the late 1960s was driven in 
large part by the growth of interest in autonomous defence production, which although 
accounting for just 0.5 per cent of industrial output by 1970, was disproportionately 
important for the development of technology through research and development55 . 
In addition to the commercial interest of major corporations such as Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries (which then occupied a 38 per cent market share of the defence sector) in a 
doubling of defence expenditure, so1ne elements within big business were sympathetic 
to the argu1nents that a long-range Japanese naval presence would reduce the 
vulnerability of Japanese 1nerchant shipping and regarded a Japanese defence role in 
Southeast Asia as a natural extension of the development of the region as an export 
market and source of raw materials56 . Other business lobby groups such as the keizai 
doyukai subscribed to the linkage between Japan's import dependence and increasing 
the size of the MSDF, advocating a Japanese naval protection role overlapping its oil 
routes tlu·ough the Straits of Malacca to the Indian Ocean57 . Particular concern 
surrounded the security of the Straits of Malacca, given Japan's status as the largest 
user, the impending withdrawal of the Royal Navy from Singapore, an increased Soviet 
51 Katahara Eichi. The Politics of Japanese Defence Policy Making, 1975-1989, unpublished PhD thesis, 
Griffith University, April 1990, p 132. 
52 Kaihara Osamu, 'Jissai Mondai to shite Fukano' ('Such a Mission is far beyond Japan's Power': On the 
Sea-Lane Defense Problem in Dispute No. 2), Sekai no Kansen, December 1982, p 130; and Maeda Tetsuo, 
The Hidden A nny: the Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces, Edition Q Inc., Chicago, 1995, pp 23 0-234. 
53 Joseph P Keddell , The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures, M.E. 
Sharpe , Armonk, New York, 1994, p 48. 
54 
'To Strengthen Autonomous Defense; Keidanren To Decide at Its General Meeting of 23rd ', Mainichi 
Shimhun, May 21, 1969, Daily Summary of the Japanese Press, May 1969. 
55 Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics and the Postwar Search fo r 
Autonom,y, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, pp 53-59 . 
56 Maeda Tetsuo. The Hidden A nny: the Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces, Edition Q Inc., Chicago, 
1995, p 142. 
57 Goto Moto , 'Japan in Asia', Japan Quarterly, October-December 1969, Vol. 26, No. 4 , pp 390-391. 
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naval presence and increased assertiveness on the part of the littoral states58 . (Japan's 
sea-lane diplo1nacy towards Southeast Asia is explored in Chapter Six). The President 
of Tokyo Electric Power, Kikawada Kazutaka, who was reportedly the inspiration 
behind the maraka boeiron, argued that while Japan should cooperate with regional 
states to ensure access through the straits, an expanded MSDF should also have a role in 
preserving access for Japanese shipping there given the cost of diversion if the straits 
were closed to tankers59 . 
Since its formation, two camps have debated the basic role of the MSDF: those who 
have argued for the necessity of an ocean-going navy to protect Japan's sea lanes, 
against advocates of a more limited coastal anti-invasion force. Sekino Hideo and 
Kaihara Osamu respectively articulated these viewpoints60 . 
i) Sekino' s SLOC defence concept. 
In May 1971, Sekino Hideo, an ex-Imperial Navy officer and Commander in the MSDF 
(who was among those staff officers involved in the convoying exercise between Japan 
and the Philippines and Guam refeITed to above) articulated his views about Japan's 
strategic environment and the role of the MSDF in an essay for the US Naval Institute' s 
Proceedings61 . Sekino 1napped out a maritime strategy for Japan in which the protection 
of sea communications would have priority. 
Flanked by potentially hostile powers on the Asian mainland and dependent upon long 
lines of supply for imports critical to its survival, Sekino saw Japan's role as a Pacific 
sea power as a strategic necessity determined by geography and the distribution of 
natural resources rather than nostalgia for the "mistakes" of the pre-1945 period62. 
Acknowledging Japan's inability to defend itself unaided against the Soviet Union or to 
protect its global trading interests independently, Sekino thought that some form of 
alliance with the United States would be necessary "as far ahead as can be foreseen", 
58 Bhabani Sen Gupta, T.T. Poulose, Hemlata Bhatia, The Malacca Straits and the Indian Ocean: A Study of 
the Strategic and Legal Aspects of a Controversial Sea-lane, Macmillan, New Delhi, 1974, p 62. 
59 Ibid. pp 42-43. 
60 The idea to compare and contrast Sekino and Kaihara is adapted from James Auer 's The Postwar 
Rearmanient of Japanese Maritinie Forces, 1945-71 , Praeger, New York, 1973. However, the analysis 
presented in this chapter also draws from miginal material. 
61 Sekino Hideo, 'Japan and Her Maritime Defense' , U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , May 1971 , Vol. 97, 
No. 819, pp 98-121. 
62 Ibid. p 109. 
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while relying on diplomacy to secure commercial access to natural resources63 . Against 
invasion, to compensate for the "unchanging geographical disadvantage of insufficient 
strategical width", Japan would have to rely on the US Air Force and Seventh Fleet as 
"the most effective power to prevent direct aggression against J apan"64. 
Regarding the security of trade routes, Sekino acknowledged the impossibility of single-
handedly defending Japan's sea lanes to the Persian Gulf and beyond. In a crisis, Japan 
would not be able to depend on the cooperation of oil-producing states in the Persian 
Gulf, nor able to guarantee the 40 per cent of its trade which passed across the Indian 
Ocean. Within the scope of practicable capabilities in the Pacific Basin, Japan could 
hope to maintain economic access to Southeast Asia, Oceania and the Americas through 
a combination of diplomacy and the "cooperation of American and Australian sea 
power". Given these strategic parameters, Sekino maintained that Japan's vulnerability 
was such that it simply could not afford to ignore the safety of its seaborne commerce. 
Three military threat scenarios facing Japan were identified: nuclear attack, invasion 
and a guerre de course, each potentially jeopardising the survival of the state. The 
probability of a nuclear attack or invasion occurring was judged to be "virtually nil", 
because of the deterrent effect of Article V of the 1960 U.S-J apan Security Treaty. In 
contrast, a guerre de course directed at Japan's maritime commerce was judged the 
most likely scenario. Sekino' s reasoning for this was twofold. First, with the growth of 
its annual imports to around 300,000 tons, Sekino believed that a blockade of seaborne 
imports of fuel, raw materials , foodstuffs and military supplies could choke Japan's 
industrial base and war-fighting ability as it had done during the Pacific War, despite 
the apparent restraining influence of nuclear weapons on large-scale conflict (see 
Chapter Three). Second, Sekino suggested that an aggressor would actively favour the 
guerre de course as an means of applying indirect military pressure on Japan at 
comparatively low risk of US retaliation because, under the terms of Article V of the 
Security Treaty, "Japan cannot expect the cooperation of the powerful Seventh Fleet in 
protecting maritime traffic"65 . Envisaging that a Soviet naval campaign against 
Japanese shipping would be accompanied by domestic political unrest orchestrated by 
Communist sympathisers, he speculated: "Such a two-pronged offensive would deplete 
63 Against nuclear threats, Sekino believed the US nuclear umbrella would deter the Soviet Union from 
attacking Japan, although he also thought that a "local retaliatory force" might be required to deter China at 
some point in the future . 
64 Ibid. p 102. 
65 Quoted in James E. Auer, 'Japan ' s Maritime Self-Defense Force: An Appropriate Maritime Strategy? ', 
Naval War College Review, Vol . 24, No.4, December 1971, p 9 
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both the nation's livelihood and the fighting power of the self-defense forces" . With 
Japan domestically divided over the legitimacy of defence and security relations with 
the United States, small-scale attacks on shipping might be launched in order to 
undermine Japanese confidence in the Security Treaty and sap the national will to resist; 
their "psychological" effect achieving strategic objectives out of all proportion to the 
physical damage inflicted and forces committed. Sekino argued the MSDF should 
prioritise the protection of sea communications in Japan's defence over an anti-invasion 
role, to "hold out" long enough for US forces to intervene, or to inflict sufficient 
attrition on enemy submarines and aircraft to force a halt to attacks on shipping. 
Sekino argued that it would be a realistic objective for Japan to meet its basic import 
requirements in wartime, at half the rate of peacetime consumption or about 150,000 
tons, to fall back on Southeast Asia, Australasia and the Americas as a supply base, and 
establish a "maritime safety zone" in the waters north of Indonesia for the passage of 
merchant vessels and military supplies. By utilising geographic factors in its favour, 
Sekino thought that a viable sea lane defence concept could be developed in concert 
with the United States and regional states, in which the MSDF would have primary 
responsibility. 
In case of a war with the Soviet Union, Sekino anticipated that "attacks on Japanese sea 
communications by sub1narines and airplanes must be the main tasks of the Soviet 
Pacific Fleet, if it should operate against Japan"66 . Soviet long range land-based 
aviation, principally Tu-95 'Bears' and Tu-16 'Badgers' would be "well suited for 
finding and attacking convoys". However, since they would have to operate without 
fighter escort in order to attack shipping passing south of Japan, Sekino judged that 
"large-scale attacks by these planes would not be expected"67 . The major threat foreseen 
was from the Soviet Pacific submarine fleet, which he estimated at 100 boats of all 
types. Against Soviet Pacific Fleet units concentrated at Vladivostok, Japan would be 
able to block access from the Sea of Japan through the key straits controlling access to 
the Pacific and Sea of Okhotsk, by monitoring the straits in peacetime and preparing to 
1nine the1n in war. Controlling the Tsugan1 and Shi1nonoseki straits, Japan would also 
be able to inhibit Soviet naval passage through the Tsushi1na (Korea) Strait and Soya 
66 Sekino Hideo , 'Japan and Her Maritime Defense' , U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1971 , Vol. 97, 
No. 819 , pp 107-108 . 
67 Ibid. p 105. 
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(La Perouse) Strait, leaving only the shallow and often ice-bound Tartar Strait, 
separating Sakhalin and Russia's Maritime Province, wholly beyond Japan's reach 68 . 
Since the blockade of straits alone could not be expected to prevent all enemy 
submarines and aircraft from infiltrating into the Pacific and East China Sea, Sekino 
proposed to exploit other features of Japan's archipelagic geography, by building chains 
of acoustic listening stations and air bases located on islands along its southwest and 
southeasterly approaches. To the southwest, the Amami and Ryukyu Islands stretched 
almost to Tai wan. Beyond Tai wan, the Philippine archipelago would complete a partial 
barrier against the East China and South China Seas, as far south as Borneo. To the 
south east, the Izu/Ogasawara Bonin/Kazan Retto chains (collectively termed the 
Nainpo Islands), co1nbined with the Marianas and Micronesia to fonn a second island 
screen facing the open waters of the Pacific. 
In terms remarkably similar to those drawn up by Admiral Oikawa's Imperial Navy staff 
in 1943, Sekino envisioned the creation of a vast "protected lake" within an arc of open 
water between these two elongated island chains stretching from Japan to Indonesia, 
through which Japanese merchant ships and supply vessels could sail in relative 
security, transporting enough strategic commodities and materiel to ensure national 
survival. Within the "maritime safety zone" itself, patrol aircraft, attack submarines, 
destroyers and escorts assigned to high-value convoys would operate in coordinated 
fashion to minimise reaction times. Sekino was confident that "hunter-killer teams" 
would be able to detect and destroy most Soviet submarines. Very-low-frequency active 
sonar and passive hydrophone arrays dispersed at intervals along the easlern island 
chain would ensure a "high chance that targets would be detected during their passage 
from 100, or even 200, miles away", enabling "patrol planes and helicopters based on 
some of these islands ... to reach the points of detection within one hour"69 . While 
Soviet nuclear submarines operating south of Japan would be unaffected by fuel 
limitations, Sekino claimed that their effective range would be constrained by Japan's 
cumulative surveillance, patrol and ASW activities. 
68 Japan's strategic advantage as a natural bani er to passage from the Sea of Japan was equally evident to 
US Cold War planners who have sought Japanese help in monitoring the Tsushima, Tsugaru and 
particularly the Soya straits since the 1960s. Japan began laying acoustic monitoring equipment in the 
Tsugaru Strait in 1968, wh ile sound surveil lance sonar system (SOSUS) sets were also installed in the 
Tsushima and Soya straits. (Usui Naoaki, 'Japan Plans to Bolster Already Formidable ASW Capability', 
Defense News, June 24, 1991, p 14) 
69 Ibid. p 120. 
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To carry out the maritime safety zone concept, Sekino estimated that a fleet of around 
500,000 tons and 570 aircraft would be needed (Figure 12). 
Figure 12: Sekino' s opti1nal MSDF force structure 
ASW forces (415,500 tons) 
6 nuclear attack submarines (SSN) of 3,000 tons each; 
9 conventionally powered attack submarines (SSK) of 1,500 tons each 
3 small helicopter carriers of 20,000 tons each 
66 destroyers (DD) of 4,000 tons each 
30 destroyer escorts (DE) of 2,000 tons each 
Counter-invasion/coastal defence (118,000 tons) 
16 DD of 4,000 tons each 
16 DE of 2,000 tons each 
Mine Warfare (32,000 tons) 
60 Coastal minesweeping craft of 400 tons each 
4 Mine-layer craft of 2,000 tons each 
Air wing (570 aircraft) 
198 land-based aircraft 
24 flying boats 
348 helicopters 
It was estimated that partial i1nplementation could be achieved with 300,000 tons and 
400 aircraft. With its actual strength of about 130,000 tons and around 40 ASW ships, 
in 1971, Sekino judged that the MSDF "is able only to protect in convoys 20-30 per cent 
of the nation's mariti1ne transportation, for a distance of several hundred miles from 
Japan; that is in the waters bounded by the mainland, the Nampo Islands and Nansei 
Islands"70 . However, at a minimum, Sekino thought tankers could be escorted from 
Palau, between Saipan and Indonesia, which he proposed could be developed as a 
staging and storage point for Japan's oil supplies in warti1ne. 
While the concept of a Maritime Safety Zone and the build-up of Japan's ASW forces 
was predicated upon a potential threat to Japanese merchant shipping, Sekino thought 
that Japan's 1nilitary task would be: 
70 Ibid. p 103. 
"to relieve the U.S. Polaris submarines and the Seventh Fleet of the dangers of 
enemy submarines by means of the safety zone, because these forces would then be 
more secure in carrying out their missions. In this manner, Japan could enhance the 
security of sea communications which bind together, and permit the survival of, the 
nations of the free world in the Pacific. Furthermore, this may be the maximum 
measure permitted Japan at sea under our current Constitution."71 
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That Sekino' s views represented more than a marginal view within the MSDF is 
suggested by the publication of an internal JDA instruction pamphlet dating from 
February 1970. The pamphlet, disclosed in a 1980 article by Nishijima Ryoichi, 
outlined the importance of a blue-water sea lane defence role for the MSDF, stating: 
"The removal of threats against our sea lanes of communication is vital in securing 
survival of the nation. All threats, including the direct invasion of our homeland, 
could be more easily prevented in advance if the attack from the sea is stemmed or 
thwarted . . .. So we must try to oppose and destroy the enemy fleet to secure our sea 
lanes of communication. A defensive 'fortress strategy' is not a realistic one. Those 
large-scale offensive operations we are not allowed to carry out under the 
restrictions of the present constitution despite their necessity will have to be 
conducted by the US forces but the MSDF should work in the direction of 
mitigating the limitations as much as it can in order to eliminate the danger of 
b . b . d fl "72 ecorrung a es1ege eet . 
ii) Kaihara ' s counter-view. 
Kaihara Osamu was a senior official within the National Defense Council whose more 
restrictive view of defence posture was both representative of non-uniform JDA 
officials and a natural counterweight to the 'navalist' views of Sekino. Kaihara held in 
common with Sekino that the SDF were chronically under-prepared to achieve their 
stated mission of rebuffing a conventional attack on Japan. However, Kaihara was 
strongly opposed to the ambitions of MSDF officers to expand the scale and scope of 
maritime operations to protect Japan 's sea lanes , which he regarded as an echo of the 
strategic debates of the 1930s, when Imperial Navy officers had helped to lead Japan 
into an 'unwinnable ' war with the United States. Kaihara would remain a forceful, 
71 Ibid. p 121. 
72 Nishijima Ryoichi . 'Participation of Maritime Self-Defense Forces in RIMPAC', Asia Pacific 
Coniniunity, No. 7, Winter 1980, pp 43-53. 
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public critic of the sea lanes defence concept when this resurfaced as the focus of 
alliance cooperation in the 1980s. 
Kaihara' s reading of Japan's strategic liabilities, as an island nation located near Asia's 
military power centres, lacking in strategic depth, devoid of natural resources and with a 
concentrated urban infrastructure and population, led him to the opposite of Sekino' s 
"umealistic" conclusions 73 . He argued that Japan's strategic vulnerabilities would put 
the SDF at such an obvious disadvantage in any conflict with the Soviet Union -- its 
main potential adversary -- that its only rational mission should be conventional 
deterrence against an invasion. In his eyes, charging the MSDF with protecting Japan's 
commercial sea lanes was a nostalgically driven "beautiful dream", reflecting a "guilty 
conscience" over the Imperial Navy's negligence in failing to protect Japan's merchant 
arm during the Pacific War. 
Kaihara criticised the use of abstract tenns such as 'sea route zones' (korotai), 
'protection of maritime transportation' and 'sea lanes defence' (shiiren bi5ei) as lacking 
in concrete meaning or operational utility. In reality, he argued that sea lanes were not 
static areas of sea space capable of being defended like territory, but potentially 
limitless. Even if such a task were possible, Kaihara argued that Japan lacked the 
econormc resources to commit to such an undertaking. Moreover, the technical 
difficulties involved in each of the four stages of anti-sub1narine warfare -- detection, 
classification, localisation and destruction -- suggested that the MSDF would be unable 
to prevent a determined Soviet Pacific submarine force from attacking Japanese 
co1nmerce, a force which by the beginning of the 1970s out-numbered the total US 
submarine fleet at the outbreak of war in 1941 by a factor of three. Furthermore, a 
strategic requirement to blockade Soviet submarines within the Sea of Japan would be 
highly provocative, possibly unconstitutional and risk a pre-emptive air strike that 
would decimate the largely unprotected frontline equipment and infrastructure of the 
SDF. 
Kaihara criticised Nakasone ' s plan to defend the nansei and nanti5 korotai from 
"rampaging" Soviet submarines with two ASW helicopter caniers , as operationally non-
viable. The southeastern sea route alone, 1,000 nm long and 240 nm wide, contained a 
73 Kaihara Osamu, ' Jissai Mondai to shite Fukano, On the Sea-Lane Defense Problem in Dispute No. 2, 
Sekai no Kansen ('Ships of the World '), December 1982, pp 129-30; and James E. Auer, The Postwar 
Rearmament of Japanese Ma ritime Forces, 1945-71, Praeger, New York, 1973, pp 134-39. 
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surface area of 777,600 square kilometres, or double that of Japan itself 74. He disputed 
the notion that a single helicopter carrier deployed on patrol could establish sub-surface 
sea control over such a vast area of open ocean, interpreting the JDA' s focus on the 
submarine threat as a justification for the acquisition of expensive, ocean-going ASW 
escorts and long-range patrol aircraft. 
Kaihara argued that the defence of sea lanes, as an abstract, was an illusory concept 
beyond the reach of even the US Navy. He cited a 1970 assessment by a senior ASW 
officer in the US Navy, Vice-Admiral T.F. Caldwell, that the US Navy would be unable 
to mount continuous trans-atlantic convoys in warti1ne, and a similar statement by the 
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James Holloway, in 1975, that the United States 
would be unable to guarantee convoys of oil tankers from the Persian Gulf to Europe 
and North A1nerica75 . While smaller navies such as the Royal Navy possessed the 
capability to secure sea transport in chokepoints such as the Dover Strait, doing so 
within areas of open sea was "i1npossible". If the US Navy and its western allies 
struggled with the task of sea lane protection in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, Kaihara 
asked, what hope could Japan have of achieving this on its own in the Pacific? 
Although he was not opposed to MSDF participation in patrol or convoy operations in 
the Northwest Pacific, if the United States requested Japan's assistance, this mission did 
not in his opinion equate with the security of Japan' s commercial sea lanes. In contrast 
to Sekino's advocacy of a blue water role for Japan extending throughout the Western 
Pacific, Kaihara concluded that the more operationally realistic and constitutionally 
legitimate goal for the MSDF should be to improve its capability to counter an invasion 
-- a 1nission that would confine its duties to Japan's coastal periphery. · 
VI. The Prin1acy of constraints. 
From 1972, Japanese defence policy reverted to the incremental approach of previous 
LDP-led governments, based on the consolidation of existing capabilities. The 'dream' 
of autonomous defence foundered together with Nakasone's draft version of the Fourth 
Defense Build-up Programme, while discussion of the maraka bi5eiron also ebbed. In 
the debate over what kind of defence policy Japan should develop for the 1970s it was 
essentially Kaihara' s viewpoint, stressing territorial defence over maritime force 
projection, that prevailed, although not to the extent that the MSDF was retrenched to a 
74 Kaihara Osamu, ' Jissai Mondai to shite Fukano', On the Sea-Lane Defense Problem in Dispute No. 2, 
Sekai no Kansen ('Ships of the World '), December 1982, pp 130-31. 
75 Ibid. p 133 . 
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coastal defence force. Domestic and external constraints were instrumental 111 this 
process, while bureaucratic politics and personalities were also important. 
After Nakasone left the JDA in mid-1971, the Agency suffered a succession of scandals 
and accidents, including the collision of an ASDF fighter and a passenger jet in July, 
which reinforced its disadvantaged position as a sub-ministerial organ within the 
government. Nakasone' s irmnediate successors at the JDA were short-lived in the post, 
less charismatic and either unable or unwilling to support the draft so closely associated 
with their predecessor, which was duly rejected by the National Defense Council. A 
less ambitious version put forward by the Agency was sent back and a third version, 
heavily trimmed by the MoF, was finally approved by the cabinet in October 1972. 
Neither Prime Minister Sato Eisaku' s administration, nor the successor government of 
Tanaka Kakuei had any wish to revisit the contro:7ersy generated at home and abroad by 
Nakasone' s draft plan, and defence was subordinated to higher policy priorities in the 
period 1972-75, including finalising the Okinawa reversion, normalisation of relations 
with the People's Republic of China and austerity induced by the OPEC Oil Crisis. 
Although Nakasone had been intensely conscious of the need to forge greater public 
support for the SDF, an agenda that he would also pursue as prime minister in the 
1980s, his attempts whilst at the JDA to propel policy ahead of popular and bureaucratic 
consensus heightened domestic divisions and aroused suspicions abroad. This 
experience demonstrated to the LDP leadership and civilian planners at the JDA that 
further increases in defence spending were politically unsupportable. 
Autonomous defence also failed to gain political backing because Sato was preoccupied 
with the Okinawa reversion, finalised in May 1972. In addition to the practical 
challenges of expanded tenitorial defence responsibilities, symbolically, the recovery of 
Okinawa boosted the confidence of Japanese leaders, for whom the return of the islands 
to rule from Tokyo had long been a priority and as such marked a watershed in the 
country's relationship with the United States. The security implications of the handover 
were addressed in the Joint Communique released by President Richard Nixon and 
Prime Minister Sato in January 1972. By explicitly linking Japan's security with Korea 
and Taiwan, and the role of US bases in Okinawa to maintaining the security of the 
region, the Co1nmunique alleviated Japanese decision-makers ' uncertainty about the 
future of the US security guarantee which, at the strategic level, had fanned official 
consideration of autonomous defence. Conversely, by re1noving ambiguities about the 
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freedom of US forces to operate out of bases in Okinawa, the Nixon-Sato Communique 
also settled US security concerns related to reversion, although local frictions caused by 
the heavy US presence on the island continue to complicate bilateral security relations 
in the early 21st century 76. However, the political triumph of Okinawa's return was 
only temporary for the Sato government, which quickly foundered under the weight of 
political scandals and fell from power only three months later. 
The incoming administration of Tanaka Kakuei, despite his own assertive brand of 
conservatism, was receptive to quantitative restrictions on Japan's defence capability, 
partly to stem opposition attacks over defence spending, which had continued to 
increase in the absence of a finally approved version of the Fourth Defence Build-up 
Plan. Moreover, China had emerged as a new foreign policy variable following 
President Nixon's 'shock' re-establishment of US-China relations in February 1972. 
China had been a vociferous critic of the Nakasone Plan and in October 1971, the 
official Peking Review signalled growing concern about Japan's ambitions to develop a 
naval presence in the Malacca Straits , alleging that the LDP had circulated an internal 
report on maritime defence including a reference to securing its "maritime lifeline" in 
the straits and to building up "the military strength to meet requirements". In response, 
Nakasone' s successor as JDA Director General reassured opposition parties in the Diet 
that it would be "inconceivable that MSDF craft could ever operate in the Straits of 
Malacca, let alone the Indian Ocean" 77 . 
In October 1972, while visiting Beijing to discuss normalisation with the People's 
Republic , Tanaka offered to impose an official limit on Japanese defence spending of 1 
per cent of GNP to Zhou Enlai , Mao Zedong 's foreign minister. On October 6, one 
week after returning from Beijing, Tanaka directed the JDA to draw up limits for 
'Defense Strength in Peacetime ' (heiwaji no boeiryoku), partly to allay Chinese 
concerns about Japan ' s defence build-up, as well as to draw the teeth of Diet opposition 
shortly before the cabinet was set to approve procurement plans for the Fourth Defense 
Build-up Plan. Neither Sato (Kishi Nobusuke's younger brother) nor Tanaka were 
considered natural 'doves', but both were led by domestic and external constraints to 
adopt moderate defence policy stances . When Tanaka was forced to step down over the 
76 Tokyo's tacit acceptance of the continuing use of Kadena air base for B-52 bombing missions over North 
Vietnam and Cambodia after reversion was part of the price for securing the return of Okinawa and the 
affirmation of the US security guarantee to Japan inherent in the Communique. 
77 Yaacov Y.I Vertzberger, Coastal States, Regional Powers, Superpowers and the Malacca-Singapore 
Straits, Institute of East Asian Studies Research Paper, University of California, 1984, p 64. 
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Lockheed co1Tuption scandal in late 197 4 he was succeeded by Prime Minister Miki 
Takeo, a moderate on defence by conviction, rather than convenience. His leadership 
and that of his successors, Fukuda Takeo and Ohira Masayoshi ensured that a 
favourable political climate was established in which a systematic review of defence 
policy to formalise the ad hoc moderate approach of the Sato and Tanaka 
administrations could be achieved. 
Jishu boei also ran into opposition from the ministries with influence concerning 
security policy. MOFA had cooperated with the JDA in 1969, in return for its 
assistance in brokering the teclu1ical aspects of the defence implications of the Okinawa 
handover with the US military, as a means of improving its bargaining position with the 
United States during negotiations over Okinawa78 . This cooperation ended once the 
Okinawa question was superseded by normalisation with China as the main diplomatic 
priority. However, the most trenchant opposition to an expansion of defence spending 
came fro1n the MoF79 . 
From its initial 1969 announcement of a planned Fourth Defense Build-up Plan until the 
release of Nakasone's draft plan in April 1970, the JDA had been careful to avoid 
releasing detailed cost estimates. However, as the plan was understood to require a 
doubling of defence expenditure, the MoF regarded jishu boei as a threat to its fiscal 
goal of maintaining defence spending within 1 per cent of GNP. In an indication of the 
influence which the Ministry exerted over the JDA, the MoF went as far as to issue a 
rebuttal to the strategic premise of the JDA' s proposals for expanding Japan's maritime 
defence, in 1969. The MoF advanced three specific counter-arguments: 
Firstly, the reversion of Okinawa did not justify the expansion of Japan 's defence 
capabilities, because "it is not conceivable at all that (a foreign power) will invade 
Japan through Okinawa" as long as U.S. forces remained there. 
Secondly, convoying was no longer effective, given the increase in Japan 's fuel 
consumption and the impossibility of directly protecting the number of tankers 
required to import an estimated 100 million tons of crude oil per year. 
78 
'To Strengthen Maritime Defense After Okinawa Reversion; JDA Explains to Foreign Ministry', Yoniiuri 
Shimbun, May 17, 1969, Daily Summary of the Japanese Press, US Embassy, Tokyo, May 1969. 
79 Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics and the Postwar Search for 
Autonomy, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, pp 59-62. 
Thirdly, the JDA's plans to defend maritime transportation meant exceeding the 
threshold of localised conflict outlined in the Third Defense Build-up Plan, because 
attacks on Japan's shipping lanes could be conducted remotely and were likely to 
involve foreign merchant ships, the defence of which would exceed the 
Constitutional mandate for self-defence80. 
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When the JDA released its 5.2 billion yen cost estimate for the Fourth Plan, in April 
1970, the MoF argued against any increase on the grounds that this exceeded the 
projected GNP growth rate. Ultimately, a diminished budget of 4.6 billion yen was 
agreed upon in October 197281. Defence spending nonetheless grew 17 per cent in 
1972-76, even as it continued to decline as a proportion of government spending, from 
7.0 to 6.2 per cent. However, a government-wide austerity programme ordered in the 
wake of the 1973 Oil Crisis subjected the defence budget to tighter controls as Japan 
was plunged into its first post-war recession in 1974 and the National Defense Council 
placed a freeze on defence acquisitions in December 197 5. 
Acquisitions slated for the MSDF as part of the final version of the Fourth Defense 
Build-up Plan included a total of 13 destroyers equipped with SAM, surface-to-surface 
missiles and helicopters, five submarines, a fleet support ship and 92 combat aircraft. 
However, at the end of fiscal 1976, owing to the procurement freeze, the MSDF lagged 
more than 30 per cent behind its acquisition targets. Only eight of the intended 13 
destroyers had been built and the MSDF' s plans to acquire its first supply ship had to be 
sacrificed82 . MSDF strength in August 1975 stood at 45 escort ships, 40 mine-
countermeasures craft, 35 patrol boats and 15 submarines, with vessels of all types 
amounting to less than 200,000 tons. 
VII. The National Defense Program1ne Outline (taikiJ). 
Reflecting the above confluence of factors, civilians within the JDA were well-placed to 
push a moderate agenda in the early 1970s. The most important of these was Kubo 
Takuya, head of the JDA Defense Policy Bureau from November 1970 to June 1974 and 
subsequently appointed Administrative Vice-Minister -- the top bureaucratic post in the 
agency. Kubo came to the Defence Agency from a police background, concerned that 
80 
'Finance Ministry Is Guarded Against Possible Increase in Defense Power in Course of Okinawa 
Reversion Negotiations ', Asahi Shinibun , May 23 , 1969, Daily Summary of the Japanese Press, US 
Embassy, Tokyo, May 1969 . 
81 Katahara Eichi . The Politics of Japanese Defence Policy Making, 1975-1989, unpublished PhD thesis, 
Griffith University, April 1990, p 133. 
82 Asahi Shinibun , August 28 , 1975 , p 2; and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 5, 1978, p l. 
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the incremental build up of SDF capabilities should not open-ended. Beginning in 
1971, he began circulating memos within the Agency written under a pseudonym, 
canvassing support for a strategic policy framework to guide defence policy beyond the 
scheduled completion of the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, in 197683 . Kubo's model of 
a Standard Defense Force Concept (kibanteki no boeiryoku koso) evolved gradually and 
was broadened through the input of civilian advisory groups to eventually underpin the 
1976 National Defense Programme Outline, or taiko, which served as the foundation of 
defence policy until its revision in 1995. 
In common with Nakasone, Kubo emphasised that an essential condition of an effective 
defence capability was to build domestic support for the SDF. He also perceived 
Japan's defence dile1mna to be peculiarly acute owing to lingering suspicions about 
Japanese militarism in the region, believing that any attempt by Japan to compensate for 
perceived vulnerability through an independent military build-up was liable to spur a 
regional arms race. Externally, Kubo determined that in a security context defined 
globally by superpower detente and regionally by the maintenance of the US-Japan 
security relationship, Japan's strategic environment was likely to remain benign. On 
this basis it was decided that the posture of the SDF could be premised on the 
probability that no major threats were likely to emerge within a ten-year time-frame. 
SDF capabilities could therefore be capped at approximately the levels already attained 
by the early 1970s without undermining security. Kaihara thought that the qualitative 
force levels detailed in the final, scaled-back version of the Fourth Defence Build-up 
Programme, subject to qualitative improvements in certain areas, were sufficient to 
provide a deterrent against "small-scale aggression" and to ensure the cooperation of the 
United States, upon which Japan would continue to rely for extended conventional and 
nuclear deterrence. 
Qualitatively, the Standard Defense Force Concept recommended improvements to SDF 
capabilities in neglected areas owing to the bias in past procurements towards frontline 
capabilities. Areas targeted for improvement included force readiness, survivability, 
logistical support and intelligence. Maintenance of a full surveillance and intelligence 
posture (dubbed 'a rabbit's ears'; usagi no niimi) was highlighted as pivotal to the 
credibility of a s1nooth "defence structure alteration potential in case of substantial 
geopolitical changes". Intelligence was one area of defence capability in which moves 
83 Katahara Eichi. The Politics of Japanese Def ence Policy Making, 1975-1989, unpublished PhD thesis , 
Griffith University, April 1990, pp 135-37. 
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towards greater defence self-reliance accelerated at a time when the build-up of 
frontline platforms was being de-emphasised84. 
Kubo' s first opportunity to incorporate the Standard Defense Force Concept into 
official defence policy came when Prime Minister Tanaka issued the 'Defense Strength 
in Peacetime' directive to the JDA in October 1972. The concept as announced in the 
Diet, on February 1, 1973, embodied most of the ideas in the Standard Defense Force 
Concept and outlined quantitative restrictions similar to force levels already achieved by 
the Ground and Air SDF: 
• GSDF: 5 armies, 13 divisions, 180,000 men; 
• ASDF: 3 regional air forces (8 wings); 1 composite wing, 800 aircraft; and 
• MSDF: 5 regional commands; 4-5 escort flotillas, 280,000 tons85 . 
However, the government was compelled to withdraw the Defense Strength in 
Peacetime shortly after the draft was put before the Diet, as neither the Socialists not the 
Communists were prepared to confer de facto recognition on the SDF as the price of 
approving quantitative limits on Japan's defence capabilities 86. It was not until the Miki 
administration came to power in Dece1nber 197 4 that a favourable political atmosphere 
was re-established. Promoted to JDA Vice-Minister in July 1975, Kubo received strong 
support from both Miki and his new Minister of State for Defense, Sakata Michita, who 
would remain in charge of the JDA for an unusually long period, from December 1974 
to December 1976. Between them, Kubo and Sakata presided over the task of drafting a 
replacement to the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, with an up-dated version of the 
Standard Defense Force Concept as its centre-piece. 
Under the guidance of Kubo and Sakata, parallel measures designed to build consensus 
behind the drafting of a successor plan were implemented. A broad-based civilian 
advisory panel, the 'Forum on Defense Issues' , was set up to widen participation in 
defence policy to include business leaders and academics such as Kosaka Masataka. 
The panel met several ti1nes between April and June 1975, its recommendations feeding 
into the Standard Defense Force Concept. The following June, to signal its commitment 
84 Defense of Japan 1977, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, p 57 . 
85 Linton Wells , 'The Sea and Japan ' s Strategic Interests 1975-1985 ', John Hopkins University PhD thesis , 
Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1975, p 203, footnote 15. 
86 Interview with Ito Kenichi , Mitsubishi Electric Corp, Tokyo, March 8, 1999. 
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to transparency, the JDA released its first defence white paper since 1970, resuming 
annual publication thereafter. 
The Standard Defense Force Concept was incorporated formally into Japan's defence 
policy with the adoption of the taiko by the National Defense Council, approved by the 
Miki cabinet on October 29, 1976. It identified four requirements to guide future 
defence capability: 
i) Japan should possess the assorted functions required for national defence, including 
logistical support, while maintaining a balanced structure of organisation and 
deployment. 
ii) A full surveillance posture should be maintained in peacetime. 
iii) Japan should be able to effectively deal with any situation up to the level of limited 
and small-scale aggression. 
iv) Japan should have a force structure capable of being "smoothly adapted" when 
required by a serious change in circumstances87 . 
Quantitative limits on frontline platforms and combat units, were set out in an Attached 
Table (beppyo) (Figure 13). 
87 Def ense of Japan 1977, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, p 53 ; and Defense of Japan 1995, 
Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, p 73. 
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Figure 13: The Attached Table of the 1976 National Defense Programme Outline 
(taiko) 
SDF Basic Units Main Equipment 
GSDF Regional Units 12 Divisions 
2 Combined Brigades 
Mobile Units 1 Armoured Division 
1 Artillery Brigade 
1 Airborne Brigade 
1 Training Brigade 
1 Helicopter Brigade 
Low Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile 8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
Groups 
(180,000 personnel in total) 
ASDF Aircraft Control & Warning 28 Groups 
Interceptor 10 Squadrons 
Support Fighter 3 Squadrons 
Air Reconnaissance 1 Squadron 
Air Transport 3 Squadrons 
Early Warning 1 Squadron 
High Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile 6 Groups 
Main Equipment: 
Combat Aircraft Approx. 430 
MSDF ASW Surface Ship Units (for mobile 4 Escort Flotillas 
operations) 
ASW Surface Ship Units (regional district 10 Divisions 
units) 
Submarine Units 6 Divisions 
Minesweeping Units 2 Flotillas 
Land-based ASW /Patrol aircraft 16 Squadrons 
Main Equipment: 
ASW Surface ships Approx. 60 ships 
Submarines 16 Submarines 
Combat Aircraft Approx. 220 
Source: Defense of Japan 1995, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, p 270. 
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i) Maritime capabilities under the taiko. 
Flowing largely from the operational requirements of its anti-submarine and rmne 
warfare missions, the MSDF structure set out in the taiko comprised four major areas: 
a) Four escort flotillas 88 , defined as basic, surface anti-submarine units for mobile 
operations, would be maintained to ensure that one would be operational at all times. 
b) A total of ten ship divisions would be deployed within Japan's five coastal defence 
districts, enabling one division per district to be on constant alert to carry out coastal 
surveillance, defence and anti-submarine operations. 
c) Submarine, ASW helicopter and mines weeping units would also be maintained. Six 
submarine divisions, each composed of two or three boats, would be assigned to 
conduct surveillance of important harbours and straits. The MSDF' s minesweeper force 
would be divided between coastal units under district-level command, and two flotillas 
assigned to cover the Sea of Japan. 
d) Land-based antisub1narine and patrol aircraft would conduct surveillance missions, 
patrol nearby seas and protect surface ships. 
To meet these operational requirements, relatively few changes in defence equipment 
were outlined, apart from the addition of two submarines and approximately ten 
ASW /maritime surveillance aircraft. The totals set out in the Attached Table allowed 
for approximately 60 escort destroyers, 16 sub1narines and 220 combat aircraft. In 
addition, the MSDF were authorised to possess around 40 offshore and coastal mine 
warfare ships as well as small numbers of amphibious landing ships and to acquire a 
fleet replenishment vessel. 
The taiko spelled an apparent victory for those who had sought quantitative limits 
against the incremental expansion of defence capability under the numbered defence 
plans without any accompanying strategic rationale. In other respects, the taiko was 
vague enough to allow for the open-ended qualitative enhancement of defence 
capability through the operation of smaller numbers of advanced platforms acquired 
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with "due consideration to qualitative improvements aimed at parity with the technical 
standards of other nations". Nor was a completion date specified, or spending guidelines 
laid down. As an added constraint to mollify the opposition parties, and in accordance 
with of one the main recommendations of the report issued by the Forum on Defense 
Issues in September 197_5, on November 5, the Miki administration added the weight of 
a cabinet resolution to a limit of 1 per cent of GNP ratio on defence spending, which 
had been observed unofficially since 1967. 
While the annual ratio of defence spending to GNP stayed at or below 0.90 per cent 
from 1976-79, annual defence budgets continued to increase by an average of 12.5 per 
cent during this period as the economy rebounded from the Oil Crisis. However, the 1 
per cent ceiling helped to neutralise political opposition, enabling the government to 
treat defence policy increasingly as a budgetary issue to be delegated for technical 
management within the JDA without engendering the kind of parliamentary controversy 
that had attended the Fourth Defence Build-up Programme. 
ii) Post-taiko maritime capabilities. 
During the formulation of the Taiko, the most keenly debated question related to SDF 
force structure was whether the MSDF should have four or five escort flotillas. The 
MSDF maintained that a fifth escort flotilla was necessary, to enable it permanently to 
assign one flotilla to the Sea of Japan. Given overhaul and crew-rotation requirements, 
it was argued that a fifth flotilla would provide a reserve capability guaranteeing the 
MSDF' s ability to maintain two flotillas at high readiness and allow it simultaneously to 
cover the Sea of Japan and Japan's Pacific _approaches 89. The view of the JDA civilian 
internal bureaux was that four escort flotillas already provided sufficient coverage. The 
failure of MSDF officers and civilian JDA officials to agree upon force structure had 
resulted in the compromise formula of 4-5 escort groups when the Defense Capability in 
Peacetime was a1u1ounced in February 1973. However, during the drafting of the taiko, 
the MSDF' s preference for a fifth flotilla was included in the draft version of the 
Attached Table. Although Prime Minister Tanaka indicated support for a fifth flotilla, 
according to a senior JDA official at the time, this was resisted by both the JDA and 
MoF90 . The strongest resistance came from the MoF, which led to the number of escort 
88 Each flotilla is typically composed eight escort destroyers equipped with ASW helicopters (Norman 
Levin, Mark Lorell, Arthur Alexander, The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese Security 
Policies, Rand, Santa Monica, 1993, p 51). 
89 Tokyo Shimbun, March 2, 1974, Daily Summary of the Japanese Press, March 1974, US Embassy, 
Tokyo, p 14. ' 
90 Interview with Ito Kenichi, Mitsubishi Electric Corp, Tokyo, March 8, 1999. 
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flotillas in the final version of the Attached Table being revised down to four. Since 
1976, this has remained the basic force structure of the Self-Defense Fleet91. 
In contrast to the Third and Fourth Defense Build-up Plans, the taiko contained no 
reference to the protection of maritime transportation, although reference to the defence 
of sea routes out to 1,000 nautical miles was included in materials used by the drafters 
of the taiko 92 . In the final version of the taiko, the responsibilities outlined for the 
MSDF emphasised operations in coastal areas and nearby seas, including surveillance 
and patrol, defence of harbours, straits and surface ship protection. Within the 
quantitative limits outlined in the Attached Table, now measured by numbers of vessel 
types rather than aggregate tonnage, the MSDF would still be able to operate a sizeable 
ocean-going surface fleet, but short of the scale and vessel types required to project 
power along the lines Sekino had advocated five years previously. 
The taiko encouraged the MSDF and its fellow service arms to shift the emphasis of 
their defence planning away from quantitative expansion as well as promoting a better 
balance between frontline equipment and previously neglected areas such as logistics, 
readiness and intelligence. Qualitative modernisation left open the route for a 
succession of new weapons systems approved in the late 1970s including most 
importantly, the P-3C, which represented a quantum leap over the P-2J anti-submarine 
patrol aircraft93 . In 1979, the first of four new 8,500-ton Towada-class fleet-underway-
replenishment-vessels was commissioned into service, extending the Self Defense 
Fleet's capability to undertake sustained blue water operations 94 . , Similar capability 
leaps were achieved by the ASDF through acquisition of the E-2C Airborne Early 
Warning (AEW) aircraft and the F-15 fighter95 . Over the 20-year lifetime of the taiko, 
Japan's maritime air and defence capabilities improved far beyond the scope envisioned 
in 1976. 
91 Waga Kuni ni okeru Boeiryoku Seibi no Keika , 1982, p 88, 
92 Interview with Hoshuyama Noburo , former JDA Director, Defense Facilities Administration Agency, 
Adviser, Kyoei Life Insurance, Tokyo, March 11 , 1999 . 
93 Of all the weapons systems acquired by the SDF after the Taiko , the P-3C -- approved in December 1978 
-- demonstrated that a quantum leap in capability could be achieved within the equipment ceilings outlined 
in 1976. In contrast to the far more limited P-2J, each P-3C could patrol an area equivalent to Shikoku 
island and monitor all convergence zones under ideal conditions. 
94 Peter J Woolley and Mark S. Woolley, 'Japan 's Sea Lane Defense Revisited ', Strategic Review, Fall 
1996, p 50. 
95 Although the E-2C was designed as a naval platform to give US carrier battle groups an organic AEW 
capability, the ASDF fo ught for and gained control over the programme, following the undetected incursion 
. of a defecting Soviet MiG-25, on September 6, 1976, which landed at Hakodate, Hokkaido , exposing the 
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Despite the defeat of its ambitions to add a fifth flotilla to the Self Defense Fleet and the 
apparent primacy attached to an anti-invasion role within the taik6, the MSDF in other 
ways carried on with little overall change. The disposition of its major fleet units at 
Y okosuka and Kure underscored a continued southward-oriented focus on Pacific 
operations at odds with the growth of Soviet naval strength in the Sea of Japan96 . 
Despite not being able to offer credible resistance against "even a moderate air threat", 
the MSDF surface fleet continued to organise itself around 'escort ships' (goeikan) 
grouped into escort flotillas (goeikantai) that were configured for a blue-water role, 
rather than coastal operations in which MSDF planners had little interest97 . While the 
taik6 aligned official defence policy closer to Kaihara' s coastal defence blueprint, the 
MSDF exploited the ainbiguity of the taik6 as a document to continue equipping and 
training towards maintaining its blue water capabilities and skills, and preserving the 
core of a potentially expanded future navy. The roles and blue water capabilities of the 
MSDF were substantially expanded in the 1980s to encompass a sea lane defence role. 
However, as is explored in the Chapter Five, the focus would be alliance cooperation 
rather than the pursuit of an autono1nous capability. 
VIII. Rising sea lane threat perceptions. 
Even as the taik6 was being implemented, doubts about the strategic premises on which 
it was based began to surface. In particular, the build-up of maritime capabilities in the 
Soviet Far East prompted concern over the security of Japan's sea lanes at both official 
and private levels. The 1977 defence white paper featured several references to the 
importance of sea lanes to Japan's security, mainly in the context of US global strategy. 
In its international section, the white paper noted that "one of the fundamental reasons 
behind the build-up of the Soviet navy is believed to be the creation of a challenge to 
the Western powers' control of the sea, particularly through the capability to prevent 
supply and reinforcement from the US mainland by blockading the maritime traffic 
lanes". As a result of improve1nents in Soviet capabilities, the JDA concluded that "the 
safety of the sea and air lanes from the U.S. mainland is being jeopardised" and that in 
this context "there is a renewed recognition among Western nations that their closer 
cooperation with the United States is of critical importance for maintenance and 
strengthening of their defence capabilities"98 . The white paper described the "sea traffic 
shortcomings in Japan's air defence readiness (Defense of Japan 1977, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times , 
Tokyo, pp 126-140). 
96 Of the MSDF' s five bases only Maizuru gives direct access to the Sea of Japan . 
97 Linton Wells, The Sea and Japan 's Strateg ic Interests 1975-1985, John Hopkins University PhD thesis, 
Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1975 , p 201. 
98 Defense of Japan 1977, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times , Tokyo, p 14. 
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blockade capability" of the Soviet Pacific submarine fleet as a "matter of concern to the 
national security of J apan"99 . 
Map 6: JDA schematic for Marine Surface Defense, 1977 
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Source: Defense of Japan, 1977, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo, Japan, p 66. 
Outlining MSDF roles as part of the Standard Defense Force Concept, the white paper 
included an inset diagram depicting 'ocean lane protection ' along two southwesterly 
and southeasterly axes (See Map 6). While the radius for Pacific maritime patrol 
aircraft was set by the JDA at 300 nautical miles from the Pacific coast and 100-200 
nautical miles in the Sea of Japan, in addition, one squadron would be deployed "to 
99 Ibid. pp 12-29. 
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each of the ocean and coastal sea lanes when the necessity for ship protection arises"100. 
Further proof that the protection of the nanto and nansei korotai was still extant as an 
MSDF mission, despite being absent from the taiko, came in November 1977, when 
Defense Agency Director General Mihara Asao said in testimony before the House of 
Councillors that "Japan was ready to exercise the right of self-defense generally within 
500 miles from its coasts and in important sea lanes within 1,000 miles -- around Saipan 
to the southeast and Taiwan to the southwest" 101 . 
The 1977 white paper also included a section dedicated to "Japan and Sea 
Corrununication", e1nphasising potential threats to sea lanes and the necessity of 
protecting marine transportation -- "the lifeline of Japan" -- in a general context of trade 
and import dependence as well as the 1973 Oil Crisis "which shook Japan's economic 
and social systems to their very foundations" 102. Although aircraft, ship-to-ship missiles 
and 1nines were all identified as tln·eats to 1narine traffic, the white paper highlighted 
sub1narines as "the greatest menace". 
Noting that "it is impossible for Japan alone to guarantee the safety of maritime 
shipping throughout the vast oceans", the JDA identified a particular need to upgrade 
Japan's ASW capability, in order to "promote confidence in the J apan-U.S. security 
system, the basis of Japanese defense". The JDA' s analysis of potential sea lane 
tlu-eats, although couched in terms of heightened economic vulnerability to supply 
disruptions as a result of the Oil Crisis, was, from the viewpoint of alliance politics, 
partly a reaction to growing US pressure on Japan to boost the level of its ASW 
capability. The stress placed by the JDA on submarine tln·eats to Japan's sea 
communications appeared also in the context of subsequent sections of the white paper 
given over to explaining the "need for deployment of (a) follow-on ASW aircraft" and 
were thus partially aimed at preparing the ground for the pending replacement to the 
ageing P-2J, with the more expensive and far more capable P-3C. 
Perceptions of Japan's potential vulnerability to co1nmerce disruption were in evidence 
elsewhere. The Oil Crisis and instability in Iran in the late 1970s "brought heated 
debates on the vulnerability of the sea-lanes and communication between the Middle 
100 Ibid. p 66. 
101 Mihara was replying to a question on Japan's ability to protect shipping in the Malacca Straits , an 
exercise that the IDA chief stressed was still beyond both the MSDF' s constitutional mandate and level of 
capability. ('Japan Shipping Defenseless in Malacca Strait ', The Japan Times , November 16, 1977, p 4). 
102 Defense of Japan 1977, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times , Tokyo, pp 100-01. 
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East and Japan"103. In June 1977, an advisory defence report, Alternative Force 
Structure of Japan's Defence Force, drawn up by the defence commentator, Sakanaka 
Tomohisa, concluded "In the light of its reliance on imports of food, energy and raw 
materials, the threat posed by inten-upting the flow of raw materials to Japan would be 
more serious than a military threat". The report concluded that while a general anti-
shipping offensive against Japan was improbable: 
"the fact remains that Japan's weakness against this form of attack is conceded by 
nearly all analysts, whether they support or oppose an escort role for the MSDF. 
Initial losses would be heavy since the submarine fleets would probably be 
deployed prior to hostilities, and convoy systems could not be organised 
immediately. These sinkings, particularly if they included a few supertankers, 
would have great psychological impact" 104. 
The report noted that Japan's vulnerability to blockade depended partly on non-military 
measures such as stockpiling, austerity controls and resource substitution. Moreover, 
the military task of protecting Japan's maritime commerce unaided in a sustained anti-
shipping campaign was something Sakanaka regarded as beyond the capabilities of the 
MSDF. However, against the apparent impossibility of the military task, so long as the 
United States was committed to Japan's defence, preparing to secure at least a portion 
of the country's ocean-going imports would be "worthwhile" given that the objective 
would be merely to ensure Japan's survival until the conflict could be terminated. 
Sakanaka stressed that Japan was at a strategic advantage, first, because Soviet naval 
forces based at Vladivostok were geographically hemmed in; and second, by the belief 
that the cumulative attrition of Japan's ASW efforts could be expected incrementally to 
degrade the submarine tlu·eat105 . 
Like Sekino, Sakanaka also emphasised Japan's peculiar vulnerability to anti-shipping 
attacks in view of national psychology, perceived economic vulnerability and the 
memory of the wartime blockade as the "the most single decisive factor in the collapse 
of the Japanese economy". In the light of international awareness of these factors, a 
103 Eto Shinkichi . 'Japanese Perception of National Threats', in Charles Morrison (ed.) Threats to Security 
in East Asia-Pacific, Pacific Forum/Lexington Books, Lexington Massachusetts, 1983, p 54. 
104 Sakanaka Tomohisa. Altemative Force Structure of Japan's Self Defence Force, Unpublished draft 
provided by the author, June 1977, pp 30-40. 
105 Allowing for crew rotation, repairs and the prio1ity accorded to protecting the Soviet Far Eastern fleet of 
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), it was estimated in the late 1970s that only around 20 
conventional and nuclear attack submarines would be assigned to the SLOC interdiction mission in the 
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potential enemy might view low-level sporadic attacks on Japanese ships or ships bound 
for Japan as a low-cost, low-risk means to undermine morale and create uncertainty over 
the US alliance commitment, aimed ultimately at neutralising Japan during a period of 
heightened tension, or non-nuclear conflict, between the superpowers 1°6. 
Conclusion. 
Between systemic pressures on Japan as an independent actor within the international 
system and constraints developed at the level of domestic politics, the single most 
important influence on the formation of Japan's defence and security policies after 1945 
was the bilateral security link with the United States. After 1950, US pressure on Japan 
to engage in limited rearmament was the key factor in the re-constitution of armed 
forces. The US security guarantee also afforded Japan's post-war leaders the strategic 
space ( or "greenhouse", to use Hellman's metaphor107) in which to concentrate on 
economic growth and develop a minimal approach to defence policy through formal and 
normative constraints that limited the size, power and legal utility of the SDF. 
While the redrawing of its borders and reliance on the United States for external 
security simplified the dynamics of Japan's maritime defence, the post-war expansion of 
Japan's international trade increased its potential vulnerability to blockade. 
Notwithstanding their relatively sanguine views about the military threats posed by the 
Soviet Union, post-war leaders such as Yoshida appreciated the particular importance of 
US naval protection to Japan's security and were more sympathetic to the creation of 
Japanese maritime forces than ground forces. Senior MSDF officers, business leaders 
and politicians -- some of them drawn from the ranks of former Imperial Navy --
regarded the defence of SLOC as a core mission for the MSDF, given Japan's status as 
a 1na j or trading power and the world's largest importer of energy resources. As Sekino 
indicated, the desire to acquire independent naval capability also reflected doubts 
among MSDF officers about US willingness to extend extra-ten-itorial security 
guarantees to Japanese shipping. 
Among those who favoured expanding the MSDF into a fully fledged great power navy, 
as well as those who sought merely to build public support for the government's 
Western Pacific (Nishijima Ryoichi, 'Participation of Maritime Self-Defense Forces in RIMPAC ', Asia 
Pacific Community, No . 7, Winter 1980, pp 49-50. 
106 Sakanaka Tomohisa, Alternative Force Structure of Japan 's Self Defence Force, Unpublished draft, June 
1977, p 39-40. 
107 Donald C. Hellmann, in Clesse, Inoguchi, Keehn and Stockwin (eds), The Vitality of Japan : Sources of 
National Strength and Weakness, St Antony's Press, Oxford, 1997, p 184. 
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defence policy, there was a common recognition that the rationale of protecting Japan ' s 
commercial shipping lanes, with its appeal to 'defensive defence' and compatibility 
with economically defined norms of security and perceptions of vulnerability, was an 
elegant and useful device towards overcoming the controversy surrounding all aspects 
of Japan's post-war maritime rearmament. The defence of the nation's sea lanes, while 
having a popular resonance matched by few other potential justifications for the Self 
Defense Forces, was also sufficiently vague and malleable to lend itself to a justification 
for most aspects of the MSDF' s force structure and operations. For similar reasons, 
examined more closely in the following chapter, sea lane defence was also useful to the 
United States as a rationale for deepening naval cooperation with Japan, given its 
interest in utilising the MSDF' s complementary capabilities in ASW and mine warfare, 
and towards countering the legal barriers to inter-operability imposed by the 
Constitution and the Cabinet Legislative Office's 'ban' on collective self defence. 
Despite Nakasone's plans to pursue autonomous defence, Japan's defence build-up was 
led back onto a minimalist path in the 1970s by the enduring quality of constraints 
reinforced at systenric, alliance and domestic levels. The JDA' s flirtation with 'self-
reliance' provoked political dissent from constitutional pacifists, challenged the growth-
oriented priorities of the MoF, and was ultimately subordinate to such foreign policy 
goals as the nonnalisation of relations with China. The adoption of the taiko reflected 
the ascendance of the minimalist vision supported by Kaihara, Kubo and Sakata over 
the a1nbitions of Nakasone and naval advocates represented by Sekino to pursue a 
policy of naval expansion that would have voided the constraints inherent in the 
Yoshida Doctrine. However, the basic ambiguity of the taiko, a characteristic which it 
shared with 1nost other aspects of defence policy in the 1945-77 period that were 
designed to appease both pro- and anti-defence critics , also rendered its constraining 
function vulnerable to reinterpretation once strategic conditions changed in the late 
1970s and 1980s. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Sea Lane Defence and Alliance Cooperation: 1977-90 
Introduction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the decision-making process that propelled sea 
lane defence to the forefront of Japan's defence policy and alliance relations during the 
1980s. Following on from the model of post-war drivers and constraints presented in 
Chapter Four, the major policy-making variables are considered at the levels of Japan's 
interaction within the international system, the US-Japan Alliance, and Japanese 
domestic politics. The same questions that framed Chapter Four pertain equally to this 
chapter. First, how did perceptions of Japan's strategic vulnerability to the disruption of 
sea lanes drive decision-makers' responses in defence and alliance policy? Second, to 
what extent were such concerns employed 'politically' as a rationale to legitimise the 
existence and force structure of the Self Defense Forces (SDF). 
In addition, this chapter seeks specifically to explore the decision-making process that 
led to Prin1e Minister Sukuki Zenko's 'pledge ' to the United States, in May 1981, that 
Japan would defend its sea lanes to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles (nm) and how this 
shaped policy under his administration and that of his successor, Nakasone Yasuhiro. 
Particular emphasis is placed on developments at the level of late-Cold War US military 
strategy and alliance politics as factors determining the modernisation of SDF 
capabilities and Japan ' s deepening military integration within the Alliance. In terms of 
domestic politics, the i1nportance of Nakasone's role as an active backer of alliance 
cooperation and increased defence spending is stressed. At a transnational level of 
decision-making, attention is also drawn to the role played by Maritime Self Defense 
Force (MSDF) officers, served by their transnational links to the US military, in 
advancing sea lane defence as an issue demanding the attention of more reluctant 
civilian leaders, such as Suzuki, that was instrumental to overcoming domestic 
constraints on the SDF. 
The chapter briefly sets out Suzuki ' s 1981 statement on sea lane defence, before 
charting shifts in the global strategic balance and changes in US strategy from the late 
1960s, demonstrating how these increased Japan' s strategic importance to the United 
States. The process that led to Suzuki ' s comments is then analysed in detail, with 
reference to shifts in Japan' s own t~ireat perceptions during the 1970s. The Nakasone 
government's embrace of sea lane defence as a rationale for alliance cooperation and 
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force modernisation is then explored, with an analysis of Japan' s involvement in the 
'Tanker War' during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq conflict. 
I. Suzuki's sea lane defence 'pledge'. 
On May 8, 1981 , following his summit meeting with President Ronald Reagan in 
Washington, Prime Minister Suzuki gave a press conference at the National Press Club. 
Asked about the extent of Japan ' s defence commitments, Suzuki stated: 
"It is natural for Japan to defend its surrounding waters, which is (sic) our 
country 's back-yard. We will strengthen our defence capability in order to defend 
several hundred miles of surrounding waters and the sea lanes to a distance of 
1,000 nautical miles" 1• 
The reference to defending sea lanes out to 1,000 nm attracted immediate attention from 
US officials. The Joint Communique released earlier, while affirming a Japanese 
commitment to boost defence efforts in surrounding sea and airspace, had not included 
any attempt to define Japan's defence responsibilities beyond the extent of its territory. 
While Suzuki subsequently denied having made anything beyond a non-binding 
statement of intent at the press conference, the 'Suzuki pledge' propelled the issue of sea 
lane defence to the political forefront of alliance cooperation and J ~pan's defence policy 
over the following decade. In this process, changes in US strategy since the late 1960s 
provided the catalyst for a corresponding shift in Japanese perceptions. 
II. Shifts in US strategy. 
Shifts in US strategy and the relative decline of US power from the late 1960s onwards 
led to an increase in burden-sharing pressure upon Japan in which naval cooperation and 
sea lane defence emerged as key priorities. During the late 1960s, assumptions about 
the economic and 1nilitary superiority of the United States that had underpinned Pax 
Americana were progressively challenged. A perceived decline in US power, as 
demonstrated by the failure to achieve a military victory in Vietnam, was judged in 
strategic terms against the Soviet Union and also economically vis-a-vis US allies in 
Europe and Asia. Popular and Congressional opposition to the war in Vietnam, feeding 
into the 1973 War Powers Act, also raised questions, political willingness aside, about 
the legal freedom of US policymakers to conduct future armed interventions overseas. 
1 Sekai Keizai Johou Service, Japanese-American Relations and Comprehensive Security, Research Insti tute 
for Peace and Secmity, Tokyo, 1986, p 15; and Watanabe Akio (ed.), Sengo Nihon no Shushotachi (Japan's 
Postwar Prime Ministers), Chu o Koronsba, Tokyo, 1995, p 327. 
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The Nixon Doctrine, announced in Guam in July 1969, was designed to lessen the 
burden of US troop commitments across Asia by encouraging Washington' s allies to 
assume the "primary responsibility" of providing the manpower for their defence. Apart 
from a sizeable Army commitment to be maintained in South Korea, the US post-
Vietnam military presence in East Asia was hencefo1ih to be re-configured to an 
'offshore' strategy reliant on forward-deployed air and sea power, for which the 
predominantly Japan-based US Seventh Fleet would be the crux. The shift from a 'two-
and-a-half war' to a 'one-and-a-half war' force-sizing concept was accompanied by a 
major drawdown of US conventional forces in Asia2. While US allies in Asia would 
have to contribute more towards their conventional defence under the Nixon Doctrine, 
Washington would continue exclusively to provide strategic nuclear deterrence to its 
allies in the region. Outlining his Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, Secretary of Defense 
Melvin Laird wrote in 1971 that "we do not intend to be the policeman of the world ... it 
is realistic and more effective that the burden of protecting peace and freedom should be 
shared more fully by our allies and friends". Noting that "in escort ships, our friends 
and allies around the world possess a greater number than we do", Laird stated: 
Therefore it is one of our goals for the 1970s that our Atlantic and Pacific allies 
should provide a major contribution to protecting the convoys that in war would be 
carrying material for their sustenance3. 
Also underlying the Nixon administration's willingness to reduce US military 
commitments on the Asian continent was its recognition of the Sino-Soviet split. 
Exposure of the split paved the way for the Nixon administration's diplomatic opening 
to China in 1971, which exploded the founding premise of pre-Vietnam strategy for the 
Far East, which had been based on the containment of a monolithic Communist threat. 
For the remainder of the Cold War, US-China relations would increasingly take on the 
character of a quasi-alliance against the Soviet Union, while the diversion of Soviet 
conventional and nuclear strength to counter China helped to transform the US strategic 
position positively in Asia and globally. Even as the perceived threat of monolithic 
communism receded and relations with the Soviet Union warmed during the Detente 
period, US military planners beca1ne progressively concerned that the nuclear and 
conventional balance was tilting in Moscow's favour. A rise in Soviet political 
influence in the Middle East, East Africa and Southeast Asia was seen to be backed by a 
2 Robert Komer, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense?, University Press of America/ Abt Books, 
Lanham, 1984, p 16. 
3 James E. Auer, 'Japan 's Maritime Self-Defense Force: An Appropriate Maritime Strategy?', Naval War 
College Review, Vol. 24, No.4, December 1971 , p 16. 
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growing ability to project conventional forces and to conclude basing agreements. As a 
result, areas previously thought of as discrete regions of Cold War confrontation and 
proxy conflicts came to be regarded as inter-related military ' theatres' of global 
superpower competition. 
Within the US Pacific Command, concern at the modernisation of Soviet strategic and 
conventional forces in the Far East was accentuated by the post-Vietnam retrenchment 
of US conventional forces in Asia and declining defence budgets 4. Soviet naval power 
projection was noted with particular alarm in the predominantly maritime environment. 
Beginning in the early 1970s, Delta-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines 
(SSBNs) capable of launching long-range Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles 
(SLBMs) on the Continental United States from Soviet waters were introduced into the 
Northern and Pacific fleets. Under the 'bastion' concept, Soviet long-range ballistic 
missile submarines were deployed to adjoining semi-enclosed seas in order to take 
advantage of natural geography that lent itself to the creation of layered air and sea 
defences designed to protect a Soviet second-strike capability against US counter-
measures5. The Soviet Pacific Fleet, charged with establishing an eastern bastion (to 
complement the pri1nary Barents Sea bastion of the Northern Fleet) in the remote Sea of 
Okhotsk (see Map 7, below), expanded at a faster rate than the other Soviet fleets. Its 
aggregate tonnage rose from around 700,000 tons to 1,200,000 tons between 1967 and 
1976, including some 40 nuclear-powered submarines6. Defences layered concentrically 
around the Sea of Okhotsk bas tion included radar and acoustic surveillance sites 
installed on Sakhalin and the Kuriles and the forward basing of a MiG-23 interceptor 
squadron and an anti-ship missile battery on three of the four islands disputed with 
Japan. 
4 
'An Interview with CINCPAC, Admiral Robert L. J. Long ', Sea Power, Vol. 26, No. 8, July 1983. 
5 Geoffrey Jukes , Russia 's Military and the Northern Territories Issue , SDSC Working Paper No. 227, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canbena, 1993, pp 7-9 . 
6 The Soviet Pacific Fleet was assigned responsibility for 35 per cent of the Soviet strategic submarine force 
and the second most important strategic mission in the Soviet Navy. However, according to Captain 
Nakanishi Kenj i, the Soviet Pacific Fleet acquired new models only 2-3 years after these had been 
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Map 7: The Sea of Okhotsk and the Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles 
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In addition to the build-up of Soviet attack submarines, the potential threat from long-
range strike aviation operating from airfields in the Soviet Far East from the mid-1970s 
onwards came to dominate US naval threat perceptions in the Pacific 7. The aerial threat 
to US aircraft carriers was rendered more acute once the Tu-22M Backfire, with a 
introduced into the Northern Fleet. (Interview with Capt Nakanishi Kenji, Research Department, Maritime 
Staff College, March 4, 2002). 
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supersonic combat radius of 1,000 nm and armed with the Kh-22 Kitchen long-range 
anti-ship cruise missile, began overflying the Sea of Japan and conducting simulated 
runs on US carrier battle groups, "adding a new dimension to the threat to the sea lanes 
in this area"8. By the mid-1970s, US Chief of Naval Operations James L. Holloway was 
warning Congress that the Soviet maritime build-up in the Far East meant that US sea 
lines of communication (SLOC) west of Hawaii could no longer be guaranteed9. Similar 
concerns were expressed by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Admiral Maurice Weisner: 
'The gradual expansion of the Soviet navy has coincided with an ebb in the American 
ability to expand its efforts on the front lines of the western Pacific to an all-time low. 
In the event of emergency, there is probably only a fifty-fifty chance that the United 
States would be able to supply and communicate with American troops in Asia and the 
Pacific in the initial stages of war ' 10 . 
The Soviet Union ' s involvement in the Horn of Africa and increased Soviet naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean, including access to the Yemeni port of Aden, suggested to 
US naval planners that the Soviet Union intended to develop "unprecedented power-
projection capability into the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions ... ai1ned at developing a 
two-front war-fighting capability in Europe and East Asia" ll. To increase its coverage 
of the Indian Ocean, where Soviet naval activities had increased steadily since 1968, the 
US Navy developed a variant of its strategy to 'swing' naval forces from the Pacific to 
the Atlantic. While responsibility for the Arabian Sea was shared between the 
Mediterranean-based Sixth Fleet and the Pacific-based Seventh Fleet, this burden fell 
disproportionately on the Seventh Fleet during the closure of the Suez Canal, in 1967-
75. 
Even as Seventh Fleet responsibilities were being extended, the fleet was being cut back 
to pre-Vietnam levels , based around two aircraft carrier battle groups , totalling 550,000 
tons 12. By 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger reported to Congress that US 
naval force levels in the Pacific had fallen to around half their level in 1965 13 . During 
the 1970s, several international crises in the Indian Ocean basin prompted reactive 
7 From the 1960s onwards, US carrier battle groups transiting the Pacific were regularly intercepted by pairs 
of Tu-95 bombers, in an area refen ed to as the 'Bear Box', extending approximately 1,000 nm east of Japan. 
8 CINCPAC Admiral Robert Long, Address to the Navy League, October 28, 1982, USIS Official Text, 
December 3, 1982. 
9 Cited in 'An Interview with CINCPAC, Admiral Robert L. J. Long', Sea Power, Vol. 26, No. 8, July 1983. 
10 Statement by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Admiral Mamice Weisner, Asahi Shinibun, August 28, 1978. 
11 Herbert Lee, 'US Stresses Allies Roles in Sea Lane Secwity', USICA Backgrounder, November 9, 1982. 
12 Fred Ikle, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; statement before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, 10 June, 1982; USICA Official Text, June 15, 1982. 
13 Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress FY 1983 Budget, February 8, 1982, II-30. 
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deployments of US carrier battle groups through the Straits of Malacca, including the 
1971 Inda-Pakistan War, the 1973 Yorn Kippur War and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. 
Most importantly of all, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 was seen 
by some Western strategists as evidence of Soviet intentions to fulfil the czarist-era 
objective of acquiring an outlet onto the Indian Ocean. By the spring of 1980, when Iran 
and Iraq were also at war, the United States had two carrier battle groups deployed 
around the Arabian Sea and was upgrading logistic suppo11 facilities on the mid-Indian 
Ocean island of Diego Garcia in support of a semi-permanent naval presence in the 
region. 
With the withdrawal of most UK forces west of Suez, Washington believed that of its 
allies in the Pacific, only Australia and Japan were capable of counting in the naval 
balance. Fearing that the stretching of Seventh Fleet coverage to the Arabian Sea had 
left gaps in US military coverage of the Western Pacific, the Pentagon looked 
particularly to Japan, highly dependent on Middle Eastern oil and owner of the largest 
merchant fleet in the world, to contribute naval forces directly to Indian Ocean patrols or 
to compensate locally for the reduced Seventh Fleet presence around Japanese waters. 
US references to Japan's security stake in the Indian Ocean are evident as far back as 
Defense Secretary Laird's comments in March 1971 that: 
The Russians have a greater (Indian Ocean) presence there than we do . It is of 
concern to the US of course. It should also be of interest to Japan, and I have told 
the Japanese that it should be so 14. 
By 1975, US officials had narrowed their preference for Japanese defence cooperation to 
three functions in the Northwest Pacific, namely: 
• securing maritime transpo11ation; 
• strengthening antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability; and 
• improving air defence15 . 
In addition to invoking Japan 's dependence on the security of its oil routes through the 
Indian Ocean as a means to pressure Tokyo to boost its level of maritime defence 
capability, US officials also expressed concern at the failure of the MSDF to meet its 
14 Quoted in Bhabani Sen Gupta, T.T. Poulose, Hemlata Bhatia, The Malacca Straits and the Indian Ocean: 
A Study of the Strategic and Legal Aspects of a Controversial Sea-lane, Macmillan, ew Delhi, 1974, pp 
63-64. 
15 Asahi Shimbun, August 27 , 1975. 
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procurement targets under the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan. These remained frozen 
under fiscal austerity controls imposed by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) at 45 esco11 
ships, 15 submarines and 40 mine-sweepers. Based on a Japan Defense Agency (JDA) 
1974 estimate of Soviet Pacific Fleet strength (at 8 cruisers, 54 destroyers, 31 nuclear 
and 63 diesel submarines), the Maritime Staff Office believed that the MSDF had less 
than half the level of ASW capability required to secure sea areas around Japan. The 
director of the JDA' s Defence Policy Bureau, Maruyama Subaru, stated in April 1975 
that "even if the MSDF' s four escort fleets are modernised, and ... reach 250,000 tons, it 
is difficult to expect them to ensure perfection in the protection of maritime transport in 
the sea areas around our country" 16. ASW exercises conducted off Oshima in that year 
also repo11edly exposed shortcomings in the MSDF' s ASW operations 17. 
Despite the close personnel linkages and regular bilateral exercises between the MSDF 
and US Navy, no formal framework for bilateral defence cooperation existed. In its 
absence, consultations described as study meetings were held between senior US and 
Japanese staff officers in late 1974 and January 1975 to discuss an operational 
framework for defence cooperation in the event of an "emergency". Participants 
included the Chairman of the SDF Joint Staff Council and the Commander of US 
Forces, Japan18. US military officials proposed that the MSDF should "share, together 
with the US Navy, the defense of the maritime transportation line, which is the life-line 
for the Japanese economy"19. In May 1975, as Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General George Brown testified to Congress highlighting US expectations that Japan 
should raise the level of its ASW capability, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger 
suggested that Japan should make the protection of sea lanes a priority in addition to 
territorial defence20. With the memory of the 1973 Oil Crisis still fresh, US statements 
began to achieve the desired effect on key figures within Japan's ruling pa11y, with 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Vice-Secretary Shiina declaring: 
"Most of Japan's resow·ces, in the case of oil 99 per cent (sic) pass from the Persian 
Gulf through the Indian Ocean through the Malacca and then Taiwan Strait on their 
way to Japan. Any minor disruption, even an isolated terrorist incident, would 
have a major impact on Japan ' s energy picture. Defence is not limited to territorial 
16 Asahi Shim,bun, April 2, 1975, p 3. 
17 Yomiuri Shimbun , August 29, 1975 . 
18 Asahi Shimbun , August 24, 1975. 
19 Mainichi Shimbun , August 27, 1975, p l. 
20 Tsunoda Jun, 'Japanese Security Problems and Perspectives in the Late 1970s ', Orbis, Vol. 24, No. 3, Fall 
1975, pp 884-885. 
integrity alone. We must also consider how to defend Japan 's interests as they 
exist in tankers at sea"21 . 
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Opposition parties expressed concerns that as a result of increasing foreign pressure 
(gaiatsu), MSDF and Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF) capabilities would not only be 
increased, but that esco11 operations could be extended geographically far beyond 
te1Titorial waters, raising constitutional questions over overseas dispatch. Following 
reports that high-level military-to-military consultations had taken place, in March 1975, 
Ueda Tetsuo, a Socialist member of the House of Representatives, alleged in the Diet 
that a "secret agreement", under which Japan would take responsibility for sea lanes 
connecting the joint naval base at Yokosuka with Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines, had 
been concluded between military officers from both countries22 . JDA Director General 
Sakata Michita denied the existence of a secret agreement, admitting only that the JDA 
had promoted studies on Japan-US cooperation concerning the defence of the sea areas 
around Japan 23 . Ueda' s question nonetheless prompted Sakata to consider an official 
framework for bilateral defence cooperation with the United States, based on "the 
premise of the general command of the seas by the US Navy Seventh Fleet, upon 
establishing a concept for defense in the sea areas around our country". Sakata' s interest 
in deepening the consultative institutional framework of the Alliance also reflected his 
concern to prevent SDF personnel from "going it alone" with their US counterparts and 
circumventing Japan's system of civilian control. 
As part of Sakata' s initiative, James Schlesinger was invited to Tokyo for a bilateral 
defence summit in Tokyo on August 29, setting in motion a process that would 
culminate in the drafting of the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, released in 
November 1978. The importance of sea lanes was reflected in the text of the 1978 
Guidelines, which stated that the MSDF and US Navy would "jointly conduct maritime 
operations for the defence of surrounding waters and sea lines of communication". 
Although the Guidelines were not subject to Diet approval and no geographical 
limitation was placed upon sea lane defence, mention of the MSDF' s co-responsibility 
for defending sea lanes was especially significant in light of the fact that reference to 
defending sea lanes had been left out of the 1976 taiko , the government's defence policy 
outline. 
21 Asahi Shinibun , August 29, 1975. 
22 Yomiuri Shimbun , April 2, 1975. 
23 Yomiuri Shimbun, April 3, 1975, p 2. 
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Meanwhile, US political pressure on Tokyo to increase its levels of defence spending 
began to intensify. In the month that the Guidelines were released, a senior Democrat on 
the House Armed Services Committee visiting Tokyo, Congressman Richard Wright, 
said that Japan's dependence on sea lanes was "above all other nations in the Far East", 
and that accordingly Japan should do more to "defend its sea lanes for shipping"24. 
During his visit to Japan in late 1978, Defense Secretary Harold Brown reaffirmed 
Washington's desire to see improvements to Japan's level of air defence and ASW 
capability25 . During JDA Director Kanemaru Shin's visit to Washington in August 1978, 
Brown had warned that a Minsk-class vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) canier was 
likely to be deployed by the Soviet Pacific Fleet in 1979 and told Kanemaru that 
America's naval power alone "will not be sufficient to cope with the Soviet Navy in the 
Far East". Regarding the third area of cooperation identified in 1975, the protection of 
shipping, Brown urged Japan to take responsibility for guarding 'branch' sea lanes 
extending from its Pacific ports to the seas north of the Philippines and said that the 
United States expected the MSDF to acquire the capability to protect shipping along a 
southwesterly axis -- in the direction of Taiwan -- and southeast, towards the Bonin 
islands26 . In return, it was affirmed that in a crisis the US Navy would secure routes 
across the central Pacific used to transport Middle Eastern oil and other materials (if 
necessary deploying its entire Pacific-based canier force of six canier battle groups)27. 
The protection of shipping along the nanto and nansei korotai thus emerged at the centre 
of a debate within the Alliance about whether to define and apportion military roles on a 
geographical or functional basis. Although Kanemaru was personally suppo11ive of an 
enhanced role for the MSDF in alliance cooperation, for example backing its 
participation in the biannual Rim of the Pacific Exercises (RIMPAC), the Japanese 
government was reluctant to commit the SDF to new territorial responsibilities. 
However, at the military level, MSDF officers' awareness of and interest in Japan's 
potential involvement in defending branch sea lanes in the Pacific had been expressed in 
a MSDF training manual as far back as 1970, which had stated: 
It will be difficult to determine whether the enemy will choose coastal routes or 
ocean ones to attack. The latter are generally considered more important since they 
provide logistic support to the US military bases in Japan and supply necessary 
materials to the Japanese people as well as because larger vessels traverse these 
24 Tokyo Shimbun, November 16, 1978, p 2. 
25 Yoniiuri Shimbun , November 16, 1978, p 2. 
26 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 3, 1978. 
27 Yomiuri Shimbun, July 2, 1978. 
routes. In any case, the routes Japan wants to secure must be effectively connected 
with the US Central Pacific sea lanes of communication (LOC). This sea lane is to 
be set up in wartime as a logistic support route from the US to the far East and 
Australia. Effective linkage with the LOC will be the main objective of our sea 
lane concept28 . 
III. Japan's rising profile in US strategy. 
1. Military-strategic pressures. 
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Even as the United States showed interest at the political level 1n broadening the 
geographical extent of Japan ' s defence responsibilities under the rubric of sea lane 
defence, its naval strategy against the Soviet Union was evolving towards a more 
offensive posture in the Pacific, in which Japan's active cooperation was deemed 
crucial. 
In June 1979, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Hayward said: 
An extremely large number of warships would be required to protect convoys 
operating over the long maritime transport routes. The United States Navy has instead 
adopted an offensive approach to push the enemy into a defensive position. The United 
States Navy and the Maritime Self Defense Force coordinate so that they do not 
duplicate each other's efforts. This enables American warships to operate 
independently. The Maritime SDF's antisubmarine P-3Cs are deployed so as to fulfill 
this duty' 29 . 
Of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern naval bases, only the sub1narine base at Petropavlosk 
-- on the Kamchatkan peninsula -- enjoyed unrestricted access to the Pacific. However, 
lacking overland transport links , Petropavlosk was dependent upon other Soviet bases in 
the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk for re-supply by sea and air from the main 
Soviet naval base at Vladivostok, facing the Sea of Japan. Japan ' s geostrategic position 
as a nattu-al sea-air cordon around the major Soviet bases in the Sea of Japan, as noted in 
Chapters Two and Four, was described by Admiral Holloway in . Congressional 
testimony as providing "the most definitive military justification for a strong security 
relationship with Japan". 
28 Nishijima Ryoich.i. 'Participation of Maiitime Self-Defense Forces in RIMP AC', Asia Pacific 
Comniunity, No. 7 , Winter 1980, pp 46-47. 
29 Maeda Tetsuo , The Hidden A rmy: the Untold Sto ry of Japan 's Military Forces, Edition Q, Inc., Chicago, 
1995 , p 234. 
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According to Holloway, the strategic priorities of the US Navy throughout the Pacific 
Command could be reduced to protecting its base facilities and essential lines of 
communication in the Pacific and Indian Ocean: 
"The success of this strategic concept depends to a large degree on the ability of the 
United States and its allies to block the exits to the Sea of Japan and bottle up the 
Vladivostok-based Russian fleet units; and the utilisation of Japanese air bases as a 
barrier against the movement of Soviet long-range aircraft from their bases in the 
Vladivostok complex to the shipping lanes of the Pacific Ocean." 
Holloway noted fu1iher that "it is only with the assistance of the Japanese, operating as a 
military ally, that the Japanese straits can be effectively denied to the Soviets, and 
Russian long-range aviation prevented from overflying the Japanese archipelago"30 . 
Similarly, Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy and Plans Robert Komer concluded 
that closing the straits would be difficult to achieve "without active Japanese 
· ,,31 cooperation . 
Accompanying the abandonment of the 'swing' concept from 1979, the concept of 
'horizontal escalation' emerged as part of the US Navy's development of a new 
mariti1ne strategy to underpin its global force posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union (see 
Chapter Two). Although contested by those within the Depa1iment of Defense who 
viewed the emphasis on offensive pre-emption within horizontal escalation as 
destabilising, the concept called for US Pacific-based forces -- in the event of a Soviet-
led offensive in the Middle East or Western Europe -- to open up a new theatre of 
operations and mount reprisal strikes against Soviet Far Eastern bases. This was based 
on a calculation that the vulnerable disposition of Soviet military infrastructure in the 
Far East together with US strengths in mobility, concentrated strike power and 
geostrategic position in the Western Pacific, would enable US forces to wage a (sub-
nuclear) conflict on favourable tenns 32. Operationally, the concept depended on the 
forward-positioned strike units of the Seventh Fleet, including carrier-based aviation as 
well as the recently introduced Toniahawk cruise missile, which greatly complicated the 
Soviet defence planning environment by extending a strategic strike potential to all US 
30 Testimony of Admiral J arnes L. Holloway before the US Congress, Hearings before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, East-West Relations: Focus on the Pacific, 97th Congress, 2nd Session. June 16, 
1982, pp 53-54. 
31 Robert Komer, Maritinie Strategy or Coalition Defense?, University Press of America/ Abt Books, 
Lanham, 1984, p 87. 
32 Harold C. Hinton, 'The United States and Extended Security Commitments : East Asia', The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 457, September 1981, p 99. 
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principal surface combatants and submarines33 . According to John F. Lehman, President 
Reagan's first Secretary of the Navy, by building up US naval forces in the north Pacific 
the United States "signalled to the Soviets that if they attacked NATO Europe they could 
expect to see us coming at them in the Pacific"34 . However, to be fully credible, 
horizontal escalation required not only Japan's passive acquiescence as a basing 
platform, but its active military cooperation by providing air defence over the Japanese 
archipelago and in closing the main egress points from the Sea of Japan. 
2. Political-economic pressures. 
In addition to strategic reasons for pursuing defence cooperation, other factors in the 
political economy of US-Japan relations inclined Washington to apply increasing 
pressure on Tokyo to boost its defence spending from the late 1970s. The first stirrings 
of trade tension over soya beans in the early 1970s had, by 1980, become fully fledged 
disputes about automobile exports. This fanned Congressional charges that Japan was 
'free-riding' on the US security guarantee in the same year that its bilateral trade surplus 
surpassed the symbolic watershed of $10 billion. Among major US allies, Japan stood 
out conspicuously as posting the largest bilateral trade surplus yet devoting the smallest 
proportion of national wealth to defence. The dominance of trade and security issues in 
US-Japan relations made policy linkages unavoidable, at least in Congress, in spite of 
the efforts of officials on both sides to separate economic ties from defence relations35 . 
Statements by senior US officials on Japan began to take on an increasingly combative 
tenor towards the end of the Ca11er presidency. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
complained of Japanese "complacency" over defence, describing the Japanese 
government's plan to boost the defence budget by 7 .6 per cent for fiscal 1981 as 
insufficient36 . US irritation with Tokyo intensified after the Iranian revolution, 
following the disclosure that all six major Japanese trading houses were continuing to 
purchase Iranian oil, heedless of a US request for its allies to join an economic embargo 
in retaliation for the seizure of the US embassy and its staff in Teheran37 . Under-
Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Plans Robe11 Komer, visiting Japan in September 
1980, i1npressed upon JDA Director General Omura Joji the com1ection between Japan's 
33 Paul Keal , Japan's Role in United States Strategy in the Pacific, Working Paper No. 106, Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1986. 
34 Jobn F. Lehman Jr, Coniniand of the Sea , Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1988, p 404. 
35 See for example, Michael Armacost' s account of US attempts to sell the AW A Cs aircraft to Japan: 
Armacost, Michael H. Friends or Rivals?: the Insider's Account of U.S. -Japan Relations, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1996, p 89. 
36 
"Japan ' s Budget for Arms Seen as Inadequate", New York Times, December 31 , 1980, p l. 
37 Interview with Ambassador Okazaki Hisaluko, Okazaki Institute, Tokyo, 1999, March 12, 1999. 
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dependence on US naval protection in the Middle East and US interest in boosting SDF 
efforts in the Pacific: 
'The defense of the sea lanes is a problem of life and death importance for the 
western nations. Japan benefits most from the maintenance of the sea lanes ... only 
the US can defend. It will deploy its Seventh fleet in the Indian Ocean to fulfill 
this responsibility. Naturally, the defense of the area around Japan will be 
weakened. Japan too, should recogmse these circumstances and strengthen its 
defense power' 38 . 
3. 'Roles and Missions'. 
The failure of the Carter administration, despite harsh rhetoric, to persuade the Japanese 
government significantly to raise defence budgets prompted a rethink among incoming 
officials of the Reagan administration in January 1981. The Republican administration 
came to power with two basic objectives for Japan policy: first, to maintain Japan's 
Western orientation; and secondly, to obtain "a more equitable burden-sharing 
arrangement"39 . Although these were similar to the policy objectives of the Carter 
adnlinistration, Reagan officials including Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for East Asia Richard Armitage and Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger shared the view that it was counter-productive to criticise an ally publicly. 
Moreover, they agreed that maintaining a focus on achieving abstract budgetary targets 
in the absence of an accompanying strategic rationale was unlikely to persuade a 
reluctant ally facing significant domestic opposition to fu11her defence commitments40 . 
With the Defense Cooperation Guidelines ah-eady in place, a new strategy was suggested 
of assigning 'roles and missions' within the Alliance which, when linked to 
corresponding target capabilities, would supply their own strategic rationale for 
increased funding. 
Although Haig is credited with co1n1ng the phrase 'roles and missions', the original 
architect of the approach was the Special Assistant for Japan of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Commander James Auer, who had studied at the National Defense 
Academy in Yokosuka in 1970. In addition to his extensive knowledge of the MSDF, 
Auer had actively maintained military and political contacts in Japan. Personal links, 
especially those between officers from the two navies , were to play a key role in the 
38 Asahi Shim,bun, October 5, 1980, p 2. 
39 Richard Armitage and Karl D. Jackson, "U.S. Strategic Interests in East Asia and the Pacific", Asian 
Pacific Defense Fonun, Spring 1988, Vol. 12, No. 4 pp 39-40. 
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decision-making process surrounding sea lane defence in the 1980s. As a result of the 
personal network Auer had built up while an officer studying at Y okosuka, and 
particularly his friendship with the former MSDF Chief of Staff, Kimura Hideo, Auer 
was able to consult informally with other former MSDF chiefs, Uchida Kazutomi and 
Naka1nura Teijiro, and via these channels contact Oga Ryohei the incun1bent Chief of 
Staff. In Washington, close navy-to-navy links extended to Japan's Defence Attache, 
Kawamura Sumihiko, a former P-3C pilot and intelligence officer, and another long-
time associate of Auer. As a result, Kawamura was able to make regular, unscheduled 
calls to the Japan office in the Pentagon --- in contrast with the more formally observed 
relations between counterpart personnel from the other services 41 . 
In February 1981, Armitage visited Japan unofficially with Auer as part of the Reagan 
administration's preliminary review of security policy towards Japan. Armitage met and 
exchanged opinions with Tanba Minoru, who was in charge of alliance relations at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), JDA Councillor for Foreign Relations Okazaki 
Hisahiko, who was seconded from the MOFA, Shiina Moto, the deputy head of the 
LDP' s Policy Research Committee, and Kimura. The concept of a division of labour 
based on sharing roles and missions was tentatively broached, whereby the MSDF 
would adopt as its operational focus ASW, minesweeping and pursue the capability to 
block Soviet naval access to the Soya (La Perouse ), Tsugaru and Tsushi1na (Korea) 
straits, thus enabling the US Navy to concentrate on offensive operations (see Map 1). 
After returning to the United States, Armitage and Auer submitted a memorandum to 
Weinberger outlining roles and missions for the SDF and US military, areas of 
responsibility in sea and air defence, and the estimated forces needed to achieve these 
missions. At this time, US Ambassador Mike Mansfield sent a cable to Washington 
requesting clarification of the new administration's policy on the US-Japan Security 
Treaty and bilateral trade issues as soon as possible. With Haig in favour of a less 
confrontational approach to alliance relations, the memorandum on roles and missions 
became accepted as the foundation of the first Reagan administration's Japan policy on 
security matters. 
The new US administration officially pressed its case in March 1981, when Foreign 
Minister Ito Masayoshi visited Washington in preparation for the leaders ' summit in 
40 Sekai Keizai Johou Service, Japanese-Anierican Relations and Comprehensive Security, Research 
Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, 1986, p 11. 
41 Agawa Naoyuki, Um i no Yitjo, Chuo Koronsha, Tokyo, 2001 , pp 210-20. 
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May. Weinberger indicated interest in obtaining Japanese cooperation to defend sea 
areas "west of Guam and north of the Philippines"42. However, Ito responded that this 
might contravene the cabinet-level ban on the exercise of collective self-defence and 
gave a commitment only to reply later, subject to fu1iher discussions43 . In the build-up 
to Suzuki's visit in May, Washington's roles and missions agenda for the SDF 
crystallised into three key objectives: 
1. To establish sea control within a fan-shaped area of the No1ihwest Pacific extending 
south of the main Japanese islands, east of the Philippines and west of Guam. Within 
this area the focus would be on countering Soviet submarines and Backfire bombers. 
2. To build the capability, including n1ine warfare, to blockade the Soya, Tsugaru and 
Tsushima straits. 
3. To establish an air defence screen over Japanese territory and pa1i of the Sea of Japan 
to defend against Soviet fighters and bombers. 
Owing to its proximity to the Soviet Far East and the decision (approved in late 1977) to 
acquire the F-15, Japan -- Washington believed -- would be able to accomplish the 
second and third missions without projecting military forces beyond its air defence zone. 
However, the first objective entailed an unambiguous geographical expansion of Japan's 
defence zone, potentially with major implications both for the SDF' s force structure and 
conformity with the ban on collective self-defence. According to the Congressional 
Researcher Larry Niksch, in the zone within which Washington wanted Japan to take 
primary responsibility for sea control, specific MSDF tasks were to include the 
convoying of merchant shipping to Japan, as well as "effective offensive and defensive 
capabilities against Soviet submarines, surface ships and aircraft over a wide ocean 
area' '
44
. 
During 1980, the policy-making environment in Japan was pa1iicularly sensitive to US 
pressure. Okazaki Hisahiko, who was at that time involved in drafting speeches in the 
Diet in his capacity as JDA Councillor for Foreign Relations , recalls that US frustration 
concerning Japan's defence spending levels , increased security concerns prompted by 
42 Sekai Keizai Johou Service, Japanese-American Relations and Comp rehensive Security, Research 
Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, 1986, p 17. 
43 Agawa Naoyuki, Umi no Yujo, Chuo Koronsha, Tokyo, 200 1, p 2 17-218. 
44 
'Defence Burden-Sharing in the Pacific: US e pectations and Japanese Responses', Asian Affairs, 
July/ August, 1981 , pp 333-34. 
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the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and annoyance over continuing Japanese oil 
purchases from Iran, combined to make the Foreign Ministry especially anxious to 
placate Washington through concessions on security issues 45 . 
4. RIMPAC participation. 
As a major practical step towards deepening defence cooperation with the United States, 
in February 1980, the MSDF sent its first contingent to the month-long RIMPAC 
exercises, conducted off Hawaii. MSDF officers had sought Japanese participation at 
RIMPAC since the exercises sta1ted in 1971, but were unable to overcome opposition 
from the JDA' s internal bureaux. However, the Schlesinger-Sakata meeting in August 
1975 swung the environment in favour of bilateral defence cooperation. Yet it was not 
until 1979 that backing for RIMPAC from the JDA's civilian management was 
fo1thcoming, under Director General Kanemaru Shin and his successor Yamashita 
Ganri46 . Although bilateral naval exercises dated back to the 1950s, RIMPAC, as a 
multilateral exercise focussed on a potential threat from the Soviet Union -- potentially 
placing MSDF units under US operational command -- presented the JDA with 
substantial legal obstacles. Negotiations to overcome these and more practical problems 
in the way of Japan's participation were conducted at the military level on the Japanese 
side by Captain Yoshida Manabu47 . Eventually, a formula was arrived at that would 
allow the MSDF technically only to exercise on a bilateral level with US Navy units, as 
an extension of a joint US-Japan training programme dating from 1976. MSDF forces 
dispatched to RIMPAC in February 1980, under the command of Captain Yoshioka 
Tsutomu, were modest -- limited to the helicopter destroyer Hiei, the guided-missile 
destroyer Aniatsukaze and a P-2J aircraft. However, RIMPAC nonetheless signified to 
contemporary observers "momentum for ... Japan's role in the joint defence of the 
Pacific sea lanes in the 1980s"48 . 
RIMPAC enabled the MSDF and US Navy to lay the groundwork for closer naval 
cooperation more than a year before the Reagan administration adopted roles and 
missions. According to Nish~ima Ryoichi, during preparations for the exercise, MSDF 
operational planners were already focussing on a wedge-shaped area, "with the 20th 
parallel as its base and the Tokkaido megopolis (Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka) as its vertex", 
within which the MSDF would assume primary responsibility for ASW, deploying its P-
45 Interview with Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko, Okazaki Institute, Tokyo, 1999, March 12, 1999. 
46 Agawa Naoyuki, Umi no Yi7,jo, Chuo Koronsha, Tokyo, 2001 , pp 220-25. 
47 Yoshida would become MSDF Chief of Staff in the 1990s. 
48 Nishijima Ryoichi , 'Participation of Maritime Self-Defense Forces in RIMP AC', Asia Paci.fie 
Community, No. 7, Winter 1980, pp 43-53. 
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3Cs to prevent Soviet submarines from encroaching "eastward across the N ansei Islands 
and westward across the Isu-Ogasawara Islands line"49 . While this move towards 
adopting the defence of an area of sea space marked a departure from defending 
shipping directly, esco1ied convoys of merchant ships and tankers remained part of the 
MSDF' s operational plans. Based on estimates of the minimum level of economic 
imports needed during wartime, the concept called for the MSDF to assign its four 
flotillas ( each composed of eight vessels) to escort convoys of around 50 merchant ships 
dispatched at the rate of eight per month, which would receive US naval protection as 
far as the 20th parallel. The 20th parallel rough! y bisects the Bashi Channel between 
Taiwan and the Philippines, and runs close to Okino Tori Shima (Parace Vela), which 
marks the southernmost extent of Japanese territory on the eastern fringe of the 
Philippine Sea. 
IV. The Suzuki pledge and its aftennath. 
According to Okazaki, in 1979-80 an unprecedented latitude was extended to 
parliamentary debate on security and defence issues, enabling the use of previously 
taboo terms in the Diet, such as "potential threat", vis-a-vis the Soviet Union50 . In 
October 1980, on the heels of Komer's highlighting of Japan's dependence on US naval 
protection in the Middle East, Foreign Minister Ito stated before the House of 
Councillors Special Committee on Security: 
Japan could not help but strive to build up its defence capabilities to a certain level 
now that the increased US naval presence in the Indian Ocean, designed to ensure 
peace and stability in the Middle East region and the West's vital sea lanes there, 
has considerably reduced US military strength in Asia and the West Pacific. 51 
Ito's statement, the most suppo1iive of its kind to date, was followed by Prime Minister 
Suzuki's appearance before the Committee on November 10, when he said that the SDF 
had the legal right "to defend Japanese shipping on the high seas if it is exposed to attack 
and other dangers". Suzuki also stated that the MSDF' s target of assuring the security of 
waters for several hundred nm from Japanese coasts and the sea routes serving Japan for 
up to 1,000 nm from Japan re1nained unchanged but that the SDF were not capable of 
protecting Japanese vessels in the Gulf and Indian Ocean. This marked the first 
49 Nishijima Ryoichi, 'Participation of Maritime Self-Defense Forces in RIMPAC', Asia Pacific 
Community, No. 7, Winter 1980, pp 43-53. 
50 Interview with Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko , Okazaki Institute, Tokyo, March 12, 1999. IDA Director 
General Omura Joji stated before a Diet committee in 1980 that the Soviet military build-up constituted a 
"latent tlu-eat" (Matsumae Tatsuro. The Limits of Defense: Japan as an Unsinkable Aircraft-Carrier, Takai 
University Press, 1988, pp 125-26). 
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occasion 1n which a post-war pnme minister had asserted the constitutionality of 
protecting Japan's sea lanes beyond the extent of its tenitorial waters52. According to 
Okazaki, the brief for Suzuki's inaugural visit to Washington was prepared with the 
objective of presenting Japan in the most positive light possible, by re-packaging 
existing policy statements that were already a matter of Diet record. 
The Joint Communique issued at the conclusion of Suzuki's meeting with President 
Reagan in May 1981 included a recognition by both leaders of an "appropriate division 
of roles" in defence and that Japan would undertake to: 
• defend Japan's territory and sunounding sea and air space; 
• alleviate the financial burden of stationing US forces in Japan; and 
• extend aid to strategically important regions. 
In return, the United States affirmed that it would: 
• extend nuclear protection to Japan; 
• maintain offensive forces in and around Japan; 
• retain forces in South Korea; and 
• defend sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and southwest Pacific53 . 
While no significant Japanese defence policy concessions were contained in the Joint 
Communique, the reference to "alliance relations" (domei kankei) itself was ground-
breaking and controversial in Japan, where official reference to the Security Treaty in 
such terms was still taboo. Controversy over the use of the term "alliance" in the official 
text eventually prompted Foreign Minister Ito's resignation. According to Okazaki --
who accompanied the premier to the United States -- Suzuki was unaware of the 
controversy generated either by the Joint Communique or his subsequent press 
conference until he read the Japanese press coverage of the summit on his return flight to 
Tokyo. Only at this point did Suzuki realise that his comments on sea lanes had been 
taken by Washington as an official policy commitment on the part of his administration. 
With US officials believing they had won a public conunitment from the prime minister 
to assume primary responsibility for the defence of sea areas out to 1,000 nm, 
51 
'LDP, DSP Agree Japan Needs Improved Defense Capabilities', Japan Tinies, October 25, 1980, p 1. 
52 
'SDF Could Legally Protect Sea Lanes, Ships if Capable: Suzuki', Japan Times, November 11 , 1980, p 1. 
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Washington's attention shifted to the desired level of armament for Japan to discharge 
its expanded responsibilities. In June 1981, at the Thirteenth Security Subcommittee 
meeting in Hawaii, the US side floated a force modernisation proposal for the SDF that 
put forward quantitative targets significantly exceeding those stipulated in the 1976 taiko 
in several areas (Figure 14): 
Figure 14: US force structure proposals at the 13th Security Subcommittee meeting 
Main equipment TaikiJ US Proposal 
Escort destroyers 60 70 
Submarines 16 25 
ASW patrol aircraft 100 (P-3C and P-2J) 125 (P-3C) 
Air defence squadrons 10 14 
Early Warning squadrons 2 1 
Sources: Oga Ryohei, Shiiren no Himitsu, Shobunsha, Tokyo, 1983, p 201; and Matsmnae 
Tatsuro, The Limits of Defense: Japan as an Unsinkable Aircraft-Carrier, Tokai University 
Press, 1988, p 138. 
In addition to quantitative targets, the United States recommended boosting SDF 
readiness and sustainability levels, including a suggestion to build up a three-month 
supply of ammunition. Some Japanese observers have noted that the total of 70 
destroyers put forward in the US proposal matched the MSDF' s own recommendation 
for five escort flotillas outlined at the planning stages of the Basic Defense Force 
Concept, suggesting that MSDF officers may have fed their force structure preferences 
to their US Navy counterparts in Hawaii54. Given the closeness and informality of navy-
to-navy ties, it see1ns highly likely that the US interlocutors at Hawaii would at least 
have been aware of the MSDF' s preferences. At the same time, against increasing 
resistance from the Suzuki cabinet, US officials and senior officers were at pains to 
stress that an SDF role in sea lane security would not mean assuming a collective self-
defence function, as "Japan's capability to defend her home islands, tenitorial sea and 
air space may ultimately rest on the security she can provide to the sea lines of 
53 Sekai Keizai Johou Service, Japanese-American Relations and Comprehensive Security, Research 
Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, 1986, pp 11-12. 
54 Katahara Eichi, The Politics of Japanese Defence Policy Making, 1975-1989, unpublished PhD thesis, 
Griffith University, April 1990, p 215. 
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communications and the access they provide to the raw materials needed to sustain her 
in both peace and war"55. 
Meanwhile, Suzuki had been angered by what he saw as a misrepresentation of his 
summit meeting with Reagan, during which the premier had stressed Japan's pacifist 
credentials. After returning to Japan, Suzuki sought to distance himself from his 
comments on sea lane defence at the National Press Club, describing them as merely "a 
statement of a future objective" rather than an official commitment. Foreign Minister 
Ito's successor, Sunoda Sunao, maintained equally that no geographical expansion of 
Japan's defence responsibilities had been entered into56 . Under pressure from those 
within the LDP, including Miyazawa Kiichi, who were wonied at the fiscal implications 
of further defence commitments, the prime minister declared that strict constraints 
would be imposed on sea lane operations, "if such operations are to be canied out"57 . 
Nevertheless, the Reagan administration used the issues of sea lane defence to maintain 
pressure on Tokyo to increase its defence efforts. In February 1982, Caspar Weinberger 
told Congress that Japan could increase its contribution to regional stability by 
strengthening its air and sea defences "and providing protection to the sea lines of 
communication out to 1,000 miles"58. The following month, Weinberger suggested that 
the force structure outlined in the taiko could be achieved by 1990, requiring an annual 
increase in defence spending of 10 per cent in real terms. In July 1982, the Suzuki 
administration went some way towards meeting US expectations by raising the 
authorised total of P-3Cs to be acquired by the MSDF to 100 aircraft from 45, a measure 
that promised greatly to boost its ASW capabilities. By agreeing to more than double 
the numbers of Orions in its inventory, the MSDF' s ability to prevent the infiltration of 
Soviet submarines into the Northwest Pacific was greatly enhanced, with obvious 
implications for improving the operational environment of the US Seventh Fleet. 
However, the issue of how to fund accelerated acquisitions of the P-3C, F-15 and E-2C 
re1nained unresolved under Suzuki. 
55 Commander US Forces, Japan, Charles Donnelly, quoted by Herbert Lee, 'US Stresses Allies Roles in 
Sea Lane Security', USICA Backgrounder, November 9, 1982. 
56 Sekai Keizai Johou Service, Japanese-American Relations and Comprehensive Security, Research 
Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, 1986, p 15. 
57 Peter Woolley, Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000, Lynne Reiner, Boulder, 2000, p 70; and 
Aurelia George, The Nakasone Challenge: Historical Constraints and New Initiatives in Japan's Defence 
Policy, Legislative Research Service, TI1e Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Discussion Paper 
No. 2, 1987, p 11. 
58 Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress FY 1983 Budget, February 8, 1982, II-30. 
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In 1978, the JDA formulated the Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate (MTDPE), 
covering fiscal years 1980-84, as the first long-term procurement plan initiated under the 
taiko. Although intended to speed up completion of the taiko and subject to review after 
three years, the MTDPE was considered within government only to have the status of 
JDA 'internal reference material' and therefore was considered not binding on the MoF, 
which remained opposed to increased defence spending not least because it was 
attempting to rein in deficit financing by the LDP and maintain a balanced budget59 . 
Without full government backing for the 1980-84 MTDPE or the revised version 
spanning 1983-87, the MoF was able to enforce cuts that led ultimately to the JDA' s 
procurement objectives being barely half fulfilled. Although the United States 
interpreted the MoF' s intervention as a setback in its effo1ts to raise Japan's defence 
spending, the political environment was to alter in Washington's favour under Suzuki's 
successor, Nakasone, who came to power in November 1982. 
At the Fourteenth Security Subcommittee meeting convened at Hawaii in August, JDA 
interlocutors proposed that a dedicated study on sea lane defence be launched under the 
auspices of the Defense Cooperation Guidelines. Although initially welcomed by the 
US side, the JDA proposal reflected ambivalence towards sea lane defence within the 
JDA' s internal bureaux among those who sought to delay any substantive commitments 
arising from Suzuki's 'pledge', by drawing out the length of the study (in a tried-and-
tested JDA technique designed to demonstrate a response to US pressure without 
committing to substantive policy change). As a result, the study was not launched 
officially until March 1983, and did not report its findings to the Japanese cabinet until 
December 1986, before being submitted to the Security Consultative Committee in 
January 1987. 
V. Japan's changing threat perceptions. 
The focus accorded to sea lane defence within Japan 's defence policy during the 1980s 
reflected more than simply an ad hoc response to US pressure or opportunist attempts on 
the part of Japan's uniformed defence establishment to boost their legitimacy and 
budgetary claims. While both of these factors obtain, Japan's strategic concerns were 
also being remould~d during the 1970s. First, this was in response to a perceived 
diminished US military commit1nent to East Asia that was apparently confirmed in 1977 
by President Carter's announcement that he intended to withdraw US ground forces 
from South Korea. Second, the build-up of Soviet military capabilities in the vicinity of 
59 Joseph P. Keddell, The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures, M.E. 
Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1994, p 68. 
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Japan also caused mounting concern, both among Japanese politicians and defence 
planners. The Report on Comprehensive National Security, commissioned by Prime 
Minister Ohira Masayoshi in April 1979 reflected: 
In considering the question of Japan's security, the most fundamental change in the 
international situation that took place in the 1970s is the termination of clear 
American supremacy in both military and economic spheres60 . 
In the wake of the US withdrawal from Vietnam, opposition parties began to moderate 
their position towards the Security Treaty and the SDF. Of the four main opposition 
parties, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the Japan Co1n1nunist Party (JCP), K61neit6 
('Clean Government' Party) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP -- a splinter party 
from the Socialists), both the Communists and Socialists had been committed to 
abrogating the Security Treaty since the 1950s and regarded the SDF as unconstitutional. 
For their part, both K61neit6 and the DSP began to readjust their defence policy 
platforms in 1975. The DSP shifted from an insistence on ejecting US troops from 
Japan to recognising the "necessity" of the Security Treaty, while K61neit6 softened its 
demand for an i1nmediate abrogation of the Treaty, to doing so on the basis of mutual 
consent. While the Socialists refused to recognise the constitutionality of the SDF and 
used security policy to attack the government in the Diet (as exemplified by Ueda's 
questioning on sea lane defence), Party Chairn1an N arita T61nei signalled a shift towards 
acceptance of the Security Treaty in a speech in Dece1nber 1976. By 1981, K6111eit6 had 
recognised the SDF and put forward its own recommendations on the expansion of 
defence capability, passing a motion in September that recognised Moscow's build-up of 
the Soviet Pacific Fleet, its deployments to the Northern TeITitories and the invasion of 
Afghanistan as posing a security threat to Japan61 . The DSP dropped its opposition to 
the Security Treaty and supported the creation of a standing security committee in the 
Diet in January 1981. Though the JSP continued to espouse unarmed neutrality, from 
November 1978, the party softened its opposition to the Security Treaty and shifted its 
policy on the teITitorial dispute with the Soviet Union to bring it in line with that of the 
LDP62. 
60 Report on Comprehensive National Security (Translation), Comprehensive National Security Study 
Group, July 2, 1980, p 7. 
61 However, the party only endorsed the development of a "water's edge" anti-invasion capability for the 
SDF (Joseph P. Keddell , The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures, M.E. 
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MOFA officials viewed the reinforcement of Soviet defences in the No1ihern Territories 
beginning in 1978 mainly as a reprisal for the inclusion of a 'non-hegemony' clause 
(implictly directed at the Soviet Union) in the Japan-China normalisation treaty signed 
in August63. JDA analysts interpreted the Soviet move as driven by the military logic of 
turning the Sea of Okhotsk into an SSBN 'bastion', which might lead to pre-emptive 
Soviet attacks on Hokkaido or even northern Honshu in order to secure transit through 
the Soya or Tsugaril straits64 . The i1npression of hostile Soviet intentions was sealed by 
Moscow's conclusion of a friendship treaty and basing rights with Vietnam in 
November 1978, the deployment of SS-20s missiles to the Soviet Far East, and the 
invasion of Afghanistan. 
The notion of a "military threat from the no1ih" was given popular expression through a 
series of books and articles published in Japan around this time 65. Ground Self Defense 
Forces (GSDF) Chief of Staff Kurisu Hiromi was forced to resign in 1978 after 
suggesting that without a framework of emergency legislation (yuji hosei) "supra-legal" 
measures might be needed to respond to a military attack. In March 1979, Kurisu' s 
successor, General Nagano, became the first figure publicly to raise revision of the taiko 
in light of the changing security environment, and in 1981 Chairman of the Joint Staff 
Council Takeda questioned the viability of Japan's 'defensive' defence policy66 . 
Increased Soviet air activity in Japan's vicinity meanwhile saw the number of ASDF 
scrambles to intercept Soviet aircraft rise from 281 in 1975 to 939 in 1981. 
Japanese sea lane threat perceptions and defence planning concepts were also evolving. 
Oga Ryohei was MSDF Chief of Staff during the early 1980s. In Shiiren no Himitsu 
('Sealane Secrets'), published in 1983, he divided the concept of sea lane security into 
separate economic and military components. Economically, he argued that seaborne 
trade underpinned Japan's prosperity, reflecting its large population, poor resource 
endowment and corresponding need . to import raw materials and export valued-added 
manufactured goods. Militarily, maritime supply routes across the Atlantic and Pacific 
63 Interview with Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko, Okazaki Institute, Tokyo, 1999, March 12, 1999. 
64 Nishimura Shigeki, "The Military Balance in Northeast Asia" IIGP Paper, 1991. 
65 See for example, Summaries of Selected Japanese magazines 1985, Ame1ican Embassy, Political Section 
Office of Translation Services, Tokyo Maruyama Hiroyuki , Shokun , 'Be Guarded Against Soviet Pacific 
Fleet' , November 1985, pp 41-43; and Nakamura Kenichi, 'Ext1ication from Soviet Threat Argument', 
Sekai, Ap1il 1985, pp 20-26. 
66 Chapman, Drifte and Gow, Japan 's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence, Diplomacy, 
Dependence. Frances Pinter, London, 1983, p 69; and Matsumae Tatsuro. The Liniits of Defense: Japan as 
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were deemed vital to US military strategy at a global level, and its ability to defend 
Japan from attack67 . 
Geographically, he identified three maJor sea lanes as crucial to Japan's econormc 
security: 
• the sea lane connecting Japan, via the Ryukyu island chain, Bashi Channel and 
either the Straits of Malacca or Lombok, with Southeast Asia and the Middle East 
(accounting for 60 per cent of imports); 
• a southeastern sea lane linking Japan with Oceania and Australasia, via the 
Ogasawara/Bonin islands (16 per cent of imports); and 
• the 'great circle' route connecting Japan, across the Pacific, with No11h and South 
America (20 per cent of imports). 
The importance Oga attached to the defence of sea lanes and a concomitant requirement 
for a navy capable of 'blue-water' operations bore resemblance to Sekino Hideo's blue-
water vision. However, Oga' s strategy -- drawing heavily from that articulated by the 
former MSDF Chief of Staff, Uchida Kazutomi, in the 1970s -- also differed in key 
respects. The vision of an autonomous navy still held an emotional appeal to many 
senior MSDF officers (many of whom, Oga included, were veterans of the Imperial 
Navy68) and ce11ain nationalist politicians. However, by the beginning of the 1980s, 
MSDF plans were firmly pre1nised on a functional division of labour defined by the 
ASW and mine-sweeping 'shield' provided by the SDF and the 'sword' wielded by US 
mobile strike power69 . Oga thus stressed that the success of Japan's defensive efforts 
was dependent on maintaining close coordination with US forces. 
Oga' s proposed "total strategy" of sea lane defence incorporated the MSDF' s anti-
submarine effo11s, led by P-3C aircraft and helicopter-equipped destroyers , air defence 
conducted by the ASDF, the blockade of Soviet egress points from the Sea of Japan as 
well as the direct protection of high-value units including supply ships and US aircraft 
caITiers. The importance of boosting coordination and intelligence exchange with the 
67 Oga Ryohei. Shiiren no Himitsu, Shobunsha, Tokyo, 1983 , pp 164-204. 
68 Oga graduated from military training November 1942 and participated in the Japanese withdrawal from 
the Aleutian island of Kiska before retraining and serving out the remainder of the war as a submariner. In 
August 1945, his mother and sister were both killed at Nagasaki. In 1950, he commanded an MSA 
minesweeping unit sent to Korean waters . 
69 Agawa Naoyuki. Unii no Yfijo, Chuo Koronsha, Tokyo, 200 1, p 216. 
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Maritime Safety Agency was also stressed, as by other JDA analysts 70 . From a military 
point of view, Oga emphasised the efficiency of closing the Sea of Japan, using the 
MSDF' s submarines and mines, as a means to limit the potential Soviet threat posed to 
Japan's sea lanes. However, he also recognised that constitutional problems would be 
posed by the operational necessity to act pre-emptively in closing the straits in order to 
prevent a surge of Soviet naval vessels from the Sea of Japan. Moreover, by publicly 
committing itself to closing the straits, Japan caITied a risk of increased tension with the 
Soviet Union, which might develop its own pre-emptive doctrine in order to secure 
transit thought the Soya Strait. 
Assuming that a partial blockade of the Sea of Japan could successfully be mounted, 
Oga expected that Soviet aircraft and submarines would still be able to advance south 
from Kamchatka and the Kurile islands and threaten ships by approaching from east of 
Ogasawara. To counter this threat, it would be necessary to establish a semi-circular 
blocking line stretching from Northern Japan to Kamchatka. In contrast to the previous 
focus in JDA white papers on Soviet submarines, Oga' s analysis placed roughly equal 
emphasis on the threat posed by Soviet maritime aviation. The increasing Soviet air 
threat prompted him to draw parallels between Japan's strategic requirements and Great 
Britain's defence against Germany during 1940, based on a robust air defence, control 
over proximate straits, a unified national spirit, strong political leadership . and the 
preservation of trans-oceanic sea lanes to receive logistical support from the United 
States 71 . 
Other Japanese security analysts and former MSDF officers continued to focus more on 
the submarine threat posed to Japan's sea lanes by the Soviet Union. Admiral Uchida, 
who remained highly influential within the MSDF, wrote in 1980 that Soviet naval 
capability posed the ut1nost threat in the East Asian region. Accordingly he stressed: 
'An anti-submarine warfare capability must be the first charge on the resources of 
any nation precipitately faced with the possibility of starvation and exhaustion by 
hostile blockade. A force structure based upon the overall striking force of the 
United States and the regional defence forces of various indigenous nations must 
be the basic military concept in East Asia' 72. 
70 See also Asanuma Hirosato, 'Joho no Totaru Shiisutemu ga Fukaketsu' ('Total System of Intelligence is 
Indispensable '), On the Sea-Lane Defense Problem in Dispute No. 1, Sekai no Kanseri, December 1982. pp 
126-29. 
71 Oga Ryohei . Shiiren no Hiniitsu , Shobunsha, Tokyo, 1983. p 171. 
72 
'Naval Competition and Security in East Asia' in Jonathan Alford (ed.), Sea Power and Influence: old 
issues and new challenges, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Farnborough, 1980, pp 107. 
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However, the JDA' s position on sea lane defence as reflected in defence white papers 
remained ambiguous. The 1983 Defense of Japan canied a section, separated by a 
border from the official text, entitled "On various debates concerning Protection of Sea 
Lines of Communication (So-called "sea lane defence")". Without refening to Suzuki's 
comments, the white paper was vague on the geographical scope of sea lane defence, 
noting that while Japan's goal was to achieve a capability to provide SLOC protection to 
"about 1,000 nautical miles or so", the actual scope of sea and airspace to be defended 
"all depends on the situation at the time"73 . 
Regarding the defence of foreign ships bound for Japan, the JDA's position was also 
ambiguous, noting that although the right of self-defence would not normally be 
extended to foreign ships on the high seas carrying goods to Japan, "as a matter of 
theory, there is an undeniable possibility that, if an aimed attack takes place against this 
nation and if Japan is in the midst of exercising the right of self-defence, the nation 
attacking Japan might resort to indiscriminate attacks on third nation vessels with 
cargoes bound for Japan, in order to stop their transportation". Thus, according to the 
IDA' s interpretation, if such cargoes were deemed "vital", SDF defence operations to 
halt any attacks on shipping could be construed as falling within the legal definition of 
the individual right of self defence. Lastly, while noting that the denial of passage 
through the straits around Japan was constitutional, the white paper also stated that this 
would only be undertaken after an armed attack took place against Japan 74 . 
Criticism of the SDF' s involvement in sea lane defence came not only from the expected 
quarters of pacifist party-political and media opinion. Kaihara Osamu, a previous critic 
of the MSDF' s blue-water ambitions, resurfaced to argue that sea lane defence made 
sense only as a "a gesture or expression of willingness to cooperate with the U.S.", while 
independent analysts such as Maeda Tetsuo and Chuma Kiyofuku regarded the concept 
as a device to justify the expansion of SDF capabilities and Japan's incorporation into 
US global military strategy. 
Kaihara put forward counter-arguments supporting the necessity for , and the viability of, 
a sea lane defence concept -- up-dating those he had advanced a decade earlier. 
Improvements to Soviet capabilities in the Far East and the further expansion of Japan 's 
trade since the 1960s only increased his conviction that it was pointless for Japan to 
73 Def ense of Japan 1983, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, 1983, pp 73-77. 
74 
'The 1983 Japanese White Paper: an Assessment', Asian Defence Journal, December 1983, p 54. 
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invest resources in protecting trade against the implausible scenario of a Soviet guerre 
de course.75 . Kaihara ' s analysis was, to a significant degree, borne out in the JDA's own 
classified operational research conducted as part of the US-Japan joint study on sea lane 
defence, the results of which were leaked to the Daily Yomiuri in December 1986. 
Based on four scenarios for Soviet attacks against Japan (ranging from escalation over a 
period of six months to a large-scale assault and assuming only limited support from the 
United States), the JDA estimated SDF losses as involving: 
• the destruction of 45 per cent of the MSDF' s destroyers; 
• 30 per cent of civilian cargo vessels used for transportation of oil, iron ore and grain; 
• up to 80 per cent damage to radar installations, and the loss of 30-40 per cent of 
ASDF fighters; and 
• the destruction of 70 per cent of GSDF tanks and 40 per cent casualties among SDF 
troops 76 . 
Maeda Tetsuo (1995), an independent defence commentator, shared the view that the 
advance of sea lanes to the top of Japan's defence agenda during the 1980s owed more 
to its political than strategic value. According to Maeda, the elastic spatial definition of 
sea lanes gave supporters of an extra-teITitorial defence role for the MSDF and ASDF 
the flexibility arbitrarily to redraw the geographical boundaries of Japan's self-defence 
zone without directly confronting the proscriptions against overseas dispatch and 
collective self-defence. Furthermore, a call to defend the nation's sea lanes could also 
publicly be presented as an "appropriately commercial" issue to channel the public's 
perception of Japan's economic vulnerability into increasing popular support for defence 
spending 77. Military threats posed to Japanese shipping interests recalled the spectre of a 
resource cut-off that had generated public concern during the 1973 Oil Crisis and, 
further back, the "lasting and visceral memory in the Japanese people" of the US 
wartime blockade. Maeda thought that the MSDF would be able to perform its ASW 
roles and missions against the Soviet Union adequately within its existing capabilities, 
given the strategic advantages flowing from its control over the major straits around the 
75 Kaihara Osamu, ' Jissai Mondai to shite Fukano' ('Such a Mission is far beyond Japan's Power'), On the 
Sea-Lane Defense Problem in Dispute No. 2, Sekai no Kansen, December 1982, pp 130-33; and 'U.S. and 
Japan: Defense Tensions', Wall Street Journal, January 12, 1982, p 28. 
76 This assumed that the Soviet Union would commit around 200 surface combatants, 40 submarines and 
950 aircraft (including 150 Backfire bombers) and the equivalent of two to three air and seaborne divisions. 
SDF forces available in 1986 included 14 submarines , 53 destroyers and 79 fixed-wing ASW aircraft and 
280 ASDF combat aircraft (Study Predicts Soviets Could Seize Sea-Lanes ', The Daily Yomiuri, January 6, 
1987, p 1). 
77 See also Matsumae Tatsuro , The Lim.its of Defense: Japan as an Unsinkable Aircraft-Carrier, Takai 
University Press , 1988, p 139-40. 
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Sea of Japan. However, by linking sea lane defence to a semi-redundant convoying 
concept, the MSDF could better justify their status and budget-driven preference for a 
large su1face fleet. Like Katahara (1990), Maeda also believed that the overlapping 
interests and close communication between the MSDF and US Navy led both 
organisations to cooperate in exerting pressure on the Japanese government to allocate 
more resources to modernising Japan's maritime defence capabilities. Finally, he 
regarded claims that the Soviet Union was targeting Japan's SLOC in the Indian Ocean 
and South China Sea (echoed in Japan's 1979 defence white paper) as alarmist given 
that Soviet bases in Vietnam located astride Japan's major economic SLOC would be 
vulnerable to counter-attack from US forces in the region in the early stages of any 
conflict. 
VI. Nakasone and sea lane defence. 
In November 1982, Nakasone Yasuhiro replaced Suzuki as prime minister. Nakasone 
was to remain premier for five years, a duration in post-war Japanese politics exceeded 
only by Sato Eisaku (1964-72). As prime minister, Nakasone adopted a policy agenda 
less radical than his record either as JDA Director General or parliamentarian, choosing 
not to advocate constitutional revision or a revival of autonomous defence -- measures 
that remained too controversial for the LDP to risk a backlash from the opposition 
parties and public opinion, with contemporary polls recording 70 per cent opposed to 
constitutional revision (which requires a two-thirds majority vote in the Diet)78 . 
However, within these constraints, Nakasone demonstrated a will to advance his policy 
goals ahead of the prevailing consensus in a way that few post-war premiers had done 
since Kishi in the 1950s. 
Nakasone's approach towards defence differed markedly from that of his immediate 
predecessors , Suzuki and Ohira, in that he regarded it as an issue on which to 
demonstrate leadership on both a domestic and international stage. Nakasone' s 
objective of awakening a "defence consciousness" (boei no ishiki) among the electorate 
formed part of a wider aim to achieve a "settling of Japan's post-war accounts" 
including the co1Tection of a perceived pacifist bias in the education system founded 
d . h O . 79 unng t e ccupat1on . In foreign policy, Nakasone saw defence as part of his 
objective of gaining 'membership of the west'. In an international context in which the 
United States was pressuring its NATO allies to spend more on defence, Nakasone 
78 
'Rearming Japan ', Christian Science Monitor, April 4, 1983 , pp 13-15. 
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signed the 1983 Williamsburg G7 Summit Declaration to "maintain sufficient military 
strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat, and to ensure the peace". In a 
bilateral context, boosting Japan 's military eff 011s was also seen by Nakasone as a 
means to obtain a more 'equal' alliance relationship with the United States80. 
Sea lane defence presented Nakasone with a ready-made platform upon which to pursue 
the twin objectives of boosting defence spending above the symbolic threshold of one 
per cent of Gross National Product (GNP) and bolstering bilateral defence cooperation 
with the United States. In January 1983, two months after taking office, he gave an 
interview to the Washington Post, in which he declared, first, that "the whole Japanese 
archipelago ... should be like an unsinkable aircraft canier ... against infiltration of the 
Backfire bomber". Second, he promised "full control of four straits that go through the 
Japanese islands so that there should be no passage of Soviet submarines and other naval 
activities". Third, he linked these objectives to a desire "to defend the sea lanes between 
Guam and Tokyo and between the Strait of Taiwan and Osaka"81. 
Nakasone subsequently reaffirmed his intention before the Diet of achieving the levels 
of defence capability set out in the taiko as soon as possible and announced an 
exemption for the United States from Japan 's ban on arms exports82. In February, 
Nakasone declared before the Diet that if Japan was under attack the SDF would have 
the legal right to assist US naval vessels on the high seas if they were on their way to 
defend Japan. This expansion of the individual right of self-defence was a significant 
move towards broadening the scope of defence activities seen as permissible within the 
ban on collective self defence83 . 
During the spring of 1983, Nakasone travelled to Southeast Asia to assuage regional 
concerns that Japan intended to expand the geographical range of its sea lane defence 
79 Aurelia George, The Nakasone Challenge: Historical Constraints and New Initiatives in Japan 's Defence 
Policy, Legislative Research Service, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Discussion Paper 
No. 2, 1987, pp 24-26. 
80 
' Japan's Choice: A Strategy for World Peace and Prosperity': Nak:asone's speech at the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, June 11 , 1984, Press Release No. 1149, Embassy of Japan, Canberra, June 18, 
1984. See also Norman D Levin, Japan 's Changing Defense Posture, Rand Note N-2739-OSD, June 1988, 
pp 21-23. 
81 
'Shouldering Arms -- and a Bigger Budget Burden', Far Eastern Economic Review, February 3, 1983, p 
46 ; Nak:asone 's interview is interesting not only in that he refened to the Strait of Taiwan rather than the 
Bashi channel as the southern extent of Japan's sea lane defence area, but he also specified four straits to be 
defended within Japan 's immediate environs. In addition to Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima, Nakasone was 
rrobably referring to the Osumi strait near Shimonseki, separating Kyushu and southern Honshu. 
2 
'Policy Speech by P1ime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone to the 98th session of the National Diet', January 
24, 1983, Press Release No. 1122, Embassy of Japan , Canberra, p 8. 
83 Sato Seizaburo, 'Clarifying the Right of Collective Self-Defense', Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 3 No. 2, 
Fall/Winter 1996, pp 91-107. 
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activities south of the Bashi Channel84. The strength of Asian reaction to his proposal to 
expand the SDF, as IDA Director General in 1970, had led Nakasone to be pa11icularly 
mindful of the importance of assuaging foreign concerns about Japan' s rearmament. 
One major advantage of the description of 1,000 nm as a ' limit' to Japan's sea lane 
defence responsibilities was that Japan's defence zone could be officially kept to a point 
north of the Philippines, thereby avoiding inflaming regional suspicions about Japan's 
intentions85 . Nakasone' s enthusiastic backing of sea lane defence and commitment to 
the "straits blockade" (kaikyo fiisa) helped to recover US support, which had waned 
following the Suzuki administration's attempts to limit the fallout of the premier's 
comments in 1981. The commencement of the study into sea lane defence, from March 
1983, fu11her reinforced Nakasone's efforts to prove Tokyo's credentials as a military 
ally. 
Nakasone was determined to breach the one per cent of GNP defence spending 'limit', 
which had stood as official Cabinet policy since 1976. However, rather than confronting 
the limit directly, he proposed to fund the new MTDPE for 1986-1990 at a level deemed 
necessary to complete the taiko that w1ould automatically exceed the one per cent of 
GNP threshold at some point in the programme's duration. Since the 1983-87 MTDPE 
had fallen approximately 50 per cent short of its targets for want of official backing, 
Nakasone unde11ook to upgrade the new MTDPE to the status of a government 
programme, with the authority of cabinet backing necessary to override MoF 
b. · 86 o ~ect1ons . 
Nakasone was politically strong enough in 1985 to win backing within the LDP for this 
course of action. The 1986-1990 MTDPE, with appropriations set at 18.4 trillion yen (in 
1985 prices), was adopted as a government programme on September 18, 1985, and 
redesignated the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP). However, the effort to break the 
one per cent of GNP barrier in 1985 failed, owing partly to higher-than-expected 
economic growth that year, and it was not until 1987 that it was finally surpassed by a 
margin of 0.004 per cent. The text of the MTDP identified three defence functions to be 
strengthened: 
i) air defence of the main islands; 
84 Ak:aha Tsuneo, 'Japan's Response to Threats of Shipping Disruptions in Southeast Asia and the Middle 
East ', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2, Summer 1986, pp 270-71. 
85 Interview with Capt Nakanishi Kenji, Research Department, Maritime Staff College, March 4, 2002. 
86 Chuma Kiyofuku, 'The 1986-90 Defense Plan: Does It Go Too Far?', Japan Quarterly Vol. 33 No. 1 Jan-
April 1986, pp 13-18 . 
ii) protection of SLOC in the waters surrounding Japan; and 
iii) capability to counter an invasion. 
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The MTDP thus placed the mission of sea lane defence within the framework of the 
taiko for the first time, something that the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines 
had not achieved87 . The MTDP also delineated an ambitious set of procurement targets, 
tailored towards offshore air and sea defence capabilities, where US expectations were 
highest. Allocations to the MSDF and ASDF reached a combined level of nearly 50 per 
cent of the budget allocated to the three SDF (garnering 23.4 per cent and 26.4 per cent 
respectively) while the GSDF' s allocation -- although still the largest -- fell to 37 per 
cent88 . 
The existing MSDF fleet was to be modernised to improve its anti-submarine, arr 
defence and mine warfare capabilities. With nine additional destroyers to be 
commissioned under the MTDP, the MSDF would have a total of 62, compared to the 
"approximately 60" authorised by the taiko. The submarine fleet was raised to 16, and a 
commitment to acquire a total of 100 P-3Cs reaffii-med. Provision was also made to 
acquire twelve MH-53 minesweeping helicopters. This expansion of maritime aviation 
required the creation of two new squadrons bringing the total to 16. With these 
adjustments, the MSDF' s unit structures and operational aircraft matched the 
quantitative force structure blueprint contained in the taiko. A new ASW centre 
equipped with US software was also opened at the joint naval base in Yokosuka in 
198789 . The introduction both of new missile armament and of anti-submarine 
helicopters aboard esco11 destroyers was made a subject of studies, resulting in the 
decision to acquire Aegis-equipped destroyers in 1987. The Aegis radar capability 
would greatly expand the surface fleet 's air defence at sea and improve interoperability 
with the US Navy from the first ship delivery in 1993. While the Aegis procurement 
was justified in terms of fulfilling Japan's sea lane defence commitments out to 1,000 
nm, towards the end of the Cold War the specific operational role of Aegis destroyers 
was "to provide a sanctuary route for US carriers coming to the defence of Japan"90 . 
Both the ASDF and GSDF (with the incorporation of the straits closure mission) also 
used sea lane defence to justify both their roles and procurement plans in the mid- to 
87 
'The Mid-term Defense Program (FY 1986-1990)', Defense Bulletin , Vol. 9, o. 1, September 1985, 
Public Information Division, Japan Defense Agency. 
88 Defense of Japan 1985, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times , Tokyo, p 149. 
89 Interview with Capt Nakanishi Kenji , Research Department, Maritime Staff College, March 4, 2002. 
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late-1980s. The most significant increase to the ASDF inventory implemented under the 
MTDP was in the total of F-15s, 63 of which were planned for acquisition, raising the 
authorised total from 155 to 18791 . A further five E-2Cs were acquired to bolster 
surveillance. Among several feasibility studies authorised in the MTDP, including 
Over-the-Horizon (0TH) radar and in-flight refuelling, dedicated research into 'air 
defence over the sea' (yojo bokii) -- inaugurated in December 1987 -- was commissioned 
in order to weigh procurement options in the light of new SDF operational 
responsibilities out to 1,000 nm. The ASDF also rationalised its plans to acquire 
Airborne Warning and Control System (AW A Cs) aircraft from the United States 1n 
terms of fulfilling Japan's sea lane defence commitments. 
Although the United States aimed to build up ASDF and MSDF capabilities in 
particular, the GSDF was also able to use sea lane defence as a rationale to defend its 
budgetary allocation, especially once the Nakasone administration committed the SDF to 
blockading the "four straits". Based on a scenario for a Soviet landing in Hokkaido, the 
GSDF adopted "Sea Shore Strike" as a new operational concept to orient its doctrine and 
procurement strategy. With the fielding of SSM-1 surface-to-ship missile units under 
the MTDP, the GSDF also gained an integral role in the defence of the Soya and 
Tsugan1 straits92 . 
Despite the Reagan administration's increasing satisfaction with Japan's defence efforts 
under Nakasone, pressure on Tokyo to raise its defence spending to 2-3 per cent of GNP 
continued to mount at the Congressional level. In June 1985, during a visit to 
Washington by JDA Director General Kato Koichi, the US Senate passed a motion 
calling on Tokyo to increase military spending93 . This was followed up by further 
legislation requiring the President to report to Congress on Japan's progress in 
implementing the taiko and towards meeting its sea lane defence commitments by 
199094. 
90 Michael Green, 'Despite Aegis, Japan Still Will Depend on U.S . Navy', Defense News, August 13, 1990, 
f 8. 
1 Acquisition of F-15s was one area where the MTDP fell short of its procurement targets: a total of 187 
aircraft was not acquired until the 1991 -95 MTDP. 
92 A 1989 article by Japan ' s defence attache to Washington, Matsukane Hisamoto , reveals the extent to 
which sea lane defence served as a rationale to justify the force structure and operational concepts of all 
tlu·ee Self Defense Forces ; 'Japan and Security of the Sea Lanes ', Global Affairs, (Spring): 1989, pp 61-63 . 
See also Vice Admiral Kitamura and Nishimura Shigeki, 'Transformation of the U.S.-Japan Defense 
Posture: Toe New Soviet Challenge', International Institute for Global Peace (IIGP) Policy Paper, October 
1991. 
93 Joseph P. Keddell , Jr. The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures, M.E. 
Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1994, p 127. 
94 Katahara Eiichi, The Politics of Japanese Defence Policy Making, 1975-1989, unpublished PhD thesis , 
Griffith University, April 1990, pp 280-282. 
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Nonetheless, by the end of 1986, Nakasone' s administration had done enough to head 
off a rupture in alliance relations that might have occuned had a less defence-minded 
leader been in power. Nakasone achieved a 36 per cent rise in spending between 1982 
and 1987 -- a rate of increase above any NATO country except the United States95 . The 
tempo of alliance cooperation increased in tandem: Nakasone granted permission for the 
United States to station F-16s at the joint base in Misawa from April 1985, significantly 
enhancing US maritime strike capabilities in the Northwest Pacific; the first joint ground 
exercises took place in Hokkaido in 1986; and in that year the MSDF sent a full escort 
flotilla and a P-3C contingent to the RIMPAC exercises. 
The MTDP force levels were still considerably below those proposed by the United 
States at Hawaii in June 1981. However the pattern of procurements was clearly directed 
towards boosting those capabilities -- ASW, mine warfare, and extended air defence -- in 
which the US had the greatest strategic interest. A joint US-Japan study on 
interoperability was set up in January 1987, and exercises conducted under the auspices 
of the Guidelines continued to deepen cooperation and exchange between the SDF and 
US Armed Forces. By Nakasone' s last year in office, the US administration was largely 
satisfied with Japan's burden-sharing efforts, and in January 1987 US representatives at 
the Sixteenth US-Japan Security Subcommittee meeting endorsed Japan's defence 
budget and its efforts to conduct the build-up within the confines of the taiko. However, 
Congress was less able to separate defence cooperation (and prospective Japanese 
purchases of expensive US weapons systems) from mounting trade friction. In 1987, as 
the US trade deficit with Japan reached $57 billion, Congress passed a joint resolution 
demanding that Japan should devote 3 per cent of GNP to defence96 . 
Nakasone' s successors returned to an essentially low-profile, ' incrementalist' approach 
towards defence. Defence spending continued to increase at around 5-6 per cent through 
1991, but peaked both as a proportion of GNP and government spending in fiscal 198897 . 
By the late-1980s , the pendulum in US policy towards Japan, which had tilted for so 
long in favour of increasing the level of SDF armament, began to swing back towards 
the objective of keeping this within 'defensive ' bounds. The US Ambassador to Tokyo 
95 Joseph P. Keddell , Jr. The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures, M.E. 
Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1994, pl 00, 131. 
96 S. Javed Maswood, Japanese Defence: the Search for Political Power, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Allen and Unwin, 1990, pp 46-47. 
97 The respective figures are 1.013 per cent of GNP and 6.51 per cent of the general account (Joseph P. 
Keddell, Jr. The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures, M.E. Sharpe, 
Armonk, New York, 1994, p 149). 
199 
during the early 1990s, Michael Armacost, later recalled that the Department of Defense 
decided to "draw a line in the sand" over the MSDF' s ambitions to acquire an aircraft 
carrier and aerial refuelling, although he noted that this desire was "perhaps encouraged 
by their counterparts in the US Navy and Air force". In Armacost' s view, although this 
capability was relevant to its sea lane surveillance and defence mission, it "signalled 
possibly larger ambitions as well". MSDF ambitions to acquire an aircraft carrier -- an 
aspiration common to all large navies -- were still ingrained, despite the deepening of 
defence cooperation with the US Navy98 . In the late 1980s, JDA officials testified 
before the Diet that light aircraft carriers would be permissible under the Constitution. 
However, studies into the suitability of acquiring a vertical take-off and landing 
capability to solve the MSDF' s weakness in air defence at sea, concluded that Harrier-
type aircraft would be too slow to combat the Tu-22M99 . 
VII. The Tanker War. 
Coinciding with the most ac.tive debate on Japan's involvement in sea lane defence, 
during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), Japanese shipping in fact faced a direct military 
threat in the Strait of Hormuz, through which around 55 per cent of its oil was shipped at 
the time. As far back as 1980, Republican Congressmen Paul Findley had used the 
prospect of an Iranian blockade of the Strait to press Japan to contribute to US-led 
patrols of the Gulf100 . As a result of such attacks, early in the conflict the Japan 
Shipowners' Association (JSA) (nihon senshu kyokai) and the powerful All-Japan 
Seamen's Union (zennikkai) restricted their members' activities aboard tankers in the 
Gulf region101 . Despite pleas for both sides to respect freedom of navigation from 
Japan's UN ambassador, Kuroda Mizuo, and talks between Foreign Minister Abe 
Shintaro and his Iranian and Iraqi counterparts in September 1984, attacks on Japanese-
owned and chartered tankers persisted. On July 5, 1984, a Japanese engineer was killed 
after Iranian aircraft bombed the Liberian-registered tanker Primrose, while it loaded oil 
at the Ras Tanura terminal in Saudi Arabia. 
The failure of Japan's diplomatic effo11s to secure its shipping interests in the Middle 
East served only to underscore its reliance on the US naval presence in the Gulf, and to 
98 Norman D Levin, Mark Lorell, and Arthur Alexander, The Wary Warriors : Future Directions in Japanese 
Security Policies , Rand, Santa Monica, 1993 , p 53; and Usui Naoaki, ' Japanese Navy Stresses Updates 
ASW Capability ' , Def ense News, September 9, 1991, p 9. 
99 Michael H Armacost. Friends or Rivals ?: the Insider's Account of U.S.-Japan Relations , Columbia 
University Press , New York, 1996, pp 88-90; and interview with Adm. Kawamura Sumihiko, Okazaki 
Institute, March 1999. 
100 Yomiuri Shimbun, October 8, 1980, p 1. 
101 Aka.ha Tsuneo. 'Japan's Response to Threats of Shipping Disruptions in Southeast Asia and the Middle 
East', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2, Summer 1986, pp 255-77 . 
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strengthen US arguments that Japan, if unable to commit naval forces directly, should at 
least boost its own defence effo1is, thus enabling more Seventh Fleet assets to be 
released from the Northwest Pacific. Japanese-owned and registered tankers (including 
the 180,000-ton Nisshin Maru and the 227,000-ton Diamond Marine) were among the 
victims of escalating air and surface attacks on shipping by Iran in August 1987. As a 
result, the JSA and the All-Japan Seamen's Union on September 2 temporarily 
suspended all Japanese-operated ships from entering the Strait of Hormuz, while the 
Shipowners Labour Relations Agency began organising three-tanker convoys for 
shipping already in the Gulf to mininlise the risk of further attacks 102. 
In this context, MOFA, reluctant to request US naval protection for Japanese shipping 
for fear of Iranian reprisals against Japan's economic (mainly oil-related) interests in the 
country, proposed making financial contributions in support of US operations in the Gulf 
which had expanded to include escort operations for Kuwaiti-flagged tankers. However, 
Prime Minister Nakasone proposed to dispatch MSDF minesweepers directly to the 
Gulf. In the face of strong opposition from within his own party, including from Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Gotoda Masaharu, a decision was 1nade to supply navigational aids to 
Saudi Arabia instead103 . Nakasone's failure to win support for his initiative to dispatch 
minesweepers in 1987 demonstrated that in both practical and political terms, Japan's 
ability to extend naval protection to its shipping beyond 1,000 nm remained well beyond 
its reach. Although MSDF minesweepers were dispatched to the region in April 1991, 
this occurred only after the end of the Gulf War -- only underscoring the government's 
inability to dispatch the Self Defense Forces overseas in circumstances that might 
imperil its ban on collective self defence. 
Conclusion. 
Sea lane defence emerged at the centre of Japan's defence policy and alliance relations 
in the late 1970s and 1980s owing, a priori, to pressure from the United States to boost 
defence efforts. This reflected Washington's assessment of its own deteriorating 
strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and determination to shift more of the 
burden of defence to regional allies. Japan's dependence on the US Navy for security in 
the Gulf region -- particularly after the Iran-Iraq War demonstrated the vulnerability of 
Japanese shipping to attack -- provided a persuasive rationale for US officials to pressure 
Tokyo to boost its defence efforts in the Northwest Pacific to compensate for the 
102 
'Iran attacks Japanese-leased oil-tankers', The Japan Times, September 19, 1987, p l. 
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reallocation of US Seventh Fleet assets to the Indian Ocean. Moreover, US officials 
who were familiar with the longstanding ambitions of former Imperial Navy officers to 
develop the MSDF into a blue-water navy oriented for a sea lane defence role knew that 
appealing to Japan' s vulnerability to blockade was likely to register politically in Japan 
as would few other scenarios for military cooperation. As a relative 'dove' on defence 
issues, Prime Minister Suzuki's May 1981 comments and subsequent retractions fit the 
pattern of minimal, ad hoc responses to US burden-sharing demands consistent with the 
Yoshida Doctrine and do1nestic constraints laid down in the 1945-77 period. However, 
US efforts to expand Japan's share of the 'defence burden' via sea lane defence also met 
with support among Japan's security policy decision-makers, including within the JDA, 
MOFA and LDP, who for their own varying strategic, bureaucratic and political reasons 
supported an increase in Japan's defence and alliance cooperation efforts. 
Suzuki appears, at best, to have been an unwitting accomplice in setting the political 
agenda for sea lane defence in the 1980s. The substance of his comments in May 1981 
closely echoed his statements before the House of Councillors Special Committee on 
Security in October 1980 and Diet speeches of JDA officials as far back as Kubo 
Takuya' s statement in November 1970. Having received assurances from his staff that 
his speeches to be delivered in the United States reflected existing policy that was 
already a matter of Diet record, Suzuki was under the impression that he was merely re-
affirming JDA plans for defending convoys dating back to the 1960s, to appease US 
officials eager to press Japan for an expanded territorial defence commitment. However, 
to Washington, the prime minister's comments constituted official acceptance of an 
expanded geographical division of responsibilities within the Alliance. Initially resisted 
by the LDP leadership, the political rationale of sea lane defence was subsequently 
e1nbraced and expanded to include a blockade of the Sea of Japan by Nakasone, who 
backed the build-up of SDF capabilities and alliance cooperation against the Soviet 
Union. Defence suited Nakasone' s pursuit of a moderate nationalist domestic political 
agenda and was also part of a wider shift in Japanese elite and political opinion that 
perceived a relative decline in US power as detrimental to Japan's security. 
For the SDF, the real problem, even under an administration sympathetic to funding its 
expansion, remained its need to find a credible role that, on the one hand, was acceptable 
to the public and accountable to the Constitution, and, on the other, was able to fulfil the 
103 Interview with Japan 's former ambassador to Washington, Murata Ryohei, March 6, 2002; and Sudo 
Sueo, Southeast Asia in Japanese Security Policy, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1991, p 
39. 
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rmn1mum strategic requirements expected and sometimes demanded by the United 
States. Sea lane defence proved to be a highly flexible concept that lent itself to these 
policy needs. A shift in SDF doctrine towards adopting an extra-territorial sea and air 
area defence role, functionally integrated within US military strategy, could thus be 
argued as falling within the right of individual self-defence, based upon a Soviet threat 
to Japan's sea lanes. Although the "protection of maritime transportation" was 
maintained as part of the MSDF' s rationale for sea lane defence, this masked an 
incremental but pronounced shift from the original limited concept of escorted convoys 
dating back to the 1960s, progressing through an intermediary stage of patrolled sea 
lanes in the early 1970s, to a concept of zonal defence by the time of Japan's entry into 
RIMPAC in 1980. Throughout the decade, the pattern of SDF procurement and 
exercises pointed to its deepening integration within US global military strategy directed 
against the Soviet Union. Although the· end of the Cold War in 1990-91 abruptly 
withdrew the strategic rationale that had underpinned sea lane defence, sea lane security 
would continue to assert itself as a strategic priority for Japan in the post-Cold War era 
against a more diffuse, but also more plausible array of threats and challenges, as will be 
shown in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Japan's Sea Lane Diplomacy in Southeast Asia since the 1970s 
Introduction. 
This chapter explores the diplomatic aspects of Japan's SLOC security, concentrating 
on Japan's efforts to secure its navigational interests in a region of particular importance 
outside the 1,000 nautical mile (nm) perimeter of sea lane defence. The choice of 
Southeast Asia as a case study for Japan's sea lane diplomacy reflects the economic 
importance to Japan of chokepoint straits and seas in the region, as profiled in chapters 
One and Two. These include the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok-Makassar and the 
South China Sea, through which pass approximately 42 per cent of Japan's trade and 
most of its energy imports. 
First, Japan's interests are partly to ensure that safe navigation is physically possible 
through congested, constricted and shallow waterways. Second, its status as the major 
extra-regional user of Southeast Asia's straits and coastal seas, for shipments of oil, 
liquefied natural gas (LNG), nuclear waste and other hazardous cargoes has also made it 
the object of coastal states' environmental concerns, with the potential to create political 
friction. Third, coastal states' jurisdictional claims to the region's most important sea 
lines of communication (SLOC), many of which have received recognition under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) framework, have made it 
important for Japan to be diplomatically engaged in the region. 
Given the emphasis that Japan has placed on excluding any strategic military content to 
its diplomatic relations, especially with other Asian countries sensitive to the legacy of 
wartime occupation by Japan, this thesis is also concerned with the extent to which 
Tokyo's self-declared pursuit of 'comprehensive security' has enabled Japan to ensure 
its SLOC security interests with regional states in overlapping fields including 
economic relations and diplomacy. The importance of diplomacy in securing Japan's 
energy supply routes was identified in the 1979 official Report on Coniprehensive 
National Security, which stressed: 
It is ... important to find ways to ensure the safe passage of tankers through the 
long transport route passing the Indian Ocean, the Malacca Strait, and the South 
China Sea. Since Japan cannot resort to its own military power to protect tankers in 
these areas, it must give adequate consideration to alternative policies for this 
purpose and be willing to support the cost they entail 1• 
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These concerns are echoed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) December 2002 
Energy Diplomacy statement, which declares "maintaining and enhancing friendly 
relations with Middle East countries and other energy producing countries and countries 
along international shipping lanes" to be among Japan's foremost diplomatic 
objectives2. 
This chapter charts the evolution of Japan's sea lane diplomacy from its failed bid to 
internationalise the Straits of Malacca in the early 1970s up to 2003. It initially locates 
Japan's SLOC-security interests in Southeast Asia in the general context of its regional 
diplomacy. This is followed by an analysis of Japan's responses to and perceptions of 
the UNCLOS framework. The chapter then focuses on three core sea lane security 
concerns for Japan in Southeast Asia. First, the Straits of Malacca demand separate 
consideration owing to their economic importance to Japan and the fact that jurisdiction 
is shared among three states. Second, Japan's diplomacy towards Indonesia is explored 
in the context of the latter's archipelagic doctrine and control of several other SLOC 
i1nportant to Japan's trade. Third, Japan's shipments of radioactive fuels, which have 
been the object of particular opposition among coastal states in the region and beyond, 
are examined, demonstrating the importance of environmental problems within SLOC 
security. 
The chapter shows that Japan has developed a composite approach that blends official 
and private diplomacy (via non-governmental organisations and commercial 
organisations) as well as reliance on other maritime states to pursue the more 
confrontational aspects of freedom of navigation in the region. Specifically, this 
chapter argues Japan ' s diplomacy has been effective in terms of limiting its 
vulnerability to "troublesome" conditions and tolls being placed by regional states on 
commercial shipping. By establishing cooperative frameworks and good will with 
Southeast Asian states, Japan has reduced its own perception of vulnerability and need 
for compensatory defence policy responses. Potential military threats to Japan 's 
navigational interests in Southeast Asia have also been made less likely as a result of its 
1 Report on Comprehensive National Security (Translation), Comprehensive ational Security Study 
Group, July 2, 1980, p 54. 
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broader diplomacy and econonnc linkages with the region. However, Chapter Seven 
argues that Japan's diplomatic influence has only a limited effect in regard to non-state 
actor threats posed to its shipping interests in Southeast Asia by piracy and terrorism, 
while Chapter Eight suggests that China's potential threat to the Southeast Asian sea 
lanes is regarded by Japan's policy-makers as requiring a different order of diplomatic or 
defence policy response. 
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I. Japan's diplo1nacy towards Southeast Asia. 
Having officially forsworn military options in its dealings with the coastal states, Japan 
has had to rely on almost exclusively non-military means to secure access through the 
Southeast Asian chokepoints, making this the most critical test of its diplomatic and 
economic levers to deliver a liberal passage regime to serve its international shipping 
interests. However, Japan's almost entirely commercial interest in freedom of 
navigation 1n the region has also simplified its dealings with littoral states more 
interested in limiting foreign military deployments for reasons of security and 
sovereignty than inhibiting merchant shipping3. 
In looking after its interests in navigational access and shipping safety in Southeast 
Asia, Japan has generally been content to follow the lead of more assertive Western 
maritime states, such as the United States and Australia4. This reflects the pattern of 
Japan's post-war foreign policy approach in Asia, which was based on maintaining a 
low political profile in order to secure its resource import needs and to minimise 
political risk to its large commercial presence in the region. However, a policy approach 
using various non-military policy levers and a mixture of state and private sector 
involvement has gradually developed and has proved largely successful in securing 
Japan's navigational security interests in the region from legal and environmental 
challenges by coastal states. 
In the mid-1970s, a number of violent anti-Japanese riots in Southeast Asian capitals 
forced a review of Tokyo's regional policies. Since that time, the record of Japan's 
diplomacy with the key coastal states in Southeast Asia has been notable less for 
diplomatic failures or triumphs than for a stable continuum. Political and commercial 
relations have strengthened steadily, both at a bilateral level and through Japan's 
multilateral interface with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which 
was formed in 1967. Despite the implication of the non-official 'Malacca Straits 
defence theory' (maraka boeiron) of the late 1960s that maritime Southeast Asia falls 
potentially within Japan's defence zone, it has been part of Japan's official defence 
policy to reassure Southeast Asian countries, particularly in respect of its security 
interest in the straits that "Japan has only the capability of securing shipping within the 
3 See for example, Jay L. Batongbacal, 'Archipelagic Sealanes and Transit Passage Tlu·ough Straits: Shared 
Responsibilities Is (sic) Essential to Implementation', Conference paper presented at the 13th International 
Conference on Sea Lines of Communications, Canberra, April, 2001 , p 6. 
4 Akaha Tsuneo, Japan in Global Ocean Politics, University of Hawaii Press and Law of the Sea Institute, 
University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1985 , pp 77-9. 
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range of 1,000 miles from Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka"5. Visiting Japanese premiers have 
tended to adhere to former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo' s formulation (laid out in 
Manila in August 1977) of seeking "heart-to-heart" relations based on: 1) not becoming 
a "military power"; 2) seeking closer economic, political and cultural cooperation with 
states in the region; and 3) promoting ties between ASEAN and Indochina 6. 
Economic relations based on the 'three pillars' of investment, trade and aid have 
underpinned the rhetoric of closer ties and cooperation since the 'Fukuda doctrine' was 
announced. Following Fukuda' s visit, Japan promised $1 billion in aid. However, in 
large part the deepening of economic ties resulted from the revaluation of the yen under 
the 1985 Plaza Accords, which triggered a flood of foreign direct investment (FDI) from 
Japan into Southeast Asia. FDI levels increased from $855 million in 1986 to $4.7 
billion by 1988, making Japan the region's largest external source of capital and 
Southeast Asia Japan's preferred overseas production platform in Asia. Additionally, 
between 1985 and 1992, trade between ASEAN and Japan rose by an annual average of 
20 per cent, making ASEAN Japan's third largest trade partner after the United States 
and the European Union. As the third leg of Japan's economic ties, Southeast Asia 
emerged as one of the primary beneficiaries of the expansion of Japan's Overseas 
Develop1nent Assistance (ODA) programme, the world's largest in the 1980s and 1990s 
until overtaken by the United States in 2001. In addition to benefiting Japanese firms 
relocating to Southeast Asia7, ODA was and is still viewed by the MOFA as "creating 
an international environment favourable to Japan"8. Some of Japan's aid to major 
ASEAN states, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, was labelled "strategic" during 
the 1980s owing to the political importance attached to these countries' Western 
orientation in a Cold War context and their "strategic location in key transit points in 
the world's ocean navigation"9. 
5 See, for example, articles on JDA Director General Kawara Tsutomu's 1988 visit to Indonesia: ('Kawara 
ends his Indonesia trip satisfactorily, Jakarta Post, July 2, 1988, p 1); and JDA Director General Mihara 
Asao' s 1977 testimony before the House of Councillors Cabinet Committee 'Japan Shipping Defenseless in 
Malacca Strait', The Japan Tinies , November 16, 1977, p 4); and also Chapter Four. 
6 Chaiwat Kamchoo, 'Japan's Role in South-east Asian Security: Plus c;a Change ', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 64, 
1991, pp 9-10. For the most recent example, see Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro ' s speech: ' Japan and 
ASEAN in East Asia - A Sincere and Open Partnership' delivered in Singapore, January 14, 2002; Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Japan, website: www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0201/speech.html 
7 Japan's ODA programme has laid special emphasis on building up the infrastructure of local economies 
through an allocation to public-works projects double the average of developed country donors. 
8 Diplomatic Bluebook 1998, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan/Urban Connections , Tokyo 1998, p 97. 
9 Steve Chan, 'Humanitarianism, Mercantilism, or Comprehensive Security? Disbursement Patterns of 
Japanese Foreign Aid', Asian Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 1992, pp 10-14. 
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Japan's economic decline since the collapse of the asset bubble in 1990-91 has eroded 
its pre-eminent economic position within Southeast Asia. Japan's economy remains five 
times larger than China's measured in dollars terms and Japanese FDI in the ASEAN 
region still amounted to 2 billion dollars in 2000. Nonetheless, China's rising economic 
and political profile in the region, as exemplified by a November 2001 agreement to 
establish an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area by 2010, has prompted Japan to propose its 
own plans for deeper economic ties with ASEAN states, on a bilateral and multilateral 
b . 10 as1s . Such an approach is designed to maintain Southeast Asia as "a sphere of 
paramount Japanese economic importance" 11 . The fact that Southeast Asia has been 
exempted from 10 per cent cuts to the overall aid budget implemented by Prime 
Minister Koizun1i Junichiro's ad1ninistration is a testainent to the i1nportance Tokyo 
attaches to the value of ODA as a tool of influence in a region of high economic and 
strategic value -- not least as a provider of mineral and energy resource exports. 
II. Japan and UNCLOS. 
In addition to relying on other maritime states, to avoid the impression of overt 
assertiveness, Tokyo has sought where possible to represent its legal and navigational 
safety concerns through the multilateral auspices of the IMO as the UN-level body 
responsible for international shipping interests 12. According to Leifer (1978), this has 
handed Japan "the prospect of securing the best of both worlds in that it avoids undue 
tension with coastal states with whom it has close economic associations while its goal 
of transit passage is obtained through the diplomacy of the superpowers" 13 . 
Japan's approach to UNCLOS has evolved unevenly. According to a personal account 
of Japan's "inept" and "dismal" negotiating performance at the second UN CLOS 
conference (UNCLOS II) in the early 1970s, Tokyo's view of UNCLOS was affected by 
a declining faith in the ability of the United States to protect Japan's sea lanes militarily. 
This perception led Japanese negotiators to overestimate the power of resource-supplier 
states while underestimating their own position. Moreover, Japanese representatives 
drawn from the Foreign, International Trade and Industry, Transport and Justice 
ministries as well as the agencies for Fisheries, Defense, Land, Natural Resources and 
10 David Kruger and Murray Hiebert, 'Battered but Still on Top', Far Eastern Economic Review, January 
24, 2002, pp 24-25. 
11 Richard p Cronin, 'Japan's Expanding Role and Influence in the Asia Pacific Region: Implications for 
US Interests', Current Politics and Econoniics of Japan, Vol. 3, No. 2/3, 1993, p 121. 
12 Through such agreements as the International Safety Management (ISM) Code and Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watch.keeping for Seafarers (STCW) Convention. 
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Energy were reportedly unable even to reach a coordinated position on many issues put 
before them 14. Continued wariness about UN CLOS was behind Japan's decision to 
oppose the legal concept of a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the 
only one of 116 nations represented at the UNCLOS III meeting in Caracas to do so15 . 
Japanese commentators have periodically expressed concerns over the implications of 
the UNCLOS framework throughout its evolution (1958-94), especially in regard to 
'creeping jurisdiction' and legal justifications that could be used to implement tolls and 
other restrictions on vessels' movements. According to Japan's senior representative to 
UNCLOS III, MOFA's former Deputy Director of the Sea Law Office, Iguchi Takeo, 
the importance of Japan's relations with Indonesia and Malaysia has increased as a 
result of the Law of the Sea, given its potential implications for freedom of navigation 16. 
In 1980, former Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) Chief of Staff Admiral Uchida 
Kazutomi commented that as long as innocent passage is respected in archipelagic 
waters and transit passage upheld in international straits "few problems are likely to 
arise". Equally, Uchida expressed concern about the potential for "states with 
international straits within their tenitorial waters impos(ing) troublesome conditions 
beyond those related to safety and pollution" and other "difficulties and hindrance" in 
h . 1 . 17 arc 1pe ag1c waters . Vice-Admiral Yamamoto Makoto, a former Chief of the Self 
Defense Fleet, has identified "unilateral declarations restricting specific waters" as 
among the most important potential challenges confronting freedom of navigation in the 
Asia-Pacific18 . According to former JDA Administrative Vice-Minister Akiyama 
Masaru, until 2001 the Agency's most senior policy official, the trend among coastal 
and archipelagic states to claim sunounding waters, including international straits, 
constitutes the second-most important maritime security challenge to Japan, after 
China's future defence capability 19. In part because of such suspicions, Tokyo's 
13 Michael Leifer, International Straits of the World: Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia, Sijthoff and 
Noordhoff, The Netherlands, 1978, p 175. 
14 Blaker, in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.), Japan's Foreign Policy: After the Cold War: Coping with Change, M.E. 
Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1993, pp 4-5. 
15 Akaha Tsuneo, Japan in Global Ocean Politics , University of Hawaii Press and Law of the Sea Institute, 
University of Hawaii, Honolulu , 1985, p 116. 
16 Iguchi Takeo, 'Emerging Ocean Regime for International Security Cooperation', Ocean Governance and 
OPK: The Thirteenth International Symposium Proceedings, National Institute for Defense Studies , Tokyo, 
1998, p 4. 
17 Uchida Kazutomi, 'Naval Competition and Security in East Asia', in Jonathan Alford (ed.), Sea Power 
and Influence: old issues and new challenges, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Farnborough, 
1980, pp 105-06. 
18 Yamamoto Mako to, 'Sealane in the Asia-Pacific Region Today and their Vulnerabilities ', Eleventh 
International Conference on the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) Studies, Tokyo, November 17-18, 
1997, pp 1-6. 
19 Interview with Akiyama Masahiro , Chairman, Ship and Ocean Foundation, Nippon Foundation, Tokyo, 
March 4, 2002. 
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diplomacy on the Straits of Malacca and towards the Law of the Sea was initially 
counter-productive, as is detailed below. 
m. The Straits of Malacca. 
As the 1najor commercial user of the Straits of Malacca, drawing around 90 per cent of 
its oil and much of its LNG through the straits, the challenge for Tokyo in its dealings 
with the three 'straits states' -- Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore -- has been to separate 
its interests in navigational safety as far as possible from politico-legal issues impinging 
on sovereignty. Generally, whenever the two issues have become entangled, as occurred 
during the early 1970s, Japan's relations with the coastal states have suffered. 
Indonesia is by far the most important of the straits states to the navigational interests of 
Japan and other extra-regional maritime states given its size and geostrategic location 
between the Indian Ocean and Pacific (see Map 9, below). A major concern of 
Indonesia's post-independence leaders was to control the movement of foreign naval 
forces through the Straits of Malacca, which, it was feared, might otherwise continue to 
serve as a gateway for foreign powers seeking to intervene in the archipelago. In the early 
years of the Indonesian Republic such concerns were given credence by the use of the 
straits by the Dutch to build up their forces in West New Guinea and later by covert 
assistance by the United States and United Kingdom to rebels in Sumatra and elsewhere 
with the aim of destabilising President Soekarno's left-leaning government in Jakarta. 
Map 9: Indonesia (pre-October 1999) and surrounding seas 
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Aspirations to control the straits 1n their entirety periodically resurfaced during 
Soekarno's rule. However, Indonesia 's declaration of a 12 nm ten-itorial sea in 1957 
was followed by legislation in 1960 committing Jakarta to demarcate its sea boundaries 
with its neighbours by means of a median line in cases where the waters dividing them 
were less than 24 nm wide. However, cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia was 
impossible throughout the 'Confrontation' period (1957-66), when the straits were the 
scene of military clashes between Indonesian and Commonwealth forces. Only once the 
anti-Communist President Soeharto was in power and all three littoral states were linked 
as co-founding members of ASEAN from 1967, did cooperation on the straits again 
become possible20 . 
For its part, Malaysia shared the desire of many newly independent coastal states, 
including Indonesia, to "wrest some control from developed nations which had by and 
large determined the course of customary international law particularly at the law of the 
sea conferences"21 . Using powers of decree invoked to quell racial disturbances in May 
1969, the Malaysian government enlarged its own territorial sea from 3 nm to 12 nm in 
August. In March 1970, the two states reached agreement to delimit a common 
boundary along a median line, placing a 'jurisdictional gate' across the straits. 
Singapore shared a common interest in improving navigational conditions in the strait. 
However, as it is also sun-ounded by Indonesian and Malaysian territory, and 
strategically reliant on outside powers' access through the Straits of Malacca for its 
survival, the joint enclosure of the straits by its neighbours signalled negative 
consequences for its security. 
IV. Japan's interests in the Straits of Malacca. 
Although the Straits of Malacca had served as a conduit for Japan's imports and exports 
since recovery began in the 1950s, Japan's concerns about navigational safety in the 
straits increased in late 1960s with the introduction of the first 200,000 dead weight tons 
(DWT) Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), which increased both the risks and stakes 
involved in a collision or major accident22. In July 1967, three months after the Tokyo 
Maru became the first Japanese supertanker to ground itself in the Straits of Malacca, 
20 Dino Patti Djalal, The Geopolitics of Indonesia 's Maritinie Territorial Policy, Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, Jakarta, 1996, pp 115-24. 
21 Koh Kheng Lian, Straits in International Navigation: Contemporary Issues, Oceana Publications, 
London, 1982, pp 56-58. 
22 James Morgan , 'Strait and Narrow', Far Eastern Economic Review, December 4, 1971, p 46. 
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Japan proposed to the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO) -
- until 1982, the forerunner to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) -- the 
creation of 'sea lanes' to separate east-bound and west-bound traffic within the straits. 
The Indonesian representative to the IMCO agreed to this suggestion in principle, with 
the proviso "that such an arrangement shall in no circumstances interfere with the rights 
and integrity of a State in its territorial water". It was also made clear that Indonesia 
would be unable to bear the costs of any associated survey and dredging work "for the 
foreseeable future" 23 . Jakarta, for this reason, did not oppose a survey expedition 
conducted by a Royal Navy hydrographic vessel in 1967. 
In July 1968, the Malacca Straits Council was formed in Japan as a private body to 
coordinate Japanese oil, shipping and marine insurance companies, and to represent 
their common interests in navigational safety and access to the straits24. The Ministry of 
Transport (MoT) meanwhile began to organise funding for survey expeditions to 
determine the suitability of the straits for large tankers25 . In spite of Indonesia's 
sensitivity regarding its "rights and privileges", and misgivings among all three littoral 
states over Japan's decision to appropriate the name of the straits for the Malacca Straits 
Council, Japan's gathering interest in improving navigational safety was not itself the 
object of concern for either Indonesia or Malaysia. 
Changes in Southeast Asia's external security environment around this time were key to 
a shift in attitudes among the straits states as well as in Japan. Early in 1968, the UK 
government, under mounting fiscal pressure, announced that it was accelerating by 
several years its military withdrawal 'East of Suez' to 1971, while from July 1969, the 
United States began to draw down its forces in mainland Southeast Asia with the 
announcement of the Nixon Doctrine. The first passage of a Soviet naval flotilla 
through the straits in 1968 was widely interpreted as a signal of Soviet interest in filling 
any related power vacuum. Soviet cargo vessels carrying supplies to Moscow's Far 
Eastern outposts were subsequently sighted regularly in the straits26 . To Indonesia and 
Malaysia, these developments represented both new uncertainties and opportunities. To 
the New Order regime in Jakarta, the Soviet presence prompted fears that Communist 
23 Ibid. p 77. 
24 Current contributors include oil firms, marine insmers, the Japan Shipowners Association and individual 
shipping companies such as K-line. (Interview with Capt. Osuka Yoshihiro, Asst. General Manager, Marine 
Safety and Environmental Team, 'K ' -line, February 28, 2002). 
25 Michael Leifer, International Straits of the World: Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia, Sijthoff and 
Noordhoff, The Netherlands , 1978, p 40. 
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rebels would receive clandestine support and that Indonesia could potentially be drawn 
into a superpower clash over access to the straits. In Malaysia, questions were asked in 
parliament about the government's readiness to prevent unfriendly warships from using 
the straits even though Western forces retained a small air and naval presence on their 
eastern shore27 . By the same token, the drawdown of Anglo-American defence 
responsibilities in the region was an opportunity for both Indonesia and Malaysia to 
repair bilateral ties and mutually to assert their sovereignty claims. Obtaining 
Singapore's cooperation was an important objective for Indonesia, as it would enable 
the Malacca and Singapore straits to be presented as a single legal entity, on which a 
common position might jointly be adopted. 
Following the Royal Navy survey in 1967, Japan obtained permission from the coastal 
states to proceed with a preliminary survey of the straits from January to March 1969. 
The Hydrographic Department of the Maritime Safety Agency and MoT officials also 
participated in the survey conducted under the auspices of the Malacca Straits Council. 
As a private level body with plenipotentiary powers, the Malacca Straits Council 
enabled the government to minimise Japan' s diplomatic profile in negotiations on the 
straits , partly to avoid the impression of imposing its will, but also to avoid conferring 
de Jure recognition of Indonesia ' s and Malaysia's territorial sea claims28 . The survey 
identified several shoals and sunken obstacles, and plans were laid for a second 
expedition. In May, the MoT and MOFA held joint consultations with US International 
Development Agency, with a view to presenting a plan to secure safety of navigation in 
the straits to other major users and to the three coastal states later that year. 
However, Japanese negotiators learned subsequently that Kuala Lumpur had linked its 
permission for a new survey to Japan' s recognition of the new 12 nm territorial sea 
boundary declared in August. Tokyo was reluctant to recognise Malaysia's claim, since 
it amounted to recognition that the narrowest sections of the Straits of Malacca were 
entirely under the sovereign control of the coastal states. In September 1969, a Japanese 
naval flotilla was dispatched through the straits . Although this was the MSDF' s first 
post-war training mission to Southeast Asia, it was in part a signal designed to 
26 Dino Patti Djalal, The Geopolitics of Indonesia's Maritinie Territorial Policy, Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, Jakarta, 1996, p 11 6. 
27 Koh Kheng Lian, Stra its in International Navigation: Contemporary Issues, Oceana Publications, 
London, 1982, p 60. 
28 Hasjim Djalal notes that Japan has employed a similar tactic of using private organisations to conclude 
bilateral fisheries agreements with Indonesia over access to the Banda Sea (Indonesia and the Law of the 
Sea, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 1995, p 154) 
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demonstrate Japan's concern to keep the straits internationalised, as suggested by the 
MSDF Chief of Staff's reported comments to departing crews, framing the symbolic 
importance of the training mission in the context of the Royal Navy's withdrawal from 
Singapore29 . When the Administrative Bureau of the Malacca Straits Council attempted 
to negotiate survey and dredging rights for Japanese vessels separately with Indonesia 
and Singapore, the approach was rejected by Indonesia30 . The dispute was settled only 
in May 1970 following a direct appeal for Malaysia ' s consent from Japan ' s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. A compromise was eventually reached whereby an Indonesian vessel 
would be used for the second survey. 
Concerned at Malaysia's unexpected linkage to its territorial sea claims and at the new 
concert between former rivals in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta, Japan approached the 
IMCO in 1970 to garner support for some form of institutional representation for itself 
and other shipping nations on navigational safety matters in the straits. In October, the 
Japanese delegate to the IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation revealed 
Tokyo's intention to "set up an international co-operative system which inclucles three 
littoral countries and major shipping countries" as a prerequisite to the introduction of a 
traffic separation scheme31. In early 1971, MoT representatives took the idea one stage 
further, by proposing to set up a Malacca-Singapore Straits Board, including 
representatives from major maritime states, to whom the straits states would be required 
to report on an annual basis. Failing to anticipate the straits states ' reaction to these 
proposals, the issue of international regulation was pursued further by the Japanese 
delegation at the meeting of the IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation in 
London in July 1971. 
Indonesia and Malaysia both registered their strong opposition to Japan's 
"inappropriate" attempt to "take away" the right to control and supervise the straits from 
the coastal states. On November 16, 1971 , Indonesia and Malaysia bilaterally 
proclaimed the "de-internationalisatlon" of the straits in a Joint Statement, to which 
Singapore also partially acceded. The tripartite Joint Statement asserted that: 
29 Michael Leifer, International Straits of the World: Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia , Sijthoff and 
Noordhoff, The Netherlands, 1978, pp 42-43. 
30 Bhabani Sen Gupta, T.T. Poulose, Hemlata Bhatia, The Malacca Straits and the Indian Ocean: A Study of 
the Strategic and Legal Aspects of a Controversial Sea-lane, Macmillan, New Delhi, 1974, pp 58-59. 
31 Michael Leifer, International Straits of the World: Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia, Sijthoff and 
Noordhoff, The Netherlands, 1978, p 45 . 
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• Safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is the responsibility of 
the coastal states concerned. 
• A body should be established to coordinate safety of navigation, composed only of 
coastal state representatives. 
• The problem of safety of navigation and the question of internationalisation of the 
straits should be treated as two separate issues. 
• While "fully recognising their use for international shipping in accordance with the 
principle of innocent passage", Indonesia and Malaysia declared that the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore were no longer considered "international straits". (On this 
point Singapore restricted itself to "taking note" of the Malaysian-Indonesian 
. . 3? ) pos1t1on - . 
• On the basis of this understanding, the three governments approved the continuation 
of the hydrographic survey. 
Thus, Japan's attempts to promote internationalisation of the straits had the opposite 
effect. Despite protesting against the Joint Statement, when questioned in the Diet 
about Tokyo's response to the tlu·eat of restrictions on Japanese shipping passing 
through the straits, then-Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo said only that "Japan would 
insist on the principle of free passage"33 . Malaysia's and Indonesia's fait accompli 
exposed the limits of Japan's influence over the littoral states. It was also a set-back for 
Japan's Southeast Asian diplomacy, casting Tokyo in the role of a former occupying 
power attempting to impose a solution on decolonising states in Asia -- the very 
perception that its post-war regional diplomacy was designed to counter. 
A change in the legal status of the straits was not inherently threatening to Japan's 
security; the concerns of govern1nent and industry flowed more from uncertainty as to 
the ultimate intentions of the straits states. It was thought at the time that Indonesia was 
contemplating the exclusion of large tankers from the Straits of Malacca in order to 
attract more shipping south through the archipelago, in support of its plans to develop 
the port of Tjiltjap on the south coast of J ava34. In the follow-up to the Joint Statement, 
various official and non-official statements emanating from Malaysia and Indonesia 
gave Japan further cause for concern. In 1972, Indonesia proposed banning fully-laden 
VLCCs over 200,000 DWT from traversing the straits , which would have compelled 
32 James Morgan , 'Strai t and arrow', Fa r Eastem Economic Review, December 4, 1971 , p 46. 
33 Sen Gupta et al , The Malacca Straits and the Indian Ocean: A Study of the Strategic and Legal Aspects of 
a Controversial Sea-lane, Macmillan, New Delhi, 1974, p 57. 
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Japanese supertankers either to divert through Lombok or to sail under-capacity. As 
both of these options would have incu1Ted considerable extra cost they were resisted. 
On April 17, 1972, the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy was reported as saying 
that warships and supertankers would be attacked if they entered Indonesian teITitorial 
waters35 . VLCCs, the majority of them feITying oil through the straits to Japan, were 
increasingly the object of environmental concerns in the littoral states, with Malaysian 
Deputy Prime Minister Tun Ismail Abdul Rahman telling an ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting in Singapore that the coastal states opposed internationalisation of the straits as 
"such a concept would ... endanger the livelihood of large segments of the population 
of our countries"36 . 
Japan was particularly concerned that the straits states would use their sovereignty 
claims to charge tolls similar to those charged in sea canals used for international 
navigation. In 1972, Tungku Razaleigh, then president of the Malay Chambers of 
Commerce, laid out plans -- without official approval -- to set up a joint Malaysian-
Indonesian authority that would charge levies on ships transiting the straits, aimed in 
part at directing traffic to Malaysian and Indonesian ports facing the straits. The 
proposed annual income from levies (set at $5,000 for oil tankers, $3,000 for cargo 
ships and $1,000 for cargo ships calling at Malaysian and Indonesian ports) was 
estimated at $147 million37 . 
The early 1970s was the low-point for Japan' s Straits of Malacca policy and marked the 
end of its attempts to gain a direct role in administering the straits through an 
international regime. The Joint Statement forced a re-evaluation of Japanese policy, 
prompting greater recognition of the coastal states' interests and the development of 
other non-military policy levers , mainly through increased financial and technical 
assistance. For their part, the coastal states subsequently moderated their stance having 
succeeded in extending their sovereignty over the straits. This was partly because 
security concerns relating to the straits lessened as the domestic and regional security 
environment stabilised in the 1970s. Japan 's decision to part-fund Malaysia's 
development of Port Klang as a repair facility capable of accommodating VLCCs, thus 
34 
'What 's in it for Them?', Far Eastern Economic Review, December 11, 1971, p 2. 
35 Cited in Koh Kheng Lian, Straits in International Navigation: Contemporary Issues , Oceana 
Publications , London, 1982, p 61. 
36 Ibid . p 62. 
37 In a contemporary essay, Hasjim Dj alal wrote that "the right to be compensated for works undertaken to 
facili tate passage" should not be confused with an intention by Indonesia to establish tolls. (Indonesia and 
the Law of the Sea, Centre for Strategic and International Studies , Jakarta, 1995, p 327). 
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generating local revenues from tanker traffic in the straits, may also have helped to ease 
Malaysian environmental concerns38 . The change in both Indonesia's and Malaysia's 
positions generally reflected shortcomings in their enforcement capacity as well as their 
ability to finance safety measures independently. This necessarily led them back to 
pursuing cooperation with user-states. In addition, as UNCLOS ill progressed, it 
became clear that many of the coastal states' key objectives, including recognition of 
the 12 nm territorial sea for coastal states as well as a new category of archipelagic 
state, would receive recognition under international law. The role of UNCLOS as a 
confidence-building legal regime through which the interests and concerns of both 
coastal and maritime states could be mediated was essential to restoring Japan's 
relations with the straits states to a cooperative track39 . 
For Indonesia, the recognition of its claim to archipelagic status -- Jakarta's primary 
objective under UNCLOS -- justified a compromise on the application of an innocent 
passage regime to the Straits of Malacca, especially as the eastern half of the straits fell 
outside its archipelagic waters claim. For the maritime states at UNCLOS, led by the 
United States, the quid pro quo demanded of the littoral states in return for recognition 
of many of their claims was to accept a new category of "transit passage", a more liberal 
regime guaranteeing unfettered movement through straits connecting one high seas area 
or EEZ with another40 (see Appendix 2). As UNCLOS took shape, uncertainties that 
had fuelled suspicions between Japan and the straits states during the Joint Statement 
period began to give way to the expectation of a common legal framework that would 
recognise the sovereignty claims of coastal states while upholding freedom of 
navigation through international straits. Indeed, following Jakarta's adoption of the 
Law of the Sea in 1985, Indonesian diplomats reverted to refeITing to the Straits of 
Malacca as an "international strait"41 . 
1. The Traffic Separation Scheme and Under-Keel Clearance limit. 
The next major test of Japan's relations with the straits states came when the VLCC 
Showa Maru ran aground in 1975, spilling more than 3,000 tonnes of crude south of 
Singapore. Although the spill was small in proportion to the tanker's capacity, the 
38 
'What's in it for Them?', Far Eastern Economic Review, December 11, 1971, p 2. 
39 According to Hasjim Djalal, "cooperation between the three states and Japan ... has been very successful, 
although it is not clear whether it is well-known outside Japan and the three coastal states", Indonesia and 
the Law of the Sea , Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 1995, pp 360-61. 
4° Koh Kheng Lian, Straits in International Navigation: Contemporary Issues, Oceana Publications , 
London, 1982, p 77. 
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incident remains the worst peacetime spillage in the Straits of Malacca and sparked 
substantial compensation claims against the Japanese owners from all three straits 
states. However, the accident was successfully contained as an issue of navigational 
safety, with minimal political fallout on Japan's relations with the coastal states. The 
Showa Maru began a process that resulted in the implementation of the Traffic 
Separation Scheme (TSS) and the establishment of the Revolving Fund, which together 
laid a stable foundation for Japan and the straits states to cooperate on navigational and 
environmental safety issues thereafter. 
There are basically two approaches to improving safety for the passage of large tankers 
through the Straits of Malacca. The first relies on enhancing the safety parameters of the 
straits, by conducting surveys and dredging operations to establish optimum routes, 
designating separate lanes for east and west-bound traffic and installing navigation aids. 
The second is to impose size and speed restrictions on vessels by setting a minimum 
under-keel clearance limit. While Japan's preference was for the former approach, the 
straits states pushed for an under-keel clearance limit, as this placed the onus of 
responsibility and cost on the vessel owners. 
In the wake of the Showa Maru accident and the donation by the Japanese government 
of an oil-skimming vessel to Singapore, the Malacca Straits Council hosted a conference 
on shipping safety in Tokyo which recommended measures to improve safety in the 
straits, including the TSS and under-keel clearance scheme and the installation of 
navigational aids 42. The Japanese Shipowners' Association drafted a set of navigation 
rules for the MoT, including an instruction to reduce tanker speeds to 10-12 knots. A 
tripartite Council on Safety of Navigation and Control of Marine Pollution was then 
formed among the three straits states, which agreed to adopt an under-keel clearance of 
3.5 metres (m) throughout the straits and to improve navigational aids further. It was 
also agreed that the users should bear the full cost of implementing safety measures. 
Following an extensive consultation process, the IMCO approved the under-keel 
clearance regulation and a TSS in the straits, in the Singapore Strait and around One 
Fathom Bank (see Map 10, below). Japan accepted both initiatives, but requested a 
period of grace to make the necessary alterations to its tanker fleet43 . The combined 
41 Dino Patti Djalal, The Geopolitics of Indonesia's Maritime Territorial Policy, Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, Jakarta, 1996, p 129. 
42 Koh Kheng Lian , Straits in International Navigation: Contemporary Issues, Oceana Publications, 
London, 1982, pp 80-83. 
43 In an effort to improve safety standards for ships, since 1978 Japan has granted 'scrap-and-build ' 
subsidies to Japanese shipbuilders to encourage the modernisation of its tanker fleet. 
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scheme was eventually introduced in May 1981, with financial and technical assistance 
from Japan. As a result, VLCCs over around 230,000 tons have since diverted through 
the Lombok Strait, for which Japan mounted joint preparatory survey expeditions with 
Indonesia in 1974 and 197544. 
Map 10: The Traffic Separation Scheme in the Straits of Malacca 
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The coastal states developed their own individual estimates for an under-keel clearance 
limit by adding values from three variables; squat (a phenomenon whereby the draught 
of a vessel increases as the result of a localised reduction of the water level caused by 
its forward motion), wave action swell, human factors, and a safety margin. An under-
keel clearance limit of 3.5m was eventually adopted as a compromise figure between the 
Indonesian estimate of 4.5m and the Singaporean estimate of 2.0m46 . A difference of 
44 As noted in Chapter One, K-line is among those shipping firms currently seeking to negotiate a 0.5 m 
reduction to the under-keel clearance limit. (Interview with Capt. Osuka Yoshihiro, Asst. General Manager, 
Marine Safety and Environmental Team, 'K' -line, February 28, 2002). 
45 
'Making the Straits Safer: A User's View of Alternative Routes ', paper given at the International 
Conference on the Strait of Malacca: Meeting the Challenges of the 21
st Century, Malaysian Institute of 
Maritime Affairs, June 14 and 15, 1994. 
46 Singapore's recommended under keel clearance was 2.5m less than Indonesia' s estimated minimum 
clearance, despite the fact that the Singapore Strait is statistically the most dangerous waterway in the Straits 
of Malacca. Some commentators have speculated that Indonesia was pursuing its development agenda by 
making it more economical for large tankers to divert through Lombok, where Jakarta had plans to construct 
.. r 
' ,. 
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even one metre caITies major commercial implications, since it means that a 250,000 
DWT VLCC must reduce its load by 15,000 DWT. On a national scale, this would 
translate into an annual shortfall in capacity of 1 O million tons according to one 
Japanese estimate47 . A 1973 estimate in contemporary prices put the cost of dive1iing 
Japan's VLCCs over 200,000 DWT through Lombok-Makassar at some 10 million yen 
per tanker for each voyage, adding $100-270 million to Japan's annual oil import bill, 
which then totalled $3 billion 48 . At that time, Japan operated over 90 tankers in the 
200,000-250,000 DWT range. 
As of 2001, technical and financial assistance provided by Japan to the straits states 
through the Malacca Straits Council since 1968 amounted to over 13 billion yen. Of the 
10 billion yen disbursed up to 1993; 1.4 billion was allocated to hydrographic surveys 
(the last conducted in 1978); 1.4 billion for the removal of four shipwrecks; 1 billion for 
dredging operations; 3.5 billion to install and maintain navigation aids; 502 million for a 
buoy tender donated to Malaysia in 197549 ; and 400 million to capitalise the Rolling 
Fund50 . Since 1981, the fund has given the straits states the facility to withdraw money 
quickly to pay for responses in the event of serious spillages51 . The Petroleum 
Association of Japan has also funded environ1nental clean-up exercises in the straits. In 
1993, a base was established in Singapore to forward store equipment used for 
combating oil spills and the three littoral states have developed responses in case of oil 
spills through the Oil Spill Preparedness and Response (OSP AR) project, financed 
exclusively by Japan via the Rolling Fund 52. Other measures to improve safety in the 
straits have been introduced with Japanese participation through the IMO, including a 
mandatory ship reporting system -- STRAITREP-- which has been in force in the Straits 
of Malacca since December 1998. STRAITREP requires all vessels transiting the straits 
oil storage and docking facilities. (Koh Kheng Lian, Straits in International Navigation: Contemporary 
Issues, Oceana Publications, London, 1982, pp 85, 95). 
47 Ouchi Kazuomi, 'Making the Straits Safer: A User's View of Alternative Routes ', paper given at the 
International Conference on the Strait of Malacca: Meeting the Challenges of the 21 st Century, Malaysian 
Institute of Maritime Affairs, June 14 and 15, 1994, p 4. 
48 Far Eastern Economic Review, February 26, 1973, pp 14-15. 
49 Negotiations have recently been held for the possible replacement of the buoy tender donated to Malaysia. 
50 Ono Akio, 'Japan's Contribution to Safety and Pollution Mitigation in the Straits of Malacca' in Hamzah 
(ed.), The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding and Navigational Safety, 
Maiitime Institute of Malaysia/Pelanduk Publications , 1997, Kuala Lumpur, pp 241-246. 
51 Teh Kong Leong, 'The Revolving Fund -- a Unique Facility', Paper given at the International Conference 
on the Strait of Malacca: Meeting the Challenges of 21st Century, Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs, 
Kuala Lumpur, June 14-15, 1994, p 2. 
52 Chia Lin Sien, 'The Strait of Malacca as a Tanker Pipeline: Some Considerations for Northeast Asian 
Users', Paper given at the International Conference on the Strait of Malacca: Meeting the Challenges of 21st 
Century, Malaysian Institute of Mai·itime Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, June 14-15, 1994, pp 14-17. 
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to divulge details such as name, call-sign, position, course and speed and whether 
hazardous cargoes are aboard53. 
Japanese technical and financial assistance was central to a number of other safety 
initiatives introduced in the straits. The hydrographic Common Datum Charts, on 
which the TSS was based, drew mainly from survey data collected jointly by Japan and 
the straits states from 1969-75. From 1976-79, the Malacca Straits Council compiled 
data on tidal ranges and currents54. In 1978, Japan was involved in a survey of One 
Fathom Bank to establish a 23m navigable channel to service east-bound traffic. After 
this survey was completed in November, Japan and the three straits states agreed to the 
installation of additional navigational aids. In 1979, the MoT agreed to fund the 
dredging operations required to make the new channels passable55 . Between 1969 and 
1988, the Council installed 39 navigational aids (lighthouses, beacons, buoys and 
surface radars) in the straits, which have since been maintained and replaced as 
necessary56 . The Malacca Straits Council and the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency have also discussed, as part of the ODA programme, a further round of surveys 
to monitor wrecks and shoals in the straits57 . 
Japan also linked the legal position of the Straits of Malacca under UN CLOS to its own 
policy on the UN Law of the Sea. In May 1977, under the terms of the Law on the 
Territorial Sea, Japan extended its territorial seas to 12 nm, but opted to retain an outer 
limit of 3 nm in the four international straits abutting Japanese territory -- Soya, 
Tsugaru, Tsushin1a, and Ostn11i58. This self-limiting ordinance was to avoid 
undermining its negotiating position with Indonesia and Malaysia by appearing to 
endorse the enclosure of international straits within territorial waters. The linkage was 
admitted by the government of the day: 
53 The Singapore Conference on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore - Issues, Perspectives and Post-
Conference Developments; www.sils.org/seminar/1996-straits-overview.htm. 
54 Ono Akio, 'Japan 's Contribution to Safety and Pollution Mitigation in the Straits of Malacca' in Hamzah 
(ed.), The Straits of Malacca : International Co-operation in Trade, Funding and Navigational Safety, 
Maritime Institute of Malaysia/Pelanduk Publications , 1997, Kuala Lumpur, p 242. 
55 Koh Kheng Lian, Straits in International Navigation: Contemporary Issues, Oceana Publications, 
London, 1982, pp 90-91. 
56 In October 1990, shipping radars were installed in the Singapore Strait, with the data feeding into the 
vessel traffic information system. 
57 Ono Akio, 'Japan's Contribution to Safety and Pollution Mitigation in the Straits of Malacca' in Hamzah 
(ed.), The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding and Navigational Safety, 
Maritime Institute of Malaysia/Pelanduk Publications, 1997, Kuala Lumpur, pp 242-43. 
58 Akaha Tsuneo, Japan in Global Ocean Politics, University of Hawaii Press and Law of the Sea Institute, 
University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1985, pp 119-23 . 
From the comprehensive viewpoint of the national interest of Japan, which imports 
the majority of its resources from overseas and depends heavily on trade and 
maritime shipping in particular, it is necessary to ensure free passage of merchant 
ships and large-sized tankers through the Straits of Malacca and elsewhere. . .. 
Therefore, as a provisional measure, for the time being, we shall not alter the 
present situation with respect to the so-called international straits of Japan59 . 
2. A Kra canal? 
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Most re-routing alternatives to the Strait of Malacca involve existing waterways passing 
through the Indonesian archipelago (see Chapter One). However, Japan has 
intermittently expressed interest in a canal or 'land-bridge' across the Isthmus of Krain 
Thailand. The original idea of a canal, which dates back to the 17th century, has been 
revived in several forms. The land-bridge concept involves the construction of a pipeline 
and overland railway to connect terminals on either side of the isthmus. Although this 
would represent a saving of up to 1,000 nm on the Straits of Malacca sea route (see Map 
11, below), it would only be a worthwhile option for "Japan-bound VLCCs which would 
otherwise use Lombok", according to Swinnerton (1996)6°. 
Map 11: Proposed route of the Kra Canal compared with the Straits of Malacca 
In 1971, a Japanese approach was made to the military government in Thailand 
requesting permission to conduct a survey for possible routes across the Isthmus. The 
59 Quoted in Ibid. p 12 7. 
60 Russ Swinnerton, 'A Description of Regional Shipping Routes : navigational and operational 
considerations', Maritime Studies, No. 87, March/April 1996, pp 10-22. 
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plan, similar to the land-bridge concept, envisaged 500,000-ton tankers operating shuttle 
runs between the Persian Gulf and a terminal at the Andaman Sea end of the pipeline. 
Oil would then be pumped to the Gulf of Thailand, where 200,000-DWT tankers would 
service the route to and from Japan. Construction was estimated to be four times 
cheaper than that of excavating a canal across the Kra. However, the successor to the 
Thanom-Praphat regime, which fell from power in 1973, did not pursue the project. 61 . 
The Mitsubishi Research Institute announced an interest in a Kra canal in 1986, when it 
included its own canal blueprint as part of a long list of infrastructure 'mega-projects' in 
the Global Infrastructure Fund. Some of the proposed schemes in the Fund amounted to 
little more than an exercise in corporate prestige. A proposal to construct a canal within 
10 years using nuclear blast earth-clearance methods was rejected on environmental 
grounds. However, a Mitsubishi proposal in 2000 to develop port facilities and an 
industrial development zone, in conjunction with a canal, received serious attention 
from Thai politicians eager to revive Thailand's post-1997 crisis economy with a 
national-scale construction project. Development costs were estimated at $25 billion to 
construct a two-way canal 102 kilometres (km) long, 25m deep and 400m wide62. 
Unlike previous proposals that assumed the canal would have to be funded with external 
capital, it was suggested, at a seminar on the Kra Canal Project held at Hat Yai on 
January 15, 2000, that the proportion of foreign funding required would be as little as 20 
per cent, with the remainder being sourced through a public flotation and Thai 
government funds 63 . 
Proponents of the canal have claimed that navigational conditions would be less 
hazardous than in the Straits of Malacca and that it would be less prone to piracy or 
terrorist attack. It has also been claimed that the financial saving, relative to the cost of 
passage tlu·ough the Malacca and Lombok Straits would range from $37,000-120,000 
per sailing. However, a 1973 survey report, based on a 12-year construction timeframe, 
for a canal of equivalent length but only half the width predicted that the project would 
take more than 50 years to recoup its start-up costs64. Serious environmental objections 
have also been raised, which democratic governments in Thailand are less able to ignore 
than their 1nilitary predecessors. Nonetheless , Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra' s 
61 
'Kra Canal Project ', at: www.kracanal.or.th/problemengl.htm 
62 
'The Kra Canal: Thailand's $25 billion question', Asia Tinies online; at 
www.atimes.com/editor/ Al0Ba0l .html. 
63 Supradit Kanwanich, 'Kra Canal Proj ect: To dig or not to dig' Bangkok Post, January 23, 2000. 
64 Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, Coastal States, Regional Powers, Superpowers and the Malacca-Singapore 
Straits , Institute of East Asian Studies Research Paper, University of California, 1984, pp 78-82. 
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administration revived the canal proposal in late January 2003, by offering a contract to 
the Hong Kong-registered Phuket Pass Project (PPP) consortium to conduct a $50 
million dollar feasibility study. Japanese and Australian interests are believed to be the 
major financiers behind PPP, which has met local criticism due to the personal links 
between its chairman Adisak Techa-adisak and Charoon Wutikarn, the head of the 
government's study committee into the project. It is alleged that PPP' s connections 
with the government ensured that it was awarded the contract without competitors. 
PPP' s proposal, thought to be worth up to 35 billion dollars, envisages the construction 
of a trans-Isthmus canal concentrating on the ports of Chumphon and Songhkla in the 
Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea towns of Ranong and Satun as possible sites65 . 
Doubts persist as to the commercial viability or additional security benefits of a Kra 
canal, although as traffic expands in the Straits of Malacca safety concerns could 
become more important (see Chapter One). Expressions of interest from Thai and 
Japanese-funded preliminary studies have, at a minimum, provided Japanese industry 
and officials with a form of insurance against any future attempts by Malaysia or 
Indonesia to place further restrictions on tanker traffic passing through the straits or to 
charge tolls. 
V. Indonesia's archipelagic doctrine as a diplon1atic challenge. 
Jakarta's political and military elites have tended to attach great importance to 
controlling surrounding waters and airspace. This aim is closely identified with the 
security and defence of the state, reflecting concerns over great power naval 
involvement arising from Indonesia's geostrategic location; doubts about the fragile 
nature of national unity arising from the country's fragmented geography; a historically 
honed suspicion of outside intervention in Indonesia's internal conflicts by extra-
regional powers; and a determination to maximise Jakarta 's strategic leverage and 
aspirations to regional leadership 66 . These concerns led to the formation of an 
archipelagic doctrine, first expressed in a December 1957 Declaration asserting that all 
waters within baselines connecting the outermost points of the Republic were "integral 
parts of the territory of the Indonesian state"67 . In 1960, this Declaration was enacted 
65 
'Hong Kong firm gets study deal', Bangkok Post, January 21, 2003: at 
www.bangkokpost.com/210103_News/21Jan2003_news06.html 
66 Dino Patti Djalal, The Geopolitics of Indonesia's Maritime Territorial Policy, Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, Jakarta, 1996, p 102. 
67 Ibid. p 29. 
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into law by the Act on Indonesian Waters Number Four (PRP/1960)68. The archipelagic 
doctrine, or Wawasan Nusentara, is designed to forge a unified identity and a viable 
state from over 13,000 islands and dozens of ethnic and linguistic groups as well as to 
gain control over sunounding marine resources, expanding Indonesia's "national 
tenitory" from 2 million square km to 5 million. Thus the Indonesian government 
linked sovereignty over archipelagic waters to "the country's tenitorial integrity, the 
unity and social cohesion of its people as well as national development". 69 For these 
reasons, Indonesia's policy-making elites view the archipelagic doctrine as "vital to our 
continued survival as a nation"70 . 
As the pnmary alternative route for tankers unable to pass through the Straits of 
Malacca, and for most of the bulk ore trade between Australia and Japan, Lombok-
Makassar is the second most important strait in Southeast Asia for Japan's trade 71 . 
These straits, together with Sunda and Ombai-Wetar, fall wholly within Indonesia's 
archipelagic waters claim, which received recognition from UNCLOS ill in 1982, as 
well as a new category of "archipelagic sea lanes passage", devised to cover routes 
normally used for international navigation through archipelagos (see Appendix 2). 
The military security focus of Jakarta's position on freedom of navigation and 
Indonesia's expressions of "sympathy with those who need international trade, because 
we are also dependent on international trade" simplified the task for Japanese 
negotiators at UNCLOS. This position was in contrast to Jakarta's suspicion of "big 
powers" intent on pursuing "global strategy". According to Hasjim Djalal, Indonesia's 
foremost maritime legal authority and negotiator, it was the intention of Indonesian 
interlocutors at UNCLOS that merchant shipping would be free to transit the 
archipelago without restriction, with the exception of the largest categories of oil 
tankers and vessels canying hazardous cargoes which demonstrate "the need for a more 
68 Maj. Gen. Subijakto, 'Indonesia's Perception of SLOC in Southeast Asia', Journal of the Australian 
Naval Institute, November 1989, pp 27-31. 
69 Minister of Foreign Affairs Press Release Concerning Indonesia' s Archipelagic Sea Lanes, No. 
28/PRJVI/98, June 15, 1998: www.deplu.go .id/english2/pr28-98.htm. 
70 According to Hasjim Djalal, "The sad history of our people during the colonial domination had indicated 
to us that whenever the waters between the islands were regarded as a separating factor, the whole 
Indonesian nation disintegrated. In fact, this was used as a means by previous dominating powers to subdue 
the nation. We have learned the lesson that the unity of Indonesia as a nation can only be preserved by the 
archipelagic concept". (Indonesia and the Law of the Sea , Centre for Strategic and International Studies , 
Jakarta, 1995, p 318). 
71 Chia Lin Sien, in Hamzah (ed.), The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding 
and Navigational Safety, Maritime Institute of Malaysia/Pelanduk Publications, 1997, Kuala Lumpur, p 
104. 
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regulated passage"72. The prospect that the coastal states in Southeast Asia would be 
tempted to block commercial navigation is rejected by Djalal as a "fallacy", invoked by 
maritime states as "a tactical argument during the Law of the Sea negotiations". 
According to one Western observer, as long as Indonesia remains reliant on Japan as an 
export market for oil and gas, as well as for in-flows of aid and investment, the 
deliberate obstruction of Japan's sea communications by Jakarta or other Southeast 
Asian states would be "akin to cutting their own throat"73 . Hasjim Djalal echoes the 
logic of economic inter-dependence as a deterrent to unilateral action against Japan: 
The Japanese would like to have unimpeded passage through the straits for their 
own shipping, for their imported resources, and for their exports. It is in the 
Japanese interest to cooperate with the three coastal states, and it is in the latter's 
interests to co-operate with Japan as well 74 . 
1. Sea lane closures. 
Indonesia has closed straits used by international shipping four times; 1n 1958, 1964, 
1978 and 198875 . The first two closures were aimed at restricting the movement of 
British and Dutch naval vessels during periods of conflict or tension. Indonesia's 
motivation for the phased 48-hour closure of the Sunda and Lombok Straits in 1988, 
ostensibly to conduct naval gunnery drills, has been seen variously as a signal of 
Jakarta's displeasure over Saudi oil-pricing policies or aimed at Japan after it diversified 
its oil purchases away from Indonesia 76. However, a more plausible explanation is that 
by temporarily closing the straits, the military, possibly in coordination with the Foreign 
Ministry, was testing international reaction to a legal precedent for suspending 
passage 77 . At the time, the assertion of Defence Minister Benny Moerdani that 
Indonesia was exercising its "sovereign right" prompted a qualification from Foreign 
Minister Ali Alatas that the Sunda and Lombok straits were "part of our archipelagic 
waters, albeit not quite full national waters". 
72 Hasjim Djalal, Indonesia and the Law of the Sea, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 
1995, pp 326-327. 
73 Daniel Coulter 'The Economics of SLOC Protection ; an Overvalued Mission ', Eleventh International 
' 
· Conference on the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) Studies , Tokyo, November 17-18, 1997, p 4. 
74 Hasjim Djalal, Indonesia and the Law of the Sea, Centre for Strategic and International Studies , Jakarta, 
1995, pp 360-361. 
75 Jolm McBeth, 'Troubled Waters', Far Eastern Economic Review, December 29, 1994 and January 5, 
1995, p 18. 
76 Defender Vol. 5, No . 4, Summer, 1988/89; and Nayan Chanda, 'Troubled Waters' , Far Eastern 
Econoniic Review, November 10, 1988, p 18. 
77 Dino Patti Djalal, The Geopolitics of Indonesia 's Maritime Territorial Policy, Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, Jakarta, 1996, p 130. 
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The Japanese authorities coordinated their diplomatic response with Australia, but did 
not officially protest against the closure until the next year, following protests from West 
Germany, the United States and Australia. As the closures resulted in little or no 
disruption to traffic through the straits, the MOFA did not register the incident as a threat 
to Japan's shipping interests 78 . With a view to the risk of being denied access to various 
Southeast Asian straits in future, the Japanese shipping firm 'K'-line has studied 
alternative routes through the archipelago via the Sunda Strait, Lombok and via Maluku. 
However, the company has not studied the much longer diversion around Australia79 . 
2. Archipelagic sea lanes. 
In August 1996, two years after UNCLOS had entered into force, Indonesia informed the 
IMO's Maritime Safety Committee that it had nominated three archipelagic sea lanes 
(ASLs), each on a north-south axis: i) through the Sunda and Karimata Straits to the 
South China Sea (ALKI-1); ii) through the Lombok and Makassar Straits and Sulawesi 
Sea (ALKI-11); and iii) a tri-pronged ASL connecting the Maluku Sea with the Ombai 
and Wetar Straits and Arafura Sea (ALKI-111)8°. Despite implicitly restricting 
archipelagic passage along an east-west axis, Jakarta maintained in June 1998 that "for 
the time being, the three north-south lanes are sufficient"81 (See Map 12, below). 
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78 Interview with Umemoto Kazuyoshi, Director, First International Organizations Division, Economic Affairs 
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 1999. 
79 Interview with Captain Osuka Yoshihiro, Assistant General Manager, Marine Safety and Environmental 
Team, K-line. 
80 International Maritime Organisation, Maritime Safety Committee, MSC 67 /7 /2, 67th Session, August 30, 
1996. 
81 Felix Chan, ' Jakarta to Open Three Sea Lanes for International Passage', Shipping News , June 17, 1998. 
82 Source: Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Republic of Indonesia: 
www.dkp.go.id/ie/peta/Geografis%20Laut.htm 
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The United States and Australia were the first nations to express concern about the 
proposed ASLs and the implications for (principally naval) vessels aiming to sail 
laterally through the archipelago, from Darwin to Singapore via the Java Sea for 
example 83. The absence of an east-west ASL is of less obvious economic importance to 
Japan than south-north ASLs, which include the heavily trafficked Sunda and Lombok-
Makassar routes. Nevertheless, it is still claimed that the restriction of merchant 
shipping to just three ASLs would result in "additional costs which would have to be 
borne in higher cormnodity prices''84. 
Among the maritime states most obviously affected, Australia sought consultations with 
Indonesia through the IMO over the designation of ASLs prior to the meetings of the 
IMO's Maritime Safety Committee and Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, 
respectively in December 1996 and December 1997. Indonesia's response was to 
recognise the IMO' s authority only insofar as it addresses the technical aspects of 
navigational safety, such as monitoring and surveillance of sea and air traffic through 
the ASLs85 . In May 1998, the plenary meeting of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee 
endorsed h1donesia' s ASLs proposal, paving the way for its entry into force from 1999. 
Wishing to avoid overt criticism of Indonesia and with little direct interest in lateral 
communications through the archipelago, Tokyo's response to the north-south ASL 
proposal followed a familiar pattern of reliance on other maritime states to press their 
f d f · · 86 ree om o na v1gat1on concerns . 
Prior to the fall of the Soeharto regime in May 1998, the issue of political stability in 
Indonesia had been considered by Japan to be "irrelevant in the case of the Lombok or 
h M 1 S · ,,87 t e a acca traits . Such confidence has diminished sharply with Indonesia's 
economic downturn and rising social and political instability marked by the 
intensification of inter-co1nrnunal violence and regional rebellions in provinces such as 
Aceh and Maluku, which are located near major sea lanes. Since 1998, an upsurge in 
maritime piracy (the focus of analysis in the next chapter) has made Indonesian waters 
the world's most dangerous environment for international shipping, while the October 
83 
'Water of Strife ', Far Eastern Economic Review, February 29, 1996, p 30. 
84 Russ Swinnerton, 'A Description of Regional Shipping Routes: navigational and operational 
considerations', Maritinie Studies, No. 87, March/April 1996, p 21. 
85 Hasjim Djalal , Indonesia and the Law of the Sea, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 
1995, pp 239-40. 
86 Russell Skelton, "Jakarta shipping plan sparks anger", Sydney Morning Herald, June 5, 1996, p 15 . 
87 Ouchi Kazuomi, 'Making the Straits Safer: A User's View of Alternative Routes', paper given at the 
International Conference on the Strait of Malacca: Meeting the Challenges of the 21
st Century, Malaysian 
Institute of Maritime Affairs , June 14 and 15 , 1994. 
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2002 Bali bombings of Western tourist targets underscored the risk that Islamist 
terrorist groups operating within the country could stage a repeat of the al-Qaida-linked 
attack off Yemen on the French tanker, Limburg, by targeting shipping moving through 
Indonesian waters (see Chapters Two and Seven). For Japan, along with other states 
with a security interest in maintaining maritime access to the archipelago, the growing 
and multi-faceted threat posed by lawlessness and 'rogue' elements within the 
Indonesian state has shifted the focus of concern away fro1n the potential risks posed by 
the government ' s archipelagic policies to a more basic concern over its capacity to 
maintain political stability. 
At the same time, resurgent inter-communal violence and secessionist movements and 
the forced separation of East Timor from the Republic in November 1999 have revived 
concerns within Indonesia's political and military elite about foreign interference in the 
archipelago, leading to a more assertive posture on the movement of foreign naval craft, 
particularly near politically sensitive provinces. Reflecting this trend, a US warship en 
route to East Timor was challenged near Maluku in October 2000, on suspicion of 
providing arms to local separatists88 . Also, in late May 2001, Indonesian Navy vessels 
reportedly opened fire on two Panamanian-registered dredgers, contracted to work on 
reclamation projects by the Singaporean government, while in an Indonesian shipping 
1 S. 89 ane near 1ngapore . 
VI. Nuclear shipments. 
Japan has also faced legal challenges from coastal states related to its shipment of 
em·iched nuclear fuels. Since Japan began importing mixed-oxide (MOX) fuels from 
Europe in 1992, governments and private pressure groups in states along the route of 
shipments have sought to exclude these nuclear materials from their EEZ or territorial 
waters90 . Reflecting the shift that has occurred in definitions of security since the end of 
the Cold War, Japan's policy of importing plutonium has itself been described as a 
threat to Asia-Pacific SLOC91 . In response to opposition from Malaysia and Indonesia, 
Japan was forced to route its first shipment, aboard the Akatsuki Maru, around Australia 
88 
'Jakarta Challenges US Warship ', The Australian, October 29, 2000, p 7. 
89 
'Indonesian Navy fires at dredgers off Singapore ', Reuters News Service, June 1, 2002. 
90 This includes the government of South Korea, which expressed its concern to Tokyo in July 1999 that 
MOX fuel might be delivered to Japanese ports via the Korea (Tsushima) Strait. ('ROK Expresses Concern 
Over Plutonium Shipment ', Yonhap News Agency, July 12, 1999). 
9 1 Ji Guoxing, 'SLOC Security in the Asia Pacific ', Center Occasional Paper, Asia-Pacific Center for 
Security Studies, Honolulu , February 2000; at www.apcss.org/Paper_SLOC_Occasional.htm 
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instead of its prefened route via the Straits of Malacca92. Prior to its departure, Foreign 
Minister Alatas stated, "we cannot close international sea lanes but we have called on 
' 
Japan, even pressed Japan, not to use Indonesian waters". A Japanese request to use the 
Lombok Strait was also refused93 . 
The four shipments that have taken place from Europe thus far have followed varied 
routes illustrating the flexibility of shipping compared with overland modes of 
transport. The Akatsuki M aru sailed from Cherbourg, via the Cape of Good Hope, 
south about Australia, through the Tasman Sea and southwest Pacific to Japan. The 
shipment aboard the Pacific Pintail sailed from Cherbourg, via the South Atlantic and 
Cape Horn across the Pacific. The third vessel, the Pacific Teal, repeated the route used 
by the Akatsuki Maru, while the final shipment left Cherbourg aboard the Pacific Swan 
and sailed to Japan via the Panama canal94 . A fifth, return shipment took place in late 
2002, when a consignment of MOX fuel originally delivered in 1999 was returned to 
British Nuclear Fuels Limited in the United Kingdom via the route used by the Akatsuki 
Maru and Pacific Teal. The use of varied routes kept secret for security reasons, has 
enabled Japan to carry out these infrequent shipments largely on schedule, albeit at the 
price of alienating a large nu1nber of coastal states. 
The rights of coastal states, under UNCLOS, to enforce pollution restrictions within 
their BEZ, or to uphold unilateral or regional nuclear-free zones, has been invoked by 
several coastal states along the route of the shipments. While small states such as 
Mauritius have had no choice but to confine their opposition to diplomatic channels, 
some Australasian and South American countries have dispatched naval or coast guard 
vessels to ensure the nuclear cargo ships remain outside their BEZ. A growing 
possibility that Japan's nuclear programme may be curtailed, on technical as well as 
domestic political grounds, means that this particular aspect of its SLOC security 
matters could decline in importance. 
92 Subsequent shipments have been transported aboard purpose-built PNTL vessels including the Pacific 
Swan (1979), the Pacific Teal (1982) and the Pacific Pintail (1987). These vessels incorporate such safety 
features as double hulling, twin engines , radiation-monitoring systems, fire-fighting systems and advanced 
navigation and communication equipment, in accordance with IMO and International Atomic Energy 
Agency standards. They are also armed with naval guns and manned by a UK-trained security crew. 
93 Interview with Lt. Gen. Shikata Toshiyuki , Tokyo, March 7, 1999. 
94 Grant Hewison, Shipping and Regional Security, in Sam Bateman (ed. ) Maritime cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific Region: Current Situation and Prospects, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 132, 
Australian National University Press , 1999, Canberra, pp 145-46. 
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Conclusion. 
The limits of Japan's influence and shortcomings in its diplomacy were demonstrated in 
November 1971, when Malaysia and Indonesia jointly declared their intention to "de-
internationalise" the Straits of Malacca following Tokyo's push to secure representation 
for itself in an international supervisory regime governing the straits. From that low-
point, Japan, acting 'privately' through the non-official Malacca Straits Council, 
bilaterally at the state level, and multilaterally through the IMO, has steadily built up 
cooperative relationships with the key straits states. These ties have generally enabled 
Japan to balance its interests in safety and economy with the coastal states' sovereignty 
concerns and desire to minimise their exposure to environmental problems, with the 
exception of strong opposition to Japan's nuclear cargoes. Japan's status as the only 
user state to have set up an institutionalised funding mechanism has won it good will 
among the riparian states in the Straits of Malacca, as has its provision of technical 
assistance. 
Although there remains some anxiety in Japan as to the potential for UN CLOS to lead 
to 'creeping jurisdiction' in maritime Southeast Asia, no major legal restrictions on the 
navigation of Japanese or other vessels using the Straits of Malacca have been 
introduced since the under-keel clearance regulation and TSS came into effect. No 
Asia-Pacific state has opposed the principles of freedom of navigation or innocent 
passage, while UN CLOS has given Japan grounds to defend itself under international 
law against any future attempt by signatories to introduce tolls95 . In this way, the Law 
of the Sea can be regarded as a maritime confidence-building measure, reducing 
uncertainties about the effects of coastal state jurisdiction on freedom of navigation and 
obviating the need for Japan to compensate by seeking a military presence in the region. 
Moreover, the establishment of a ui:iiversal international maritime legal framework 
makes it less likely that there will be a repeat crisis over the legal status of the Straits of 
Malacca. 
Despite relying on other maritime states to press the more contentious aspects of 
navigational access to Southeast Asia's sea lanes, Japanese initiatives utilising 
economic and diplomatic influence since the 1970s have been quietly effective in pre-
empting legal moves by coastal states to restrict access to commercial shipping and at 
creating a cooperative framework for addressing navigational safety in the Malacca 
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Strait. Nonetheless, such efforts have limited scope for mitigating threats to its shipping 
interests in Southeast Asia posed by piracy, tenorism and regional conflicts in the South 
China Sea. Japan's perceptions and responses to these conventional and unconventional 
SLOC threats in the post-Cold War era are explored in the following two chapters. 
95 While Article 26(2) makes provision for "payment only for specific services rendered to the ship, Article 
26(1) states that 'No charge may be levied upon foreign ships by reason only of their passage through the 
territmial seas". 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Japan's Post-Cold War SLOC Security: Piracy and Terrorism-at-Sea 
Introduction. 
This chapter has two purposes. The first, in Section I, is to review the major post-Cold 
War changes and developments within Japan's security environment, particularly 
regarding sea lane security and to look at how recent Japanese governments have 
responded to altered strategic circumstances in terms of alliance and defence policy. In 
Section II, Japan's responses to maritime piracy and tenorism-at-sea are examined as a 
case study in non-state actor threats to Japan's sea lines of communication (SLOC). 
This follows on from the overview of piracy and terro1ism-at-sea in Chapter Two. In 
Chapter Eight, a second post-Cold War case study profiles Japan's state-level military 
SLOC security concerns, concentrating on emerging views of China as a potential 
strategic threat, and the perceived impact of a regional conflict occurring near Japan's 
major SLOC, including the existing maritime threat posed by No1ih Korea. China's 
alleged involvement in the 'military' category piracy is dealt with as part of Japan's 
piracy concerns in this chapter for the sake of clarity. 
This chapter argues that Japan's post-Cold War security posture, after undergoing a 
period of disorientation and dislocation in the early 1990s, came under the influence of 
rising 'realist' perceptions about Japan's security environment in reaction to a series of 
regional security crises mid-decade. The resulting strategic uncertainty brought a 
renewed focus on the US-Japan Alliance among Japanese security policy-makers, the 
restructuring of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to suit a more fluid secu1ity environment 
and the pursuit of multilateral and bilateral security dialogue and linkages. Perceptions 
of potential maritime threats identified during the official review of defence policy 
unde1iaken in 1994 are analysed, together with how this shaped changes to the force 
structure of the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF), as defined in the revised 1995 
National Defense Programme Outline, or new taiko. A profile of generalised 
perceptions regarding Japan ' s post-Cold War sea lane security among policymakers and 
analysts completes Section I. 
The case study in Section II begins by evaluating conflicting data on the scale of the 
piracy and maritime tenorism threats confronting Japan, before profiling Japanese 
policy responses at state, private and multilateral levels. Japan's responses to tenorism 
are further explored in the context of the MSDF' s deployment of a flotilla to the Arabian 
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Sea in the wake of the September 11 attacks in the United States and the likely 
implications this has for Japan's future approaches to SLOC security. Although the case 
study demonstrates that maritime piracy is widely perceived as a security threat in Japan, 
it also shows that attempts to involve Japan directly in anti-piracy patrols in Southeast 
Asia and to support anti-te1Torism effo1is in the Arabian Sea and Gulf region reflect their 
use partly as pretexts for developing an expanded Japanese security role. 
I. Japan's post-Cold War defence and security. 
As shown, sea lane defence served primarily as a political rationale for force 
modernisation and deepening military cooperation with the United States during the late 
Cold War period. This occurred in the context of a perceived, proximate threat posed by 
the build-up of the Soviet Union's maritime defence capabilities. By the end of the Cold 
War, the SDF were approaching the force levels set out in the taiko, and these were fully 
achieved in all categories by 1995. As a result of sea lane defence, the MSDF emerged 
at the end of the Cold War with 62 principal surface combatants (more than the Royal 
Navy), 16 submarines and 30 mine warfare ships. More than half of its authorised total 
of 16 squadrons of fixed-wing antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft were equipped 
with P-3Cs, with the inventory eventually reaching 100 as the last P-2J s were retired1. 
The effects of sea lane defence on major SDF acquisitions continue into the present. 
Kongo, with a loaded displacement of 9,485 tons, became the first Aegis-radar equipped 
destroyer commissioned into MSDF service in 1993 and the first to be acquired outside 
the US Navy. Similarly, the plans of the Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF) to acquire 
Airborne Warning and Control System (A WACs) aircraft, which had also been linked to 
"burden-sharing issues and the SLOC defence agreement"2 led to an order for the first 
two of four E-767s being placed in December 1992, with Japan' s defence planners 
expressing their preference for an airframe "that has a range that can fly to the 
Spratlys"3. The gradual entry into service of 130 F-2 support ·fighters , the costly and 
problematic product of the FS-X joint development programme with the United States, 
promises to significantly boost the anti-ship capabilities of the ASDF. 
t Fleet Air Force P-3Cs conduct patrols under the coordination of ASW operation centres at Hachinohe, 
Atsugi, Kanoya and Naha. (Usui Naoaki, 'Japanese Navy Stresses Updates ASW Capability', Defense 
News, September 9, 1991 , p 6). 
2 Norman D Levin, Mark Lorell, and Arthm Alexander, The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese 
Security Policies, Rand, Santa Monica, 1993, pp 62-63. 
3 Asahi Shimbun, December 2, 1995; and Lam Peng Er, 'Japan and the Spratlys Dispute: Aspirations and 
Limitations ', Asian Survey, Vol. 36, October 1996, p 1009. 
4 Alan Stephens, 'Japanese Aerospace Power ', Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, January 2000, p 17. 
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Upon achievement of the taiko force levels, the MSDF had approximately twice as many 
destroyers as the US Seventh Fleet and over four times as many P-3Cs. Despite 
emerging from the Cold War with the largest Asian navy behind the fast-deteriorating 
Russian Far Eastern Fleet, a 1993 RAND study judged the MSDF to be weak in the 
areas of fleet air defence, power projection, amphibious operations and long-range 
submarine operations, partly as a result of its increasing integration with the US Seventh 
Fleet5. As a result of the MSDF' s single-minded concentration on navy-to-navy 
cooperation within the US-Japan Alliance, little effort had been made in the 1980s to 
develop a joint operational doctrine or exercise programme with the other Self Defense 
Forces. For example, the first joint SDF drill was conducted only in November 1998, on 
Io Jima6. The lack of jointness compounded weaknesses in the MSDF's capabilities. 
Regarding air defence, for example, SDF doctrine stipulates that escort vessels will 
conduct air defence to protect vessels at sea while the ASDF will "conduct air defence 
operations within its capabilities"7. To compensate for the MSDF's lack of organic air 
cover, ASDF F-15s forward-based on Io Jima (with an unrefuelled combat radius of 
1,000 nautical miles, nm) could provide a significant level of protection for the Self 
Defense Fleet. However, despite the conclusion of the official yojo boku ('air defence 
over the sea' ) study, the ASDF has continued to concentrate mainly on territorial air 
defence 8. 
Japan's ability to respond to the emerging challenges of the post-Cold War era was 
found wanting more immediately in terms of the 'software' of political constraints 
binding the SDF' s use than in terms of lacunae in the military hardware built up during 
the Cold War. Having been slow to accept US claims of an intensified Soviet threat to 
Japan's sea lanes in the late 1970s, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) proved equally 
cautious about recognising the end of the Cold War. Defence white papers as late as 
199 5 identified a potential threat to "sea lanes around Japan" posed by Russia's 
modernising Far Eastern mariti1ne capabilities9. Citing concerns over Russia ' s residual 
capabilities, North Korea ' s unpredictability and uncertainty over China's long-term 
5 Norman D Levin, Mark Lorell , and Arthur Alexander, The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese 
Security Policies, Rand, Santa Monica, 1993, pp 49-56. 
6 Def ense of Japan 2000, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, p 345. 
7 Ibid, p 78 . 
8 Shiiren Boei to Kaikyo Fusa ('Sealane Defence and Straits Blockade'), Seiron, July 1983, pp 66-67; and 
interview with Adm. Sakonjo Naotoshi, MSDF (Retd), Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, 
February 12, 1999. 
9 Def ense of Japan 1995, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, pp 45-49 . 
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intentions, 'realist' Japanese scholars, such as Sato Seizaburo, remained sceptical about 
whether an end of the Cold War could be declared in Northeast Asia 10. 
The first test of the ability of Japan's security framework to respond to post-Cold War 
realities came in August 1990, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Requests 
from the United States for Japan to contribute militarily to the international coalition 
being assembled to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait came as a shock to Japanese leaders, 
exposing the undeveloped state of the gove1nment' s crisis decision-making machinery 
and a level of 'burden-sharing' expectation that the existing legal framework could not 
support11 . The ability of the already politically weak government led by Prime Minister 
Kaifu Toshiki to respond decisively to the Gulf Crisis was hindered by an alignment of 
opposition parties on the left, resistant to any involvement in US military interventions, 
and conservatives resentful of US pressure on economic matters 12. Attempts to enact a 
bill to enable the SDF to participate in United Nations (UN) peace-keeping operations 
were subject to obstruction by opposition parties in the Diet. Tokyo's ultimate pledge of 
$13 billion towards funding the US-led campaign did little more than to confirm 
negative views of Tokyo's 'cheque-book diplomacy'. The significance of the post-
belluni dispatch of an MSDF mine-sweeping flotilla to the Gulf in April 1991 was 
similarly dismissed as tokenism, even though the first overseas operational deployment 
of the MSDF represented a momentous policy departure in domestic political terms 13 . 
Japan's 'failure' to respond to the Gulf Crisis provided the impetus for a review of 
defence policy, but political inertia and the transition, in August 1993, to the first non-
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government since 1955, meant that an official review of 
the 1976 taiko was not ordered until February 1994. However, the Gulf War did give 
rise to a more immediate initiative on the pai1 of the LDP politician Ozawa Ichiro, who 
launched a Special Study Group within the party in June 1991 to analyse Japan's Role in 
the International Comniunity (kokusai shakai ni okeru nihon no yakuwari). The Special 
Study Group Draft Repo11, released in February 1992, focussed on the collective 
10 See for example, Sato Seizaburo , 'Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: Threats, Risks and Opportunities , 
Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 1; No. 1, 1994; and Nishimura Shigeki, 'Transformation of the U.S.-Japan 
Defense Posture: The New Soviet Challenge', International Institute for Global Peace (IIGP) Policy Paper, 
October 1991. 
11 Courtney PwTington, 'Tokyo 's Policy Response Dilling the Gulf War', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 65, 1992, p 
167. 
12 Ian Gow, 'Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Japan -- Civilian Control of Whose Military?', The 
Japan Society, Vol. 136 (Winter) 2001, p 9. 
13 The 1991 dispatch of MSDF minesweepers to the Gulf was supported by the Keidanren, the Japan Oil 
League, the Japan Shipowners ' Association, the Japan Seamen's Union and the Arabia Oil Company 
(Courtney Pw1.ington, 'Tokyo 's Policy Response During the Gulf War', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 65 , 1992, p 
172). 
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security framework of the UN Charter as a vehicle for Japan to move beyond a 'passive' 
posture of security reliance on the United States. Aimed at developing a political 
leadership role on the global stage, the centre-piece of the group's recommendations was 
Japan's participation in UN peace-keeping operations (PKO)14. Ozawa's linkage of an 
SDF peace-keeping role to Japan' s recovery of 'normal' sovereignty and pursuit of a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council has been dismissed, especially within Japan, 
as primarily conceived to gain foreign plaudits in order to improve his domestic political 
standing. Japan's involvement in international peace-keeping nonetheless emerged as a 
major pillar of its foreign and defence policies in the 1990s, with the enactment of the 
International Peace Cooperation Law on June 15, 1993, paving the way for Japanese 
PKO deployments, to Cambodia (1993), Zaire (1994), the Golan Heights (1996), 
Honduras (1998) and East Timor (2002), among other destinations. However, a special 
five-point charter heavily circumscribing the SDF' s terms of participation in PKO, 
adopted as part of the 1993 PKO law to win opposition parties' support, excluded Japan 
from UN and other peace-enforcement operations15 . Japan's hopes for the UN as a 
vehicle for solving regional conflicts also diminished as successive UN peace-keeping 
efforts faltered in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia from 1993 onwards. 
1. Defence policy review. 
In February 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro's administration commissioned a 
report on The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan (nihon no anzen 
hoshi5 to bi5eiryoku no arikata), from the Advisory Group on Defence Issues, under 
Higuchi Hirotaro, chairman of Asahi Breweries16 . The nine-member group, including 
former JDA Administrative Vice-Minister Nishihiro Seiki and Aoyama Gakuin 
University Professor Watanabe Akio, took the Gulf Crisis as their case study in 
considering improvements to Japan's crisis-management capabilities and the 
restructuring of the SDF. However, the JDA convened its own, parallel 'Conference to 
Examine the Future Modality of Defense Capability', from June-December 1993 and 
chaired by JDA Director General Aichi Kazuo, out of concern that the Advisory Group 
would be used to justify deep cuts to SDF force levels and in order to attempt to cushion 
14 
'Japan's Role in the International Comniunity' (Draft Report), February 1992, Japan Echo, Summer 
1992, pp 49-58 . 
15 The five 'Basic Guidelines ' adopted as part of the 1993 PKO Law set out as a precondition for Japan's 
participation in UN peacekeeping: 1) a cease-fire in place; 2) the consent of all parties to Japan's 
participation; 3) strict impartiality on the part of the peace-keeping force; 4) the ability of Japan to withdraw 
its contingent; and 5) restrictions on the use of weapons to the "minimum necessary" (Defense of Japan 
1995, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times , Tokyo, p 99). 
16 Usui Naoaki, Hosokawa Accelerates Review' , Defense News, January 10-16, 1994, p 4. 
238 
itself from the findings of the 'Higuchi Repo1i' 17 . In May 1994, JDA Director General 
Kanda Atsushi cited N 01ih Korea as the main reason why no dramatic cuts were to be 
made to SDF strength as part of the official review of defence policy18. 
The Higuchi Report premised its recommendations on a post-Cold War transition in 
international relations "from the confrontational to the cooperative pattern". During this 
transition, the report identified risks to global security from localised military clashes 
(which "will occur more frequently and become more complex" than during the Cold 
War), the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the destabilising spread of 
poverty and social discontent in weak states no longer suppo1ied by the major powers. 
Despite the repo1i' s relatively benign assessment of the global security environment, the 
fact that the Higuchi panel convened during the crisis over North Korea's withdrawal 
from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty underlined to participants the importance of 
maintaining Japan's alliance with the United States and improving the structure of the 
SDF to adapt to the possibility of regional conflict, while simultaneously developing a 
multilateral security dialogue among Asia-Pacific countries. Multilateralism would 
evolve according to a three-stage agenda aimed initially at boosting confidence-building, 
before moving to an interim process of preventive diplomacy, with an ultimate objective 
of conflict resolution19 . The attachment to multilateralism was paiiicularly associated 
with Watanabe's input. From their respective inaugurations in 1994 and 1993, the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific (CSCAP) received financial and diplomatic backing from Japan as the respective 
official and 'track-two' vehicles for multilateral security dialogue. The JDA has also 
established over 13 bilateral defence dialogues with countries other than the United 
States since the end of the Cold War2°. In accordance with a formula established under 
Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi's administration (1991-93), Japan's would also seek to 
form ad hoc groupings, such as the four-party Korean Peninsula talks involving Japan, 
the United States, South Korea and China, designed to coordinate policy on North 
Korea. 
17 Defense of Japan 1995, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, p 143 ; and Mike Mochizuki, Japan: 
Domestic Change and Foreign Policy, National Defense Research Institute/RAND, Santa Monica, 1995, p 
72. 
18 Usui Naoaki, 'Japanese Will Follow U.N. Action on Korea', Defense News, April 25-May 1, 1994, p 18 ; 
and 'Japan to seek Broader Regional Power', Defense News, May 9-15 , 1994, p 4, 44. 
19 Advisory Group on Defense Issues , The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan, 
Japanese Government Translation, GM:3338- , August 12, 1994, pp 7-10, 17-18 . 
20 As of June 2000, Japan had institutionalised security and/or defence consultations with the following 
states and organisations: NATO, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, South Korea, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Australia and Canada. IDA officials have also held regular 
defence talks with the Philippines and Vietnam, since 1999, and India since 2000. (Defense of Japan 2000, 
Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, pp 177-78). 
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2. Maritime threats and capabilities. 
The Higuchi Report identified "interference in the safety of maritime traffic", together 
with the violation of territorial air space, limited missile attack, illegal occupation of part 
of the country, terrorism and an influx of armed refugees among potential military 
dangers confronting Japan in the post-Cold War world21 . Despite a declining probability 
of conventional military aggression against Japan, such as "full-scale attacks on sea-
lanes by Soviet submarines", the report's authors stressed that the safety of maritime 
traffic was "a matter of life and death to Japan", due to the country's extremely high 
degree of overseas dependence for energy supplies and trade in manufactured goods (see 
Chapter One). 
Following their discussion of MSDF strategy and problems on March 30, 1994, the 
group met for the 15th time to discuss sea lane defence, together with manning levels for 
the Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF), on June 22. Its members concluded that the 
defence of Japan's maritime interests would continue to be rooted in the Alliance with 
the United States with its "overwhelming superiority at sea", supported locally by the 
MSDF and the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) in its coast guard duties22. In terms of 
force structure recommendations, they concluded that the reduced threat faced by Japan 
justified a downsizing of the MSDF' s antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and mine counter-
measures fleet. At the same time, it was recommended that greater attention be paid to 
establishing a "more balanced" capability with particular emphasis on improving 
command, control, communications and intelligence, including a recommendation to 
deploy reconnaissance satellites. Improving the SDF' s ability to operate jointly both 
with US forces and within its own ground, air and maritime components was stressed. 
With UN PKO participation in mind, a need was also identified to expand the MSDF' s 
ocean-going sealift and supply capabilities, the need for which had been revealed during 
the SDF deployment to Cambodia in 199323 . 
The findings of the Higuchi Report and JDA study fed through to a revised version of 
the taiko, released in November 1995. As a result, the MSDF was downsized, with a 
decision made to cut one of two mine countermeasures flotillas, three regional destroyer 
divisions and three squadrons of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (Figure 15). However, under 
the new taiko, the Fleet Escort Force remains the core of the MSDF surface fleet, which 
is still composed of four escort flotillas, each of which is made up of eight helicopter-
21 Advisory Group on Defense Issues , The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan , 
Japanese Government Translation, GM:3338-, August 12, 1994, p 18 
22 Ibid. p 22. 
23 Andrew Lim, 'Japanese Peacekeeping Operations', Military Review, April 1994. 
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carrying escorts, including a Kongo-class Aegis destroyer to provide arr (and, 
potentially, ballistic missile defence24) . The MSDF eventually plans to acquire a total of 
eight Aegis destroyers, in an echo of the '8:8:8' force structure guideline (composed of 
twin battleship squadrons and eight heavy cruisers) adopted by the Imperial Navy in the 
1920s (see Chapter Three). The Fleet Submarine Force operates 16 conventionally 
powered, domestically manufactured boats, which are organised into two flotillas. One 
new submarine is launched every year and the oldest automatically retired, creating a 
very modern fleet, equipped with Sub-Harpoon anti-ship missiles and Type-89 wire-
guided torpedoes. The first of the 2,750-ton Oyashio class was commissioned in March 
1998, built to a double-hulled design enabling longer range, deep-water operations and 
equipped with hull and flank Hughes/Oki ZQQ 5B/6 sonars25 • Two submarines are held 
in reserve for training and one has been conve1ied to trial an air-independent propulsion 
system, based on Kockums' Stirling engine design, which would enhance future 
submarines' capability for sustained, submerged operations26 • 
24 The SPY-I radar at the heart of the Aegis system is capable of tracking and targeting up to 100 aerial 
targets simultaneously; the MSDF DDG, Myoko, tracked the North Korean Taepodong missile launch over 
Japanese tenitory in August 1998 from the Sea of Japan. Similarly, the March 1996 Chinese short-range 
ballistic missile tests in the Taiwan Strait were tracked by the US Navy DDG, USS Bunker Hill (Bungei 
Shunju , November 1998, pp 150-57, FBIS-EAS-98-299, FBIS Translated Text, Daily Report, October 26, 
1998; and Funabashi Yoichi, Alliance Adrift, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1999, p 360) . 
25 Kyodo, March 16, 1998, FBIS-EAS-98-075 ; and Usui Naoaki, 'Japan's Sub Upgrade Proceeds Despite 
Cuts', Defense News , January 23-29, 1995, p 6. 
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Figure 15: Force levels of the 1995 taiko 
SDF Basic Units Main Equipn1ent 
GSDF Regional Units 8 divisions 
6 Brigades 
Mobile Units 1 Armoured Di vision 
1 Artillery Brigade 
1 Airborne Brigade 
1 Helicopter Brigade 
Low Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile 8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
Groups 
ASDF Aircraft Control and Warning 8 Groups, 20 Squadrons 
Interceptor 9 Squadrons 
Suppo1i Fighter 3 Squadrons 
Air Reconnaissance 1 Squadron 
Air Transport 3 Squadrons 
Airborne Early Warning 1 Squadron 
Ground-to-Air Missile 6 Groups 
Main Equipment: 
Combat Aircraft Approx. 400 
MSDF Destroyer Units (for mobile operations) 4 Escort Flotillas 
Destroyer Units (regional district units) 7 Divisions 
Submarine Units 6 Divisions 
Minesweeping Units 1 Flotilla 
Land-based ASW /Patrol aircraft 13 Squadrons 
Main Equipment: 
Destroyers Approx. 50 
Sub1narines 16 (plus 2 in training) 
Co1nbat Aircraft Approx. 170 
(140 vessels and 370,400 
tons) 
Source: Defense of Japan 2000, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, p 89, p 245. 
The Fleet Air Force has been reduced under the new taiko from 16 to 13 fixed-wing and 
helicopter squadrons. Although a domestically produced jet design is likely to succeed 
26 Article by Rear Admiral Yamazaki Makoto, Director, Logistics Department, Maritime Staff Office, 
Gekkan Jadi , November 1996, pp 7-17 (FBIS-JST-97-001 , January 14, 1997); and David Lague, 'We All 
Live for Another Submarine ', Far Eastern Economic Review, August 15 , 2002, p 14. 
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P-3C maritime patrol aircraft as they are phased out from 2010, Japan ' s fleet of over 80 
Orions still constitutes the MSDF' s most potent ASW asset, capable of reaching the 
Straits of Malacca with a range of over 2,000 nm.· In addition, five EP-3 electronic 
surveillance versions have been acquired since 1990 as pa11 of a drive to upgrade 
Japan's intelligence-gathering capabilities, which saw the establishment in January 1997 
of a new Defence Intelligence Headquarters , in Ichigaya. The launch of the first two of 
up to four domestically produced reconnaissance satellites scheduled for late March 
2003 will fu11her add to Japan' s ocean surveillance capabilities27 • 
3. Alliance factors. 
Despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat rationale, which had underpinned US-
Japan military cooperation on sea lane defence during the 1980s, US interest in sea lane 
defence cooperation with Japan periodically resurfaced in the mid-1990s, focused on 
potential regional maritime conflict zones in East Asia. Concern in the early part of the 
decade that the South China Sea was a possible flashpoint led US defence analysts to 
conclude that "Some nations have much more stake than the United States in free 
movement of ships on Southeast Asian SLOC, and these nations should be encouraged 
to cooperate and share the costs of SLOC protection and safe navigation"28 . 
Other regional security cnses involving the United States have included a maritime 
dimension. During the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis, the United States 
considered imposing a sanctions blockade against North Korea. In March 1996, Chinese 
missile tests in the waters north of Taiwan prompted a reactive deployment of two US 
canier battle groups to the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait. Notwithstanding Japan's own 
concerns over Pyongyang' s missile and incipient nuclear capabilities, the government's 
reluctance to participate in any US-led naval blockade in the Sea of Japan threatened a 
crisis of confidence within the Alliance recalling Japan ' s "to11ured response" to the Gulf 
Crisis29 . Growing awareness of a potential sho11-term threat to Japan from North Korea 
and long-term uncertainty over China thus spurred Japanese efforts, at the alliance level, 
to revise the 1978 US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, and domestically, to draw 
up new legislation to define rules of engagement for the SDF in emergency situations 
(yiqi hosei). 
27 Two of the satellites are optical and two will use radar imagery; both with an optimal resolution of one 
metre (Nishijima Tom , 'Optical, radar satellites to focus govt ' s view' , Daily Yomiuri Online, March 6, 
2003 : www.yomiuri .co.jp/newse/20030304wo7l.htm). 
28 John Noer with D avid Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in South-east Asia, National 
Defense University Press/Center for Naval Analyses, 1996, Washington D.C. , p 6. 
29 Mike Mochizuki, Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy, National Defense Research 
Institute/RAND, Santa Monica, 1995, p 70; and Nigel Holloway and Sebastian Moffett, 'Cracks in the 
Armour', Far Eastern Economic Review, May 2, 1996, pp 14-16. 
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Following the Higuchi Report and new taiko, moves were made to 'revitalise' the 
Alliance, via the April 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration on Security and three 
major initiatives. The first two of these, the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement 
and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa report (dealing with local problems 
generated by the US bases), were respectively concluded in October and December 
1996. Most significantly, a process was also begun to revise the 1978 Guidelines, the 
new version of which was released on September 23, 1997, and approved by the Diet in 
May 1999. 
As the Guidelines were being reviewed, US analysts and former officials laid out 
proposals for a geographically expanded maritime cooperation role for Japan within the 
Alliance. In May 1996, one month after the Clinton-Hashimoto summit, former US 
Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy Richard Armitage proposed that 
Japan should double its geographical area of responsibility for sea lane defence to 2,000 
nm in the event of a regional conflict, in effect extending the area of alliance military 
cooperation to include the whole of the South China Sea30 . US concern to enlist greater 
Japanese cooperation in the South China Sea was also borne out in a proposed 
multinational security framework for "ensuring the security of the sea lanes against 
piracy and other threats" laid out by Brookings Institute analyst Mike Mochizuki: 
Such a framework may eventually involve Japanese destroyers escorting merchant 
ships during periods of international tension in conjunction with other nations. This 
kind of cooperation would not be directed against China because China would be a 
participant. But it should restrain China, as well as other countries, from disrupting 
mariti1ne traffic. 
According to Mochizuki, joint US-Japan naval exercises could also "be necessary to 
deter Chinese attempts to pressure Taiwan through shows of force" 31 . The text of the 
New Guidelines itself states only (as in the 1978 draft), that in response to an armed 
attack on Japan, SDF and US forces "will bilaterally conduct operations for the defence 
of surrounding waters and for the protection of sea lines of communications", while the 
SDF "will have primary responsibility for the protection of ships in sunounding waters, 
and for other operations". However, in a departure from the 1978 Guidelines, 
approximately 40 new "rear-area" joint operational tasks applying to "situations in areas 
30 
'Japan Urged to Defend Longer Sea Lanes in Wartime', Jiji Press Newswire, May 30, 1996. 
31 Mike Mochizuki, 'Toward a New Japan-U.S. Alliance ', Japan Quarterly, July-September 1996, pp 15-16. 
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surrounding Japan" were deemed permissible under Japan's interpretation of the right of 
individual self defence. These included maritime surveillance, intelligence-gathering 
activities, logistic support, mine clearance and "inspection of ships based on United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions"32. 
4. Japan's post-Cold War sea lane threat perceptions. 
The undiminished importance of the MSDF's role in SLOC defence in the post-Cold 
War era is a the1ne echoed by many former and serving senior MSDF officers. Admiral 
Akimoto Kazumine, who proposed that the MSDF redefine its post-Cold War missions 
by expanding its multilateral constabulary activities through an Ocean Peacekeeping 
Concept33 also sees its core military missions as essentially unchanged from those of the 
Cold War, namely: 
i) the defence of Japanese territory against invasion; 
ii) the security of maritime traffic; and 
iii) the protection of SLOC for the reinforcement of US military forces to J apan34 . 
In Akimoto's view, what has changed since the end of the Cold War is that "the defence 
of sea lanes is not so much a national interest of individual states as it is ... a global 
interest". In a similar vein, Admiral Kawamura Sumihiko has predicted that while 
SLOC security "used to be only Japan' s concern, because Japan was utterly dependent 
on imported oil ... SLOCs from the Persian Gulf will assume a much greater importance 
to almost all countries in the region" in light of growing energy demand across East Asia 
35
. Based on a scenario of rising import demand fanning competition over limited energy 
resources, the importance of sea lanes "for the survival and prosperity of countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century" is likely to intensify, according to Kawamura36 . 
Senior JDA analysts and MSDF officers have repeatedly affirmed that "the primary 
mission of Japan's (MSDF) is to secure the safety of 1naritime traffic to a distance of 
32 
'Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation ', Defense of Japan 2000, Japan Defense Agency/Japan 
Times, Tokyo, pp 284-291. 
33 Akimoto Kazumine. 'OPK (Ocean-Peace Keeping) : Multilateral Naval Cooperation for Ocean 
Stabilization ', Ocean Governance and OPK: The Thirteenth International Symposium Proceedings, 
National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 1998, pp 16-23. 
34 Akimoto Kazumine, 'Mission and Contribution of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force in the Post-
Cold War and EEZ Era', paper prepared for the International Conference sponsored by the Korean Institute 
for Maritime Strategy, December 11 , 1998, p 3. 
35 Kawamura Sumihiko, 'SLOC Security - A Japanese Perspective', in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates 
(eds), The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, Canberra Papers on Strategy and 
Defence, No. 118, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1996, pp 165-167 . 
36 Kawamura Sumihiko , The Kawaniura Papers, The Kawamura Institute, Chiba, Japan, November 1998, p 
101. 
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1,000 nautical miles"37 and that "the JMSDF' s basic mission of defending the homeland 
and protecting the sea lines of communication will not change"38 . The Higuchi Report's 
description of maritime transportation as a "matter of life and death" for Japan, is a 
theme echoed by former MSDF Chiefs of Staff Hayashizaki Chiaki and Yoshida 
Manabu39 . 
Former MSDF Chief of Staff Vice-Admiral Yamamoto Makoto has argued that the 
value of SLOC for the deployment of military forces is a strategic constant for Japan, 
despite a general decline of interest in sea lane security since the Cold War, and that the 
post-Cold War expansion of trade in the Asia-Pacific has also increased the importance 
of SLOC to regional security. Thus, SLOC security lends itself to naval cooperation as a 
"joint" undertaking among major maritime trading nations40 . Towards a typology of 
post-Cold War SLOC threats to regional sea lanes, Yamamoto identified the following 
six categories: 
• disruption due to maritime accidents or disasters at sea; 
• disruption to the maritime system; 
• damage from piracy; 
• unilateral declarations restricting specific waters; 
• disruption due to regional conflict; and 
• intentional obstruction by a sea-denial power. 
Of these six categories, Yamamoto classified the ·latter three as "difficult to resolve 
without the employment of a military response". In April 1998, JDA Administrative 
Vice-Minister Akiyaina Masaru said, in the context of the debate over the geographical 
scope of the US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines, that sea lanes were among the 
factors important to Japan's peace and security that may be used to define emergencies 
in "areas sunounding Japan", even if far from Japanese tenitory41 . 
37 Kondo Shigekatsu, 'The Maritime Priorities of Japan', in Maritinie Change: Issues for Asia, Sam 
Bateman and Ross Babbage (eds), Allen and Unwin, 1993, p 147. 
38 K. Nakamura, 'Strategic Influence of JMSDF' , U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1994, p 82. 
39 Hayash.izaki Chiaki, 'Retired Admiral on Post-Cold War MSDF Strategy', Securitarian, November 1996, 
pp 15-19. FBIS-JST-96-053 , 1 November 1996; and Yoshida Manabu, 'Resources, Maritime Transport and 
SLOC Security', in Malcolm J Kennedy and Michael J. O'Connor, Safely By Sea, University Press of 
America, Lanham, Maryland, 1990, 36. See also Kawano Katsutosh.i, 'Japan's Military Role: Alliance 
Recommendations for the Twenty-First Century ', Naval War College Review, August 1998, Vol. 51, No. 4, 
1998, p 18. 
40 Yamamoto Makoto, 'Sealane in the Asia-Pacific Region Today and their Vulnerabilities', Eleventh 
International Conference on the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) Studies, Tokyo, November 17-18, 
1997, pp 1-6. 
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The generalised concern with sea lanes extends beyond the naval fraternity and JDA 
analysts to 'reluctant realists' in Japan's academic community. Soeya Yoshihide, for 
example, has highlighted the "vital" importance of sea lanes among realpolitik 
considerations influencing Japan's security perceptions , in the context of its 
geographical location, limited resources, and the increased complexity of the post-Cold 
War Asia-Pacific security environment42. In September 2002, Masuda Tatsuo, Vice 
President of the state-owned Japan National Oil Company and former President of the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)-affiliated Asia Pacific Energy Research 
Centre (APERC) cited, among the risks facing Asia's energy outlook, the risk of sea 
lane disruptions in the chokepoints around Southeast Asia as a result of "military 
developments or terrorist attacks". In April 2002, APERC conducted a simulation 
exercise on scenarios for sea lane disruptions involving participants from 20 APEC 
member countries at Japan's behest43. For its part, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) "continues to hold dialogue with energy producing countries and countries 
along international shipping lanes" towards meeting the country's energy security 
needs 44. 
According to Okazaki Hisahiko45 , the two most important variables defining Japan's 
future sea lane security are the continued forward presence of the Seventh Fleet in the 
Western Pacific and China' s future political orientation and maritime strategy (see 
Chapter Eight). As the United States is the only country capable of guaranteeing sea 
control beyond 1,000 nm from Japan' s shores, he suggests Tokyo should seek to develop 
a framework that would enable the SDF to provide non-combat support to the United 
States Navy in operations in the South China Sea, and possibly mine-sweeping 
operations in the Gulf -- if necessary by developing a legal framework for collective 
defence cooperation -- ahead of any crisis 46 . Okazaki also believes that Japan's freedom 
of navigation interests in the post-Cold War era are potentially exposed to regional 
conflicts. Thus, in the Middle East, a single submarine could halt Japan ' s oil shipments 
tlu·ough the Straits of Hormuz, while in a "worst-case scenario" in Southeast Asia, 
41 Quoted in Mainichi Shimbun, Ap1il 14, 1998 Morning Edition, p 3, FBIS-EAS-98-104 16 April 1998. 
42 Soeya Yoshihide, 'Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives', Chapter 5, in Muthiah 
Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and ldeational Influences, Stanford University Press, 
California, 1998, p 199. 
43 
'Outlook for Asian Energy and its Global Implications', Middle East Econ01nic Survey, 45:5 1/52 
December 23/30, 2002. D9. Transcript of a paper delivered by Masuda Tatsuo at the 8th International 
Energy Forum, Osaka, September 21-23, 2002. 
44 
'Strategy and Approaches of Japan's Energy Diplomacy', The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
December 2002: www.mofa.go.jp/policy/energy/diplomacy.html. 
45 Okazaki 's role in decision-making concerning sea lane defence in the 1980s was covered in Chapter Five. 
46 Okazaki Hisahik:o, "In Anticipation of an Animated Discussion", January 27, 1998, 
www.glocomnet.or.j p/okazaki-inst/sealane.okazaki.e.html 
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Japan's oil routes through the Lombok and Malacca Straits could be blocked. Okazaki 
currently perceives no threat facing Japan in the Indian Ocean. However, in his view, if 
states or pirates disrupted Japan's oil tankers traversing the Indian Ocean in future, 
Japan's total reliance on the United States for naval protection would again expose it to 
charges of doing too little to protect its own shipping, as during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq 
War. Okazaki also believes that Japan should consider paiiicipating in mine clearance 
in the Straits of Malacca, for which the SDF already has the necessary level of military 
capability, but lacks the enabling politico-legal framework. Okazaki' s prescriptions for 
an expanded Japanese sea lane defence role are deliberately framed as pa1i of his long-
standing advocacy of ove1iurning the government's 'ban ' on collective self defence. 
Recent defence white papers continue to emphasise the military and econormc 
importance to Japan of SLOC, "for its survival, for sustaining its fighting capability and 
for securing the infrastructure for receiving support from the U.S. armed forces"47. 
Economically, the importance of safe-guarding Japan's maritime transportation is linked 
to the fact that "its prosperity is highly dependent on sea-borne traffic for importing 
finished goods, including machinery and equip1nent, natural resources, energy and 
foodstuffs, and for expo1iing manufactured goods, such as machinery and equipment and 
chemicals etc". It is further stressed that "an obstruction or a shutoff of maritime traffic 
to and from Japan would have serious consequences on its people's livelihood, 
economic activity and the sustenance of its defence capability. Indeed, Japan 
experienced a similar situation during World War II"48. Accordingly, "Japan's 
maritime defense capability has an important duty to protect the safety of maritime 
transportation". The 2000 edition of the East Asian Strategic Review, a quasi-official 
statement of JDA threat perceptions produced annually by the National Institute for 
Defense Studies, argued that "Ensuring unhindered use of sea lanes and the maintenance 
of peace and order on the high seas have become one of the major challenges for the 
security of East Asia"49. 
In summary, the collapse of the Soviet Union did little immediately to alter the linear, 
incremental course of Japan ' s post-1954 defence policy, which had been based on a 
gradual military build up within budgetary, capability and operational constraints. The 
continuing focus of defence white papers on the potential military threat posed by Russia 
highlighted the rigidity of a policy outlook still frozen in the tense but predictable 
47 Def ense of Japan 1997, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, p 106. 
48 Ibid. p 109. 
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framework of Cold War bipolarity. The review of this Cold War defence framework 
was not completed until 1995. Meanwhile, Japan's experimentation with UN peace-
keeping and down-playing of the centrality of the US-Japan Alliance in the initial post-
Soviet period, at a time when Japan's economic growth model was still regarded as 
robust (if no longer all-conquering), spoke of an attempt to re-orient the country's 
defence and security policies towards a new global and specifically Asian leadership 
role. However, by the time the new taiko was unveiled, strategic pressures in the form 
of uncertainty about the regional security environment, especially concerning China and 
North Korea, led Japanese policy-makers to adopt a more 'realist' and independent set 
of perceptions and responses to their security concems50 . While discounting the 
acquisition of fully fledged independent military power, as likely only to augment 
regional suspicions of resurgent militarism, Japan engaged in a modified form of 
balancing behaviour by moving to 'revitalise' the US-Japan Alliance while at the same 
time exploring multilateral regional dialogue in an attempt to diplomatically pre-empt 
the triggers of regional conflicts. Concerns about Japan's political, economic and 
military vulnerability in a less stable strategic environment were bo111e out in 
perceptions of the emergence of new threats to the security of its sea lanes. The 
following case study will show how Japan has perceived and reacted to the emergence 
of piracy and teITorism-at-sea as non-state threats, while Chapter Eight deals with 
potential state-level SLOC threats posed by China and North Korea. 
II. Japan: piracy and terrorisn1-at-sea. 
Following on from the general profile of piracy and teITorism-at-sea in Chapter Two and 
the preceding overview of Japan's security and defence policy since the Cold War, this 
case study analyses the particular threats posed to Japan's sea lanes by piracy and 
maritime teITorism as sub-state level security conce111s. After gauging the scale of the 
threat posed to Japan by these conce111s and their perception in Japan, the responses of 
policy-makers and other actors are analysed and conclusions drawn. 
Quantifying the threat to Japan posed by modern piracy 1s difficult in the light of 
unce1tainty surrounding the scale and definition of the problem. Reliable data on the 
number of Japanese ships and cargoes affected are obscured by opaque ownership 
structures associated with Japan's increasing use of flags of convenience and the 
reluctance of many shipping operators to repo1i incidents to the authorities. According 
49 
'Maritime Security Environment in East Asia', East Asian Strategic Review 2000, National Institute for 
Defense Studies, Tokyo, 2000, p 95 . 
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to the Nippon Foundation (nippon zaidan), only around 10 per cent of incidents 
involving Japanese-controlled ships are actually repo11ed. Moreover, the more inclusive 
definition of piracy used by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) contrasts with the 
high-seas-only definition of piracy used by the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO). 
According to one estimate, over 140 'Japanese ships' fell victim to piracy attacks 
between 1990 and 200151. If flag registry is taken as the defining criterion, according to 
the IMB's figures , of a total of 2,375 ships attacked in 1991-2001, only ten were 
J apanese52. If ships controlled or managed in Japan are the criteria, a total of eleven 
ships out of the 335 ships attacked worldwide in 2001 belonged to Japan, putting 
Japanese ships in equal sixth place with Norway, after Greece (50), Singapore (45), 
Germany (20), Cyprus (18) , Hong Kong (16) and the United Kingdom (15)53. According 
to the Nikkei Weekly, 31 Japanese ships were attacked in 200054. The Nippon 
Foundation is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) which, in addition to being the 
dispersing arm of the Malacca Straits Council for projects to fund navigational aids in 
the Straits of Malacca (see Chapter Six), has pursued anti-piracy initiatives on several 
fronts. These include the compilation of an online database launched in August 1999 
from questionnaires distributed to Japanese shipping companies. The survey revealed 
110 cases of piracy against Japanese-managed or controlled ships between 1994 and 
200055 . Eleven of these took place in and around the Straits of Malacca, the most 
commercially and strategically important of Japan' s extra-territorial waterways (see 
Appendix 3). 
Actual or attempted piracy attacks in the Straits of Malacca reached a record 75 in 2000. 
However, only eight of these incidents involved actual attacks; seven to ships under way 
and one involving a ship berthed in the Indonesian side of the straits. The downward 
trend in attacks in the Straits of Malacca since then is attributed by the IMB to the joint 
patrols and law enforcement effo11s of the Malaysian authorities in particular. While the 
50 See fo r example, Christopher W . Hughes , 'The orth Korean uclear Crisis and Japanese Security' , 
Survival , Vol. 38, o. 2, Summer 1996, pp 82-90. 
51 Mark J. Valencia 'Piracy and International Politics ', in Hamzah Ahmad and Ogawa Akira (eds.), 
Com.bating Piracy , The Okazaki Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 2001 , p 76. 
52 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Anned Robbe,y Against Ships: Annual Report 2001 , ICC 
International Maritime Bureau, Barking, January 2002, Table 11 , p 12. 
53 Ibid. p 14. 
54 
'Coast Guard adds to arsenal to fight high-seas crime ', Nikkei Weekly, February 11, 2002, p 6. 
55 The Nippon Foundation database should not be regarded as scientifically based, being reliant on the 
cooperation and selectivity of response among individual shipping firms . While minor thefts committed in 
port are included more serious incidents reported elsewhere are not in the database : db0l .nippon-
foundation.or.jp/cgi-bin/zaidan/search_e.cgi 
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IMB' s view is that piracy is likely to have peaked globally in 2000, the incidence of 
hijacking -- acknowledged to be the most organised and violent form of attack --
climbed from 15 to 20 in the first three quarters of 2002. In January 2003, in the latest 
of a string of attacks against tug boats in the Straits of Malacca, a vessel belonging to 
Marco Polo, a Singaporean shipping firm, was hijacked near Bintan Island and one of its 
crew members drowned56 . 
Piracy has been regarded as posing a potential threat to the security of Japan's shipping 
lanes since such incidents were first reported in the Phillip Channel in 198157. Although 
Japanese shipping companies have voiced concerns about piracy and began developing 
their own countermeasures in the early 1980s, official concern in Japan dates mainly 
from the early 1990s, when several Japanese-owned or controlled cargo and fishing 
vessels were either challenged or shot at in the East China Sea, until such incidents 
tailed off rapidly in 1994. Recent concerns centring on Indonesian waters and the Straits 
of Malacca date from the September 1998 hijacking of the Tenyu, a Japanese-owned 
cargo vessel chartered to carry aluminium ingots from the Sumatran po11 of Kuala 
Tanjung. As the most violent and organised act of its kind, the attack and seizure of the 
Tenyu generated media attention in Japan, although the fact that no Japanese nationals 
were among the 15 crew, who were all killed, limited domestic reaction58. Several 
months after its disappearance, the vessel was discovered in a south Chinese po11 
registered under a false name, and it is believed that its $3.5 million cargo may have 
been sold on in Burma, via a Singaporean firm59 . 
On October 22, 1999, the Panamanian-flagged Alondra Rainbow was hijacked in similar 
circumstances in the Straits of Malacca while transporting its cargo of aluminium en 
route to Miike in Japan. Having gained control over the vessel and maintained course for 
several days, pirates eventually cast off the 17-strong crew, including the Japanese 
captain and chief engineer, in life-rafts60 . On November 14, following the sighting by a 
Kuwaiti tanker in the Arabian Sea of a vessel matching the A Zondra Rainbow's 
description, units of the Indian Navy and Coast Guard launched a pursuit. The ship, 
which had been renamed Mega Ram,a and was flying a Belize flag, was eventually 
56 
'Piracy Worsening near Singapore, Shipper Says' , Reuters News Service, January 15, 2003. 
57 Ak:aha Tsuneo , 'Japan 's Response to Threats of Shipping Disruptions in Southeast Asia and the Middle 
East', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp 255-77. 
58 Ishida Kakuya, 'Piracy seen increasing in Strait of Malacca', Daily Yomiuri, December 29, 1998, p 2. 
59 Kawamura Surnihiko, 'Regional Cooperation against Piracy and Armed Robbery', Hamzah and Ogawa 
(eds .). Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 2001, pp 142-43. 
60 Tanaka Norihide and Takase Hitoshi , 'Piracy and Ship 's Safety: A View from the Shipping Industry' in 
Hamzah and Ogawa (eds.). Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 2001, pp 160-61. 
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recovered 300 miles southwest of Goa, on November 1761 . A portion of its 7 ,000-ton 
cargo of aluminium ingots, which had already been off-loaded and transferred, was later 
impounded in the Philippines 62. In February 2000, a Japanese-owned freighter, the 
Global Mars, was hUacked shortly after leaving Port Klang, in Malaysia, bound for 
India with a cargo of palm oil, the first of several vessels to fall victim to "a ruthless and 
determined gang ... preying on valuable palm oil cargoes being towed off the Sumatran 
coast"63. 
While such high-profile, violent hijackings have received press attention, the reported 
incidence of piracy in the Straits of Malacca is, by any standard, low in comparison with 
the volume of traffic transiting tlu·ough such a narrow and congested waterway64. The 
total of eleven piracy incidents involving Japanese-owned ships in the straits reported to 
the Nippon Foundation throughout the seven year period (1994-2000), even allowing for 
gross under-reporting, pales in comparison with the annual figure of 7,146 transits made 
by Japanese-owned vessels through the straits in 1993, while the number of attacks 
against ships in transit is only a small fraction of the total65 . For example, of the 238 
actual attacks worldwide reported to the IMB in 2001, only 64 were perpetrated against 
ships that were steaming at the time ( 42 were be1ihed, 130 anchored and the status of a 
further two undetermined). At the same time, 39 of these took place in Southeast Asian 
waters, where pirates operating from the east coast of Sumatra and Riau province have 
boarded ships that are under way, from the rear and at night66 . 
For Japan's shipping companies and commodity importers, the direct costs of piracy --
aside from physical harm done to the crews -- include the damage (or loss) of vessels 
and the theft of cargoes and valuables. More commercially damaging are the indirect 
costs of charter delays, higher insurance premiums and increased on-board security 
outlays 67. Such costs directly affect Japanese industrial sectors such as shipping and non-
61 Jayant Abhyank:ar, Piracy and Ship Robbery: A Growing Menace ', in Hamzah and Ogawa (eds.) 
Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 2001, pp 38-39. 
62 
' Indian coastguards arrest hijacked freighter off Goa', ICC Commercial Crime Services Website : 
www.iccwbo.org/ccs/news_arch.ives/l 999/indian_coastguards_arrest_hijacked_freighter.asp, November 16, 
1999. 
63 IMB statement quoted in 'Piracy watchdog calls for secure sea lanes for ships', Reuters News Service, 
October 24, 2002. 
64 
'World Oil Transit Chokepoints ', Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, 
November 2002, p 2, 5 at: www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/choke.html 
65 John Noer with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Econoniic Concerns in South-east Asia, National 
Defense University Press/Center for Naval Analyses, 1996, Washington D.C. , Appendix A, Table 30, p 69. 
66 IMB , Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2001, ICC lntemational Maritime 
Bureau, Barking, January 2002, Table 4, Status of ships during actual attacks, January to December 2001 , p 
8. 
67 Japanese insw·ers classify piracy as a war risk. Due to the high costs of war risk premiums, many Japanese 
ship operators limit their war 1isk policies to the Middle East, although one firm has responded to the 
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ferrous metals importers, but not on such a scale as to pose a systemic threat to Japan's 
economic well-being or ability to secure sufficient resource in-flows. 
For Japan, the most senous security implications of piracy lie with its potential 
connection to terrorist acts at sea designed to cause mass destruction, or in the perceived 
'military' category of piracy, as a means of applying strategic pressure to Japan. 
However, piracy may have greater practical strategic significance through the perception 
of some Japanese policy-makers and commentators that it offers Tokyo a pretext for 
exploring potential new alignments with maritime states in the Indo-Pacific region that 
could lead to an enhanced security role for Japan, or even form the basis of a future 
containment strategy directed at China. Although the concept of 'military' piracy is 
itself disputed, Japanese commentators have alleged in the past that Japanese ships were 
the target of low-level, state-sanctioned harassment in the East China Sea during the 
early 1990s. Such harassment is perceived to have been officially encouraged by 
elements within China's armed forces in order to buttress Beijing's maritime sovereignty 
claims, which were asserted in its 1992 Territorial Waters Law, which grants powers for 
the "immediate eviction of foreign military vessels or vessels owned by foreign 
governments and used for non-commercial purposes that violate the laws and regulations 
of the People's Republic of China". 
Japanese ships featured prominently in a wave of incidents involving harassment and 
shooting that swept across the East China Sea during 1991-93. Out of a reported total of 
78 boarding or shooting incidents, 32 involved Japanese-flagged vessels68. Among the 
largest vessels intercepted in international waters by Chinese maritime officials and 
forced into port, ostensibly to clamp down on smuggling activities, was a Japanese-
owned Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) in December 1992, followed by an 
unsuccessful attempt to stop an 83,000 deadweight-ton Japanese-flagged liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) carrier. Crews on board these ships repo11ed the use of firearms and 
uniformed personnel using small, naval-type craft. In March 1993, when the chairman of 
the IMO visited Beijing to raise questions about the attacks, the response of Chinese 
officials was to admit that 'rogue' officials were operating amongst its anti-smuggling 
units. 
upsurge in piracy in Southeast Asia by offering a type of cover specifically for pirate attacks at a quarter of 
the cost of war risk insmance. (' Japanese Insmer Offers Piracy Cover' , ICC Commercial Crime Services 
Website, July 25, 1999: www.iccwbo .org/ccs/institutional/introduction.asp). 
68 The Japanese total is for the period January 1992-February 1993, from Table 8:1, in Kawamura Surnihiko, 
'Maritime Transport and Communications' in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds.) , Calming the Waters: 
Initiatives for Asia Pacific Cooperation, Canben-a Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 114, Australian 
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At the time, there was widespread speculation that the incidents could be "aimed purely 
at exercising China's de facto authority in these waters"69 . Hiramatsu Shigeo, among the 
best-known and 'hawkish' China scholars in Japan, claimed in a 1994 article that the 
attacks on Japanese vessels were part of a long-term state-sanctioned strategy aimed at 
turning the East China Sea into "China's private sea"70 . The rapid drop-off in 
harassment in late 1993, following protests by Japan and the IMO, and Russia's dispatch 
of a naval flotilla to the area with orders to protect Russian shipping, was taken as proof 
by proponents of this explanation that the perpetrators of the attacks were functioning 
within a disciplined chain of command. 
Concern about piracy permeated the JDA' s official threat assessments during the 1990s. 
Since 1996, the Defense of 1 apan has cited the obstruction of safe passage in the South 
China Sea by pirates among its concerns in Southeast Asia. Following the hijacking of 
the Tenyu, this reference to piracy was expanded to include the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore in the 1999 defence white paper71 . The 2000 edition of East Asian Strategic 
Review commented that "piracy attacks have threatened the safety of maritime traffic in 
East Asia", and described piracy among the major challenges to "ensuring unhindered 
use of sea lanes and the maintenance of peace and order on the high seas"72. 
1. Policy responses. 
Japan has pursued a variety of responses at both government and private level directed at 
countering piracy. These can be categorised according to three general approaches: 
i) Cooperation with coastal states. 
ii) Self-help organised by shipping and import firms and Japan-based NGOs. 
iii) Coordination with international maritime organisations. 
National University Press 1996, Canberra, p 98. The majority of Japanese ships targeted were fishing 
vessels. 
69 
'Gunboat Diplomacy', Far Eastern Econoniic Review, June 16, 1994, pp 22-26. 
70 Hiramatsu Shigeo, 'China' s Naval Advance: Objectives and Capabilities ', Japan Review of International 
Affairs, Vol. 8 No. 2, (Spring 1994), pp 128-32. 
71 Defense of Japan 1999, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times, Tokyo, p 41; and Defense of Japan 2000, p 
50. 
72 
'Maritime Security Environment in East Asia', East Asian Strategic Review 2000, National Institute for 
Defense Studies, Tokyo, 2000, p 95. 
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i) Cooperation with coastal states. 
As noted in the preceding chapter, the importance of the region's waterways to Japan's 
trade has informed Tokyo's diplomacy towards states in Southeast Asia. Because the 
majority of piracy incidents occur within the tenitorial or archipelagic waters claimed by 
states in the region, anti-piracy cooperation has also emerged as a focus of Japan's 
SLOC diplomacy 73 . Japan has pursued both bilateral and multilateral effo1is to raise 
awareness of the problem among regional governments and to build capacity among 
coastal states' coast guards through training exchanges and technical support. 
At a multilateral level, growing Japanese concern over piracy has brought the issue on to 
the agenda of 'ASEAN+ 3' discussions held ainong Prin1e Minister Koizu1ni Junichiro, 
former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, prior to 
the ASEAN summit in November 200!74. In February 2002, the ASEAN-EU Experts' 
Group Meeting on Maritime Security proposed the creation of a "neutral flag patrol 
fleet"75 , reminiscent of a proposal put forward in the 1980s by the former MSDF Chief 
of Staff Sakonjo Naotoshi to set up an ASEAN 'joint sea lane defence command' 76 . 
Recent ASEAN meetings have themselves served as a forum for the discussion of 
multilateral responses to piracy and for Japan to float new initiatives. This has applied 
in particular to Prime Minister Koizumi, whose willingness to focus on security issues 
makes him the most assertive premier since Nakasone. In his keynote speech delivered 
on his visit to Singapore on January 14, 2002, Koizumi stated: 
I propose that Japan and ASEAN security cooperation, including transnational 
issues such as terrorism, be drastically intensified. Now, more than ever, we realize 
that one's own security is at stake when a neighbour's wall is ablaze. I believe we 
need an agreement for regional cooperation on piracy, and I will promote 
consultation to achieve that end. We must band together to eradicate the plague of 
piracy. In addition, I would like to strengthen cooperation between the Coast 
77 Guard of Japan and A SEAN counterparts . 
73 According to the Nippon Foundation, the IMO estimates that 86 per cent of incidents occur outside of the 
high seas. 
74 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2001, ICC 
International Maritinie Bureau, Barking, January 2002, p 22. 
75 Alec Almazan, 'Tougher anti-piracy solutions sought ' , Shipping Times, February 28, 2002. 
76 Sudo Sueo, Southeast Asia in Japanese Security Policy, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 
1991, p 39. 
77 Speech by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, ' Japan and ASEAN in East Asia - A Sincere and Open 
Partnership' , given in Singapore, January 14, 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, website: 
www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv020l/speech.html 
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With fewer legal and political constraints on its ability to deploy vessels beyond 1,000 
nm, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG -- formally the Maritime Safety Agency) has been at 
the fore front of official efforts to build anti-piracy cooperation. According to the 
Maritime Traffic Safety Law and Law No. 28, passed in April 1948, the JCG has 
exclusive responsibility in peacetime for the safety of commercial vessels. The Guard 
and Rescue Department of the JCG has a trans-oceanic reach, being equipped with 
around 50 large, lightly armed patrol vessels, including 11 helicopter-equipped patrol 
ships with a standard displacement of 6,500 tons as well as over 70 smaller patrol 
vessels 78 . Its largest vessels are essentially frigates except in their very limited 
armament: four Oerlikon 35 millimetre (mm) anti-aircraft cannon and two JM-61 20mm 
'Gatling' guns. JCG patrol vessels have accumulated substantial long-range operational 
experience, sending relief supplies to Bangladesh in 1991 and providing escort for 
plutonium shipments from Europe to Japan since 1992. In May 1998, the Coast Guard 
deployed two patrol vessels to Singapore on stand-by to evacuate Japanese citizens from 
Indonesia 79 . 
Initiatives undertaken by the MOFA and JCG with their Chinese maritime counterparts 
in 1993 were credited with ending the spate of attacks on shipping in the East China Sea. 
Following a meeting between the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministers in February 
1993, an informal bilateral summit of coast guard officials held in June led to the 
installation of a hot-line between both organisations. Subsequently, incidents in the East 
China Sea fell precipitously to just one in 199480 . Since 1993, regular contacts between 
JCG personnel and Chinese law enforcement officials have become institutionalised, as 
demonstrated in a me1norandum of understanding concluded between the JCG' s 
international division and China's Public Security Agency, outlining bilateral 
cooperation on drugs, illegal migration and piracy81 . 
The Ministry of Transpo1i, the controlling authority of the JCG, has sponsored several 
regional conferences on combating piracy and armed robbery against ships, in 
conjunction with the MOFA, beginning with a February 2000 meeting in Singapore. 
78 Jane 's Fighting Ships 1996-97, Jane's, London, 1996, p 384. 
79 Japan Coast Guard, Annual Report on Maritinie Safety 1998, pp 7-8, Japanese Maritime Safety Agency. 
80 Stanley Weeks , Law and Order at Sea: Pacific Cooperation in Dealing with Piracy, Drugs and Illegal 
Migration ', Calming the Waters: Initiatives for Asia Pacific Cooperation, Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates 
(eds), Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 114, Australian National University Press 1996, 
Canberra, p 51. 
81 Interview with Shinichi Goto , CGSI-III (Commander), Deputy Director, International Affairs and Crisis 
Management Division, and Hideki Mochinaga, Senior Planning Officer, Policy and Legal Affairs Division, 
Administration Dept, Japan Coast Guard, March 6, 2002. 
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Follow-up conferences were convened in April 2000 (Japan), November 2000 
(Malaysia), December 2000 (Japan) and March 2002 (Indonesia). 
Prior to the Singapore conference, an official Japanese proposal for JCG patrol vessels 
to participate in multinational anti-piracy patrols of the Straits of Malacca was disclosed 
by local media in Japan82. This initiative stemmed from an impromptu proposal made to 
Pri1ne Minister Obuchi Keizo by Indonesian President Adurrahinan Wahid on the 
sidelines of the ASEAN leaders summit in Manila, in November 199983 . Political 
support was also offered, at least to begin with, by other ASEAN states, including 
Malaysia and Singapore. However, on the substantive issue of joint coast guard patrols 
in the Straits of Malacca the conference failed to reach agreement, due mainly to China's 
opposition84 . Malaysia and Indonesia also later expressed reservations over the prospect 
of JCG vessels patrolling their territorial waters , at the Council for Security Cooperation 
in the Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation Working Group meeting in Manila, in July 
200085. 
Fifteen regional countries were represented at the April 2000 Asia Anti-Piracy 
Challenges 2000 conference in Tokyo, including China, South Korea, India, Bangladesh 
and the ten ASEAN states. At its conclusion, a non-binding statement was issued 
agreeing to cooperate on maintaining law and order at sea, to pursue information 
exchange and provide techi1ical assistance including training and equipment to assist in 
capacity-building among coast guard organisations with limited resources86 . The JCG 
identifies "the strengthening of cooperative relations with concerned countries to combat 
the issues of piracy" and "promoting countermeasures to maritime crimes, such as the 
frequent occurrence of piracy in the seas surrounding Southeast Asia in pa1iicular" as 
part of its response to transnational crime. Cooperation activities include summits 
between coast guard chiefs and joint training exercises87 . The JCG has also sought to 
engage in prompt information exchange; to stage mutual visits by patrol ships; to extend 
82 Nayan Chanda, 'Foot in the Water', Far Eastern Econoniic Review, March 9, 2000, pp 28-29. 
83 The meeting apparently took place one-to-one without note-takers present. 
84 
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(eds .) . Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 2001, p 81. 
85 Mark J. Valencia 'Piracy and International Politics', in Hamzal1 Ahmad and Ogawa Akira (eds.), 
Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 2001 , p 81. 
86 Text of the statement issued at Asia Anti-Piracy Challenges 2000, April 27-29, 2000; Press Release No. 
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technical aid and to open the JCG Academy and Training School to regional coast guard 
and civilian officials88 . 
Japanese commentators have backed the joint patrols, undertaken in the Straits of 
Malacca by Malaysia and Singapore since 1992, as a model that could be expanded to 
include the wider region89 . However, piracy concerns in the straits have continued to 
centre on Indonesia. In its 2001 piracy report, the IMB expressed its hope that "the 
Indonesian authorities will increase their efforts, without which the area will always 
remain high risk". Indonesia's shortcomings owe partly to a capacity shortfall, induced 
by the economic crisis of 1997-98. According to Admiral Kawamura Sumihiko, 
Indonesia's cturent maritime patrol and surveillance capability is less than half the level 
required to patrol its maritime claims effectively90 . In February 2002, the Indonesian 
Navy announced that it had "deployed three warships on a permanent basis to guard the 
waters off Aceh to prevent arms smuggling and three others to contain pirate attacks on 
cargo vessels passing through the Malacca Straits"91. However, the drying up of off-
budget revenues from army-owned state corporations and the run-down of the official 
defence budget since 1998 (currently supplying only around 25 per cent of military 
funding) have led segments of the military to supplement their incomes by engaging in 
extortion92. 
Ties between the Japanese and Indian coast guards cemented during the A Zondra 
Rainbow pursuit have led both countries to institute joint procedures for anti-piracy 
patrols93 . In November 2000, JCG Director Arai Shogo flew to Chennai (Madras) to 
observe a joint drill designed to develop information-sharing, common communications 
and rescue procedures. The patrol ship Shikishi,na also sailed to Chennai, via the Straits 
of Malacca. According to the MOFA press release, the Shikishima' s visit highlighted 
"the expanding cooperation between Japan and India and their resolve to check the 
growing menace of sea piracy and to ensure safety along Asia's busiest maritime route 
88 Jayant Abhyankar, Piracy and Ship Robbery: A Growing Menace' , in Hamzah and Ogawa (eds.). 
Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 2001, p 54; and interview with Commander 
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Ogawa Akira (eds.). Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute , Kuala Lumpur, 2001, pp 147-50. 
90 Ibid, p 151. 
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which is a crucial lifeline for commerce"94. JCG vessels cunently visit the Straits of 
Malacca on a quarterly basis and have conducted exercises with their Malaysian 
counterpaiis since November 200095 . In November 2001, the JCG conducted an anti-
hijacking drill with the Philippines Coast Guard off Manila, involving members of the 
JCG' s paramilitary Special Security Team, equipped with light arms for boarding and 
· · 96 seizure operations . 
However, the direct involvement of JCG vessels and aircraft in anti-piracy patrols 
remains problematic under Japanese law. Under Articles 2 and 236 of Japan's criminal 
code, jurisdiction covers only crimes against Japanese-flagged ships on the high seas. 
Japanese-owned vessels operating under flags of convenience would fall outside the law, 
leaving the legal basis for JCG operations to counter piracy beyond Japan's tenitorial 
waters in doubt for the majority of vessels carrying Japanese cargoes, or in cases where 
h J . 1 97 t e perpetrators are not apanese nationa s . As the JCG is also proscribed from 
exercising with military units in other countries, joint patrols with those states that 
assign constabulary duties to their navy would not be possible98 . 
While the JCG has restricted its presence in the Straits of Malacca to port visits and 
drills with its counterpaii organisations, expanding naval cooperation between the 
United States and India yielded an agreement in February 2002 on protecting 
commercial shipping in the Straits of Malacca. Under the agreement, India's regional 
naval cormnand in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, at the western approach to the 
straits, coordinates patrols and the escort of high-value ships such as oil tankers and 
LNG carriers with US warships, which have access to bases in Singapore at the straits' 
eastern end.99 . India's pai·ticipation in 'trial' patrols of the straits began in April 2002100 . 
ii) Non-governmental responses. 
The Nippon Foundation, as the most active Japanese NGO on piracy issues, claims to 
have promoted counter-measures in three ways: first, by feeding information to the 
94 
'Japanese Coast Guard Vessel to Visit India' , Press Release No. 34, Embassy of Japan in India, October 
30, 2000: www.japan-emb.org.in/pressreleases/Press_ReleasesMenu.htm 
95 Tim Huxley, 'Disintegrating Indonesia: Implications for Regional Security ' ' , Adelphi Paper 349, The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 2002, p 83. 
96 
'Coast Guard adds to arsenal to fight high-seas crime' , Nikkei Weekly, February 11, 2002, p 6. 
97 Tanaka Norihide and Takase Hitoshi, 'Piracy and Ship's Safety: A View from the Shipping Industry' in 
Hamzah and Ogawa (eds. ). Conibating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 2001 , p 173 ; and 
Kawamura, in Ibid. p 152. 
98 Interview with Commander Shinichi Goto , Deputy Director, International Affairs and Crisis Management 
Division, Japan Coast Guard, March 6, 2002. 
99 Edward Luce, 'Indian navy agrees to protect US shipping ', Financial Times , February 6, 2002, p 10. 
100 
'India begins patrolling Malacca Straits ' , The Hindu Online, April 20, 2002: 
www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/20/stories/2002042002901100 .htm 
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Japanese public and media about piracy; second, by encouraging shipping companies to 
pool information (including via its on-line database of piracy incidents involving 
Japanese-owned vessels); and thirdly by developing toranomon, a low-cost deck-wide 
tripwire alarm system designed to ale11 crew members to boarding attempts via 
grappling hooks, which it began deploying in February 2000. The Nippon Foundation 
has also been involved in researching a radical re-routing solution to avoid high-risk 
piracy areas in Asian and African waters. With Norwegian and Russian support, the 
Foundation co-sponsored a study into the Northern Sea Route (NSR), along Russia's 
Arctic coast from 1993-99. In spite of the technical and cost challenges involved in 
clearing an alternative route to European ports via the ice-bound Siberian coast, the NSR 
has been considered of potential commercial viability because it would halve the sailing 
distance between Japan and northern Europe via Suez. It would also bypass areas 
subject to pirate attacks and exposed to geopolitical risk, from Indonesia to Sri Lanka 
and the southern Red Sea 1°1. 
As with other navigational safety issues noted in Chapter Six, Japanese shipping firms 
and industries affected by piracy in Southeast Asia have pursued counter-measures 
independently and through maritime international organisations. Shipping industry 
representatives have called for the creation of a regional piracy surveillance group in 
Southeast Asia, composed of coast guard and police units, to patrol areas most affected 
by piracy. Backers of the plan also believe that a new international convention might be 
necessary to cover the realignment of domestic law to enable suspect vessels that 
attempt to shelter within the tenitorial waters of other states to be pursued and inspected. 
The burden of funding the proposed group would be divided among all stakeholders 1°2. 
Since 1983, the Japan Shipowners' Association (JSA) has recommended the adoption of 
safety measures aboard its members' vessels aimed at reducing the risk of piracy. These 
include improved on-deck lighting103, increased watch duty, better shipboard 
communications and the installation of on-board alarm systems and remote ship 
monitoring systems in addition to those already offered by the Nippon Foundation and 
the IMB' s Shiploc system 104. Nippon Yusen Kaisha has developed its own Fleet 
101 The Yokoharna-Hambmg route via Suez is 11,400 nautical miles, compared to 6,600 nm via the NSR 
(International Northern Sea Route Programme overview: www.fni.no/insrop). 
102 Tanaka Norihide and Takase Hitoshi, 'Piracy and Ship 's Safety: A View from the Shipping Industry' in 
Hamzah and Ogawa (eds.). Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 2001, pp 165-66. 
103 Given the trend towards smaller crews and larger vessels, some ships now regard lighting the deck 
directly as counter-productive, since this advertises points of vulnerability to potential attackers. 
Increasingly, light is directed at the water around the vessel in order to help those on deck to detect 
a~proaching vessels. 
1 4 Shiploc is a tracking system which relies on Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) technology and a 
concealed, battery-powered transmitter placed on board participating ships, giving shipowners the ability to 
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Remote Monitoring System to alert its central offices in case communications are 
disrupted with vessels belonging to its 450-strong fleet105 . Shipowners have also been 
encouraged to report incidents to both coastal states and the Japanese authorities. 
Among the metals and shipping firms most affected by robberies and hijacking in the 
Straits of Malacca, Sumitomo Metal Industries , Showa Denko K.K. and Tokyo Senpaku 
have made private an-angements with Indonesian military personnel for on-board 
protection during transit through Indonesian waters 1°6. 
Since 1992, the JSA has also sought to build links with other regional shipping firms, via 
the Asian Ship Owners ' Forum (ASF), and to lobby governments to address piracy as a 
policy concern. The ASF, with members from seven states, has called on coastal states 
to address particular 'hot-spots' such as the Straits of Malacca and the Hong Kong-
Hainan-Luzon triangle. At its 1998 meeting, the ASF praised the efforts of Malaysia 
and the Philippines to combat piracy in the Sulu Sea and called on "all governments to 
increase patrols by police or naval vessels to eradicate acts of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships in their own ten-itorial waters and the neighbouring area". The Forum has 
also called on other Asian countries to join Japan, China and India in ratifying the 1988 
Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, and the Convention on Hijack Prevention under which signatories can 
prosecute pirates for crimes committed in another state's jurisdiction. No Southeast 
Asian country has yet signed the Rome Convention. Since September 11 , the ASF' s Safe 
Navigation and Environment Committee has also increased calls on Asian governments, 
especially Indonesia, to boost maritime patrols and to investigate reported incidents of 
piracy and armed robbery107. 
iii) International maritime organisations. 
Shipping firms and the Japanese government have also relied on international maritime 
organisations to combat piracy. The IMO provides the only forum with the necessary 
breadth and authority to assemble together all of the major stakeholder groups affected 
by piracy, including coastal states, flag states and port states within the multilateral UN 
track a vessels' movements in real time by regular 'polling' via the In ternet (up to 15 times per day). It is 
relatively cheap, with an installation cost of 280 dollars (www.shiploc.com) . 
105 A shipping industry interviewee expressed some skepticism about the security value of Shiploc and other 
polling sys tems that rely on course deviation to trigger an alarm at the monitoring location. Given that this 
provides a deterrent only to long-term seizures, more in terest was expressed in anti-boarding defences, 
particularly the 'Secure-Ship' system based around a deck-wide, 9,000 volt electrified fence deployed by 
some European shipping companies. However, fire risk has limited its use to vessels carrying non-
flammable cargoes. 
106 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 18, 1999, p 1 l. 
107 International Mari time Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2001, ICC 
International Maritinie Bureau, Barking, January 2002, p 23. 
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framework. In 1992, the IMO established a working group composed of ten member 
states, including Japan, Indonesia and Singapore to assess, inter alia, the threat of 
piracy. In 1993, as a result of a report handed down by the working group, the IMO's 
Maritime Safety Committee issued two circulars: MSC/CIRC 622, outlining 
recommendations for combating piracy and armed robbery against ships; and 
MSC/CIRC 623, detailing guidance to ship-owners, operators, masters and crew on 
preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, stressing 
preventive measures spanning watch-keeping, safe anchorage and reporting 
procedures108. In parallel, the IMB set up the regional piracy centre in Kuala Lumpur in 
1992, which has served to collate and publish a database of actual and attempted piracy 
attacks. In 2001, the IMB extended its broadcast piracy warnings, via satellite, to areas 
covering Japan, Asia, East Africa, West Africa and the west coast of South America. 
The warnings cover the details of recent piracy incidents and 'high risk' areas such as 
the northeast coast of Somalia and the Indonesian portion of the Straits of Malacca 109. 
2. The MSDF, piracy and maritime terrorism. 
There have been calls within Japan to allow ships from the MSDF to become directly 
involved in anti-piracy patrols "on the high seas"110 . Russia's naval show of force in the 
East China Sea in late 1993 demonstrated to Japan's naval fraternity the "impo11ance of 
the naval presence as a method of cracking down on piracy effectively" 111 . An anti-
piracy role for the MSDF was also proposed as pa11 of an Ocean Peace-Keeping (OPK) 
concept developed by the IDA-affiliated National Institute for Defense Studies in 
Tokyo. The OPK concept is premised on the assumption that piracy and terrorist actions 
at sea are examples of post-Cold War era threats that render the "difference between 
military reaction and police reaction ambiguous" -- justifying an expansion of 
constabulary duties for the MSDF on a multilateral, region-wide basis 112. The OPK was 
also an attempt to develop a post-Cold War role for the MSDF to rival the central role 
played by the GSDF in UN peacekeeping operations. However, aside from 
108 Jayant Abhyankar, Piracy and Ship Robbery: A Growing Menace', in Harnzah and Ogawa (eds .). 
Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 2001 , p 56; and Tanaka Norihide and Takase 
Hitoshi in Ibid. pp 166-68. 
109 
'Seafarers Warned On Indonesia Pirates, Somali Armed Gangs', Dow Jones Newswires, October 23, 
2002. 
110 Tanaka and Tarase, in Hamzah and Ogawa (eds.). Combating Piracy, The Okazaki Institute, Kuala 
Lumpur, 2001 , p 173 . 
111 Kawamura Sumihiko, 'SLOC Security -A Japanese Perspective' in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates 
(eds), The Seas Unite: Maritinie Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, Canberra Papers on Strategy and 
Defence, No. 118, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1996, pp 166. 
112 Akimoto Kazumine, 'OPK (Ocean-Peace Keeping) (sic.): Multilateral Naval Cooperation for Ocean 
Stabilization', in Ocean Governance and OPK: The Thirteenth International Symposium Proceedings, 
National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 1998, p 17; and 'Mission and Contribution of the Japan 
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constitutional challenges, a prospective MSDF role in anti-piracy patrols in Southeast 
Asian waters would be certain to meet strong opposition from China. The existence of 
separate JDA and Coast Guard anti-piracy proposals can be ascribed at one level to 
bureaucratic rivalry, which may be partly responsible for the failure of either to 
materialise as envisaged. While bureaucratic competition and duplication of effort have 
often marred the relationship between the JCG and MSDF, thinking within the Maritime 
Staff Office in recent years has concentrated more on military than constabulary 
operations (notwithstanding the MSDF' s ongoing role in transporting overseas 
humanitarian assistance to such remote destinations as Turkey113). At the same time, 
overlapping initiatives from the JCG and JDA exploring a role for Japan in anti-piracy 
patrols in Southeast Asia have been seen as an attempt by the Japanese government "to 
reassert its waning influence in the region as a counterbalance to China"114. 
Although both JCG and MSDF vessels currently lack a legal mandate to engage in 
patrols in the Straits of Malacca outside of the rubric of 'exercises', both organisations 
have successfully established a de facto presence in the straits. While not ostensibly 
connected with the piracy issue, the MSDF and the Singaporean Navy have conducted 
exercises since 1996, while MSDF destroyers continue to send training squadrons 
through the Straits of Malacca on an annual basis, calling at Po1i Klang as they have 
since the late 1960s115 . Since November 2001, the MSDF presence in the straits has been 
boosted as a major new operational requirement has arisen to maintain the MSDF flotilla 
on station in the Arabian Sea as paii of Japan's response to the US-led war on terrorism. 
i) Anti-terrorism and the MSDF' s Arabian Sea deployment. 
Japan's own exposure to terrorism aimed at mass destruction, at the hands of the Aum 
Shinrikyo cult which conducted the fatal March 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo 
underground led the Japanese government to consider the use of the SDF in both an 
internal and external counter-terrorist capacity long before the September 11 attacks 116 . 
After the Diet passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in just three weeks, in 
October 2001, MSDF warships were deployed the following month to the Middle East 
Maritime Self Defense Force in the Post-Cold War and EEZ Era' , paper prepared for the International 
Conference sponsored by the Korean Institute for Maritime Strategy, December 11 , 1998 , p 7. 
113 Interview with Captain Otsuka Umio , MSDF, Agenda Coordinator, Western Pacific Naval Symposium, 
Plar1s and Program Division, Maritime Staff Office, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo , March 1, 2002. 
114 Mark J. Valencia, 'Joining Up With Japan to Patrol Asian Waters ', International Herald Tribune , 28 
April, 2000. 
115 
'Three Japanese Navy Vessels Call at West Port', Berna.ma, Mar·ch 13, 2001. 
116 Christopher W. Hughes, 'Japan ' s Aum Shinrikyo, the Changing Nature of Tenorism, and the Post-Cold 
War Security Agenda', Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, February 1998, p 56. 
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"t tl · f · ,, · 111 o ga 1er In ormation rn support of US-led operations In Afghanistan . MSDF 
auxiliaries attached to the flotilla have since supplied around 40 per cent of the fuel 
requirements of US and UK vessels deployed in the Arabian Sea (as part of a force 
involving navies from around ten countries) , paiily to intercept suspected al-Qaida 
terrorists attempting to flee Afghanistan, via Pakistan. MSDF vessels, including the 
Aegis destroyer Kirishinia that sailed from Yokosuka in mid-December 2002, have since 
transited via the Straits of Malacca en route to the Indian Ocean. The deployment of 
three destroyers and two supply ships to the Arabian Sea was Japan's first-ever 
contribution of forces to an inteinational coalition during a conflict. This was made 
possible without directly tackling the government's ban on collective self-defence and 
constitutional constraints by linking the MSDF dispatch, via the Anti-Terrorism Special 
Measures Law, specifically to counter-terrorist efforts against al-Qaida and Taliban 
forces in Afghanistan, rather than defining it as a defence contingency. The new 
legislation, valid for two years from November 2001 , may be renewed for a further two 
years. 
Legally, the passage of MSDF vessels through the straits is thus unconnected with anti-
piracy cooperation involving Southeast Asian navies, the JCG's own activities or US 
and Indian naval patrols currently being mounted in the straits. However, in practical 
terms, the presence in the straits of outward-bound or returning MSDF vessels in close 
proximity and communication with naval vessels from the United States and India (with 
which Japan has developed a defence dialogue since 2000) will inevitably have a 
reinforcing effect on de facto naval cooperation in the Straits of Malacca and their 
env1rons. 
Operation 'Arabian Rainbow' was scheduled originally to last for six months through to 
May 19, 2002. However, Koizumi said on March 24, 2002 that Japan ' s military suppoii 
to US-led forces fighting against tenorism will continue for the foreseeable future and 
extended the MSDF deployments for a further six months beyond November 19 11 8. The 
long-term deployinent of MSDF units to the Gulf region under a more liberal legal remit 
than has governed any previous overseas dispatch in the SDF' s history, canies important 
implications for future maritime operations beyond the ostensible one of aiding counter-
terrorism operations in land-locked Afghanistan. These include the potential for the 
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original terms of the MSDF' s dispatch to be merged into providing logistic suppo11 for 
any US military action against Iraq. 
The Japanese government's original plan to commit an Aegis-equipped destroyer and 
the 8,900 ton Osumi amphibious landing ship (capable of deploying several of the 
MSDF' s MH-53 mine-sweeping helicopters from its flat deck) as part of the MSDF 
flotilla was postponed owing to concerns expressed by the LDP's Ko1neito Party 
coalition partner and opposition parties that the destroyer's capabilities exceeded the 
requirements necessary for operations to dislodge the Taliban 11 9. However, on December 
11, 2002, a Japanese offer was made to transport a 140-man Thai engineering battalion 
to an Indian Ocean port, for deployment in Afghanistan, paving the way for the despatch 
of the Osunii to the Indian Ocean in February 2003 120 . 
The importance of the MSDF's Aegis capability to Japan's potential participation in any 
joint ballistic · missile defence syste1n developed with the United States adds fu11her 
symbolism to the Kirishinia 's operational deployment121 . However, the decision to 
reinforce the MSDF flotilla in the Arabian Sea by deploying the Kirishinia in December 
2002 and the Osumi in February 2003, more than one year after the overthrow of the 
Taliban regime, had more i1nmediate significance in view of the potential for MSDF 
vessels to be re-assigned to support any US attack on Iraq. In early 2002, as speculation 
grew about US intentions towards Iraq, Japanese cabinet officials said that under the 
October 2001 anti-te1Torist legislation, it would be difficult for Japan to provide logistic 
support unless there is a proven connection with September 11. Subsequently, on the 
first anniversary of the Septe1nber 11 attacks, Moriya Takemasa, the Director General of 
the JDA Defense Policy Bureau, announced at a press briefing that Japan would be able 
to avail logistic support to US forces if they attacked Iraq within the framework of 
existing legislation, provided that military action was authorised by a UN resolution 122 . 
At the same time, the deployment was also being used to expand the range of Japan's 
security partners, suggesting a desire on the pai1 of policymakers to reframe their post-
September 11 security response in wider, UN-centred terms, rather than as a bilateral 
response made purely within the context of the US-Japan Alliance. In late February 
2003, the Koizumi cabinet approved a move to allow MSDF vessels to refuel vessels 
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from the French, German and New Zealand navies , in addition to US and UK vessels 
cunently deployed on anti-al-Qaida patrols in the Arabian Sea 123 . Under the terms of the 
supply agreement, ships refuelled by MSDF tenders could not pa11icipate in any 
hostilities against Iraq124. Moreover, the decision to refuel naval vessels from those 
countries whose governments are least favourably disposed to US military action in the 
Gulf (unlike Spain and Italy, which also have ships in the Arabian Sea), suggested that 
Japan was continuing to hedge its options over whether to lend support to the United 
States, at least until international diplomacy centred around a second UN resolution on 
military action had been resolved. 
Irrespective of whether MSDF vessels become involved in a conflict in Iraq, Operation 
'Arabian Rainbow ' is likely to affect the way in which SLOC security is perceived and 
conducted within Japan in the future. First, it establishes a precedent for expanding the 
legal framework under which the SDF may be dispatched without directly challenging 
the ban on collective self-defence. Thus, future MSDF operational deployments may be 
justified in reference to anti-tenorism, or by extension anti-piracy. Second, the long-
term operational deployment of MSDF vessels in the Indian Ocean sets another 
important precedent in the context of Japan's SLOC security by establishing an MSDF 
presence along the length of its main energy supply routes to the Gulf, including in the 
Straits of Malacca. In February 2003, the Daily Yomiuri reported that the Koizumi 
administration had drawn up eight "key concerns" regarding a possible war in Iraq, 
including measures "to ensure the safety of Japanese vessels in the Mideast, including 
oil tankers", suggesting that MSDF forces in place could in future be used in an escort 
125 
role . 
The decision-making process behind Japan's choice on which forces to deploy to the 
Middle East is significant to this thesis for one other reason. Requests from the US 
government in April 2002 for Japan to dispatch an Aegis destroyer and P-3C aircraft to 
the Indian Ocean were reportedly presaged by a meeting in Y okosuka of senior MSDF 
officers and the Commander of US Naval Forces, Japan, Rear Admiral Robert 
Chaplin126 . At the meeting, MSDF officers urged Chaplin to make representations 
within Washington for the US government to "strongly request" such a deployment from 
122 Japan's Laws Permi t It to Supply US Forces, Bloomberg News, September 11 , 2002. 
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Japan. In late April, US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz made the request for 
the dispatch of an Aegis destroyer and P-3C aircraft in talks with senior politicians from 
Japan's ruling coalition127 . In this way, the close navy-to-navy relationship established 
after 1945 and which played an important role in sea lane defence during the 1980s still 
functions, at the transnational level, as a semi-independent and occasionally pivotal 
influence within Japanese defence policy decision-making. 
Conclusion. 
The widespread perception of 1naritime piracy as a threat to the security of Japan's sea 
lanes, despite the very small number of incidents involving Japanese shipping interests 
relative to the volume of Japan's seaborne trade flows, is indicative of a broad array of 
post-Cold War challenges posed by non-state actors. Japan's profile as the major 
external user of waterways between the home islands and the Middle East that coincide 
with most of the piracy 'hot-spots' identified over the last decade has ensured that 
modern piracy is commonly viewed, within government and industry, as a particular 
post-Cold War concern for Japan. 
Considered relative to the scale of trade flows through affected waters, piracy could be 
seen as more of an 'irritant' to the global maritime trading network than the systemic 
economic threat it is sometimes perceived to be in Japan. However, widespread and 
growing perceptions of piracy as a national security threat appear to be borne out both in 
official statements and the views of private analysts in Japan. Apait from concerns 
about piracy's immediate economic and commercial impact, the suspicion that Japan 
was the target of 'military piracy' in the East China Sea during the early 1990s, as part 
of a clandestine Chinese policy of asserting its sovereignty claims and testing Japan's 
resolve, appears genuine in realist quarters. Such a scenario echoes Cold War fears that 
the Soviet Union would use shipping as a low-cost means to exert political pressure on 
Japan (see Chapter Four). 
As 'new' security challenges, the potential of anti-piracy and counter-terrorism to be 
used as rationales to generate post-Cold War missions and budgetary claims on the pa1i 
of the JCG and MSDF can be partly attributed to bureaucratic self-preservation 
(especially for the JDA, after the end of the Soviet threat) and competition over a 
diminishing pool of central government funds. However, the level of political 
126 Axel Berkofsky, 'Japan's navy salvo catches politicians off guard', Asia Times, May 16, 2002: 
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commitment to anti-piracy initiatives since 1998, particularly under the Koizumi 
administration, reflects more than mere bureaucratic rivalry. Piracy has also handed 
advocates of an expanded security role for Japan a politically safe pretext to explore 
maritime cooperation with Asia Pacific maritime countries, including India and several 
states in Southeast Asia. Japan's responses to the piracy issue in this context accord 
with a generalised perception that expanding multilateral security linkages with other 
Asia Pacific states has a positive influence on Japan's security environment, both by 
communicating reassurance to the region about Japan's benign intentions, and by 
serving to mitigate sources of regional conflict. A realist logic also underpinned the 
Higuchi Repo11' s emphasis on multilateralism; namely, that Japan should broaden the 
basis of its post-1945 security posture, based on Yoshida' s doctrine of reliance on the 
United States, partly as a hedging strategy against a future ebbing of the US security 
commitment to Japan, but also owing to a related concern that Japan might otherwise 
face an assertive China in the future without a major supporting ally. Japan's SLOC 
security in the context of a rising China is the subject of the next case study, in Chapter 
Eight. 
Since September 11, 2001, the nse of international Islamic-based terrorism has 
presented Japan's SLOC security with fresh challenges, given the pa11icularly high risk 
attached to al-Qaida-linked actions against shipping and port infrastructure in the Middle 
East and Southeast Asia. The dispatch of MSDF vessels to the Arabian Sea was in an 
immediate sense a 'political' response aimed at a voiding a crisis in alliance relations 
with the United States akin to those of the 1990-91 Gulf or the 1993-94 North Korean 
nuclear crises, notwithstanding Japan's pa11icular receptivity to counter-terrorist 
cooperation. A decision to extend support for a US attack against Iraq could 
conceivably follow on from this logic. Viewed from another perspective, the MSDF 
deployment represents a co1nmitment on the part of the Koizumi administration to 
expand its security role under UN auspices and to establish a naval presence along the 
length of its energy supply routes to the Gulf, with the aim of deterring future terrorist 
and military attacks on its SLOC. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Japan's Post-Cold War SLOC Security: China and Regional Conflict 
Introduction. 
This chapter explores potential conventional military threats to Japan's sea lines of 
communication (SLOC) in the post-Cold War era, focussing on China in particular. As 
shown in Chapter Two, the outbreak of conflict in a number of regions adjacent to key 
shipping lanes, including the Gulf region, the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the 
Korean Peninsula, could have a major impact on the security of shipping and disrupt 
international trade. A major conflict in the Gulf, while serious for Japan's security in 
terms of the potential for energy supply disruptions, would automatically be 
internationalised given the region's importance to global energy supplies. This, in turn, 
would mean that Japan's main problem would likely be restricted to the political one of 
how to organise its contribution to a US-led military coalition (as in 1991 and, 
potentially, in 2003). The 1nost serious regional flash-points, from the viewpoint of 
Japan's SLOC, are the more proximate concerns of the South China Sea, the Taiwan 
Strait and the Korean Peninsula. North Korea, even with its limited capability, could 
potentially threaten Japan's SLOC where they are most vulnerable, using sea mines and 
small submarines in the approaches to Japan's po11s and straits. However, the disposition 
of forces in the Peninsula is such that the ground and air dimensions would predominate, 
unlike in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, where the maritime dimension would 
shape any major military conflict primarily as a naval and air war (although China's 
missile build-up opposite Taiwan means that a cross-strait conflict could conceivably be 
limited to a missile exchange). China is seen in Japan as by far the most important state-
level variable bearing on Japan's SLOC, reflecting China's status as a party to 
sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea and Tai wan Strait. Moreover, Japanese 
concerns reflect China's geographically dominant position along East Asia's coastal 
periphery, its growing economic and political influence within the region, and its 
military and especially naval modernisation. 
This chapter concentrates on aspects of Sino-Japanese relations that have a particular 
bearing on Japan's sea lane security and China's potential to emerge as a strategic threat. 
It does not atte1npt to describe the broader dynamics of bilateral ties between Japan and 
China, which -- unlike Japan's Cold War relations with the Soviet Union -- have evolved 
to a point where they are too complex to be characterised monolithically as adversarial. 
A shift towards a more 'realist' view of China among Japan's policy-makers, noted in 
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Chapter Seven, is widely acknowledged to have occuned since the end of the Cold 
War1. While many agree that China will be the most important long-term determinant of 
Japan's future security policy, opinion diverges on whether the dynamic most likely to 
develop will be cooperative, accommodative, benignly competitive or confrontational. 
Some regard it as likely that Japanese realism toward China will assert itself in the form 
of an accommodation with Beijing in recognition of China's 'historic' role as Asia's 
dominant power2. Alternatively, Tokyo's increased support for the US-Japan Alliance 
since the mid- l 990s could be seen as evidence of Japanese policymakers' engaging in 
balancing behaviour against China's hegemonic potential. Equally, Japan's pursuit of 
multilateral security linkages with states around Asia's coastal periphery could attest to a 
deeper interest in exploring options for a future maritime axis to check China's power 
should the United States itself seek an accommodation with China. 
The major objective of this chapter is to analyse perceptions among security policy-
makers (in China as well as Japan) in as far as these relate specifically to sea lanes, and 
to draw conclusions about how these perceptions have shaped (and are likely to shape) 
the strategic dynamic of Sino-Japanese ties. Initially, I assess the influence that SLOC 
have had in the development of China's emerging maritime strategy, its operational 
concepts and naval doctrine. China's maritime capabilities and force development are 
then profiled, leading into an assessment of how China perceives the issue of Japan's 
SLOC security. This is followed by an analysis of perceptions held by Japanese defence 
decision-makers, security analysts, and former and serving military personnel regarding 
China's potential to imperil the security of Japan's major SLOC to Southeast Asia and 
the Middle East. Consideration is also given to the conventional and non-conventional 
threats that North Korea presents to Japan's SLOC. The chapter argues that although 
North Korea's maritime capabilities and threat potential (excluding its missile and 
incipient nuclear capabilities) are modest compared with those of China, North Korea 
has had an important political effect in terms of driving recent changes in Japan's 
defence policy. 
I. China's naval n1odernisation and n1aritime strategy. 
In the early 1980s, under the direction of Admiral Liu Huaqing ("China's Gorshkov"), 
the People's Liberation Almy Navy (PLAN) moved from a doctrine of People's War, 
requiring modest-sized vessels operating inshore in support of People's Liberation Army 
1 Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, 'Japan ' s Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to 
Reluctant Realism' , Survival , Vol. 38, No . 2, Summer 1996, pp 35-58 . 
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(PLA) ground forces, to a limited war doctrine extending to ambitions for a 'blue water' 
fleet, equipped for power-projection3. The blue-water ambitions of the PLAN have 
evolved in close relation to China's expanding maritime interests, which can be grouped 
into three core concerns: 
i) Territorial claims. China's most important maritime concern is the security and 
sovereignty of its 18,000 kilometre (km) coastline, including the protection of coastal 
regions where new prosperity is concentrated, as well as the 3.6 million square km of 
"territorial waters" which it claims. As sovereignty over two-thirds of this area 1s 
disputed, the affirmation of Chinese maritime claims is a major function of the PLAN. 
ii) Resource protection. The exploitation of marine resources in relation to seabed 
minerals -- especially hydrocarbons -- has grown in importance since China became a 
net energy importer in 1993 (importing 22 per cent of its oil in 1999; in 1980 it exported 
20 per cent of production 4). China also owns the world's largest fishing fleet. 
iii) Trade protection. The conduct and protection of seaborne trade, which exceeds 500 
million tonnes per year, has emerged as a major and rapidly growing priority. Since 
China's entry into the World Trade Organisation in January 2002 cemented its position 
as the 'factory of the world', the expo11 of Chinese-made goods to the United States has 
already overtaken those of J apan5. China's expo11s are projected to continue expanding 
rapidly, fed by a surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) which exceeded 50 billion 
dollars in 2002, making China the most favoured destination for FDI globally. 
Shenzhen and Qingdao have now joined Shanghai among the world's top-20 container 
ports, while Hong Kong -- the leading port -- has been under Chinese sovereignty since 
19976. 
2 John Welfield, 'The American Japanese Alliance at the Tum of the Millennium', Pacific Research, May 
1996, p 10. 
3 Liu retired in 1996 as the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, China's top military 
decision-making body (You Ji , 'The Ambition for a Blue Water Navy', Chapter 6, The Armed Forces of 
China, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1999, pp 160-200. 
4 
'Outlook for Asian Energy and its Global Implications' , Middle East Economic Survey, 45 :51/52, 
December 23/30, 2002, D4. Transcript of a paper delivered by Masuda Tatsuo at the 8th International 
Energy Forum, Osaka, September 21-23, 2002. 
5 James Kynge and Dan Roberts 'Comment and Analysis: China', Financial Times, February 5, 2003, p 15. 
6 
'Review of Maritime Transport, 2002 ', United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United 
Nations, New York and Geneva, 2002, p 69. 
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1. The role of SLOC in China's maritime strategy. 
PLAN strategists have proposed the establishment of maritime defence perimeters to 
varying depths. Admiral Liu's more limited 'green water' navy concept, apparently 
influenced by Japan' s 1,000 nautical mile (nm) sea lane defence concept, would 
basically extend PLAN coverage basically to the limit of its territorial claims in the East 
and South China Sea (the extent of China's South China Sea claims are shown in Map 2, 
in Chapter One). Admiral Zhang Xusan, the former chief of the naval staff, envisaged a 
navy capable of operating from the Sea of Japan to the Straits of Malacca and defined 
China's eastern defence perimeter as including the 'first island chain', comprising the 
Indonesian, Philippine and Japanese archipelagos and Tai wan. 
However, other Chinese defence analysts have identified strategic weaknesses in 
regarding the first island chain as the limit of China's defence zone, "with most of our 
lanes to the high seas being interdicted by the island chain, so that access to the high sea 
of the Chinese Navy is controlled to a ce1iain extent by others, who are very likely to 
close it off in wartime"7. A more ambitious defence-in-depth concept extending to the 
'second island chain', including the Bonin, Mariana, Guam and the Caroline Islands in 
Oceania (see Map 13, below) , has also been proposed, partly on the grounds that the 
increasing range of modern tactical missiles requires that enemy forces be intercepted at 
distances beyond 1,000 nm8. The establishment of military facilities in, and defence 
links with Burma and port calls to South Pacific nations have been seen as evidence of 
growing Chinese interest in acquiring the experience and base infrastructure to support 
long-range operations in the Pacific and Indian oceans. 
7 Liu Yi-chien, 'China's 21st Century Navy Prospects ', Ta Kung Pao, FBIS China Daily Report, FBIS-CHI-
1999-1011 , September 1, 1999. 
8 Hirama Yoichi , 'The Growing Chinese Navy and its Influence on Triple-Relation (sic) - Japan, US and 
Korea', paper given at Conference on Post-Unification Secwity Cooperation Among the United States, 
Korea and Japan, Hawaii, 20-23 April 1998, pp 8-9 . 
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Map 13: Oceania and the 'second island chain' 
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Emphasis has been placed by some Chinese commentators on the control of key straits 
and chokepoints, giving rise to the belief that "the Chinese Navy is going to have to have 
enough might to effectively control when necessary the key sea lanes from Chinese sea-
space to the high seas (including) the Korea (Tsushima) Strait and all straits or channels 
in the Ryukyu Islands". Owing to the perception that "the concerned countries keep a 
quite tight peacetime security, warning, and control of these straits" the same writer 
predicts that "the wartime struggle to control these straits will be very intense". To the 
south, it is seen as strategically necessary to control the Bashi, Malacca, Sunda and 
Lungmu (Lombok), straits as well as "all straits in the Philippines"9. 
In the view of PLAN officers, the control of Taiwan is valued for strategic reasons, apart 
from its political and economic value, as the "gateway" allowing unobstructed access to 
the Pacific. It is also prized for its sea denial value astride US military and Japanese 
economic SLOC; for "As such, it may be used to adversely affect the US' s forward 
deployment (and) Japan's economic lifeline" 10 . US assessments of Taiwan's strategic 
9 Liu Yi-chien, ' China' s 21 st Century Navy Prospects ', Ta Kung Pao, FBIS China Daily Report, FBIS-CHI-
1999-1011, September 1, 1999. 
10 You Ji, The Armed Forces of China, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1999, pp 212-13 . 
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value, drawn up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1948, concuned that control of 
the island by a hostile power would confer on it the "capability of dominating to his 
advantage and our disadvantage the sea routes between Japan and the Malay area" 11 . 
One Chinese source comments that: 
The island of Taiwan holds the most crucial 'central position' on the Chinese coast, 
as well as the 'central position' in the first island chain. It overlooks the Wes tern 
Pacific shipping lane outside of the first island chain from the Bering Strait and the 
Aleutian Islands . ... guarding the Bashi ... and Taiwan Strait, and controlling the 
throat of the shipping lane from the Malacca Strait north through the South China 
sea, which gives it a very advantageous geographic location of great strategic 
1 12 va ue . 
The same writer describes the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea 
as "crucial footholds that can effectively control (China's) maritime space and the 
shipping lane from the Malacca Strait through the Philippines west to the Bashi 
Strait". 
Four core roles outlined by Admiral Liu have defined the PLAN' s capabilities and 
rmss1ons: 
i) the ability to conduct campaigns for defending or disrupting SLOC; 
ii) the ability to conduct sea battles with less than first-rate sea powers; 
iii) the ability to capture, occupy and defend islands; and 
iv) deterrence. 
In spite of a shortage of battle expenence and limited resources, the PLAN places 
priority on SLOC defence as a matter of China's "economic survival", in terms of trade 
protection and the protection of oil routes from the Gulf. China's reliance on imports of 
strategic resources, such as oil and mineral ores, that are shipped through Indian Ocean 
sea lanes, "means that the Chinese Navy has to have enough might to cover the sea lanes 
through the Malacca Strait to the southern Indian Ocean, to ensure that our strategic 
resources are not interdicted". Nonetheless, the PLAN itself has identified the following 
operational and tactical difficulties confronting the SLOC defence mission: 
11 John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in 
Asia, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1997, pp 15-16. 
t2 Li Yaqiang, 'What is Japan Doing Southward', Jianchuan Zhishi ('Naval and Merchant Ships '), June 6, 
1997, FBIS China Daily Report FBIS-CHI-97-247 , September 4, 1997. 
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• a necessity to operate at long distances from its home bases, as far as the Gulf, 
stretching its surface and submarine esco1i capabilities to the limit; 
• a loss of initiative, due to the defensive nature of the esco1i mission, which allows an 
opponent to choose the location, method and timing of his attacks; and 
• tactical vulnerability for surface escorts arising from the necessity to operate at slow 
speeds in convoy formation. 
However, SLOC disruption is seen as integral to the navy's future operational plans, 
first, because long-distance lines of supply are regarded as a weakness of great power 
navies; and second, because a blockade of Taiwan is regarded as a serious military 
option in case of a cross-strait conflict. The following principles for SLOC interdiction 
have been put forward: 
• priority should be given to selective attacks on enemy SLOC; 
• to avoid damaging counter-attacks, PLAN units should be dispersed while carrying 
out supplementary "small-scale disruptive activities" during the campaign; 
• anti-SLOC campaigns should be conducted mainly within range of land-based air 
cover; and 
• SLOC disruption should also include attacks on enemy ports, while the number of 
targets should be limited 13 . 
2. PLAN Force modernisation. 
The PLAN expected to complete its first stage of modernisation by the end of the 1990s. 
During this phase, while avoiding direct confrontation with other navies as far as 
possible, the onus of development would fall on land-based medium-range aviation and 
attack submarines while the PLAN' s three fleets (Northern, Eastern and Southern) 
would build an ocean-going task force to practice blue water operations. In the second 
stage, lasting until 2020 or 2030, the PLAN would move to a blue water configuration 
capable of three-dimensional naval conflict, equipped with nuclear-powered ballistic 
missile submarines (SSBNs) , aircraft carriers and other major su1face combatants. 
In the 1990s, the PLAN moved some way towards meeting its first stage objectives, 
scrapping more than half of its vintage Romeo-class submarines and all of its first-
generation destroyers , acquiring two 8,000-ton Sovremennyy-class destroyers and four 
13 You Ji , The Anned Forces of China, Allen and Un win , Sydney, 1999 , pp 18 1-82. 
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Kilo-class submarines from Russia and domestically producing Ming and Song-class 
submarines and the Luhu-class guided missile destroyer (DDG), while retrofitting 
existing surface combatants with surface-to-air missiles (SAM). Submarine 
development received priority in PLAN planning during the 1990s. Although the PLAN 
experienced initial problems in operating and training crews for the Kilo submarines, a 
decision to treble its Russian-bought fleet in part was aimed to compensate for the 
failure of the Song programme to develop according to schedule, following its poor 
performance during sea trials in 1995 14. In June 2002, as part of an arms deal with 
Russia worth $4 billion (which has helped to make China the world's largest arms 
importer), Beijing agreed to buy a further two Sovreniennyy destroyers ( equipped with 
the supersonic SS-N-22 'Sunburn' anti-ship missiles) and up to eight more Kilo 
submarines (all of the improved '636' design and offered at a 'below-market' price of 
$200 million each) equipped with the 'Club' anti-ship missile, with a range of 225 km. 
China has yet to develop over-the-horizon targeting capabilities to utlilise these missiles 
to their full range, but has put a premium on developing over-the-horizon radar and 
space-based surveillance and targeting systems to this end. Unsurprisingly, the PLAN 
has experienced teething problen1s in the transition to a smaller more modern and potent 
submarine fleet (with half as many boats as a decade ago), requiring it simultaneously to 
assimilate imported off-the-shelf technology while developing domestic designs 15 . Once 
the PLAN has mastered these problems however, it will "be able to form an ambush 
platform at the strategic chokepoints in the West Pacific such as around the Bashi 
Channel and the Taiwan Strait"16 . Operationally, although the pattern of recent PLAN 
training activity has been limited, it has made progress towards developing its long-
range capabilities, with the destroyer, Qingdao, completing China's first 
circumnavigation in September 200217 . 
The PLAN currently numbers 290,000 personnel, fielding around 60 destroyers and 
frigates, around 50 conventional and six nuclear submarines, as well as an air arm with 
over 500 fixed-wing aircraft and 50 helicopters. Forty Su-30MKK maritime-strike 
variant aircraft were also included in the 2002 arms deal with Russia. Despite recent 
14 John Pomfret, 'China nears deal for 8 submarines', International Herald Tribune, June 7, 2002, p 1. Kilo 
submaiines have a range of 7,500 miles when snorkelling at 7 knots. Both the Song and obsolete Ming-
classes have a submerged range of 3,800 kilometres. China's Nuclear-powered Han-class submarines have 
unlimited range, but would be unsuited to the anti-shipping role . 
15 The Ming-class submai·ine is basically a re-modelled Romeo-class submarine; The Song-class is an 
original design, developed with Israeli and French assistance. 
16 The Bashi Channel/Luzon strait was the major killing ground of Japanese merchant ships during the 
Second World War (See Chapter Tlu·ee) 
17 John Ruwitch, 'Chinese navy cmises toward modernisation', Reuters New Service, October 1, 2002; and 
United States Depai·tment of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of 
China, July 2002, p 26. 
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advances in force modernisation, the PLAN has made greater progress in its strategies 
and organisational restructuring towards becoming a blue water force than it has in 
hardware or operational te1ms. The US Department of Defense identifies one of China's 
main military weaknesses as its limited capacity for protecting air and sea lines of 
communication against superior naval and air forces 18. Air defence for the surface fleet 
remains limited to point defence; moreover, the PLAN does not have any capability to 
defend itself against cruise missiles. The indefinite postponement of plans to acquire an 
aircraft canier in conjunction with the expansion of its submarine force and land-based 
naval air arm appear to signal a more limited ambition to pursue sea control in coastal 
and offshore areas, and the pursuit of a sea-denial capability that "could form the core of 
a force to allow China to blockade Taiwan's ports"19 . Furthermore, the acquisition of 
such a capability would also have both political and military value, by raising the costs 
to the United States of sending its Navy and Air Force to operate in and around the 
Taiwan Strait, and possibly the South China Sea as well. During the 1982 Falklands 
War, the single Type-209 submarine possessed by the Argentine Navy, the San Luis, 
distracted the British naval task by forcing it to concentrate its resources on 
antisubmarine warfare throughout the three-month campaign 2°. 
3. China's tenitorial claims and SLOC. 
At the diplomatic level, China has given assurances that it "attaches great importance to 
the safety and free passage of South China Sea international sea lanes"21 . After the 
February 1995 stand-off between the Philippine Navy and Chinese vessels near 
Mischief Reef, "respect for free navigation" was affirmed at a vice-ministerial level 
meeting between Chinese and Philippines diplomats in early August 1, 1995. At a news 
conference in November 2000, Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Ri, addressing proposals 
for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with rival claimants in the ten-member 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), affirmed that "There is no problem 
with the international sea lanes ... at this stage and there won't be a problem in the 
future"22 . China's switch to a more accommodative position over its tenitorial disputes 
in the South China Sea since the mid-1990s has been perceived as a tactical shift in 
18 Ibid. pp 20, 53. 
19 David Lague, 'We All Live for Another Submarine, Far Eastern Economic Review, August 15, 2002, p 
13. 
20 Peter Louis Young, 'New Submarine Technology and the Asian Market in the Nineties', Asian Defence 
Journal , November 1990, p 72. 
21 Statement by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen addressing ASEA Foreign Ministers in August 
1995, FBIS China Daily Report, FBIS-CHI-99-025, January 25, 1999. 
22 FBIS China Daily Report, FBIS-CHI-2000-1125 , November 25, 2000. 
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response to the preoccupation of China's strategists and political leadership with the 
issue of Taiwan since the crisis in cross-strait relations that erupted in 1995-9623 . 
Map 14: China's military regions 
Jriimql 
• Koria 
Xinjiang 
CHINA 
Military Regions 
Military region boundary 
Province-level boundary 
..JinlJ!.. MIiitary region capital 
® Province -level capital 
O 5QO K11ome ter1 
0 500 MIIH 
·1 
Sovth China 
S ea 
80tJr,;d41y r@ptctHn ta hon la 
"ot nace•••r~y authout11jve 
Sea 
' 'It 
802466 (5451 1415-96 
Source: CIA/University of Texas. 
According to the US Depar1:lnent of Defense report released in July 2002, Taiwan is 
"the major focus of China' s military modernisation"24 . China' s military strategy 
towards Taiwan is aimed at developing a range of "credible" military options designed 
to maximise Beijing' s leverage in negotiations, which "may reflect an increasing 
willingness to consider the use of force to achieve unification". Among its options are 
23 Interview with Adm. Sakonjo Naotoshi, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, February 12, 
1999. 
24 United States Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People 's Republic of 
China, July 2002, p 50. 
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air and missile strikes launched from within the Nanjing Military Region, cyber-warfare 
and a blockade of the island 25 . 
Taiwanese defence analysts have long perceived a merchant blockade of the island as 
consistent with precepts of Chinese strategy that consider political and psychological 
factors to be at least on a par with military factors · in the use of force. According to Tsai 
and Chen, a commercial blockade of the island may be favoured by China's military 
authorities as a means of applying Sun Tsu' s strategic dictum of Ju gong ('capturing a 
fortified city without attack' ). A blockade would provide a means of exe11ing pressure 
on the island's leadership politically, economically and psychologically, given the 
perception that the "symbolic" sinking of even "one or two Taiwanese merchantmen ... 
will drastically weaken the security of Taiwan' s maritime traffic"26 . 
One of two options are foreseen in the event of a merchant blockade, involving either a 
'close' blockade in the island ' s vicinity, or one executed at some distance. Since 92.5 
per cent of shipping normally docks at one of three ports -- Kaohsiung (50.5 per cent), 
Keelung (25.7 per cent) and Taichung (16.5 per cent) -- the former option, conducted via 
a submarine-led blockade of the approaches to the island's major commercial ports, 
would simplify the problem for the PLAN of how to distinguish between trade bound for 
Tai wan and cargoes bound for other destinations, thus reducing the political risks of 
internationalising and escalating the conflict. A close blockade could also target 
shipping in the approaches to tenninals, where concentration is unavoidable. Against 
this, a close blockade would entail higher military risks, given closer proximity to the 
island's armed forces and port defences, as well as the def enders ' familiarity with the 
operating environment. A remote blockade would severely constrain the ability of 
Taiwan' s navy and air force by forcing them to disperse their forces , thus reducing the 
military risks to China' s f orces27 . 
Although the PLAN could release assets from all three of its fleets for use in a distant 
blockade against Taiwan, their operational effectiveness would be reduced if operating 
far from their own bases. According to Tsai and Chen 's scenario, if a blockade against 
25 Ibid. p 46. 
26
, Michael M. Tsai and York W. Chen, 'Submarines and Taiwan ' s Defense ' , Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 
1, No. 3, Spring 2001 , pp 126-27, p 135. 
27 The Taiwanese Navy is assessed by the US Defense Department to be generally well-run and maintained, 
focused on counter-blockade and SLOC defence missions. However, there are doubts as to its ability to 
perform overlapping missions simultaneously (United States Department of Defense, Annual Report on the 
Milita ry Power of the People's Republic of China, July 2002, p 55). The mos t significant aspect of planned 
US arms transfers to Tai wan is the planned sale of eight conventional submarines -- which would do much 
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Taipei were unde1iaken, China would commit the four submarine squadrons at the 
disposal of its Southern and Eastern fleets. In conjunction with surface and signals 
intelligence operations, these forces could be deployed in inner and outer blockade lines; 
the former blocking traffic and raiding Taiwan's civilian and military harbours, while 
the outer 'ring' would target any merchant vessels attempting to break the blockade to 
supply the island, while concuITently deteITing US attempts to dispatch seaborne 
supplies or to intervene directly (from Okinawa and other Pacific bases)28 . According to 
US estimates, China has enough mine warfare assets (including bottom-laid mines, 
moored-influence mines, mobile mines, remote-controlled mines, and propelled-
warhead mines) to lay "a good defensive and a modest offensive minefield". These 
mines could be laid in areas where merchant ships are likely to be concentrated, by 
submarines and/or Chinese commercial and fishing vessels29 . 
4. Chinese perceptions of Japan's SLOC. 
Japan's own naval modernisation programme, its alliance relationship with the United 
States and alleged militarist tendencies have been presented by Chinese analysts as 
posing a potential threat to China and its maritime security30 . The overlap between both 
countries' maritime defence zones, including the disputed Senkaku Islands, in the East 
China Sea, also presents a potential source of tension31 . 
Chinese analysts are also aware of Japan's vulnerability to a blockade: 
From the Western Pacific to Southeast Asia, the maritime shipping lane through the 
Straits of Malacca to the . .. Persian Gulf is called Japan's economic 'lifeline', with 
the Straits of Malacca ... being the key link of that lifeline. The obstruction or even 
blockade of that shipping lane would cut off Japan's economic lifeline, paralysing 
the Japanese economy and society. Keeping this shipping lane open is a key 
to improve Taiwan's ASW capability (David Lague, 'We All Live for Another Submarine, Far Eastern 
Econoniic Review, August 15, 2002, pp 12-14'). 
28 Michael M. Tsai and York W. Chen, 'Submarines and Taiwan 's Defense' , Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 
1, No. 3, Spring 2001 , pp 122-77, 136-39. 
29 United States Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of 
China, July 2002, p 23, p 51. 
30 You Ji, The Armed Forces of China, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1999, pp 202-04. 
31 Tensions rose between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu in China) in 1978. 
China's official policy was thereafter redefined according to Deng Xiaoping's formula whereby the dispute 
would be reserved for a "wiser generation" of Japanese and Chinese leaders to solve. Tensions resurfaced in 
1990 and 1996, linked to the activities of rightist groups in Japan seeking to assert Japan's claims to the 
uninhabited islands which were ceded by China under the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 . 
condition for Japan's survival and development, as well as a crucial mission in the 
development of the Japanese SDF32 . 
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Indeed, some Chinese analysts have argued that Japan could use the perceived 
vulnerability of SLOC as a pretext to justify involvement in a dispute over Taiwan, 
using "the right to maritime freedom" as a pretext to "ignite a conflict"33 . Right-wing 
forces in Japan are seen by the same token as using sea-lane security concerns to revive 
a "southward" expansionist strategy "to seize raw material bases"34 . At the same time, 
since 1994 China has judged the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF), to be "the 
Asian naval armed force with the strongest ocean-going escort and offensive-defensive 
combat capability", able to operate independently in the South China Sea35 . The 
Zhongguo Tongxun She news agency reported that in 1996 the Japan Defense Agency 
(JDA) published an internal report concluding that China will "bring about a pattern of 
military confrontation in its relations with Japan" and that China will "pose threats to 
Japan's maritime lifeline"36. 
II. Japanese perceptions of China's potential naval threat. 
Since the early 1990s, concern has grown among Japan's policy-makers over the 
direction of China's foreign and defence policies and the implications for Japan's long-
term maritime security. Official concern in Japan was awakened in February 1992, with 
China's promulgation of the Territorial Waters Law, legally affirming sovereignty 
claims based on China's continental shelf claim (see Chapter Seven). These included 
the Paracel and Spratly island groups disputed with Taiwan and several Southeast Asian 
states in the South China Sea, and waters in the East China Sea that fall within Japan's 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), demarcated by Tokyo along a median line between 
the two countries' coastlines. The Law "shocked" Japan by appearing to revive the 
teITitorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands37 . Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi sought 
32 Chen Lineng, 'The Japanese Self-defense (sic) Forces Are Marching Towards the 21 st Century ' , Guoji 
Zhanwang (World Outlook), No. 2, pp 18-20, February 8, 1996, in FBIS China Daily Report, FBIS-CHI-96-
085, May 1, 1996. 
33 Interview with Zhang Zhaozhong, 'US , Japan Role in Cross-Strait War Viewed', Ta Kung Pao , FBIS-
CHI-1999-0819, August 18, 1999. 
34 Li Yaqiang, 'What is Japan Doing Southward ', Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval and Merchant Ships] June 
6,1997, FBIS-CHI-97-247, September 4, 1997. 
35 Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glasser, 'Chinese Apprehensions About Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance' , Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 4. April 1997, pp 390-99. 
36 
'China Says No to Japanese Doctrine 'Which Hides Its Head But Shows Its Tail' , Zhongg uo Tongxun She 
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clarification of the Ten-itorial Waters Law from Chinese Communist Party Chainnan 
Jiang Zemin, during the latter's visit to Tokyo in April 199238 . The JDA has also 
expressed concerns that the Chinese Communist Party's Fourteenth Congress in October 
1992 "made clear that defending the interests of the tenitorial waters is part of the 
(PLA's) mission for the future", a theme that it claims is borne out in China's National 
Defence Law of March 199739 . 
Japanese security concerns were augmented further by the stepped-up activities of 
Chinese survey vessels within Japan's EEZ after 1994 and the increased presence of 
Chinese naval vessels and aircraft around the Senkaku islands, Okinawa and as far north 
as the Tsugaru Strait40 . The February 1995 Mischief Reef incident was viewed with 
alarm in Japan as an indication of China's increased assertiveness41 . At Manila's 
prompting, the issue was raised by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) at a 
vice-ministerial level meeting in Beijing on March 2 and again by Prime Minister 
Maruyama Tomiichi during his visit to China in April. In August, at the second meeting 
of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Foreign Minister Kono Yohei raised Japan's concerns 
over freedom of navigation in relation to the Spratlys dispute and stated Japan's concern 
for a peaceful solution 42 . Before the Diet in October 1995, Kono took the unprecedented 
step of citing China's tenitorial policies and military buildup as potential sources of 
instability43 . 
Beijing's growing concern at the rise of pro-Independence political forces in Taiwan led 
the PLA to conduct an initial round of coastal military exercises and missile tests in the 
island's vicinity in July 199 5, in an attempt to signal its displeasure. As the March 1996 
presidential election loomed, China resorted to a second, larger round of coastal military 
exercises in Fujian province, opposite Taiwan, and a battery of short-range ballistic 
missile tests. Japanese anxieties were sharpened by the fact that some of the missiles 
landed in waters only 60 km from Yonaguni island, at the southern end of Okinawa 
prefecture44. MOFA, while avoiding outright condemnation, described the missile tests 
as "undesirable" from the viewpoint of regional security and said that they "may create 
problems for shipping in neutral waters off the place of their fall". On March 12, as the 
38 Wolf Mendl, Japan 's Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests, Routledge, London and New 
York, 1995, p 82. 
39 Defense of Japan 2000, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times , Tokyo , p 44. 
40 Annual Report on Maritinie Safety 1998, Maritime Safety Agency, Japan, p 17. 
41 Lam Peng Er, 'Japan and the Spratlys Dispute: Aspirations and Limitations', Asian Survey, Vol. 36, 
October 1996, p 996. 
42 Ibid. pp 1004-07. 
43 Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, ' Japan ' s Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to 
Reluctant Realism', Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2, Summer 1996, p 37. 
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second of three phases to China's exercises began, Prime Minister Hashi1noto Ryutaro 
expressed his concern that many commercial flights and aircraft had been forced to 
divert around the areas affected45 . 
Although collective self-defence considerations ruled out any official Japanese military 
deployments in coordination with the US deployment of two aircraft caITier battle 
groups in the vicinity of the Taiwan Straits, Japan nevertheless dispatched Air Self 
Defense Forces (ASDF) E-2Cs and an MSDF EP-3 under the pretext of its own 
exercises to collect intelligence on Chinese activities during the crisis46 . Following the 
crisis, JDA Vice-Minister Murata, visiting China in August 1996, reiterated Tokyo's 
concerns with "the exercises which took place in commercial shipping lanes"47 . As the 
revised US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines were debated in the autumn of 1997, 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku stated, controversially, that Taiwan would be 
included within the scope of the US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines, which were 
then in the process of being redrafted48 . Attempts specifically to delimit the scope of the 
Guidelines geographically were dropped in favour of a vague formula to minimise 
controversy, whereby the Guidelines would apply "in situations and areas su1Tounding 
Japan", while at the same time preserving ambiguity over whether Japan would assist 
US efforts to repel Chinese aggression across the Strait. 
Japanese concerns about China had already featured in the August 1994 repo1i drawn up 
by the Advisory Group on Defense Issues. In their assessment of Japan's security 
environment, the report's authors highlighted China, among other Asian countries, as 
having the political 1notives and economic foundation for modernising its military power 
in addition to the risk of conflict erupting over its disputed maritime teITitorial claims49 . 
In 1995, Chairman of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) Joint Staff Council General 
Nishimoto Tetsuya became the most senior SDF officer to visit China, appealing for 
greater transparency in its defence and nuclear weapons policy. Japan's 1996 defence 
white paper, while characterising the pace of China's defence modernisation as 
"moderate", noted also that "we need to continue to watch Chinese actions, such as the 
44 Funabashi Yoichi , Alliance Adrift, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1999, pp 351-57. 
45 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts , Japan , March 6, 1996, FE/2553 Ell and FE/2559 Ell , March 13 , 
1996. 
46 Bungei Shunju , November 1998, pp 150-57, FBIS-EAS-98-299 , FBIS Translated Text, Daily Report, 
October 26, 1998. 
47 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Asia Pacific: Japan , 'Spokesman says China's Proposed Missile 
Launchings Near Taiwan 'undesirable ', FE/2553 Ell [l]. 
48 Sasajima Masahiko and Iizuka Keiko , 'Chi ' s visit marks improving defense ties ', The Daily Yomiuri, 
January 29, 1998, p 2. 
49 The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan , Japanese Government Translation, 
GM:3338-, August 12, 199'4, pp 4-6. 
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modernisation of its nuclear forces, naval and air forces; expanding its scope of activities 
in the high seas; and the growing tension in the Taiwan Strait caused by its military 
. ,,so 
exercises . 
Outside the white paper framework, one Japanese security analyst, a former Ground Self 
Defense Force general, expressed the more overt concerns that: 
"If China conducts military drills to intimidate Taiwan, or actually launches hostile 
actions in the waters around Taiwan, it will seriously impact the safety of the 
Japanese territory and its SLOC even if the areas involved are on the high seas. 
Furthermore, it will arouse and inflame the latent and instinctive fear of the 
Japanese people creating a condition of an open crisis."51 
The East Asia Strategic Review 2000 stated that China's survey activities and naval 
presence around the Senkaku had "aroused the fears of J apan"52. The review's authors 
claimed that China's increasingly assertive presence in areas sunounding Japan was 
aimed at bolstering its long-term claim to marine resources, including possible oil 
deposits around the Senkaku. Furthermore, the timing of Chinese naval activity was 
interpreted by the JDA as a political signal intended to discourage the passage of 
Guidelines-related legislation by the Diet. East Asia Strategic Review 2001 noted that 
Chinese oceanographic vessels conducted surveys within Japan's EEZ 16 times in 1998, 
30 times in 1999 and 24 times in 2000, when PLAN vessels were, in addition, spotted 
three times53 . 
The presence of warships in Japan's EEZ is not illegal under the United Nations Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS), or Japanese law. However, approaches by Chinese combat aircraft 
and submarines have occurred in the immediate vicinity of the Senkaku islands since the 
mid-1990s. On August 16, 1995, ASDF F-4 fighters based at Naha air base on Okinawa 
were ordered to intercept a pair of Chinese Su-27s that approached at high speed, turning 
short of the islands54. The following August, two Chinese submarines were reported to 
50 Defense of Japan , 1996, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times , Tokyo, p 45. 
51 General Shikata Toshiyuki, Japan's Response to the Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan: 
www.glocorrmet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/korea-pro-jap/shikata.kj3 .eng.html 
52 East Asian Strategic Review 2000, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 2000, pp 104-07. 
53 Ibid. pp 199-203 . 
54 Soeya Yoshihide, 'The South China Sea: A Japanese Perspective' , in Security Implications of Conflict in 
the South China Sea: Perspectives from, the Asia-Pacific, Carolina Hernandez (ed. ), Proceedings of the First 
International Conference on the South China Sea, Manila, November 12-14, 1995, Pacific Forum/CSIS and 
Institute for Strategic and Development Studies , Quezon City, 1997, p 130; and Usui aoak.i , 'Japan Spots 
Chinese Jets ', Defense News, August 28-September 3, 1995 , p 10. 
284 
have passed close by55 . Although reports of Chinese submarine incursions in the 
Japanese press were not officially acknowledged in Tokyo, in October 1996, the 
Defense Agency sought cabinet backing for tougher regulations to allow MSDF vessels 
to force unidentified submarines in Japanese ten-itorial waters to surface. Ostensibly this 
was in order to respond to the threat of No11h Korean submersibles following a serious 
incursion incident in South Korean waters56 . However, the Hashimoto Cabinet approved 
these measures, on December 24, with China also in mind. Indeed, it has been claimed 
that Chinese oceanographic survey vessels have been engaged in "information-gathering 
for future Chinese subn1arine operations in passages around the Ryukyu Islands"57 . In 
May 2000, China sent a Yanbing-class ice-breaker, reportedly engaged in sea-bed 
mapping, through the Tsushima and Tsugaru straits, pr01npting Japanese defence 
officials and diplomats to raise the issue with their counterparts during bilateral talks in 
Beijing, on June 19, 200058 . 
Kyorin University professor Hiramatsu Shigeo's views on China's 'use' of piracy as a 
security threat to Japan have been outlined in Chapter Seven. Hiramatsu was among the 
first Japanese analysts publicly to warn of an "emerging threat of Chinese military 
expansion", particularly the country's growing ability to project naval power into the 
sun-ounding seas, and he has advocated making an official commitment to include 
Taiwan within the scope of the US-Japan Alliance59 . The former MOFA head of 
intelligence and Ambassador to Thailand, Okazaki Hisahiko, while uncommonly vocal 
among ex-MOFA and JDA officials, and regarded as 'independently minded' (jissetsu) 
on security issues, also represents a strain of realist, balance-of-power thinking that is 
privately subscribed to within conservative policymaking circles, into which he has had 
entry, via the Liberal Democratic Pa11y (LDP) defence expert (zoku), Shiina Moto. 
Hiramatsu asserted that by applying indirect pressure on Japanese shipping, or by 
interdicting sea lanes in the South China Sea, China could "deal a serious blow" to Japan 
and Taiwan without using force. Notably, the Australian author of Safely by Sea, a 1990 
book composed of papers given at the biannual Asia-Pacific SLOC conferences since 
1982, prefigured concerns similar to those of Hirainatsu and Okazaki, arguing that: 
55 Usui Naoaki, 'East Asian Nations Aim to Bolster Sub Fleets ', Defense News, August 19-25, 1996, p 8. 
56 
'Japan Mulling New Plan Against Submarine Invasion ', Bernama-Kyodo/Asia Intelligence Wire, October 
4, 1996. 
57 Sankei Shimbun, April 17, 1999, p 3. 
58 
'Japan Voices Concern at Chinese Naval Activities Around Japan', Kyodo Weekly, June 23, 2000, at 
http://home.kyodo.co.jp/Japan Weekly/20000623 .html#WEEKL Y _ 4; and Mohan Malik, 'Japan Wary of 
Assertive China', Jane's Intelligence Review, December 2000, pp 22-25. 
Far more likely (than a Soviet direct assault) would be the use of direct, or through 
surrogates, indirect pressure upon Japan' s SLOCs at a distance beyond the reach of 
the (MSDF). The confined and relatively shallow waters of the archipelagoes (sic) 
bounding the South China Sea appear more attractive for such operations, 
particularly if they can be disguised behind existing regional conflicts or acts of 
· 60 pIIacy. 
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Given this assumed vulnerability to SLOC disruption, China's perceived determination 
to exert control over oil resources in the South China Sea, and its preparedness to use 
military pressure for political leverage, Hiramatsu recommended that Japan should 
consider a collective security arrangement with the littoral states of Southeast Asia. 
Okazaki, in common with the views of Taiwanese defence analysts quoted above, 
regards China's approach to military power as one strand in a composite strategy that 
combines political and psychological factors, aimed at "the deprivation of the 
opponent's will to fight through psychological warfare of the threat of violence"
61
. 
According to this logic, while China will not attain sufficient conventional military 
power to constitute a "real tln·eat" to Taiwan and other countries until 2020, it will 
probably have sufficient force to "exert credible psychological pressure" by 2010. 
Okazaki believes that during future periods of tension between China and Japan, China 
may seek to influence the Japanese government's position by applying pressure on 
commercial SLOC in the South China Sea62 . This 'psychological' aspect of the use of 
military pressure on 'fragile' sea lanes , has been echoed in Japanese perceptions 
throughout the post-1945 era, as seen in Sekino Hideo's views profiled in Chapter Four, 
and it is a position still embedded in the MSDF63 . 
During the Cold War, Japanese defence planners regarded China as lacking the 
industrial base · to support a submarine force capable of long-range operations, while 
China's unusually wide continental shelf was also recognised as rendering its 
submarines vulnerable in coastal waters by limiting their ability to submerge. Even late 
in the Cold War, despite having acquired over 50 attack submarines (mostly small, 
59 Hiramatsu Shigeo, 'China's Security Mind-set' , The Japan Tinies, September 15, 1998, p 18 ; and 
'China's Naval Advance: Objectives and Capabilities' , Japan Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 
(Spring 1994), p 118 . 
60 Michael J. O' Connor, Introduction, Safely By Sea, University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 1990, 
p 56. 
61 Okazaki Hisahiko, 'Can Taiwan's Freedom Be Preserved' Daily Yomiuri, June 1, 1998 ; and 'China: A 
Function of the Japan-US Alliance ', Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring/Summer) 1996, pp 45-50. 
62 Interview with Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko, Okazaki Institute, Tokyo, March 12, 1999. 
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Romeo-class boats), MSDF officers assessed China (and North Korea) as lacking 
"sufficient capabilities to attack Japanese sea lanes in the foreseeable future" 64 . By 
contrast, in the post-Cold War era, China's potential to use its submarines to blockade 
Taiwan and to threaten US and Japanese naval forces nearby is viewed by MSDF 
officers as among their most challenging operational problems65 . JDA concerns centre 
on the deep-water trenches off Taiwan and Okinawa, where the acoustic environment 
severely hampers detection, a natural hazard that is complicated by the PLAN' s 
acquisition of the ultra-quiet Kilo-636 submarine. The particular difficulties of locating 
Soviet submarines operating in this area led the MSDF, in the late 1980s, to acquire two 
Hibiki-class acoustic intelligence vessels equipped with SURTASS towed a1Tays66 . 
However, the survivability of such platforms in wartime is thought to be problematic 
without the allocation of screening forces, which would lead to a substantial drain on the 
MSDF' s limited resources67 . 
Izumi Hajime wrote in 1993 that Japan cannot "wait and see the expanding Chinese 
naval activities on the Spratly Islands located on an important transpo11ation sea lane. 
This standpoint of Japan would meet with sympathies even in the international 
community"68. According to Okazaki, by the late 1990s, China already had the military 
capability to control sea lanes in the South China Sea through air power alone, based on 
its acquisition of Su-27s and other fourth-generation strike aircraft, which if based in 
Hainan and the Paracels would be able to extend air coverage throughout the South 
China Sea. However, against a military threat to commercial navigation in the South 
China Sea, Japan would retain the option of dive11ing its imports round the South China 
Sea and absorbing the higher shipping costs involved. While Okazaki believes that 
Japan' s oil shipments could be maintained at additional cost by diverting round 
63 See Vice Admiral Yamamoto Makoto, "Sealane in the Asia-Pacific Region Today and their 
Vulnerabilities". Eleventh International Conference on the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) Studies, 
Tokyo, November 17-18, 1997, p 7. 
64According to a non-official 1989 MSDF assessment, "although the PRC and North Korea do possess 
attack submarines, we estimate that they do not have sufficient capabilities to attack Japanese sea lanes in 
the foreseeable future." (Hozurni Toshihiko , 'Naval Control of Shipping ', in Malcolm J. Kennedy, and 
Michael J. O'Connor, Safely By Sea, Unive1~sity Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 1990, p 285. 
65 Confidential interview with IDA Operations Bureau official, March 5, 2002. 
66 Interview with Captain Nakanishi Kenji , Research Department, Maritime Staff College, March 4, 2002. 
67 FY 1981 Arms Control Impact Statements, 96th Congress, 2nd Session p 342. SURTASS is a US-made 
system that is designed to supplement SOSUS seabed hydrophone anays with a mobile submarine detection 
capability deployed aboard purpose-built, twin-hulled vessels. The MSDF' s two Hibiki-class vessels 
(commissioned in 1991 and 1992) are equipped with the UQQ-2 towed anay. Hibiki-class vessels have a 
mission radius of 3,000 nm and the ability to deploy on station for 90 days . SURTASS data is relayed to 
shore stations via the Defense Satellite Communications System for processing and analysis and is shared 
with the United States. The Hibiki and its sister ship are reported to include five US teclmicians among their 
crew (Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons, 1997-99, Naval Institute 
Press , Annapolis , 1997). 
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Australia, Japan's interest in the South China Sea is perceived in much broader terms 
than simply as a physical conduit serving its economy. For Okazaki, the potential 
"Finlandisation" of the littoral states in the South China Sea is the political consequence 
likely to flow from an asse1iive China, backed by its limited maritime interdiction 
capability in the South China Sea. For this reason, the security of the South China Sea is 
' viewed as a security concern to Japan that would necessitate the SDF' s active defence 
involvement in conjunction with the United States69 . 
Some of these assumptions have been challenged by the Asahi Shinibun veteran military 
analyst Taoka Shunji, who questions the suitability of islands and atolls in the Spratlys 
and Paracels (including the airstrip on Woody Island) for combat operations, much as 
the strategic importance and survivability of Soviet bases in Vietnam were questioned in 
the late 1970s and 1980s. Taoka also dismisses "amateur" fears that a South China Sea 
conflict would severely disrupt Japan's oil supplies, arguing that the additional cost of 
diverting tankers through Lombok (and east of the Philippines) would add only 0.18 yen 
per litre to the cost of oil in Japan 7°. 
Regarding perceptions within the MSDF and its retinue of retired admirals, at one 
extreme Hirama Yoichi has compared China's "oceanic living space concept" with pre-
war Germany's expansionist lebensraum philosophy, driven by an "insatiable desire to 
obtain marine resources". Meanwhile, Admiral Liu' s offshore defence concept is 
described as the extension of a "continentalist" strategic culture to the maritime plain 
71
. 
Those like Hirama who hold deep suspicions about China's long-term intentions also 
recognise sho1i- to medium-term constraints on its power-projection capabilities and 
capability gaps in electronic support measures , electronic counter measures , air defence 
and antisubmarine warfare (ASW), which unless addressed will leave it essentially a 
coastal navy. Hiraina also cites "many geographic, political and racial problems that will 
impede China's Navy from developing into a blue-water navy", suggesting that 
Mahanist and cultural-determinist explanations still have their place in contemporary 
Japan's strategic thought. What is most feared is that China's "strategic genius" 
68 Izumi Hajime, ' Improvement of the National Defense Strategy and Defence Buildup Plans for Post-Cold 
War Japan', ' 93 International Defense Academic Seminar, Korea National War College, November 2, 1993, 
p 59 . 
69 Interview with Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko , Okazaki Institute, Tokyo, March 12, 1999. 
70 Taoka Shunji, '21 Seiki Higashi Ajia no Senryaku Kankyo ', ('Eas t Asia's Strategic Environment in the 
21 st Century'), Sekai no Kansen, December 1995, No. 504, pp 70-75; and 'Commentator Debunks PRC 
Arms Buildup ', Ronza, September 1996, pp 66-71 , in FBIS-EAS-96-162, pp 15-21. 
71 Interview with Adm. Hirama Yoichi , MSDF (Retd), National Defense Academy, Yokosuka, March 16, 
1999. 
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(according to which military power is recognised as occupying a sometimes subsidiary 
role) will be employed to exploit Japan's political and economic vulnerability 72. 
Mid-ranking MSDF officers have expressed concerns about China's "extremely 
unsettling" defence modernisation programme and assert that its military involvement in 
conflicts over the Spratl ys and Paracels would "pose a threat to Japan's sea lines of 
communication"73 . China has also been used, within the MSDF and more broadly, to 
justify the MSDF' s post-Cold War role and the retention and modernisation of its 
capabilities. Commander Mitsuhisa Masahiko identifies China's "outright expansion of 
the naval strength" as "likely to become a significant threat to (the) Southwest Islands 
and maritime traffic of Japan". Accordingly, it is argued that the MSDF "will have to 
maintain a ce1iain degree of defense capability so Japan can resolve this issue by itself', 
owing to doubts about whether the "full military support" of the United States would be 
forthcoming in the event of a Sino-Japanese clash 74. 
While the MSDF has downsized as a result of the new taiki5 and there has been no 
dramatic attempt to close capability gaps that exist in such areas as air defence, the 
steady improve1nent of existing capabilities and an expanding programme of exercise 
partners, exercise activities and overseas deployments invite the question as to where its 
own intentions lie. Although Japan already possesses one of the largest and most modern 
naval fleets in Asia, the first post-new taiki5 five-year Mid-Term Defense Program, 
spanning financial years 1996-2000, included scheduled naval construction amounting 
to 100,000 tons, including eight destroyers, five submarines, 18 other vessels and 37 SH-
60J patrol helicopters 75 . Procurements being unde1iaken as part of the 2001-05 Mid-
Term Defense Program (including a new 13,500-ton class of supply ship, a new and 
larger class of destroyer and two additional Aegis-equipped destroyers) are reportedly 
"aimed at dealing with Chinese submarines operating in the shallow waters of the East 
China Sea", as part of a general rationale linked to the defence of surrounding maritime 
areas and the maintenance of maritime traffic safety 76 . 
72 Adm. Hirama Yoichi, MSDF (Retd), 'The Growing Chinese Navy and its Influence on Triple-Relation 
(sic) - Japan, US and Korea', paper given at Conference on Post-Unification Security Cooperation Among 
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73 Lieutenant Commander Doshita Tetsuro, 'Regional Security Links Japan and US', US Naval Institute 
Proceedings , March 1995, pp 51-54. 
74 Mitsuhisa Masahiko , Defense Policy of Japan: Maritinie Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in the early 21 .w 
Century, MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey/US Department of Commerce National 
Technical Information Service, March 1995 , p 80 (emphasis added). 
75 Defense of Japan 2000, Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times , Tokyo, p 271. 
76 
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The ambiguity of the MSDF's post-Cold War strategic outlook and the continued 
orientation of its capabilities towards 'blue-water' formations has led some Japanese 
analysts to conclude that it may ultimately be aiming to establish a presence in the South 
China Sea77 . The desire of the ASDF to have the capability to maintain A WACs 
coverage as far as the South China Sea has already been noted in Chapter Seven. Since 
1999, ASDF E-2Cs and F-15s have deployed as far south as Guam for bilateral exercises 
with the United States 78 . The acquisition of in-flight refuelling under the 2001-05 Mid-
Term Defense Program will provide the ASDF with the capability to project air 
superiority and support fighters to at least the northern half of the South China Sea79 . 
The South China Sea offers a favourable operational environment for submarines (the 
Imperial Navy built a submarine base in the Spratly group after occupying the islands in 
1939), and the former commander of the MSDF' s Fleet Submarine Force, Nishimura 
Y oshiaki, expressed the view in 1997 that "unless the battle zone is pushed to the 
enemy's coastal area (at a chokepoint), our nation will suffer damages. Therefore ... we 
need to travel to a certain extent, and only submarines can accomplish this"80 . In 
October 2000, the MSDF sent the submarine Asashio to the South China Sea, near 
Singapore, as part of the quadripartite Exercise Pacific Reach 2000, which also involved 
Singapore, South Korea and the United States -- each of which supplied a submarine to 
"practice rescuing submarines in distress and their crews"81. In June 2001 , MSDF 
vessels took part in a multilateral exercise off Singapore, involving units from 16 states 
represented within the Western Pacific Naval Symposium 82. 
Concern about China is echoed among more senior and still-influential former and 
serving MSDF officers and defence officials. Former MSDF Chief of Staff Sakuma 
Makoto has highlighted China as the most important challenge facing Japan' s security in 
the post-Cold War age. China ' s maritime strategy is seen as driven by a desire to "retain 
control of ocean resources while expanding its sphere of influence" towards the creation 
77 Interview with Prof. Tadokoro Masayuki, National Defense Academy, Yokosuka, March 7, 2002. 
78 Desmond Ball and Euan Graham, Japan's Airborne SIG INT Capabilities , SDSC Working Paper No.11 , 
Australian National University, Canbe1Ta, 2000, p 9. 
79 A 1996 public affairs report by Master Sergeant Marvin D Krause on the US Pacific Command' s website 
profiling 'Indonesia Air Show (IAS) ' 96' stated that "A B l B Lancer bomber from McConnell AFB, Kansas 
landed at IAS ' 96 after flying nonstop from Kansas to Jakarta. Part of the bomber's mission involved air 
exercises over the Republic of Korea, then exercises with the Japanese over the South China Sea, before 
refueling in the air and proceeding to Jakarta. " at www.pacom.mil/forum/airshow2.htm. 
80 Nishimura Yoshiaki , adviser to Kawasaki Heavy Industries and former commander, MSDF Fleet 
Submarine Force, Quoted in Boei Gijutsu Janaru (Defence Technology Journal), September 1997, pp 4- 19, 
in FBIS-EAS-97-314, Daily Report, FBIS Translated Text. 
81 
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of a "new oceanic order" in Asia83 . Similarly, Admiral Kawamura Sumihiko attributes 
China's "advance" into the South China Sea to Beijing's determination to secure control 
over energy, mineral, and food resources84 . However, China's growing dependence on 
oil imports, which is forecast to rise to 77 per cent of its needs by 202085 , is also 
recognised by Kawamura as potentially increasing the constraints on China's scope for 
foreign policy adventurism as it gains a stake in maintaining oil shipments through the 
South China Sea86 . Nonetheless, there are fears that if the PLAN maintains its current 
pace of naval modernisation, China will "become fully capable of challenging its rival 
navies in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean in the future". 
A former MSDF Chief of Staff, Hayashizaki Chiaki, outlining his post-Cold War 
strategy for MSDF has compared China's offshore defence plans, including with regard 
to pa1is of the Sea of Japan, East China Sea, and South China Sea, with the expansion of 
the Soviet Far Eastern Fleet during the 1970s and 1980s. Another former MSDF Chief 
of Staff, Admiral Sakonjo Naotoshi, while not dismissing China's long-term threat 
potential, estimates that China's naval capabilities lag behind those of Japan by about 20 
years. Even assuming a steady increase in China's defence budget, the SDF is likely to 
retain a technological edge over the PLAN until around 2020. China's acquisition of an 
aircraft caITier would not necessarily change this, as it would both absorb significant 
defensive assets and constitute a "big target" for any opposing force. 
Among serving staff officers, the view is shared that China still lacks a power-projection 
capability, but there is particular concern over its missile capabilities and willingness to 
use these in connection with political goals, as demonstrated vis-a-vis Taiwan in 1995 
and 1996. Any use of force in the Strait would be viewed as automatically threatening 
Japan's SLOC. Viewed simply as a naITow security concern over the safety of shipping, 
tankers and container vessels in transit through the East China Sea would have the 
option to divert safely east of the Taiwan Strait. However, there is also a pragmatic 
understanding among politically aware MSDF officers that the most important 
determinant of Japan's reaction to a cross-strait crisis would be a decision by the United 
States to intervene. It is felt that this would trigger iITesistible pressures within the 
83 Adm. Sakuma Makoto 'Former MSDF Staff Chief on Security Issues', Securitarian, July 10, 1996, pp 23-
28, in FBIS-EAS-96-156, August 12, 1996, pp 4-9. 
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85 
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Alliance for Japan to provide defence cooperation under the terms of the new 
Guidelines87 . 
Long-term concern about China extends to the top of the civilian hierarchy within the 
JDA. Former Administrative Vice-Minister Akiyama Masahiro has identified China's 
future defence capability as Japan ' s single most important maritime security challenge. 
In his view, Japan should match any decision by the PLAN to acquire an aircraft carrier. 
Under Akiyama' s tenure at the JDA, the annual defence white paper assessments of 
China's military power expanded from three pages in 1995 to nine pages in the 2001 
edition. He believes that Japan may have to expand its sea lane defence commitment 
beyond 1,000 nm in future88 . 
At a wider level in policy-making and more generally in society, attitudes towards China 
are marked by ambivalence in Japan. An alleged sympathetic bias towards Beijing is 
sometimes thought to exist within the 'China School' of MOFA's Asian Affairs Bureau, 
the mass media (especially Asahi Shimbun) and sections of the LDP and big business 
(which seeks to maintain access to China's commercial opportunities/9 . The end of the 
LDP's monopoly on power in 1993, the rise of a new political generation and the demise 
of ideology as an important factor in Japan-China relations have combined to make 
debate on China more open and to weaken political taboos against criticising the 
country. The retreat from politics of LDP politicians regarded as broadly sympathetic to 
China, in particular former party Secretary General Kato Koichi , has helped to shift the 
balance of political opinion towards more nationalist voices within the controlling party. 
In 1995-96, LDP deputies called (unsuccessfully) for a freeze in yen loans to China in 
protest at Beijing' s nuclear testing programme90 . More recently, Japan's overseas 
development aid to China has come under pressure for cuts in response to China's 
continued high 1nilitary spending. A perceived increase in the tendency of Chinese 
officials to use "history problems" (rekishi mondai) from the pre-1945 period as moral 
leverage to block undesirable aspects of Japan' s foreign and defence policies is also 
resented91. Outside the LDP, the same trend is exemplified by the political resurgence of 
the mayor of Tokyo (and advocate of naval expansion), Ishihara Shintaro, whose strident 
87 Interview with Captain Otsuka Urnio, MSDF, Agenda Coordinator, Western Pacific Naval Symposium, 
Plans and Program Division , Maiitime Staff Office, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo, March 1, 2002. 
88 Interview with former JDA Administrative Vice-Minister Akiyama Masal1iro, Ship and Ocean 
Foundation, Nippon Foundation, Tokyo, March 4, 2002. 
89 Historically, the Liberal Democratic Party was divided over China policy along a faultline between the 
pro-Taipei Ajia mondai kenkyfikai ('A -ken ': the 'Asia problems reseai·ch group ') and the pro-Beijing ajia-
afu rika mondai ken/..y i"ikai (A -A ken: the 'Asia-Africa problems research group '). 
90 Robert S. Ross , Managing A Changing Relationship: China 's Japan Policy in the 1990s, U.S. Army War 
College, September 1996, p 1. 
292 
criticism of the Chinese government and ethnic Chinese criminal activities in Japan 
contrasts with his appeals to Pan-Asianism in the 1980s. Within the LDP, politicians 
concerned at the escalating trend in relocation of Japanese firms to China (see Chapter 
One) have branded China as an economic threat to Japan as well as a latent strategic 
challenger. A growing 'realist' perception that China poses a potential security threat to 
Japan has also been borne out among non-left-wing opposition parties. For example, the 
opposition shinshinto party, in 1995, included the Spratlys among sources of regional 
insecurity in its party policy outline and in 1996 issued a communique calling on China 
to halt its missile tests near Taiwan92. 
While Soeya Y oshihide has described the "China threat" thesis as "alien" to the 
Japanese government and people, and also to the country's post-1989 policy of 
supporting China's economic modernisation, there has been an "unmistakable" shift in 
Japanese official and popular attitudes towards China since the mid-1990s93 . Mainstream 
Japanese international scholars, including Eto Shinkichi, Iriye Akira and Inoguchi 
Takashi followed a liberal-institutionalist approach towards relations with China up to 
the early 1990s. This was based on the assumption that "Under present circumstances 
. . . there is no possibility of China's emerging as an expansionist, hegemonic power 
wielding military force against its neighbours to augment its own te1Titory"94. However, 
the perceptions of China held by a younger generation of Japanese academics, of whom 
Soeya is representative, have undergone a transformation in the post-Cold War period. 
In 1993, Soeya wrote that "With its status as an economic superpower and its strictly 
defence-oriented security policy Japan is in a good position to demand that China act 
with restraint in the South China Sea"95 . At the time, such views were echoed by other 
Japanese observers who thought that the threat of Japanese economic sanctions "acts as 
an important check on Chinese ambitions" and believed that Japan's status as a non-
claimant in the South China Sea qualified it to broker a solution to the te1Titorial disputes 
over the Spratlys and Paracels96 . However, after the Mischief Reef episode, the Taiwan 
missile crisis and China's nuclear tests in August 1995 and July 1996, Soeya urged the 
need to be "vigilant" against Chinese moves in the South China Sea as "one of the few 
cases where Japan's national and security interests are evidently at stake in the post-Cold 
91 Susan V Lawrence, 'Prickly Pair ', Far Eastern Economic Review, July 22, 1999, p 20. 
92 Sankei Shinibun, November 28, 1995. 
93 Soeya Yoshihide, "Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives', in Muthiah Alagappa 
(ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and ldeational Influences, Stanford University Press, California, 
1998, pp 203-07. 
94 Eto Shinkichi, 'China and Sino-Japanese Relations in the Coming Decades ', Japan Review of 
International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter) 1996, p 24. 
95 Soeya Yosh.ihide, 'Islands of Contention ', Look Japan , May 1995, p 23. 
96 Sato Koichi, 'The Japan Card', Far Eastern Economic Review, Ap1il 13, 1995, p 32. 
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War era" 97 . Since Japan "is in no position to deal with China by itself' , he concluded 
that it faced a "highly strategic" need to adopt closer defence relations with the United 
States as the only "viable counterpart to the Chinese military". 
III. North Korea's SLOC threat. 
While Japan's maritime military threat perceptions are focused on China in the medium 
to long term, a less predictable, more proximate and confirmed set of military threats 
and broader security challenges is presently posed by North Korea. In terms of a 
conventional threat to Japan' s SLOC, North Korea's possession of around 20 
submersibles is evaluated by the former head of the MSDF' s Fleet Submarine Force as 
"quite ominous"98 . The use of sea mines is also viewed with some concern by Japan's 
defence planners, although the maritime component is not generally viewed as central to 
any resumed fighting on the Peninsula. 
However, non-conventional maritime threats posed by North Korea have gained 
attention since 1999. In March of that year, the unsuccessful pursuit by MSDF surface 
vessels of two high-speed "suspicious vessels" (fushinsen) in the Sea of Japan, off the 
Noto Peninsula, den1onstrated the vulnerability of Japan ' s territorial seas and EEZ to 
North Korean covert maritime intrusions. Previous North Korean intrusions along 
Japan's Sea of Japan coastline in the 1970s and the early 1980s are thought to have 
involved illicit intelligence collection, the infiltration of cove11 operatives, drugs 
smuggling, and -- as was admitted by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in his 
Pyongyang su1n1nit with Prin1e Minister Koizu1ni J unichiro in September 2002 -- the 
abduction of several Japanese citizens99 . In December 2001 , the pursuit of another 
North Korean "spy ship" by Japan Coast Guard (JCG) vessels culminated in a firefight 
southwest of Kagoshima and the vessel's sinking, endorsed as a "resolute action" by US 
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage100 . 
The threat posed by North Korea to Japan' s maritime security has provided impetus for 
legislative moves to relax restrictions on the use of force by the JCG and MSDF. Both 
institutions have also argued the necessity of new capabilities to cope with North 
97 Soeya Yoshihide, The South China Sea: A Japanese Perspective' , in Security Implications of Conflict in 
the South China Sea: Perspectives from, the Asia-Pacific, Carolina Hernandez (ed. ), Proceedings of the Firs t 
International Conference on the South China Sea, Manila, November 12-14, 1995 , Pacific Forum/CSIS and 
Institute for Strategic and Development Studies , Quezon City, 1997, pp 130-31. 
98 Nishimura Yoshiaki, adviser to Kawasaki Heavy Indust1ies and former commander, MSDF Fleet 
Submarine Force, Quoted in Boei Gijutsu Janaru (Defence Technology Journal), September 1997, pp 4-19, 
in FBIS-EAS-97-314, Daily Report, FBIS Translated Text 
99 Misawa Akihiko, 'Japan Perspective: Grim Reality Returns to E. Asia' , Daily Yoniiuri Online, May 5, 
2002: www.yomiwi .co.jp/newse/20020705wo4 l .btm. 
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Korea's maritime intrusions , such as the MSDF' s guided missile patrol boats ordered 
after the 1999 sea chase ( each capable of making 44 knots and armed with anti-ship 
missiles and 12.7 millimetre machine guns)1°1. Official reactions to North Korea's 
maritime intrusions also exposed continuing deficiencies in Japan ' s crisis response 
capabilities and intra-governmental coordination. 
Several significant legal and operational precedents were set as a result of the North 
Korean "spy ship" incidents. During the March 1999 incident, for the first time in the 
history of the MSDF, Pri1ne Minister Obuchi Keizo ordered 1naritime security 
operations, under Aiticle 82 of the Self Defense Law, prompting the MSDF's use of 
warning shots. In its wake, the MSDF and JCG also conducted their first joint exercise 
and drafted a manual to coordinate responses to future incidents 102. In the December 
2001 incident, the JCG' s use of lethal force was justified legally with reference to the 
Fisheries Law, as the only domestic statute outlawing activities within Japan's EEZ103. 
The December 2001 incident increased momentum behind the proposed revision of 
emergency laws in case of suspected maritime intrusions that would enable the MSDF to 
launch ships at its own discretion104. It also spuned a formal declaration by the 
government backing the use of SDF vessels against suspected "suspicious ship" 
intrusions into Japan's EEZ105 . 
One of the major criticisms levelled at the JDA after the December incident related to a 
delay of several hours before the Agency passed on its knowledge about the "spy ship" 
to the JCG, prompting calls for the JDA to share intelligence more promptly with other 
government bodies106 . Prime Minister Koizumi ' s government sought to improve JCG-
JDA coordination, in part by updating a manual compiled after the March 1999 incident. 
Koizumi also sought to pro1note the coordinating function of the Cabinet Secretariat 
(naikaku kanbo) as a means to deepen inter-agency cooperation and to strengthen the 
role of the prime minister in foreign and defence policy1
07
. After the December 2001 
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incident, the government considered drafting special legislation that would enable 
discriminatory measures to be taken against North Korean vessels within Japan's 
EEZ108 . However, the basis for doing so under UNCLOS, which allows only for the 
interception of vessels related to fisheries stocks and dangerous cargoes, is doubtful. 
Nonetheless, North Korea's vessel intrusions have "opened the way for Prime Minister 
Koizumi to achieve his policy goals" 109. 
Outside of a narrow maritime security context, at the time of writing in early March 
2003, the potential missile and nuclear threat posed to Japan by North Korea appeared to 
be driving Japan towards a new threshold in its approach to military security. According 
to the Yoniiuri Shimbun, Japanese government officials, including LDP Secretary 
General Yamasaki Taku, regard the next most likely act of brinkmanship on the part of 
Pyongyang (as part of its attempt to extract concessions from the United States) to be the 
launch of a Nodong missile110 . The Koizumi government has prepared a response plan 
to deal with such a missile launch, which will involve publicising North Korean 
preparations that would be apparent to US and Japanese intelligence monitoring in 
advance of a launch111 . In the event of a missile launch into Japanese territory or waters, 
the JDA Director General would be granted the authority to order the MSDF to "engage 
in coast guard duties" and "guard against violations of Japanese airspace"112 . 
However, as MSDF Aegis destroyers possess the capability only to track, rather than to 
intercept missiles, the government has also declared that it is legally permissible under 
the Constitution to attack North Korea if facing an imminent launch. This represents a 
significant departure from the position articulated by former JDA Director General 
I 
Nukaga Fukushiro in September 1998, following North Korea's Taepodong missile test 
over Honshu, that Japan had the right to retaliate against a missile strike (based on a 
in S d h government statement from 1956) . The A DF oes not yet possess t e tanker 
refuelling, the precision-strike capabilities or the doctrine necessary to carry out a pre-
108 Confidential interview with JDA Operations Bureau official , March 5, 2002. 
109 National Institute for Defense Studies Professor Tak:esada Hideshi, quoted in Ueno Teruak:i , 'Mystery 
ship saga seen as boon for Japan ' s military', Reuters News Service, December 27 , 2001. 
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Korea will elect to launch another Nodong-1 , tested in 1993 and able to strike most targets in Japan , based 
on the theory that this would maintain pressure on the United States to open bilateral negotiations without 
provoking a military response (Hidaka Tetsuo and Kawata Takuji, 'N . Korea next move test firing missile?' , 
Daily Yomiuri, March 1, 2003. www.yomiuri .co.jp/newse/20030301 wo03.htm). 
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emptive attack against North Korea' s missile launch sites. However, the shift in the 
government's position is such as to suggest that the basic framework of post-war 
defence constraints is being fundamentally rethought. 
Conclusion. 
In the context of an emerging strategic dynamic in Japan-China relations, sea lanes have 
acquired renewed relevance as a security concern for Japan in the post Cold War period. 
The emergence of a military threat posed by China to Japan's sea lanes is widely 
perceived as possible over the long term. This is based on the underlying assumption 
that China eventually intends to establish itself as the leading power in East Asia and 
extend its sovereignty over the South China Sea and Taiwan, while exe11ing influence 
over South-east Asia. Equally, the PLAN' s perceived determination to maintain its 
current pace of military modernisation in pursuit of a blue water capability is seen as 
underpinning hegemonic ambitions with real military potential by 2020-30. 
Japanese strategists fear that if China acquires the military capability to interdict Japan's 
sea lanes this could be used as strategic leverage to discourage Japan from providing 
military and diplomatic support for the United States -- particularly in the context of 
Taiwan. Fears that China could at some point in the future seek to apply pressure 
directly to Japan's SLOC, for example by restricting navigational access in the South 
China Sea, reflect an ingrained self-perception that Japan remains vulnerable not only 
economically but as a politically 'handicapped' state. 
North Korea' s short-term challenge to Japan' s maritime security 1s, of itself, less 
strategically significant than the long-range challenge posed by an assertive China. 
However, North Korea ' s reso11 to a broad spectrum of behaviour threatening to Japan 
and regional security, from involvement in transnational crime to pursuit of weapons of 
mass destruction, has done much since the end of the Cold War to convince both elite 
and mass opinion in Japan of the necessity to readjust the country's security posture as 
laid down by Prime Minister Yoshida in the early 1950s. While military security 
remains a particularly contested area of Japanese policy-making, North Korea' s role in 
creating the political space within Japan to move beyond the confines of constitutional 
pacifism is likely to outlast the North Korean state itself. 
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The continuing attention focused within Japan on SLOC security issues, despite the 
disappearance of the singular military threat posed by the Soviet Union, demonstrates 
that its value as a security concern is deeply enduring and transcendent of change within 
the international system. It is ironic , yet instructive, that the southward strategic 
orientation of the Imperial Navy in the 1920s and 1930s, against an Anglo-American 
threat to Japan's resource supplies, should be mirrored in the contemporary orientation 
of the MSDF towards the possible emergence of a Chinese maritime threat in the same 
expanses of the Western Pacific fought over during the Second World War. Rather than 
being indicative of a recidivist militarism, the recurrent nature of these threat perceptions 
and the MSDF' s interest in establishing a South China Sea presence point instead to the 
enduring nature of Japan's strategic geography. 
With regard to the other recurrent theme of this thesis, sea lane concerns have also 
offered Japan's post-Cold War defence decision-makers important arguments to justify 
and expand the scope of their policy options. In contrast with the fragmentation of 
Japan's Cold War security concerns, to include non-state and state threats located in 
geographically disparate areas that are no longer bound by the unifying security 
framework of global bipolar rivalry, the security of sea lanes constitutes a readily 
identifiable core security concern. Theoretically, Japan's involvement in any maritime 
contingency from Yokohama to the oil terminals of the Gulf could legitimately be 
argued as falling within the ambit of Japan's SLOC security, in which national security 
is -- by extension -- at stake. As in the 1980s, when the image of Japan's vulnerability 
was invoked to convince a sceptical public of the need for an expanded maritime 
defence role with the United States, sea lane security has continuing utility for Japanese 
policy-makers keen to establish a common agenda for security cooperation with other 
maritime states in Asia. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis is driven by two questions outlined in the Introduction. The first asked how 
Japan's vulnerability to the disruption of its sea lanes has defined its strategic security 
imperatives and policy choices from the pre-war period to 2003. The second concerned 
the use of sea lines of communication (SLOC), instrumentally, to legitimise military 
activities that have been politically or constitutionally problematic in the post-1945 era. 
Two underlying research themes were also outlined: the influence that strategic 
geography has had on Japan's security policy decision-makers, and a concern with the 
nature of security and defence decision-making in post-war Japan. 
The first major finding of this thesis is that the strategic imperative of SLOC security has 
remained constant for Japan throughout the period of study, despite the pronounced 
divide between post-1945 and pre-1945 approaches to military security. The 
unchanging fundamentals of Japan' s maritime geography and poor resource allocation 
have ensured that policy-makers have consistently viewed the security of sea lanes as "a 
matter of life and death", an imperative that has driven official responses in such diverse 
fields as economic policy, diplomacy, alliance relations, defence policy and law 
enforcement. This challenges the widely held view of Japan's security in terms of 
discontinuity; reflecting the changes that have occurred since 1940 to the structure of the 
economy, to Japan's political and military institutions, and to its policy-makers' external 
threat perceptions and normative approaches to security. 
The second maJor finding is that the emphasis in post-war defence policy and the 
outlook of the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) regarding the vulnerability of 
Japan's SLOC can be fully accounted for only by understanding its use to justify 
controversial aspects of defence and alliance policy. The notion of protecting Japan's 
maritime trade, with its appeal to widely held economic norms of security, has had an 
important political value for policy-makers in the wider context of Japan's defence 
policy since 1945. 
I. SLOC as a strategic in1perative. 
Chapter One established Japan 's long-term import dependence as the essential 'pre-
condition' for its SLOC security concerns. I profiled the economic importance of 
seaborne transportation to Japan, establishing that prolonged disruption to the import of 
fuels, food and raw materials would undermine the ability of the government and 
industry to sustain all but the most basic economic activity, eventually threatening 
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national and even human survival. Japan's potential vulnerability to supply disruptions 
has fed through into a particular defence policy concern with the security of SLOC. 
In Chapter Two, I demonstrated how SLOC security has evolved as a strategic concept 
over the last century. I concluded that while the nature of maritime threats is far more 
complex and varied than was the case when Mahan and Corbett developed their theories 
of sea power, the military and economic importance of securing lines of communication 
over the sea has remained a strategic constant for maritime states. To atTive at a 
definition of SLOC security, I approached the concept by breaking it down into its 
constituent pa1is of sea power and lines of communications. I traced the control of 
communications as a concept integral to theories of sea power developed in an era when 
naval strategy was synonymous with the mono-dimensional aim of attaining command 
of the sea over rival surface battle fleets. It was shown that in the era of total warfare in 
the first half of the 20th century, the distinction between 'military' and 'economic' 
SLOC became blurred. Submarine-led anti-shipping campaigns threatened the war-
fighting capacity and survival of maritime powers such as Japan and the United 
Kingdom, establishing that a strategy of 'sea denial' could be prosecuted independently 
of surface sea control. 
Despite the infrequent incidence of high-intensity naval conflict in the nuclear era, in 
Chapters Two and Five it was demonstrated that the potential threat of the Soviet Union 
to interdict Western military SLOC was taken extremely seriously by Western military 
planners in the 1970s and 1980s. With the end of the Cold War and the run-down of the 
former Soviet fleet, the risk of a global conflagration involving high-intensity naval 
conflict in the open seas diminished sharply and, with it, the prospect of any short- to 
medium-term militai·y threat to Western military SLOC in the Atlantic or Pacific, 
beyond the littoral seas. In place of the perceived monolithic threat to SLOC security 
posed by the Soviet Union, a diffuse set of threats and challenges has emerged. The 
definition of SLOC security has thus expanded to encompass environmental concerns, 
attempts at legal enclosure, piracy, terrorism, as well as residual military threats to 
navigation posed by regional conflicts , the most serious of which are all located near 
Japan's strategically vital seaborne trade routes in the Indo-Pacific region. 
As Japan' s industrial development proceeded after 1868 and its population grew rapidly, 
it became locked into a cycle of dependence on imports in order to meet its basic 
nutritional, energy and raw materials requirements. The drive to control its own 
resource base at source was a crucial determinant of Japan's imperial expansion in Asia 
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from the 1890s onwards and led ultimately to the reckless gamble of going to war with 
the United States and Great Britain in 1941. Chapter Three showed that the US 
submarine anti-shipping campaign against Japan wrought strategic effects at very little 
cost in terms of resources committed and might even have brought about Japan's defeat 
unaided. The memory of the wartime blockade left an indelible imprint on the 'culture' 
of the MSDF, extending to wider elite and societal perceptions of Japan's vulnerability. 
After 1945, the enforced transition was made from an imperial economic model to a 
liberal-trade model, within the wider security framework of Pax Americana, as the 
means by which Japan secured access to those resources it lacked locally. This 
structural shift also brought about a major geographical reorientation of its supply base 
and export markets, increasing the importance of the Middle East, Southeast Asia and 
Australasia as the providers of energy and industrial commodities needed to fuel rapid 
industrial growth from the late 1950s to the 1970s. It also brought about a massive 
expansion in the volume of goods imported and the distances over which they were 
transported. This increased the importance to Japan's security of the three key 
southwestern, southern and eastern cormnercial shipping streams respectively 
connecting Japan, first, with the Middle East and Southeast Asia; second, with Australia; 
and third with the Americas. The strategic importance of chokepoints along these 
routes, where shipping was concentrated, also increased -- especially with regard to the 
Straits of Malacca, Japan's maritime 'life-line' . 
In Chapter One, I examined ways in which Japan has the capacity to reduce its 
vulnerability to supply disruptions, arising from its chronic import dependence, through 
economic policy measures. Government and industry efforts to diversify Japan's supply 
base trans-regionally and to build up stockpiles of oil and raw materials to soften the 
impact of any short-term supply disruption were profiled and assessed. I concluded that 
a combination of stockpiling, resource substitution and supplier diversification, and the 
adoption of progressive energy policies since the 1973 oil crisis have given the Japanese 
economy a limited cushion against the intenuption of imports along its SLOC. 
Moreover, if the government's objective in a security crisis was merely to survive the 
duration, austerity controls would provide it with the economic leeway to reduce its 
import requirements to one third of normal levels, or more if it chose to switch 
productive capacity from the expo1t sector to manufacturing goods to meet domestic 
demand. Against this more qualified picture of economic vulnerability and the ability of 
commercial shipping to detour around most localised trouble-spots and obstructed 
chokepoints between terminals, the consistently high level of attention paid to SLOC 
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disruption in Japan's post-war defence and diplomacy appears extremely risk-sensitive, 
especially considering that the only major commodity supply shock to Japan's economy 
was delivered at source, as a result of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, rather than in transit. 
Yet in spite of the efforts since 1973 to create a 'cushion' against import disruption, 
Japan still has only limited capacity to insulate itself from a major breakdown in 
seaborne transportation. The very fact that Japan's industry has developed one of the 
leanest energy consumption profiles of any advanced economy since the oil crises means 
that little 'slack' exists within the system, limiting its ability to cut energy use further 
without production or transportation suffering as a consequence. Japan's paucity of 
natural resources is so extreme relative to its basic needs that, baning a technological 
breakthrough in energy production releasing it from dependence on imported 
hydrocarbons, any serious and sustained disruption to in-bound shipping flows would 
inevitably be perceived by the Japanese authorities as a threat to national survival, 
regardless of the temporary respite afforded by stockpiles . This remained the case in 
2003 as it was in 1943 when Japan's latent vulnerability to blockade was first exposed. 
In the 1945-77 period, while strategic pressures and alliance politics were factors 
weighing in favour of Japan's rearmament, domestic constraints were paramount, as 
seen in the rejection of autonomous defence proposals in the late 1960s and the adoption 
of limits on defence capability within the taiko. Japan's pre-1945 military-dominated 
government was replaced after the war by a civilian leadership and the constitutionally 
enshrined goal of state non-belligerency. Since the Pacific War, without overseas 
tenitories or military bases, Japan has had no direct need for SLOC to project military 
power. Aside from an indirect dependence on US trans-Pacific SLOC to provide 
military reinforcement in case of external aggression, its interests in sea transportation 
have remained those of a commercial maritime power. However, despite the clear 
political and strategic departures from the pre-war situation, Japan's vulnerability to the 
disruption of its SLOC is striking as a strategic constant, which straddles the pre- and 
post-1945 divide. 
Other concerns of strategic geography have certainly 'canied over' from the pre-war 
period, as seen in a basic continuity in Japan's perceptions of the Korean peninsula as 
integral to its security. However, Japan 's interest in SLOC is peculiar among its post-
war security concerns, which are more notable for their diminished strategic content, in 
that Japan's potential exposure to a major disruption of seaborne imports increased in 
line with the exponential growth of its overseas trade and resource needs. By increasing 
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the extent of its dependence on foreign sources of supply, and on a new and more 
geographically remote set of nations, many of which were located in areas of high 
geopolitical risk, Japan's integration within the Western liberal economic trading system 
brought about a concomitant strategic requirement to ensure that an adequate level of 
naval protection (direct or indirect) was maintained in both the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans. The expansion of Japan's overseas trade thus created its own powerful rationale 
for forming a military alliance with the only maritime power capable of extending such 
protection, the United States. 
The importance of the mariti1ne influence on Japan's strategy is reflected in its 
predominant pattern of alliances with major naval powers (Great Britain from 1902-22 
and the United States from 1951 to the present). Unlike the brief and largely passive 
wartime 'axis' with the continental power of Nazi Germany, Japan entered into these 
more enduring alliances, and particularly the US-Japan Alliance, as a strategic response 
to the problem of how to secure overseas access to markets and natural resources, by 
aggregating its own naval capabilities with those of the globally dominant maritime 
power. 
In Chapter Four, I showed how Japan's post-1945 security policy was redefined, against 
the backdrop of sweeping change at the systemic, transnational and domestic levels, in 
the Yoshida Doctrine. The doctrine reflected reduced threat perceptions compared with 
the pre-war period and Yoshida's perception that Japan's resource needs could optimally 
be met via entry into a US-led trading order within which Japan's security would be 
guaranteed by the United States, leaving the government and private industry free to 
invest their energies in the tasks of reconstruction and recovery. 
Arguments in favour of the development of a large navy configured for an independent 
'sea lane defence' role resurfaced surprisingly quickly in Japan after the Second World 
War and received a level of political backing that sharply contrasted with official 
reluctance to accede to US pressure to create a large army. Yoshida and subsequent 
ad1ninistrations acknowledged that contributory forces were a political necessity. 
However, in the case of naval forces official support was also forthcoming owing to the 
strategic importance of protecting Japan's seaborne trade beyond its tenitorial waters. 
As demonstrated in Chapters Three and Four, those former Imperial Navy officers who 
filled the ranks of the post-war maritime security forces, or who entered business and 
politics, carried their wartime experiences with them and the conviction that the Imperial 
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Navy had erred in not doing more to protect Japan's merchant fleet. The task of trade 
protection was thus one that quickly established itself as a core priority for Japan's 
reconstituted naval forces as a 'lesson learned' from the Pacific War. 
Japan's security links with the United States, especially the close navy-to-navy 
relationship, were crucial to the formation, structure and operational orientation of the 
MSDF. However, concerns about the security of sea lanes also drove Japanese decision-
makers' perceptions and responses independently, by exposing a perceived weakness in 
the security guarantee extended to Japan by the United States, under the terms of the 
Security Treaty. As seen in Chapter Four, Sekino Hideo' s notion of a stand-alone 
Japanese navy oriented to a SLOC protection role in the Western Pacific stemmed partly 
from a lack of confidence that the US defence guarantee covering Japanese territory 
would apply to Japanese shipping on the high seas. This fed the concern that a hostile 
power might target Japan's SLOC, in addition to their constituting an independent 
strategic weak-point, as the Achilles Heel of alliance cohesion. 
The vulnerability of SLOC has thus been perceived within Japan in political terms as 
well as in military and economic terms. In Chapters Four to Eight the importance given 
to the 'psychological' impact of attacks on shipping by Japanese analysts and defence 
planners was demonstrated repeatedly. This partly reflects concerns that attacks on 
shipping could be used to test the margins of the US security guarantee. At a domestic 
level, politicians and defence officials have also feared that even small-scale or 
clandestine attacks on Japan's shipping interests could be used by hostile states to 
exacerbate political divisions over questions of military security and the constitutional 
legitimacy of the Self Defence Forces (SDF), or to put pressure on Japan to adopt an 
accommodative posture, for example in relation to disputed maritime territorial claims. 
Chapter Five showed that in the 1977-90 period, alliance politics were the main 
imperative of Japan's SLOC security policy responses and the main driver of change in 
Japan's approach to defence. While defence constraints remained in place, Japan's 
acquiescence in closer defence cooperation reflected not only a 'political' response to 
US burden-sharing pressure, but also the emergence of independent concerns within 
Japan about the relative decline of US power and the build-up of Soviet military power 
in the Far East. The rise of the Soviet sea lane threat to the top of the agenda of the US-
Japan Alliance in the late Cold War reflected a wider strategic context shaped by the 
relative decline in US military power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Washington's 
efforts to increase Japan's military support as an alliance partner, chiefly by augmenting 
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the maritime capabilities of the SDF. MSDF plans for the protection of shipping in 
Second World War-style convoys, in place since the 1960s, had by the 1980s given way 
to a more expansive concept of area defence. The prospective role of the MSDF in sea 
lane defence was no longer limited to the defensive task of convoying oil tankers and 
commercial shipping, and in the event of a superpower conflict, would have involved 
Japanese forces operating at a functionally integrated level alongside US forces 
deployed to carry out the US Maritime Strategy in the Northwest Pacific. Indeed, the 
success of US war plans required SDF cooperation in sealing off Soviet forces in the Sea 
of Japan, as well as in coordinated efforts to track and destroy Soviet submarines 
operating in the Pacific. These actions went far beyond the scope of Japan's official 
defence posture, as outlined in the taiko based on dealing "with any situation up to the 
level of limited and small-scale aggression". 
In the context of the various state and non-state level potential threats faced by Japan in 
1990-2003, the importance of Japan's independent strategic perceptions are rising to the 
fore, as the primary imperative of defence policy, for first time in post-war era. In 
Chapter Seven, I showed that Japan's security policy-making community has generally 
moved towards a more 'realist' viewpoint of regional and global security, a shift of 
perception that has brought about a renewed emphasis on the US-Japan Alliance and its 
reshaping from an anti-Soviet compact in the late Cold War to a 'situationally' defined 
framework for bilateral defence cooperation potentially extending as far as the Gulf. I 
also examined how Japan has adopted security initiatives independently of the United 
States, via its involvement in United Nations peace-keeping, its exploration of 
multilateral security dialogue and development of bilateral defence links with a range of 
third countries, focused on the Asia-Pacific region, where the most obvious candidates 
for potential state-level threats to Japan's security are located. 
In a more uncertain post-Cold War environment, geopolitical risk is concentrated in 
several regions along the length of Japan's major energy arterial SLOC, from the Gulf, 
via South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia. Chapter Eight showed that among 
potential state-level tlu·eats, China has assumed the central place in Japanese defence 
planners' long-range view. Japan's economically crucial SLOC to the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia are seen as potentially exposed to a rising naval power that possesses a 
long seaboard astride Japan' s southern maritime approaches. The potential for China' s 
expanding economy and rising resource needs to develop in competition with those of 
Japan and other import-dependent states in Asia has again raised the vulnerability of 
Japan's supply routes to the threat of deliberate interdiction by a hostile maritime power. 
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Japanese policy-makers recognise that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
significantly lags behind MSDF capabilities in most areas, quite apai1 from the gulf that 
separates it from the US Navy. However, Japan's concern about China's naval 
modernisation is long term and relates equally to the perceived skill of its policy-makers 
in blending military pressure with other elements of national power in the pursuit of a 
clearly defined grand strategy. Japan's concern about the security of its sea lanes is 
honed in the context of fears that China is pursuing a strategy aimed eventually at 
establishing hegemony, on land, over the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and continental 
Southeast Asia and maritime sway over the East and South China Sea. The ambition of 
those within the PLAN who aim to extend China's maritime defence zone to Southeast 
Asia and the 'second island chain' in the Western Pacific is viewed as inherently 
threatening in Japan, given the overlap with its most important economic SLOC. 
Chapter Two concluded that prracy is more of an 'irritant' to the global maritime 
transportation system than a systemic threat. However, Chapter Seven made clear that a 
high level of private and official attention is accorded to piracy as a threat by Japanese 
security policy-makers. With regard to the challenge posed potentially to Japan's SLOC 
security by Islamic terrorism, although Japan's shipping interests were not directly 
targeted in the October 2002 attack on the Limburg off Yemen, the potential terrorism 
threat to Japan's SLOC security is greater than that posed by piracy. One of al-Qaida's 
objectives is to inflict the maximum damage possible to Western economic interests in 
Muslim countries, potentially exposing Japan ' s oil supplies and shipping routes through 
the Middle East and maritime Southeast Asia to attack. 
Japan's sea lane diplomacy has sought to maintain the physical parameters of safe 
navigation in the Straits of Malacca and to limit the impact on navigational access of 
jurisdictional claims by regional states, especially those of Indonesia. In Chapter Six, I 
concluded that Japan ' s failure to secure a role in the administration of the Straits of 
Malacca in 1971, which led to the joint Indonesian-Malaysian declaration 'de-
internationalising' the straits , marked the low-point for its SLOC diplomacy in the 
region. In the context of this failure and anti-Japanese riots across Southeast Asian 
capitals in the mid-1970s , Tokyo re-evaluated its diplomacy towards the region, 
prompting a major redirection of aid flows to reflect Southeast Asia ' s strategic 
importance to Japan. Technical and financial assistance disbursed to the coastal states 
through the non-official Malacca Straits Council established a quasi-official framework 
of cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore leading to the adoption of the 
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Traffic Separation Scheme and Under-keel Clearance limit in 1977, which have 
facilitated safe access through the straits and lessened coastal states' concerns about 
collisions and spillages resulting from um·egulated shipping traffic. Japan's financing of 
the Rolling Fund has contained disputes with the straits states about how to apportion 
the financial burden of navigational safety measures in the straits. Generally, Japan has 
benefited by conducting its sea lane diplomacy indirectly through the Malacca Straits 
Council, while relying on the International Maritime Organisation and other states to 
press overtly for navigational freedoms to be upheld. With the exception of the transit of 
nuclear cargoes through the region, on which it has faced firm opposition, Japan has thus 
avoided any serious limitation to its commercial transit rights resulting from coastal 
states' jurisdictional claims. 
While Japan's sea lane diplomacy has been successful in terms of balancing its interests 
in free and safe navigation with the concerns of coastal states in Southeast Asia, official 
and private efforts have had less measurable influence in terms of ameliorating the 
threats posed to shipping by piracy, the prospect of Islamic maritime terrorism, or the 
potential for regional conflict in the South China Sea. Regarding the last of these, the 
position of China, as an extra-regional great power less beholden to aid and other forms 
of 'soft' leverage, is the key strategic variable -- making Japan's sea lane diplomacy in 
South-east Asia ultimately subordinate to balance of power concerns. 
II. SLOC security as an instrun1ental policy concern. 
Notwithstanding the depth of genuine concern in Japan about the vulnerability of its 
SLOC to disruption, this thesis has shown that controversial defence policy measures 
have been justified nominally as responses aimed at securing maritime traffic or 
lessening the vulnerability of Japan's sea lanes. At various times, in its different guises, 
SLOC protection has been employed as a rationale to build up the level of Japan's post-
war naval capabilities, to expand the functional and geographical scope of US-Japan 
Alliance cooperation and to explore security cooperation with other maritime states in 
the Asia-Pacific. Towards achieving these aims SLOC protection has offered advantages 
in several areas. 
First, sea lane defence has presented the MSDF with a rationale that has enabled its 
officers and other pro-naval advocates to defend their budgetary claims and to argue the 
necessity of maintaining a large surface fleet configured for blue water operations. The 
Mahanian dicturn that the necessity of a navy springs from the existence of peaceful 
shipping has proved useful in the context of Japan ' s constitutional pacifism for rebutting 
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the arguments of those such as Kaihara Osamu, profiled in Chapter Four, that the MSDF 
should be downsized and reconfigured to perform in a minimalist counter-invasion and 
coastal defence role. 
Second, the rationale for a Japanese naval role in trade protection accorded with the 
priority given to economic security and defence constraints within the Yoshida Doctrine. 
Widespread consensus among the various government actors with responsibility for 
security policy that Japan required reliable and safe access to natural resources overseas 
helped the cause of naval reannament to proceed more smoothly than that of the Ground 
Self Defense Forces (GSDF). As a 'defensive' task, sea lane protection could be 
accommodated more easily within the constraints of the Constitution than any other 
aspects of defence policy involving the extra-territorial dispatch of the SDF. Chapter 
Five showed that in the 1970s and 1980s, both the popular memory of the wartime 
blockade and fears of supply disruptions re-awoken by the 1973 oil crisis were used to 
persuade a domestic audience of the need for Japan to engage in deepening maritime 
defence cooperation with the United States. 
Third, as a concept that is inherently vague in geographical and operational terms, sea 
lane defence lent itself particularly well to justifying expanded defence cooperation with 
the United States during the late Cold War. During the 1980s, such cooperation drew 
Japan steadily closer towards a de facto collective self-defence posture vis-a-vis the 
United States, as a military ally integrated into US Cold War military strategy. Without 
the political 'cover' afforded by sea lane defence, intensified alliance cooperation would 
certainly have encountered greater political resistance within Japan. 
Fourth, in the post-Cold War era, appeals to sea lane security have continuing appeal not 
only in the context of legitimising defence policy to a domestic audience, but also in 
presenting the protection of maritime transportation as an important security concern 
that is shared by all maritime trading states in the region. For advocates of an expanded 
security role in Japan, as seen in Chapters Seven and Eight, it has thus provided a non-
threatening pretext on which to build security cooperation with other states that share a 
common interest in SLOC security. 
Fifth, Chapter Seven showed that piracy is an issue of sea lane secu1ity that has been 
used as a pretext to develop Japan' s regional security role since the end of the Cold War, 
albeit with mixed success. It has been used as a vehicle both to explore security 
cooperation with other states in East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia, as well as to 
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establish a limited Japanese maritime presence in the Straits of Malacca, through the 
Japan Coast Guard. As a constabulary concern, Japan's anti-piracy involvement offers 
political advantages, by offering a focus for security cooperation that does not target any 
particular state, thus lowering the political costs for participants. Japan's anti-piracy 
initiatives are also intended as a confidence-building measure designed to demonstrate 
its reliability and responsibility as a security partner, particularly to Southeast Asian 
states -- the maritime equivalent of Japan's UN peacekeeping troop deployment to 
Cambodia in 1993. Moreover, it is an area in which Japan can draw on its comparative 
advantage in capacity-building, as a donor of technical and financial aid. In strategic 
terms, Japan's sponsorship of anti-piracy cooperation serves the unstated purpose of 
laying the diplomatic infrastructure for a future 'maritime coalition', should the Japanese 
government decide to counter the activities of a more assertive China, or to compensate 
for a weakening of the Alliance with the United States. 
The MSDF has proved adept at the use of sea lane security and the safety of maritime 
transportation as pretexts and precedents to widen the scope of its operations, both 
geographically and legally. Although, as seen in Chapter Four, the 1976 taiko did not 
mention sea lane defence among the MSDF' s roles, during the 1970s the MSDF retained 
its blue water escort flotilla formations in spite of a political and fiscal climate that 
favoured the formalisation of defence constraints. Chapter Five showed how, in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the rationale of defending Japan's sea lanes -- in tandem with US 
political pressure -- enabled the MSDF to expand its budgetary claims and to deepen its 
cooperation with the US Navy. In terms of force structure, acquisitions justified under 
the rubric of sea lane defence facilitated improvements in anti-submarine and mine 
warfare capabilities that outstripped those of the US Seventh Fleet in certain areas by the 
end of the Cold War and transformed the MSDF into a highly potent navy. The MSDF 
also argued successfully for its pa11icipation in the RIMPAC exercises from 1980 on the 
strength of its SLOC defence responsibilities. The Air Self Defense Force and even the 
Ground Self Defense Force recognised the value of sea lane defence as a rationale to 
boost or to defend their budgetary shares in the 1980s. 
As seen in Chapter Seven, the MSDF' s deployment to the Arabian Sea in November 
2001 exemplifies the trend in a contemporary context. The MSDF flotilla was 
dispatched under the terms of the Anti-Terro1ism Special Measures Law, initially for a 
period of six months to "gather information" in support of US-led operations in 
Afghanistan. Since then the deployment has been twice extended and substantially 
reinforced. The terms of the MSDF' s activities in the Arabian Sea have also been 
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expanded to include refuelling naval vessels from several other countries. The 
government has also drawn up plans to protect oil tankers in the Gulf, for which the 
forces in place in the region could readily be used. Regardless of whether Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi's adn1inistration decides to extend support to US and UK 
forces involved in any offensive against Iraq, the value of the MSDF' s deployment as a 
precedent for a future Japanese naval presence in the Indian Ocean and along the length 
of its most important econmnic SLOC to the Gulf has been established. 
III. Japan's SLOC security prospects. 
This thesis has established that, as a function of its industrial structure, resource 
allocation and geopolitical location far from its sources of supply and close to potentially 
hostile powers, Japan's SLOC security is a 'permanent' strategic problem for its security 
decision-makers. 
Japan's demographic transition to a smaller, older population and the hollowing out of 
its industrial base, while not unstoppable, are trends that are both likely to continue. 
This will have a significant impact over medium- to long-term consumption trends, 
reducing Japan's absolute energy and resource requirements. Although increasing use 
of natural gas will continue to erode oil's share in primary energy production, the 
nuclear sector is unlikely to fulfill the promise of energy autonomy that it once held out 
to policy-makers. Thus, the needs of a residual onshore industrial base, domestic 
transportation and electric power demand will continue to require large volumes of 
imported resources, while the economy will remain reliant on oil for at least another 30-
40 years. Russia and other non-Gulf based producers hold out some prospect for 
reducing Japan's dependence on Middle Eastern oil energy supplies, but the draw-down 
of Southeast Asian oil and gas exports to Japan and the global dominance of Gulf-region 
reserves are likely to prevent radical change in Japan's energy import patterns until 
technology supplies cheaper alternatives to fossil fuels. Ensuring the security of its 
southern SLOC to the Middle East will therefore remain essential. 
As most of the projected increase in maritime traffic through the Straits of Malacca will 
be created by countries other than Japan, Tokyo will progressively lose its position as 
the primary user of the straits, most probably to China, whose resource needs and export 
trade will continue to undergo rapid expansion if its domestic growth potential can be 
tapped and if multinationals continue to relocate production there. The growing profile 
of non-Japanese North-east Asian users in the Southeast Asian SLOC will in one sense 
simplify Japan's task of maintaining safe navigational access, by further 
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internationalising the issue. However, unless Southeast Asian states respond positively 
to the prospect of Japan as a strategic counterweight to China, the leverage of its 
negotiating position in the region is likely to decline over time as its pre-eminent 
economic position is eroded. 
With regard to the te1Torist threat to Japan's SLOC interests, the most important 
challenge will be to maintain security around the hard and soft infrastructure 
underpinning the international shipping industry, especially at major Asian ports where 
it is most concentrated and vulnerable. Provided this can be achieved, Japan can expect 
to reap additional security benefits from the flexibility of commercial shipping to follow 
diversionary routes, as well as the availability of spare capacity to compensate for the 
lengthening of its maritime supply chain. 
At the time of writing, in early March 2003, among the sho1i to medium-range security 
concerns faced by Japan, the nuclear and missile threats posed by N 01th Korea 
commanded most attention among Japan's security planners, while the question of 
whether to extend diplomatic and non-combat military support for any US attack on Iraq 
also weighed over Japan's policy-makers. How they respond to these concu1Tent 
challenges is likely to have an important bearing not only on the future of Japan's SLOC 
security, but also the basic orientation of its defence policy. The North Korean nuclear 
crisis -- the second in ten years -- is likely to encourage the development of a more 
independent strategic defence posture for Japan, even if the stand-off between 
Pyongyang and Washington is resolved diplomatically. 
The broad array of threats posed by North Korea, from transnational crime to potentially 
nuclear-equipped missiles, constitutes a major source of external strategic pressure upon 
Japan. Domestically, the negative disposition of Japanese popular opinion towards 
North Korea, especially since its admission to abducting Japanese nationals, means that 
public tolerance of policy measures justified in relation to the 'North Korean threat' is 
higher than for similar measures justified in relation to other prospective threats. 
However, precedents established in the na1Tow context of a potential North Korean 
missile test as well as counter-te1Torism naval cooperation with third countries in the 
Arabian Sea serve nonetheless to broaden the range of legally and politically acceptable 
defence activities, in conformity with the pattern of incremental change in Japan's 
defence policy throughout the post-1954 era. While the Koizumi administration has 
substantially increased the pace of adjustment in Japan's defence and secu1ity policy 
since September 2001, the not inconsiderable chance that the Liberal Democratic Party 
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will in future unite behind Ishihara Shintaro, or a similar popular nationalist outside the 
formal party structure, raises the possibility that a more assertive defence policy stance 
may follow Koizumi. The record of Nakasone Yasuhiro, as a conservative nationalist 
who followed a less radical defence policy agenda as premier than he had advocated as a 
Diet politician, suggests that incumbency imposes its own constraints. Many ordinary 
Japanese and elected officials are also genuinely reluctant to jettison post-war 
constitutional constraints on defence capability. Nonetheless, against a background of 
economic malaise, electoral disenchantment with established political parties and 
popular opinion sensitised to a North Korean threat, the political conditions for a pro-
defence policy platform have never been more propitious in post-war Japan. Despite the 
fiscal constraints imposed by Japan's large burden of public debt, a policy of increased 
security spending justified as a form of fiscal stimulus to revive an otherwise moribund 
domestic economy could even help to overcome resistance among economic policy-
makers traditionally opposed to military outlays on grounds of fiscal prudence. 
Despite the short-term preoccupation of Japanese security planners with North Korea, 
Japan's longer-term threat horizons will centre on strategies to cope with the rise of 
China and the fear that this will led to a diminution of Japan's influence in Southeast 
Asia and elsewhere on the continent of Asia. The abiding perception that Japan's SLOC 
are most vulnerable to interdiction beyond the Bashi Channel, and particularly in the 
South China Sea, could, under the right political conditions, lead to an increased MSDF 
presence in the South China Sea and the possibility that Japan will seek to conclude 
limited basing anangements with Southeast Asian states including the Philippines and 
Singapore, without which the logistical difficulties of sustaining long-range deployments 
of ships and aircraft would impose strains on SDF capabilities. 
In the future, SLOC security will continue to serve as the nexus for several strands 
within Japan's defence and security policy-making. Economically, concerns over 
supply disruptions in transit will drive self-help policies to lessen their economic impact. 
Diplomatically, Japan will continue to emphasise the importance of free and safe 
navigation in its relations with coastal states adjacent to its SLOC in Southeast Asia and 
elsewhere. Strategically, sea lane defence will continue to bridge the gap between 
Japan's tenitoriall y defined defence interests and the security of maritime transportation 
as far as the Gulf. This could provide the impetus for a forward maritime defence 
posture, either in alliance with a naval hegemonic power or as part of an as yet 
undetermined maritime coalition. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Breakdown of Japan's primary energy supply for selected years(%) 
FY1960 FY1970 FY1980 FY1990 FY1996 FY1999 
petroleu1n 37.6 71.9 66.1 58.3 55.2 52.0 
coal 41.2 19.9 17.0 16.6 16.4 17.4 
gas 0.9 1.2 6.1 10.1 11.4 12.7 
hydro 15.7 5.6 5.2 4.2 3.4 3.6 
nuclear -- 0.3 4.7 9.4 12.3 13.0 
geothermal -- -- 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
other 4.6 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.1 
Appendix 2: Major navigational concepts introduced under UNCLOS 
The entry into force of UNCLOS in 1994 introduced the following jurisdictional 
concepts into international law, although their development over the three LOS 
Conventions (1958, 1973 and 1982), and through state practice and customary law was 
an incremental process: 
Territorial seas. 
UN CLOS recognises _ the right of coastal states to extend their territorial waters to 12 
nautical miles (nm), throughout which state sovereignty is fully exercised, and to 
exercise customs and immigration controls in a contiguous zone for a further 12 nm1. 
Prior to UNCLOS, territorial seas of widely varying dimensions had been claimed, 
varying from 3 nm to 200 nm, but the 12 nm limit had become established as an 
international norm long before the Convention entered into force. The extension of 
territorial seas has brought a number of straits used for international navigation which 
formerly contained high-seas corridors , within the sole or shared jurisdiction of coastal 
straits. 
Archipelagic waters. 
The waters enclosed within baselines drawn from the outermost edges of the 14 
designated archipelagos under UNCLOS have a legal status similar to territorial seas . 
However, one of the 'grey areas ' identified in UNCLOS legislation concerns whether 
1 Ivan Shearer, 'Current Law of the Sea Issues ', in Sam Bateman and Ross Babbage (eds .), Maritime 
Change: Issues for Asia, Allen and Un win, Sydney, 1993 , p 52. 
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prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction that applies m territorial seas extends to 
archipelagic waters2. 
Exclusive Economic Zones. 
Part V of the 1982 UNCLOS draft recognised Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) out to 
200 nautical miles. The concept of the EEZ arose as a compromise aimed at providing 
coastal states with legal ownership over marine resources out to 200 nm, as a quid pro 
quo for confining their tenitorial-sea claims to 12 miles. Within their EEZ, coastal states 
are empowered to apprehend vessels that pose a risk of pollution to the coastline or 
resources of the EEZ3. The authority of coastal states does not extend to naval vessels or 
military aircraft, however, which enjoy high seas freedoms outside territorial seas or 
archipelagic waters. 
A number of military maritime zones with the potential to affect shipping and aviation 
have also been declared outside of the framework of UNCLOS. These include warning 
and exclusion zones declared by China, in the north of the Yellow Sea and north of 
Taiwan; Taiwan's own exclusion zone in the Taiwan Strait; No1ih Korea's 70-nm 
military zones off both its coastlines and the United States has a 200-mile warning area 
in effect around its missile testing range, near K wajalein in the Pacific 4. A number of 
states, including Japan, and regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) have declared nuclear weapons free zones, banning the 
admission of nuclear weapons and/or nuclear-powered warships. 
Passage regimes. 
Aside from high seas passage, which was legally unaffected by UNCLOS (although the 
area of high seas itself was dramatically curtailed), three transit regimes were eventually 
adopted as part of the new regime. Firstly, the pre-existing concept of 'innocent passage' 
was incorporated, applying to navigation through territorial seas and, generally, within 
archipelagic waters. Secondly, the regime of 'transit passage' was created to deal with 
transit through international straits. Thirdly, 'archipelagic sea lanes passage' was 
developed to govern passage through sea lanes designated within archipelagic waters: 
2 See Elie Jaap Molenaar, in Sam Bateman (ed.) Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Current 
Situation and Prospects , CanbeITa Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 132, Australian National University 
Press, CanbeITa, 1999, pp 109-110. 
3 Ivan Shearer, 'Cunent Law of the Sea Issues ' , in Sam Bateman and Ross Babbage (eds. ), Maritime 
Change: Issues for Asia, Allen and Un win, Sydney, 1993, pp 54-62. 
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• International straits containing high seas areas. Where international straits are wide 
enough that a high seas corridor remains despite the extension of territorial seas to 
12 nm, or in such cases where the coastal state has chosen not to extend its territorial 
sea, navigation is legally unencumbered by UNCLOS. High seas corridors remain 
in the Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushi1na and Osmni straits around Japan, the Taiwan and 
Luzon Straits/Bashi Channel, the Torres Strait and the Strait of Hormuz. 
• Innocent passage. The rules of Innocent Passage, under Article 19(2) of UNCLOS, 
confer passage rights tlu·ough territorial waters for ships (and aircraft), provided they 
engage in "continuous and expeditious passage which is not prejudicial to the peace, 
good order, or security of coastal states". Although there is nothing expressly to 
exclude naval vessels from innocent passage in the UNCLOS text, some states 
request prior notification before foreign naval vessels enter their territorial or 
archipelagic waters5. Under the terms of innocent passage, warships are not 
supposed to engage in flying operations and submarines are required to proceed, 
surfaced, with their flags displayed. In archipelagic waters, innocent passage applies 
outside of nominated sea lanes where more a liberal transit regime obtains. Coastal 
states have limited rights to suspend innocent passage for security reasons or to 
carry out weapons exercises, provided such closures are temporary and do not 
discriminate between different flag-states6. Non-suspendable innocent passage, as 
formerly applied to international straits was superseded in UNCLOS by the new 
regime of 'transit passage'. 
• Transit passage. Transit passage confers the right of transit through a strait 
connecting one high seas area or EEZ with another, provided passage (and 
overflight) is continuous and expeditious. Under the regime of transit passage 
(which, unlike innocent passage, is non-suspendable) warships and military aircraft 
may proceed in their normal operational mode 7. The terms of transit passage under 
UNCLOS met most of the criteria of 'free passage in international straits' set by the 
maritime powers , representing a victory over the coastal states ' attempts to gain 
uniform application throughout their territorial waters, regardless of their use for 
international navigation. 
4 Linda Paul , in Sam Bateman (ed.) Ma ritinie Cooperation in the Asia-Paci.fie Region: Current Situation 
and Prospects, Canbena Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 132, Australian National University Press, 
Canberra, 1999, pp 127-28. 
5 Ivan Shearer, 'Cunent Law of the Sea Issues', in Sam Bateman and Ross Babbage (eds.), Ma ritime 
Change: Issues for Asia, Allen and Un win, Sydney, 1993, p 56. 
6 Ibid. p 55 . 
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• Archipelagic sea lanes passage. UNCLOS allows for archipelagic states to 
designate special sea lanes within archipelagic waters, conferring "the exercise of 
the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode for the purpose of 
continuous and expeditious transit through an archipelago between one paii of the 
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone". These sea lanes, which may be up to 50 nm in width are 
in effect 'virtual straits' where vessels enjoy the same rights as under transit passage. 
While the advantage of ai·chipelagic sea lanes (ASL) passage to the maritime state is 
that it confers more liberal transit conditions than innocent passage, concern has 
been expressed at the potential for archipelagic states to compel foreign shipping to 
pass through ASLs, nullifying the application of innocent passage elsewhere within 
archipelagic waters8. 
Appendix 3: Piracy incidents involving Japanese ships in the Straits of Malacca, 1994-
2000 
Location Date Vessel type/ Damage/ Incident Report 
Malacca Nov. BULK MONEY AT AROUND 17:28PM ON 
Strait 2000 CARRIER AND NOVEMBER 11, A SHIP ON A 
Registry GOODS. VOYAGE IN THE 
Unknown, NO MALACCA STRAIT WAS BOARDED 
15,000 dwt HUMAN BY PIRATES AND THE WHOLE 
DAMAG CREW WAS TAKEN HOST AGE. THE 
E PIRATES FLED AFTER TAKING 
MONEY AND GOODS. THE SHIP 
RESUMEDITSVOYAGETOJAPAN 
AFTER REFUELING IN SINGAPORE 
Malacca July BULK NONE AT AROUND 2200 HOURS ON 22 
Strait 2000 CARRIER JULY PIRACY ATTEMPT IN HEAVY 
(01-50.SN Liberia, TRAFFIC (6 PERSONS IN ONE 
102-32E) 25,000 dwt CRAFT OPEN TYPE) MADE CLOSE 
APPROACH ABOUT 5 METRES 
7 Hasjim Djalal, Indonesia and the Law of the Sea, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 
1995, pp 83-84. 
8 See Eric Jaap Molenaar, in Sam Bateman (ed), Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Current 
Situation and Prospects, CanbeITa Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 132, Australian ational University 
Press, CanbeITa, 1999, pp 97-121. 
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FROM PORT QUARTER READY TO 
POSITION BAMBOO HOOK BUT 
DISCONTINUED DUE TO SHIP'S 
CREW PRESENCE. 
Malacca May LPG/LNG NONE ON 27 MAY WHILE SAILING OFF 
Strait 2000 CARRIER P.UNDAN (THE STR. OF MALACCA) 
Japan, FOUND A SMALL HIGH-SPEED 
111,000 dwt BOAT APPROACHING FROM 
BEHIND AND THE CREW'S 
PRECAUTION WITH SIGNAL LAMP 
EXPELLED IT. 
Malacca Jan. BULK $14,000 AROUND 0514 HOURS FIVE 
Strait 2000 CARRIER PIRATES ATTACKED. 
Pana1na, 
7,000 dwt 
Singapore Mar. OIL US$3,382 PIRATES TRESPASSED 
Strait 1999 TANKER + 
Panama, valuables 
8,000 dwt 
Phillip Mar. OIL US$1,850 SAILING EAST AROUND 00:00 
Channel 1999 TANKER + boxes HOURS PIRATES TRESPASSED 
Panama of THROUGH THE DOOR BELIEVED 
55,000 dwt medicine TO HA VE BEEN LOCKED/LOOKED 
AROUND THE 
CAPTAIN'S ROOM AND STOLE 
MONEY/MEDICINE THOUGH THE 
VESSEL HAD CARRIED OUT 
TRAINING 
AGAINST PIRACY 
Phillip Jan. CHEMICAL US$1,400 BEFORE DAWN FOUR PIRATES 
Channel 1999 TANKER + clothing TRESPASSED ON CAPTAIN'S 
Panama, ROOM, ROBBED AND 
4,000 dwt RESTRAINED THE CAPTAIN. 
Malacca Sept. General Vessel THE WHOLE VESSEL 
Strait 1998 Cargo itself, DISAPPEARED AND FINALLY 
(Indonesi Panama, US3.5 FOUND WITH ANOTHER NAME; 
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a) 3,000 dwt million+ ALL CARGO (ALLUMINIUM 
14 crew INGOTS) SOLD ON 
members 
Near 1997 LPG/LNG US$7700 UNCONFIRMED 
Horsburg CARRIER 
h Panama 
lighthouse 45,000 dwt 
Phillip Jan. OIL US$6114 DURING SAILING PIRATES WITH 
Channel 1994 TANKER SWORDS TRESPASSED ESCAPING 
Japan, FROM PIRACY WATCH AND 
unknown DISCHARGING WATER BY FIRE 
tonnage HOSE WITH LIGHTING AT POOP 
DECK 
Malacca Jan. BULK NONE DURING SAILING A PIRATE SEEN 
Strait 1994 CARRIER (ATTEM IN NAVIGATION DEPARTMENT 
Liberia, PTED) WHO RAN AW A Y FRIGHTENED AT 
22,000 dwt CREW'S CHALLENGE 
Source: Nippon Foundation Piracy Database: dbOl.nippon-foundation.or.jp/cgi-
bin/zaidan/search_e.cgi 
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